CLEARING THE MINES

REPORT BY THE MINE ACTION TEAM FOR

THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE ANTIPERSONNEL MINE BAN TREATY

June 2014
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*Global contamination from mines
INTRODUCTION

This report offers an assessment of the remaining threat from antipersonnel mines in mined areas around the world. It is based on the best publicly available information on contamination as of May 2014, and on efforts to clear and destroy the mine threat, in particular in 2013.

Following an overall summary of mine action progress since the entry into force of the 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), profiles of the ten most affected States Parties are included in Section B. Section C details the situation in other affected States Parties. The two annexes to the report contain profiles of each affected state not party (Annex 1) and of three other areas not generally recognized as States (Annex 2).

For each profile, the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination and impact in each affected State or other area is first described. The structure of the mine action program is then explained, with a summary of the national and international actors engaged in demining. The third section, on land release, describes cancellation of suspected mine area by non-technical survey, and release by technical survey and clearance, in accordance with international mine action standards.

Compliance with Article 5 of the MBT is assessed for each State Party. These are legally binding obligations the States are required to achieve. The MBT has specific international legal obligations cases — 32 — contamination is on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party to the MBT, which under Article 5 has specific international legal obligations to find, clear, and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas within a defined time period. In this, the MBT is a landmark in disarmament and a model for effective action in tackling weapons with indiscriminate effects. Thus far, however, implementation of Article 5 has been a rocky road in far too many states, despite generous support from donors, a generalized willingness to innovate and learn among demining practitioners, and a celebrated ‘toolbox’ promoted as offering a tool for every demining challenge.

ASSESSING 15 YEARS OF ARTICLE 5 IMPLEMENTATION

PROGRESS IN MINE CLEARANCE

The international mine action community has made significant strides toward putting an end to the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. A humanitarian crisis has, in the overwhelming majority of cases, been successfully reduced to a development problem. Clearance operations over the past two decades, combined with a huge reduction in new use thanks to the MBT, have reduced casualties from more than 10,000 annually in the early 1990s to under 1,000 in 2012. Twenty-seven states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999, and more do so every passing year. As such, Mike Croll’s doomsday prediction in 1998 that the antipersonnel landmine was ‘here to stay’ may be judged ill-founded.

Today, 56 states plus three ‘other areas’ still have an identified threat from antipersonnel mines (see Table 1). In most cases — 32 — contamination is on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party to the MBT, which under Article 5 has specific international legal obligations to find, clear, and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas within a defined time period. In this, the MBT is a landmark in disarmament and a model for effective action in tackling weapons with indiscriminate effects. Thus far, however, implementation of Article 5 has been a rocky road in far too many states, despite generous support from donors, a generalized willingness to innovate and learn among demining practitioners, and a celebrated ‘toolbox’ promoted as offering a tool for every demining challenge.

Table 1. Affected States Parties, states not party, and other areas (as of May 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Other area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Today, massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined as more than 10,000 km²) is believed to exist only in two states, Afghanistan and Cambodia, and very probably also in Iraq. Heavy antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 20 km² and up to 100 km²) is believed to exist in several states: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. The situation in Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam is not known, but may also be heavy. Other states have either medium contamination (more than 3 km² and up to 20 km²) or light (up to 3 km²).

Regrettably, tens of millions of dollars have been ploughed into unacceptably low quality survey, perhaps the single biggest obstacle to faster and better targeted mine clearance. HALO Trust warned of the dangers of poor survey from the early days of mine action but their idiosyncratic style of advocacy saw the warnings go largely unheeded. Instead, demining experts and organizations
who should have known better poured donor dollars and poorly trained personnel without demining experience into landmine impact surveys that created the perception of, but did not ever accurately identify, massive mine contamination. By assuming a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ approach to mine action, every square centimeter of land became a potential sanctuary for an antipersonnel mine. A problem was multiplied and exaggerated instead of being appreciated and narrowed down.

And far too often the sanctioned remedy for the hundreds or even thousands of square kilometers of estimated mined area was clearance, clearance, and more clearance. Land release was thus a solution to a man-made problem twice over. But still in 2013, with land release now a long-established concept, there were reports of operators working for months clearing land without finding a single mine and yet never stopping to reassess the situation.

So with the Third Review Conference upon us, we have a critical opportunity to take stock. Yes, to celebrate achievements and progress – for we have evidence of both in spades –, but first and foremost to set a firm direction for the remainder of the decade. Let us work effectively to ensure that by 2020 most countries will be clear of landmines and that only the most contaminated remain. Although the amount of clearance to international standards dropped in 2013 (see Table 2), we are fully capable of clearing more than 200km² of mined area to international standards each year. If well directed to areas of actual mine contamination, we should be left with only a handful of affected states in five years’ time (see overleaf, The Remaining Challenge). Indeed, we believe that the remaining antipersonnel mine threat can be removed in almost every nation in less than ten years if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way. But to do so will require rigorous and resolute efforts to overcome our proven capabilities to date.

Table 2. Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Five years of clearance operations have resulted in the destruction of more than 1.48 million antipersonnel mines and 107,000 antivehicle mines (see Table 4), as well as countless items of UXO. It is oversimplistic to assert that a mine cleared equates directly to a life or limb saved – such is not the nature of risk – but each item destroyed assuresly helps make a country and its communities safer and potentially more productive.

Throughout the past two decades, funding for mine action has grown to a plateau of US$500 million. It has begun reducing, but this is also a reflection of certain programs ending and the need for national support to mine action to increase.

International support in 2013 amounted to almost US$435 million (down from $497 million in 2012, a more than 12% decrease). Support was provided by 30 donors to 48 states and four other areas. The top five donors accounted for more than 60% of all 2013 funding (see Table 5). In addition, reported national funding in 2013 amounted to almost US$198 million (an increase of almost $14 million compared to 2012).

Table 3. Major mine clearance programs in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>19,181</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>76,283</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3,820</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>21,618</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1,710</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>1,771</td>
<td>775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq*</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8,552</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>34,006</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>72,296</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>22,486</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6,052</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>178.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>272,053</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,391</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only partial results were obtained for Iraq so the true clearance figures are higher.

Table 4. Emplaced mines destroyed in 2009–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>260,000</td>
<td>9,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>29,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>388,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,483,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>107,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top five recipients of support for mine action were, in descending order, Afghanistan, Lao PDR (primarily for clearance of cluster munition remnants), Iraq, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (see Table 6).
completed verifications of a suspected area without finding any contamination. In addition, although Montenegro still formally to report completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2013, it appears it still has mined areas containing antipersonnel mines to release, and thus would seek a further extension to its Article 5 deadline (see Jordan profile for details).

Table 7. States and other areas that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>State not party</th>
<th>Other area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Guinean-Bissau</td>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the next five years, we believe that a further 24 States Parties and 16 states not party as well as three other areas are fully capable of completing clearance, as set out in Table 8.

Table 8. States and other areas that should complete mine clearance by the end of 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>States not party</th>
<th>States not party</th>
<th>Other areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina**</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>South Korea*</td>
<td>Nargorno-Karabakh*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Western Sahara*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Georgia*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus*</td>
<td>South Sudan*</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Sudan*</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Turkey*</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yemen*</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This would leave only the following states with outstanding clearance by the end of the decade: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Iraq, Israel, Laos, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Of these 16 states, 8 are States Parties to the MBT with a binding international obligation to clear within a specific time period. Among the other eight states, none has yet declared its intention to clear all mine contamination from its territory. Our assessment is that at least eight States Parties can complete clearance by 2025 if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way.

**Clearance subject to adequate security and control of territory, but all mined areas under effective control can be cleared (or have been cleared, such as in the case of Cyprus).**

* Without prejudice to the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK or the Maléas and Falkland Islands, if the UK leaves the islands in accordance with its international obligations, Argentina’s legal obligations under Article 5 will also be complete.

**Political ‘Will They, Won’t They’**

Indeed, the primary obstacle to effective and efficient clearance of mined areas is not funding per se, as is sometimes alleged, much less the weather or difficult terrain, but lack of political will to get the job done. In particular, where we look at the Article 5 seats and strays, such as Chad, Senegal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (discussed below), it has been lack of political will that is the major cause of persistent failure to implement Article 5, not the availability or otherwise of adequate funding.

Under Article 5, and in accordance with the six-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2013, Chad is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. Yet since 2008, Chad’s mine action program has suffered from weak government oversight and persistent mismanagement within the National Demining Center (NDC), resulting in little or no demining until October 2012 when the European Union provided funding to Mines Advisory Group (MAG). In 2012, management problems at the NDC resulted in the dismissal of its director and hundreds of employees. The director was replaced again in 2013. In an update to States Parties in April 2014, Chad acknowledged that the NDC had ’experienced some difficulties’ in ‘presenting the results of its work. As of writing, MAG had closed its program and left the country. Senegal has an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2016. It is benefiting from a seven-year extension, despite having relatively minimal contamination on its territory, much around army mined areas. After December 2013, at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Senegal declared it was planning to accelerate demining operations in order to be able to complete clearance by its 2016 deadline. In 2014, however, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) withdrew from Senegal as a result of ‘government-imposed limitations on demining activities,’ which prevented NPA from deploying demining resources where the necessary work could be done safely and from undertaking non-technical survey (NTS) in areas believed to be contaminated but which had not been

UN-SUPPORTED PROGRAMMING

While the primary responsibility for failure to conduct clearance in a timely manner and to complete clearance within defined time periods falls to the relevant state, others must also share some blame. In many instances, notwithstanding the good intentions and generally high quality of its personnel, the UN’s support to mine action has been widely derided by States and NGOs alike, often with justification. Turf wars and petty squabbles about ‘who gets the overhead’ between UNDP, UNMAS, and UNDPs have been to the detriment of mine action programs, never their benefit. But perhaps the hardest
THE ARCHITECTURE OF AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MINE ACTION PROGRAM

So what does an effective and efficient mine action program look like? In 1999, ‘humanitarian mine action’ was an accepted concept, but its understanding was rather crude. This is what the Landmine Monitor wrote in its first publication in 1999:

“Humanitarian mine action is a comprehensive, structured approach to deal with mine and UXO contamination, including survey assessment, mine clearance, mine awareness, and victim assistance. These activities are carried out to reduce the threat posed by landmines to individuals and communities in mine-infested areas, as well as to assist mine victims. Humanitarian mine action should work to create indigenous capacity in mine-affected communities, because it is part of their long-term development.”

We understand now that mine action is not necessarily (or even today, predominantly) humanitarian in nature, but developmental. This is recognized more explicitly in the definition of mine action set out in the International Mine Action Standards, but this definition is now a decade old and arguably in need of revision so as to reflect treaty obligations and evolving land release methodologies.

Activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and ERW including unexploded sub-munitions.

Note: Mine action is not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by landmine and ERW contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live safely, in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination, and in which the victims’ needs can be addressed. Mine action comprises four complementary groups of activities:

a) MRE [mine risk education];
b) humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance;
c) victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
d) stockpile destruction; and
e) advocacy against the use of APH.1

Thus, today we understand mine action, particularly demining, in more precise terms through the notion of land release and in accordance with the obligations set out in Article 5 of the MBT, Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and under international human rights law. Land release is defined in the IMAS as follows:

The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW [explosive remnants of war] through non-technical survey, technical survey and/or clearance.

The criteria for ‘all reasonable effort’ shall be defined by the NMAA [National Mine Action Authority].

We have rightly – if belatedly – moved to an ‘innocent until proven guilty’ approach, refined and underpinned by notions of risk management.

LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION

In an effective mine action program, survey capacity is put front and center. Find the mined areas and the most difficult part of the demining task has been achieved. To do so, however, requires qualified and trained surveyors who combine knowledge of demining with developed community liaison skills and a good understanding of risk management. Often times, survey personnel were put in a position where they were doomed to fail, and fail they assuredly did – in far too many cases.

LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND MINE ACTION DATA

Combined with poor survey, data management remains a crucial failing in many mine action programs, despite the availability of elaborate tools such as the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). For reasons best known to themselves, UN agencies involved in supporting mine action programs never sought to gather basic mine action data about contamination, progress in clearance, and victims — indeed the Joint Inspection Unit report of UN support to mine action made a specific recommendation in this area:

“In the context of the preparation of the new strategy, the Secretary-General should establish a global baseline of reliable data while building on ongoing efforts, which should facilitate the systematic monitoring of progress.”

PUTTING GENDER ON THE AGENDA

To date, the detailed case for a more gendered approach to mine action has not been made effectively, and mentioning the issue of gender generally provokes sniggers among (male) deminers and mine action managers. But as Kofi Annan has noted, “Gender equality is more than a goal in itself. It is a precondition for meeting the challenge of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development and building good governance.” It’s clearly more than a question of simply hiring female deminers, though this occurs in several countries and women have certainly proven their worth as deminers. Some cost-benefit analysis and gendered analysis was proposed in the late 1990s but never really caught on. A better case for how practically mine action could promote gender equality needs to be made, and it is never too late to do so.

GOOD GOVERNANCE

In a ‘business’ where cash payments predominate (at least to deminers) and major contracts can be awarded with few checks and balances, a certain level of corruption was just predictable, it was inevitable. We will never know the true scale of the mismanagement of funds but it likely runs into the tens of millions of dollars, if not more. An example occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a 2003 report found:#

Numerous allegations of corruption, including clearance tasks undertaken to benefit specific individuals — kickbacks for the award of contracts ... burying meat on test sites for explosives detection dogs to distract competitor’s dogs during accreditation trials, and re-laying landmines on sites cleared by competitors.

As described in the profile on Bosnia and Herzegovina, in April 2014, the director of the National Mine Action Center, BHMAC, was arrested by police who, along with the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), searched BHMAC premises and the director’s house. According to a spokesperson of the State Prosecutor’s office: “The suspect is under investigation for activities related to demining and over suspicions that he abused his official position and made illegal profits.”

Another example was brought to public attention in May 2014 when a major scandal was revealed in Greece about funding for a Greek ‘mine action organization’, International Mining Initiative. The head of the organization was arrested and jailed in mid-February on suspicion of fraud and money laundering. Auditors and police investigators said the group, which was founded in 2000 to clear mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, and Lebanon did not provide valid progress reports on its work. According to a 20,000-page police report, the organization also prevented inspections by Greek Embassy officials in nations where it was working. The group’s expenses were only partially checked, even as its funding increased from $336,000 in 2000 to $6.1 million in 2004. It remains unclear how much of the money was used to clear mines, but a police official with knowledge of the investigation told the Los Angeles Times:

“What we do know is that much of that money was used to purchase prime real estate in Athens and the holy island of Rhodes.”

1. As well as the demining task, MRE is the other ‘engine’ of humanitarian mine action, and for many years, MRE was rather crude. This is what the Landmine Monitor wrote in its first report of 1999:

2. “What we do know is that much of that money was used to purchase prime real estate in Athens and the holy island of Rhodes.”

ASSESSING 15 YEARS OF ARTICULATE IMPLEMENTATION 11
ASSESSING MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

As noted in the Introduction earlier, in this report we have ranked mine action program performance in all affected States Parties to the MBT. Programs are ranked according to 10 criteria with a mark out of 10 for each criterion:

- Problem understood
- Target date for completion of clearance
- Targeted clearance
- Efficient clearance
- National funding of program
- Timely clearance
- Land release system
- National mine action standards
- Reporting on progress
- Improving performance

An average score for 10 criteria gives the overall program performance scoring. An average score of 0–3.9 ranks as ‘very poor’, 4.0–4.9 is ranked ‘poor’, 5.0–6.9 is ranked ‘average’, while 7.0 or above is ranked ‘good’. Although no State Party achieved the rating ‘very good’ in 2013, any program that receives an average score of 8.0 would be considered very good for the purposes of the ranking.

Table 9 explains the indicators used to rate performance against the criteria. Each profile of an affected State Party sets out the scoring for the relevant mine action program, seen as a whole with all its components.

Table 9. Criteria and performance indicators to assess mine action program performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Performance Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>Has the extent of the mine threat been identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy? Does the estimate include confirmed mined areas as well as suspect hazardous areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>Is a state seeking to clear all mine contamination from its territory? Has a date been set by the MAC or NMAA for completion of clearance of all mined areas? Is the target date realistic based on existing capacity? Is there a strategic plan in place to meet the target date? Is it sufficiently ambitious?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>Is clearance focused on confirmed mined areas? Are significant areas of land being cleared that have no contamination? If clearance is ongoing for more than 10 days in an area without finding any contamination, what is supposed to happen?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>How much does manual clearance cost per m²? Are costs increasing or decreasing? Are dogs integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)? Are machines integrated into demining operations (where appropriate)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>Is national funding covering the cost of the MAC? Is national funding covering any survey or clearance costs?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>Are contaminated areas prioritized for clearance according to explicit criteria? Are areas of high humanitarian impact dealt with swiftly? Are there delays to clearing an area for political reasons?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>Is there a coherent land release system in place for the program? Is there a functioning non-technical survey capacity? Is there a functioning technical survey capacity?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>Do national mine action standards exist? Do they respect IMAS? Are they adapted to the local threat and context? How well are they applied?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>Does the state submit regular Article 7 reports on progress against the AP Mine Ban Convention? Does it report regularly to donors? Do these reports detail progress disaggregated by the different methods of land release?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>Has the mine action program, or key parts of it, improved or deteriorated over the last 12 months?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the analysis are set out in Tables 10 (the five best performing programs) and 11 (the five worst performing programs). The best performing mine action program in 2013 among 30 affected States Parties was Algeria, followed by Mauritania and Cambodia. The least improved mine action program in 2013 was Zimbabwe. The least performing mine action program in 2013 was Chad, slightly below Turkey and then, equally, Ethiopia, Senegal, and South Sudan.

Table 10. The top five mine action programs among States Parties to the MBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Average score</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4*</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4*</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. The five least performing mine action programs among States Parties to the MBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Average score</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28=</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28=</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28=</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>Very poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We hope to see improvement in the performance of all affected States Parties in 2014, but especially in these five programs ranked as very poor in this year’s report.

ENDNOTES

1 M. Croll, The History of Landmines, Leo Cooper, 1998.
2 There may also be antipersonnel mine contamination in, among others, Djibouti, Moldova (Transnistria), Oman, and the Philippines, but no specific mined areas have been identified in these states.
3 We do not count clearance where compliance with international standards is questioned, such as, for instance, in Iran or by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces.
4 IMAS (A/40.1), Second Edition, 1 January 2003, Amendment 6, May 2013, Definition 3(12): “Note: A number of other enabling activities are required to support these five components of mine action, including: assessment and planning, the mobilisation and prioritisation of resources, information management, human skills development and management training, QM and the application of effective, appropriate and safe equipment.”
5 IMAS (A/40.4), Definition 3(65).
7 See, for example, the works of Ted Paterson in relation to Mozambique in the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) publication from 1997, A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action.
Problem understood 8
Target date for completion of clearance 8
Targeted clearance 7
Efficient clearance 8
National funding of program 5
Timely clearance 7
National mine action standards 6
Reporting on progress 7
Improving performance 6

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCOR: 7.0 GOOD

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT
Afghanistan remains one of the countries most contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly the result of the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992-6 civil war, and the US-led coalition intervention in late 2001 which added considerable quantities of UXO.

Continuing survey in Afghanistan added 51.8km² of mine hazards to the mine and ERW action database in 2013 but the end-year estimate of 236km² and the minimum metal content of many of these mines further complicates detection.

IMPROVED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Aside from factory-produced mines, much the biggest threat to civilians continues to come from IEDs placed by non-state armed groups. The 5km² that Afghanistan identifies as contaminated by IEDs applies only to ‘legacy’ IEDs (i.e. those placed in areas that are no longer of military significance), but the impact of newly laid devices is far greater. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has reported they caused 2,890 civilian casualties in 2013 (622 killed and 1,928 injured), 16% more than in 2012 and accounting for one third of all civilian casualties from the conflict. UNAMA attributed the increase in part to the placing of IEDs particularly in areas frequented by civilians such as markets and public roads where they did not appear to target a military objective.

The number of civilian casualties from victim-activated, pressure-plate IEDs (fitting the treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine) dropped 39%, the UN reported, killing 245 civilians and injuring 312. The decline was offset by an 85% rise in civilian casualties resulting from radio-controlled devices, which killed 257 civilians and injured 892 in 2013.3

MINE ACTION PROGRAM
The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is coordinated by the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA). From 2001, this was a project of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMIS) implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and under international management. From 1 April 2012, MACCA came under Afghan management supported by an UNMAS project office.

As of January 2014, MACCA had a total staff of 191, reduced from 339 in 2012 as a result of cuts particularly in the staffing of area mine action centers (AMACs), now named MACCA regional offices. By March 2013, the number of international staff in the UNMAS project office had fallen to four (from eight in 2012), providing oversight and advisory support to MACCA, administering donor funds provided for clearance and coordination through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), and monitoring and evaluating project implementation.4

MACCA’s restructuring is taking place within the context of a broader transition of mine action from the UN to the government. Until 2008, Afghanistan had ‘entrusted interim responsibility’ for coordinating mine action to the UN.5 In 2008, a government Interministerial Board assigned the lead role in mine action to the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC), a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA), which reports to the Office of the Second Vice President. As of January 2014, the DMC had 15 staff located in the MACCA project office.5 Since 2012, discussions have continued among key stakeholders on the best formula for managing mine action. Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request said the aim was to ‘absorb a reduced MACCA structure into the civil service or to create a new structure within the government for the specific management of mine action.’6

Afghanistan is in the process of drafting a mine action law aimed specifically at fulfilling the requirements of the MBT and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. As of February 2016, a technical committee comprising concerned ministries and MACCA had reviewed the draft law and was due to send it to the Ministry of Justice to be included as an annex to a 2005 law on firearms and explosive materials.7 Most mine clearance is conducted by five long-established national and two international NGOs. The Afghan NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). The most active international NGOs are Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust. Since 2012, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSAD) has had a small operation near the border with Tajikistan.8

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of contamination</th>
<th>Hazardous areas</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>308,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antivehicle mines</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>280,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>155,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>768,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines account for 45% of the total contaminated area and impact around 40% of Afghanistan’s total mine/ERW affected population. Some 40% of antipersonnel mine contamination is concentrated in Kabul and the six other provinces that make up Afghanistan’s central region (Blmyan, Kapisa, Logar, Parwan, Panjsher, and Wardak). Antivehicle mines also pose a distinct problem. Although far fewer in number, mined areas containing only antivehicle mines are spread across some 236km² and the minimum metal content of many of these mines further complicates detection.

*Table 1. Remaining contamination as of end 2013*
STRATEGIC PLANNING

Afghanistan’s clearance plan for the 10 years to March 2023 is set down in the Article 5 deadline extension request it submitted in March 2012 and revised in August of the same year. The request foresees clearance of all antivehicle mines and battlefields areas as well as antipersonnel mines. It consolidated the then 4,442 remaining mine and ERW hazards into 308 projects, an approach intended to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization. Projects would be tackled according to their priority as determined by their impact, measured against a set of impact indicators.

PROJECT ATTAINMENT

The MAPA program for 1392 (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014) prepared by MACCA and implementing partners targeted clearance of 712 hazards covering a total of 798km², including 483 antipersonnel mined areas covering 24km², 195 antivehicle mined areas covering more than 43km², and 16 ERW hazards over a total area of 10km². If fulfilled, the plan would result in 17 districts being cleared of mines, but achieving those targets depended on receiving funding at the levels projected by the implementing partners preparing the plan.12

LAND RELEASE

Following years of accelerating clearance, the total amount of land released through clearance of mined and battle areas fell for the second successive year in 2013, by 28% (see Table 2). Some of the fall-off in the pace of land release is accounted for by the shrinking amount of battle area contamination and clearance. More significantly, a steady rise in clearance of mined areas recorded from 2008 to 2012 reversed in 2013 when operations were hampered by lower levels of donor support and the amount of mined land cleared dropped 22% from the previous year to 60km².13

Table 2. Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km²)13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>68.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>77.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>80.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SURVEY IN 2013

The ‘Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey’ (MEIFCS) which MACCA started in 2012 continued during 2013 implemented by HALO Trust (21 teams), MCPA (21 teams), DADA (five teams), and OMAR (two teams), which visited a total of 23,344 communities. Their survey resulted in a net addition of 27km² of contamination to the database, identifying 527 previously unrecorded hazards totaling 38km² and affecting around 45,000 people, and canceling 127 areas totaling 10.5km². Survey teams found 22.6% of the communities visited in 2013 to be free of known mined or battle areas but also conducted spot EOD tasks destroying more than 13,000 items of UXO.15

MACCA and operators had planned the MEIFCS as a two-year resurvey of all Afghanistan’s 398 districts but have had to recalculate the duration to allow for a far greater number of communities than expected – in some districts triple the number recorded in the official gazetteer that was the reference point for planning the survey. More than half the communities surveyed in 2013 did not appear in the gazetteer. By the end of the year, teams had completed survey in 64 districts, bringing the total surveyed to 135 out of a total in the country of 398. Implementing partners have also held back from conducting survey in more than 30 districts because of insecurity, an issue that may delay completion or curtail the extent of the survey.16 Five members of a HALO Trust survey team were abducted in Afghanistan in insecure Logar province demonstrated the continuing scope for progress in mine clearance despite the risks of insurgency in many parts of the country17 but Implementing Partners also continued to work extensively through community-based demining teams, adding 11 new teams in 2013 and standing down 96, leaving a total of 57 operating at the end of 2013. CBD operations cost $15.3 million in 2013, accounting for one-fifth of mine action spending.18

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

Afghanistan remained one of the most strongly funded mine action programs in the world in 1392 (2013–14) but delays in funding and resulting interruptions in operations took their toll on productivity. Implementing Partners cleared 60km² in 2013 (see Table 3), down by more than a quarter from 77km² the previous year, although the 19,181 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2013 only dropped marginally (by 6%).19 The uncertain outlook for donor support has raised serious doubts about the ability of the MAPA to deploy sufficient capacity to fulfill Afghanistan’s clearance targets. The number of personnel employed in mine action has dropped from a peak of 14,300 in 2011 to around 8,800 as of May 2014 and looked set to sustain further significant cuts in the coming year.20

As an example of this pattern, ATC, a long-established Implementing Partner, reported in mid-2013 that it had no projects in hand and had to stand down all but a core of staff needed to maintain its headquarters.21 MDC reported laying off 20 teams and 468 staff at the end of 2013 due to lack of funds.22 OMAR was one of the few that expected to maintain its capacity of 890 staff with the same level of donor support in 2014 as the previous year.23 HALO Trust, the biggest operator in Afghanistan, finished 2013 with a total staff of 2,793, much the same capacity as at the start of the year, but a fall-off in funding through the middle of the year and a corresponding reduction in staffing contributed to a drop of around 15% in area cleared. Other factors contributing to lower productivity included the more remote location and the more difficult terrain of many tasks remaining to be addressed.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mines released</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3,046,029</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DADA</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>7,241,718</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,330,248</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EODT</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>6,718,831</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>496,324</td>
<td>6,429</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>17,672,092</td>
<td>5,156</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPA</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3,241,521</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>12,670,250</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>7,742,225</td>
<td>3,014</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1,189</td>
<td>60,107,260</td>
<td>19,181</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUALITY MANAGEMENT

Since reductions of staff in 2012, MACCA has conducted external quality assurance through a seven-person unit in Kabul and 24 staff in its regional mine action offices, conducting fewer on-site visits and placing more emphasis on monitoring project management application and quarterly reviews of each project. The downturn in field visits combined with pressure on Implementing Partners to cut costs spurred some operators to voice concerns about declining standards. MACCA reported conducting 2,087 field visits to monitor demining, survey, risk education, and victim assistance operations in 2011 and said there was no evidence of a drop in standards. MACCA was exploring the possibility of expanding its field monitoring capacity by training provincial staff of its parent institution, ANDOMA.34

SAFETY OF DEMINING PERSONNEL

One deminer was killed and 21 injured in demining incidents in 2013, compared with three killed and 13 injured the previous year.35 HALO Trust reported that a deminer was killed by a PMN mine in Baghlan province in the course of clearing mines on a sloping terrain. Three other HALO deminers were injured, two in Takhar province and the fourth in Baghlan province. All of them occurred on mountainous, steeply sloping land.

Insurgency and criminality continued to pose the main threat to deminers, although the number of security incidents dropped from 53 in 2012 to 39 last year. Eight mine action staff were killed and four injured in security incidents in 2013, compared with six killed and 10 injured in 2012. Mine action teams suffered a number of abductions by anti-government elements or criminals, also losing 13 vehicles, 92 detectors, and 23 VHF radios.36

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the ten-year extension granted by States Parties in 2012), Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as seen possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan’s extension request, prepared by MACCA and Implementing Partners and assessed by the ICBL as the most comprehensive produced by any country so far, underlined that the program had the capacity to complete clearance of known mined areas but that its ability to do so depended primarily on sustained donor support. Little more than one year into the extension period, donor fatigue for funding Afghanistan’s mine action threatens to undermine any prospect of achieving these targets and potentially the coherence of the program.

In the Afghan year 1392 (ending in March 2014), the first year of the extension, donors provided a total of more than US$71 million, a drop of only 3% from the previous year, and sufficient to keep Afghanistan as the world’s biggest beneficiary of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Article 5 compliance. The shortfall raised the possibility of undermining the program’s ability to fully complete its Article 5 obligations and adapt its strategic plan to the ten-year extension.

Financial needs at almost $85 million and the shortfall, combined with delays in delivery, notably from the US, the biggest donor, had a disproportionate impact, delaying deployment of demining teams and reducing the amount of clearance in 2013.

Funding for humanitarian clearance has fallen more sharply in 2013 (2014–15) leaving the program, as of May 2014, close to 40% short of the level targeted in the extension request (see Support to Mine Action section below). The downturn resulted partly from cuts in support from the US linked to the decision of the outgoing government of President Hamid Karzai not to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement, although the US was reportedly considering providing substantially higher levels of support for commercial companies to clear US military firing ranges. The shortfall raised the possibility of more cuts in MACCA staff coordinating Afghan mine action and some Implementing Partners, leaving the program insufficient capacity to implement its extension request targets.37

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The MAPA obtained funding totaling $714 million for the Afghan year 1391 (ending March 2013) and $71 million for 1392 (ending March 2014), including $52 million pledged bilaterally and $19 million pledged through the VTF. The Afghan government provided $2.56 million in 2013 for clearance of Aynak copper mine, a project being undertaken by MDC.38 International donors in Afghan year 1392 included the USA, UAE, Netherlands, Germany, Australia, Japan, Canada (ICDIA), the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland, Sweden, European Union, Ireland, Denmark, PATRIP (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan Regional Integration Programme), Italy, UN OCHA, Belgium, Austria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Lithuania.

The extension request targeted $77 million in mine action expenditure in Afghan year 1392, but as of May 2014, the program had not attracted support from a number of previously important donors, including the European Union, and had secured funding amounting to only $30 million and initial pledges for another $17 million leaving the program at least 38% short.39

ENDNOTES

1. Data provided by the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), 11 February 2014.
4. The Centre was established in 1989 as the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA) and in 2000 renamed the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA). For details of the history and structure of mine action in Afghanistan, see Afghanistan’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 50–68.
5. Interviews with Alan MacDonald, Program Director, MACCA, in Geneva, 2 March 2012, and with Abigail Hartley, Program Manager, UNMAS, Kabul, 7 May 2012.
7. Article 7 Report for calendar year 2009, Form A.
8. Emails from MACCA, 18 August 2011; and Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
10. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
11. Email from MACCA, 10 May 2011.
12. Integrated Operational Framework, MACCA, April 2013, p. 60.
13. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
15. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
16. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014; and interview with Mohammed Sediq Rashid, MACCA, and Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, in Geneva, 22 December 2013.
17. Email from Farid Homayoun, Country Director, HALO Trust, 22 February 2014.
18. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
20. Interview with Kefayatulah Eblagh, Director, ATC, in Kabul, 22 May 2013.
21. Email from Shohab Hakimi, Director, MDC, 9 March 2014.
22. Email from Zekriya Payab, Deputy Director, OMAR, 27 February 2014.
23. Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO Trust, 22 February 2014.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014; DFAT operated 26 CBO teams in 2013 in Helmand, Kandahar, and Pakhta; MCFA 15 teams in Khost and Pakhta; MDC 11 teams in Helmand and Logar; and FSIO five teams in Badakhshan.
27. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
28. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014; interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMC, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
30. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014.
31. Telephone interview with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, MACCA, 20 May 2014.
32. Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 11 February 2014; interview with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, MACCA, and Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, in Geneva, 22 December 2013.
33. Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMC, in Geneva, 10 April 2014; telephone interview with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, MACCA, 20 May 2014.
ANGOLA

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Area</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.9 POOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The problem of landmines in Angola stems from 40 years of internal armed conflict that began in 1961 and ended in April 2002. A range of national and foreign armed movements and groups engaged in mine-laying that was sometimes planned but more often unruly.

Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, Mexico, and therefore the largest number of mined areas were concentrated in those provinces. However, almost every province is affected to some extent by mines and explosive remnants of war. The precise extent of contamination nationwide is not sufficiently clear. This is, in part, attributable to lack of coordination between Angola’s two mine action management bodies and to the fact that the CED (the Executive Commission for Demining) still does not use a standardized format for reporting to CNIDAH, the Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, which is responsible for coordinating mine action data. A mapping project described in Angola’s 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request, designed to represent graphically the results of the NTS and ongoing clearance activities, is intended to clarify contamination nationwide by 2016.

Table 1. Contaminated area as reported by CNIDAH in 2007–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>As %age of landmass</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (Dec)</td>
<td>CNIDAH Demining Project to Complete Article 5 Obligations</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 (Dec)</td>
<td>Art 5 Extension request</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 (Dec)</td>
<td>Presentation at 13 MSP</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 (April)</td>
<td>Presentation at workshop in Luanda</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite the fact that a national non-technical survey (NTS) is almost complete (due to be finished before the end of 2014) the extent of contamination nationwide is not sufficiently clear. This is, in part, attributable to lack of coordination between Angola’s two mine action management bodies and to the fact that the CED (the Executive Commission for Demining) still does not use a standardized format for reporting to CNIDAH, the Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, which is responsible for coordinating mine action data. A mapping project described in Angola’s 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request, designed to represent graphically the results of the NTS and ongoing clearance activities, is intended to clarify contamination nationwide by 2016.

As of April 2014, in the provinces of Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango all suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) had been transformed into confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), as a result of the survey methodology employed by the HALO Trust. Half of all remaining contamination is in the provinces of Kuanza Sul, Kunene, and Mexico (see Table 2 below). In Bié and Kuando Kubango, much of the estimated contamination was canceled by NTS or by eliminating discrepancies in the national mine action database. In certain other provinces (Bengo, Benguela, Kunene, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, and Uíge), the number of CHAs has increased significantly.

Table 2. Estimated contamination according to CNIDAH as of April 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>SHA (m²)</th>
<th>SHA (m²)</th>
<th>CHA (m²)</th>
<th>CHA (m²)</th>
<th>Totals (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>59,502,342</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9,740,587</td>
<td>60,242,929</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>8,386,909</td>
<td>8,386,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>1 Unknown</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>7,783,301</td>
<td>7,783,301</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7,643,567</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>7,693,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2,538,020</td>
<td>2,538,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huíla</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5,484,497</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3,050,762</td>
<td>8,535,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuando Kubango</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>46,810,405</td>
<td>46,810,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunene</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>110,904,166</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,916,692</td>
<td>113,818,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Norte</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,637,367</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9,215,668</td>
<td>10,853,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwanza Sul</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25,111,152</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>44,416,736</td>
<td>69,725,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>818,603</td>
<td>819,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>14,388,288</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>760,000</td>
<td>15,148,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>51,034,299</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6,710,490</td>
<td>57,744,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13,303,063</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9,586,916</td>
<td>22,890,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>112,851,938</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7,770,753</td>
<td>120,622,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3,259,995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,259,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uíge</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24,238,116</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5,998,890</td>
<td>30,237,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4,077,798</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10,413,603</td>
<td>14,491,398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 1,029 424,437,088 1,302 177,163,832 601,600,920
MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Mine clearance began in Angola in 1994 during the UN Angola Verification Mission. International NGOs were the first major mine action operators in Angola, with HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) establishing mine action programs in Huambo, Mexico, and Malanje, respectively. Subsequently four more international NGOs set up programs: MgM in 1995, Santa Barbara in 1997, INTERSOS in 1999, and DanChurchAid (DCA), which started operations in Moxico province in 2001. INTERSOS closed its mine action program in Angola at the end of 2016 as its operations in Angola were suspended due to the civil conflict in the country. Today, Angola has two mine action management bodies: the National Demining Institute (CIE) and the National Commission for Demining and Assistance and Social Reintegration. In December 2005, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) was established to manage mine clearance by INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), and the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) was established to manage mine clearance by INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), and the National Commission for Demining and Assistance and Social Reintegration. The five international NGOs remaining in Angola today (DCA, HALO, MgM, MAG, and NPA) largely concentrate on provincial plans. A number of national commercial companies establish mine action programs in Angola (Fragilp, Kubuila, OJK, PR&P, VDS, and Yola Cemercial), which are accredited by and report to CNIDAH but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas that are to be used for investment, whether or not they contain SHAs. Today, Angola has two mine action management structures. CNIDAH serves as the de facto national mine action center, reporting to the Council of Ministers (or in effect to the President of Angola). Since 2002, CNIDAH has been responsible for coordinating mine action in Angola. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies. CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province), under the vice-governor of the province, determine annual priorities based on priority tasks identified by the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs. The annual operating budget for CNIDAH in 2013 was more than US$16 million. The second mine action management body is the CED, established in 2006 to manage Angola’s national development plan. It includes mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority. It is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS). The CED’s demining budget in 2013 was more than US$48 million, four times that of CNIDAH’s. There is ongoing tension between the two national authorities over who has the power to represent national demining efforts. All operators under CED remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH according to the agreed IMSA format. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body (a commission instead of an agency). Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH’s position but the process has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval. The lack of cooperation between the two national entities is visible in poor coordination between developmental and humanitarian demining across Angola. Most developmental clearance targets roads, bridges, airports, electric towers, hydroelectric power plants, and land for major state agriculture projects and new industry investments (like cement factories), as well as for construction of new housing. In many cases, this demining is not undertaken on the basis of any known or suspected risk. Most humanitarian demining by NGOs and supported by international donors is determined by the results of LIS II and provincial priorities. A workshop in April 2014 organized jointly by the Government of Angola, CNIDAH, the European Union, and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit in support of the Cartagena Action Plan may prove to be a reconciliation milestone, with a recommendation approved by both entities whereby they are to ensure that data is cross-checked between the CED and the national database housed in CNIDAH in order to ensure that areas prioritized for demining by the CED and which also appear within the national database of CNIDAH, are dealt with comprehensively with national standards and quality management by the CNIDAH. Agreement was also secured to ensure that Angola has ‘a single credible source of information’ and that the state will ‘speak with one voice’ while maintaining a separation of verification effort and efforts to fulfil the obligations under the Ottawa Convention. Meanwhile, international funding is a challenge. In 2013, first MAG and then HALO Trust had to reduce staff capacity due to funding constraints though both hoped that personnel could be re-employed in 2014 with new European Commission funding. The mechanical assets of international operators were not used to full capacity due to lack of funding, and some were immobilized for want of spare parts also said to be due to lack of financial resources.

MANAGEMENT OF MINE ACTION DATA
Persistent problems with mine action database management in Angola, as described in detail in Landmine Monitor reports over the years, remain a significant challenge. In 2013, efforts were again undertaken to improve data quality, one of which was to work together with HALO Trust and NPA to verify all their entries in the CNIDAH database and eliminate errors while ensuring future entries are accurate. However discrepancies still exist. HALO, for example, has only 42 CHAs remaining in Huambo province in its own database while CNIDAH reports 55. An international assessor financed by UNDP and CNIDAH spent two months strengthening the skills of database staff with the result that 300 discrepancies between NGO data and the CNIDAH database were eliminated. Other common problems were: new areas not in the CNIDAH database; accredited areas not entered in the CNIDAH database; completion reports not processed; reports missing; overlapping mined area reports; and treatment of a completion report of a road task if it were a mined area. Unfortunately, the work started by the assessor was not continued by CNIDAH staff after the end of his assignment and the data was never cross-checked with DCA. Moreover, the result of agreement between NPA and CNIDAH during the consultancy about reduction of the number of SHAs in Kwanza Norte, Uige, Zaire and Malanje totaling around 85km² still is not reflected in the database.

Another critical challenge for mine action information management remains the failure of CED operators to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format. The latest strategic plans presented by CNIDAH place high hopes in the Mapping Project that is intended to give an accurate picture of all mine and demined areas of Angola and solve all the database problems. The latest version of Angola’s strategic mine action plan (covers 2013–17) is neither the plan that had not been approved by the Council of Ministers. The main goals of the plan are to:
- Ensure timely implementation of Angola’s Article 5 survey and clearance obligations.
- Reduce the risk of mine/ERW incidents.
- Strengthen institutional and inter-institutional capacity and improve the sustainability of the national mine action program.

LAND RELEASE
Angola every year makes considerable progress in reducing contamination; however, the various problems with the national database described above, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED make it impossible to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy land released since the beginning of mine action in the country.

Demining operators in Angola include DCA (in Moxico), HALO (in Benguela, Bie, Huambo, and Kwanza Kubangab), MAG (in Moxico), MgM (in Malanje), NPA (in Malanje and Zaire), while the four CED operators (PAIA, the Military Office of the President (CMPR), INAD, and the Police Border Guard of Angola (PGFAI) work collectively in all 18 provinces.

THE TEN MOST CONTAMINATED STATES PARTIES

ANGOLA

INAD reports 132 casualties from 2010 until the end of 2013, while Landmine Monitor identified 234 casualties during the same period.
COMMERCIAL COMPANIES AND LOCAL NGO CLEARANCE IN 2013

CNIDAH reports an enormous decrease of demining in 2013 in relation to 2012: from 2,924km² to only 7.94km². The dramatic decline is in national NGOs and commercial companies.32 CED reported demining of 272,041m² by the local NGO AFROMINAS, while the various commercial companies together conducted demining over a reported 5,787m² and 694km of seismic lines (areas for seismic search for oil offshore).33 CED reports destruction in 2013 of 2,930 antipersonnel mines, 157 antivehicle mines, and 166,036 items of UXO. Demining included almost 554km of electrical towers installations, almost 1,092km of roads, and a further 162km of seismic lines.34 CED, INAD, and FADA do not use international land release standards, often employing clearance resources on land that is not mined.35

NAGA VICTIM COMPENSATION

Between 2012 and April 2014, 192km² was either canceled by NTS or released by technical survey (TS) or removed from the national database by eliminating data between CNIDAH and other operators.36 NPA in 2013 canceled 61 SHAs equal to 29km² and in identifying 10 CHAs reduced the area of contamination from 2,946km² to 1,670km².37 HALO released 23 areas, canceling by NTS a total area of 0.37km² and reducing by TS a further 0.26km². HALO also introduced in Huambo province the Mine Free District Methodology whereby in all 11 municipalities representatives from 1,541 communities signed survey forms agreeing that no further minefields exist other than the 42 already identified and recorded on the national database.38 MAG reduced 5,770m² by TS in 2013.

ENDNOTES


3 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.

4 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.

5 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2012, p. 39.

6 Email from Gerhard Zank, Program Manager, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014.

7 “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5.”

8 Data compiled based on the presentation “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5.”

9 Interview with Susette Fereira, UNDP, Luanda, 14 June 2011.

10 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2013.

11 Ibid.

12 Presidential Decree No. 54/2011.


17 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.


19 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014, and Jessica Riorand, Country Director, MAG Angola, 4 April 2014.

20 Email from Anthony Connell, Programme Manager, DCA Angola, 24 April 2014, and Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014.


22 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014; and “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5.”


24 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA Angola, 24 April 2014.

25 Email from Fredrik Holmgaard, Operations Manager, NPA Angola, 23 May 2014.

26 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.

27 Ibid.


29 CMIP’s general mission is national security and demining is included in this.

30 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014; Anthony Connell, DCA Angola, 24 April 2014, Jessica Riorand, MAG Angola, 4 April 2014; and Kenneth Andrew O’Connell, Country Manager, MAG Angola, 5 May 2014.

31 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014; Fredrik Holmgaard, Operations Manager, NPA Angola, 3 March 2014; Anthony Connell, DCA-Angola, 24 April 2014, Jessica Riorand, MAG Angola, 4 April 2014; and Kenneth Andrew O’Connell, Country Manager, MAG Angola, 5 May 2014.

32 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 2 May 2014.


36 Presentation “Plano Cartagena v. Art. 5.”

37 NPA presentation to national workshop of April 2014, and email from Fredrik Holmgaard, NPA Angola, 3 May 2014.

38 Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 5 May 2014.

39 Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.

40 Interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.


42 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Anna Merrifield, desk officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2014; emails from Inguma Vaine, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian NPA, 26 April 2014, and Luisa D. Miller, Public engagement and partnerships, Office of Weapons Removal and Assistance, US Department of State, 3 April 2014; Belgium CCM Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2014; and Japan CCM Article 2 Report, Form F, 30 April 2014.

43 Information provided by Maria Cruz Cristobal, Mine Action Desk, Security Policy Unit, Directorate-General for External Relations, EU through David Spence, Minister Counsellor, Delegation of the EU to the UN in Geneva, 20 June 2011.


The BH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) reported total contamination of 1,219 km² at the end of 2013, a reduction of some 3.5% on 2012, in 9,416 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs). A general assessment completed in 2012 identified 540,000 people in 1,417 communities as affected by mines, of which 136 communities (152,000 people) were at high risk.1 BHMAC’s next general assessment is planned for 2015.2

BiH was severely affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014. On 23 May, BHMAC met with the directors of the mine action centers of Serbia and Croatia to coordinate their response to the threat of washed mines washed into areas previously considered safe. The centers pledged to share information, emphasize risk education (MRE) in the flood-affected zones, engage in emergency marking once the floods recede, and raise awareness of the impact of the lack of funds for mine action.3

Within Bosnia, 70% of the flood-affected area is in the mine-affected communities of Doboj, Maglaj, Olovo, Una-Sana Canton, Brčko and Posavina area.4 The UN reported that some 800 km² of SHA was affected by the floods; the US State Department reported the figure of 320 km².5 Bosnian authorities reported that the floods had moved mines, cluster munitions and UXO and damaged minefield fencing and signs. At an ammunition depot in Grasje, some 250 tons of ammunition were reported as being under water on 25 May 2014. There was a mine explosion in Brčko on 21 May 2014, no casualties were reported.6 Landmine survivors Initiatives reported that more than 3,000 mine survivors were living in the flood-affected region.7

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) mine action personnel worked with local crisis coordination centers to provide landmine survey and mapping support to the emergency response in Brčko, Orasje and Samac, conducted MRE, and placed 52 emergency mine signs in Domaljevac-Samac. In May 2014, NPA also responded to emergency EOD tasks in Brčko and Samac, destroying five items of UXO and one antipersonnel mine.8

On 26 May, the US Department of State deployed its Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of civilian EOD experts to Bosnia to work with local officials of both the Serbian and BiH Mine Action Centers to survey landmine-contaminated areas affected by the recent widespread floods.9 The European Union, including its peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in BiH, deployed experts to assess the impact of floods and landslides on the location of mines.10 Belgian First Aid, the Belgian Military Academy, and Vrije University Brussels’ Department of Electronics and Informatics deployed an unmanned aerial vehicle and operating team to BiH to assist survey efforts.11

UNDP disseminated maps of the flooded mine areas through its Bosnian website.12 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and National Society reported it was working with BHMAC to provide MRE.13

The Demining Commission, under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication, supervises the statewide BHMAC and represents BH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Demining Commission’s three members, representing BiH’s three majority ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats), propose the appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers, report to the council on mine action, approve accreditation of demining organizations, and facilitate cooperation between the FSBiH and RS.14

However, the principle of organizing BiH state-level bodies along ethnic lines has come under increasing scrutiny following the 2009 judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Seđić and Finci case that the rights of two Bosnians of Roma and Jewish descent had been violated by being denied the opportunity to run for high-level elected office because they were not of the major ethnic groups.15 A Demining Commissioner stated that efforts to establish a new Demining Law (see below) may either abolish the Demining Commission or add another member for “Others.”16

BiHMAC, established by a 2002 Decree of the Council of Ministers, is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organizations.17 BHMAC operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo and through two entity mine action offices – formerly autonomous entity mine action centers – and eight regional offices (Sarajevo, Pale, Travnik, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, Brčko and Bihać). The two entity offices coordinate the activities of regional offices in planning, survey, and quality control/assurance.18

Quality assurance inspectors are based in the regional offices.19

Since 2008, efforts have been made to adopt new mine action legislation in BiH with a view to creating a stable platform for mine action funding by the government and local authorities.20 However, a draft law prepared by the Ministry of Civil Affairs with support from BHMAC and UNDP, first submitted to parliament in February 2010, failed to gain parliamentary approval in 2012. The law is said to face resistance from Bosnian Serb nationalist parties concerned about concentrating functions at the state level and Bosnian Croat nationalist parties concerned about losing the ethnic quota on the Demining Commission,21 as well as demining personnel dissatisfied with the current BHMAC director.22

As of April 2014, the law had still not passed and according to a BHMAC official, was unlikely to be reintroduced to parliament before the elections in October 2014.23 A Demining Commissioner suggested the earliest a law could be passed would be in 2015.24 This lack of a new legal framework has contributed to BiH’s repeated failure to meet its funding targets under its own mine action strategy. Moreover, in 2013 and through early 2014, BiH mine action governance received increasingly critical media attention. Newspapers called attention to the almost 12 years the BHMAC director has been in office.25 There are currently no term limits on the position, one of the issues that the draft demining law has sought to address.26

In 2012, eight local companies and NGOs filed a criminal complaint with the State Prosecutor against the BHMAC
in Bosnia” as the negative press is drawing attention from

According to a spokesperson of the State Prosecutor’s office, “The suspect is under investigation for activities related to demining and over suspicions that he abused his official position and made illegal profits.” A BHMAC statement said, ‘The process of demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a large humanitarian undertaking, because it depends on donors and their grants and, due to that, we have to be completely transparent to the public. We hope that after this, negative media reports about BHMAC will end so that the process of humanitarian demining can be completed.” A local demining NGO official said he thought it was “one of the most dangerous times for mine action in Bosnia” as the negative press is drawing attention from “the good things” mine action is doing. “It’s not good for BHMAC to be in the papers in that way,” a BHMAC official said. “But in terms of operations, we are still going.” A Demining Commissioner said that: “Of course this is very bad for demining in Bosnia” and that it “is now up to us” to “remove the doubts” of donors by providing “explanations” and “increasing the pace and performance of obligations with capacities that we have. We cannot stand and wait, but we have to work and act, and each should be responsible for their actions.” The Director of BHMAC was conditionally released from custody on 9 May 2014.

The BH Mine Action Strategy for 2009–13 sets the target of becoming free of mines by 2019 and identifies seven strategic goals, including the elimination of the mine threat. BHMAC conducted the first of three planned revisions of the strategy in 2012 and 2013 (the other two are due in 2015 and 2017, respectively). The revision asserted lack of funding as “one of the major reasons” for BH’s slow progress to completion of its clearance goals. In 2014, BHMAC was elaborating new standing operating procedures for land release, including technical survey, that were expected to accelerate cancelation of SHAs.

National demining operators operational in 2013 included governmental actors (BiH Armed Forces, FBiH Civil Protection Agency, RS Civil Protection, Brčko District Civil Protection Agency), local NGOs (UG Demira, Švíjet bez mina, 40K-INQ-deminerance, ‘Pazi mine Vitez,’ Pro Vita, STOP Mines, Udržanje za eliminaciju mina, UEM), and commercial companies (Amphibia, Detektor, N&N IVSA, POINT). There are three international demining operators in BiH: two NGOs (INTERSOS and NPA) and one commercial company (UXB Balkans).

Since 2010, NPA has increasingly focused on building the capacity of the BiH Armed Forces’ Demining Battalion. NPA’s own strategic plan foresees withdrawal from BiH mine action in March 2015. However, given the slow progress of clearance in BiH, it is considering extending its mine action program, depending on donor support. Handicap International ended its mine action activities in BiH at the end of 2012 and had closed down its office by March 2013. HI withdrew from BiH as part of an effort to focus on countries with lower human development indices.

BHMAC reported that it had ‘completed its mission in Bosnia’ at the end of 2013, stating that ‘since many other local NGOs and international companies are active in the country, the presence of an international emergency NGO such as INTERSOS is no longer necessary.”

**LAND RELEASE**

BHMAC released a total of 44.3 km² of mined area in 2013, 57% of the amount achieved in 2012 and less than a third of the amount planned. Of the total, nearly three-quarters (33.26 km²) was canceled by non-technical survey. A further 9.17 km² was released by technical survey, more than in 2012, while full clearance accounted for almost 1 km², also an increase on the previous year (see Table 1), but only one-fifth of what had been planned. This is not an impressive return on more than US$20 million of funding. Moreover, at current rates of output, it may take several decades to clear BiH of mine contamination.

**SURVEY IN 2013**

BHMAC conducted general/non-technical and technical survey over a total area of almost 125 km² in 2013, about 64% of the target (195 km²), releasing 42 km², most through non-technical survey (91%) (see Table 2). BHMAC reported that 134 organizations carried out 163 technical survey tasks over a total area of 11.83 km², releasing 9.17 km². A total of 52 persons were employed in 22 survey teams in 2013. In 2014, NPA noted that releasing large areas of land through non-technical survey is ‘becoming more and more difficult’ and that applying other methods including targeted technical survey will make possible more efficient land release.

**MINING IN 2013**

Twenty-eight organizations were accredited with BHMAC for demining at the end of 2013 with a total staff of 1,529, of whom 1,115 were deminers. However, only 18 organizations participated in clearance operations in 2013. More than half of them engaged in small tasks, clearing less than 10,000 m² during the year. Overall, operators cleared a total of 1.89 km² (see Table 3), well below the 2009–13 mine action strategy target of 2.97 km².

BHMAC attributed the shortfall to ‘lack of funding’. It said it had planned mine action expenditure of BAM80.00 million (US$54 million), but actual spending had amounted to less than half that figure, reaching only BAM50.50 million (US$24 million), of which BAM16.7 million (US$11.36 million) (81%) came from national sources and the balance from international donors. Analysis shows that BiH provides a larger proportion of its national GDP to mine action than many other mine-affected countries. Nevertheless, analysis by NPA shows that in the first five years of the 2009–19 strategy, international donors contributed almost 95% of the planned funding commitments. In fact, the main shortfall has been in national funding. 35% short of the targets set out in the ten-year mine action strategy.

**Table 1. Clearance in 2009–13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Release of mined areas in 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area released (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>126,870</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEM</td>
<td>290,765</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>54,313</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Vita</td>
<td>32,256</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Pazi Mine’</td>
<td>50,922</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UG Demira</td>
<td>217,851</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOK-ING</td>
<td>115,455</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Švíjet bez mina</td>
<td>21,029</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOP Mines</td>
<td>270,074</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibia</td>
<td>10,964</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N&amp;N IVSA</td>
<td>327,949</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXB Balkans</td>
<td>3,291</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Point Ltd. Brcko</td>
<td>38,087</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detektor</td>
<td>45,640</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBiH Civil Protection Agency</td>
<td>139,612</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS Civil Protection</td>
<td>81,063</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Brcko Civil Protection Agency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH Armed Forces</td>
<td>65,352</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,891,493</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,700</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
QUALITY MANAGEMENT

In 2013, quality assurance inspectors issued 22 decisions to shut down work, 4 ordering demining to be repeated, and 1 revoking demining authorization. Tests of 342 detectors found 59 (17%) not working, an extremely high figure.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

National and international donors provided more than US$2,47 million of mine action funding in 2013, an increase of 12% US$2.05 million, which BHMAC said explained the slight increase in land cleared. BHMAC stated that it expected a similar level of funding for 2014.

ENDNOTES

1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 June 2018, p. 4.
8 Email from Amel Mujanovic, Executive Director, Landmine Survivors Network, Berlin, 26 May 2014.
15 13
20 Interion with Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 6 May 2014.
21 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
23 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
24 Interview with official of donor government, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014; and with Radubuz Zizovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
26 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, former Programme Coordinator, UNDP, Sarajevo, 20 May 2014.
27 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, former Programme Coordinator, UNDP, Sarajevo, 20 May 2014.
28 Interview with Tarik Serak, Civilian Mine Action Management department, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 April 2014, and with official of a donor government, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
29 Interview with Tarik Serak, Civilian Mine Action Management department, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 April 2014, and with official of a donor government, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
30 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
31 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
34 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
35 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, Vagosca, 17 April 2014.
36 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
37 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, Vagosca, 17 April 2014.
38 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
39 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, Vagosca, 17 April 2014.
41 Ibid, p. 7.
42 Ibid, p. 4.
43 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, former Programme Coordinator, UNDP, Sarajevo, 20 May 2014.
44 Interview with Amela Balic, NPA, Vagosca, 17 April 2014.
46 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
47 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
48 Interview with Radosav Zivkovic, STOP Mines, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
51 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
52 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
53 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
54 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 April 2014.
55 Email from Mustafa Pasalic, Demining Commissioner, BiH, 5 May 2014.
57 Ibid, pp. 2-3.
58 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 18 April 2014.
61 Email from Amelna Sauvage, former Programme Coordinator, Handicap International, 20 March 2014.
64 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
65 Ibid, pp. 10-12.
66 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
67 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
68 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
69 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
70 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
71 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
72 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 6 May 2014.
Cambodia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s. The full extent of contamination is not known. A Baseline Survey (BLS) of Cambodia’s 124 mine-affected districts completed in 2013 estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,915km². The survey will be extended in 2014 to cover another 51 ERW-contaminated districts. CMAA data does not, though, disaggregate mine and battle area clearance permitting a calculation of the remaining mine-affected area.

The BLS completed in 2013 identified 12,982 polygons or hazardous areas affected to some degree by mines, covering a total of 1,112km², of which 1,043km² were affected by antipersonnel mines (see Table 1). This included almost 892km² containing ‘scattered or nuisance’ antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

Table 1. Baseline survey results for 124 districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1 Dense AP mines</td>
<td>63,894,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Mixed AP and AV mines</td>
<td>78,601,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.1 Mixed dense AP and AV mines</td>
<td>9,154,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.2 Mixed scattered AP and AV mines</td>
<td>216,840,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 AV mines</td>
<td>68,187,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 Scattered or nuisance mines</td>
<td>674,882,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,111,561,995</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand. These account for the great majority of mine casualties but in 2013 mines still caused casualties on the other side of the country in the southern province of Takeo bordering Vietnam. Contamination includes the remains of the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt installed in the mid-1980s in a bid to block insurgent infiltration, which ranks among the densest contamination in the world with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.

The BLS identified a total of 68km² contaminated only by antivehicle mines. A number of incidents, however, have occurred outside BLS polygons, raising the possibility of residual antivehicle mine contamination on land already cleared of antipersonnel mines. The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) has called on local mine action planning units to pay attention to areas such as old road alignments that may have antivehicle mines.

Table 2. Casualties by device in 2009–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Device</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC). The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, quality control, and coordinating risk education and victim assistance. Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and a senior government minister, the Minister of Post and Telecommunication, Prak Sokhonn, who is CMAA vice-president, leads dialogue with donors as the chair of a Joint Government-Development Partners’ Mine Action Technical Working Group.

Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national NGO operator, CMAC, and two international mine action NGOs, HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group. A national NGO, Cambodian Self-help Demining, has been active since 2011 and at the start of 2014 three commercial companies active on a small scale were BACTEC, Viking, and D&Y. The Cambodian army’s National Center for Peace Keeping Forces, Mine and ERW Clearance (NPMEC) had 13 demining and two EOD teams accredited with the CMAA.

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Cambodia also faces a troubling issue with antivehicle mines, which are killing more people than antipersonnel mines (see Table 2), often on paths or tracks that have been well-used by local inhabitants. The BLS identified a total of 68km² contaminated only by antivehicle mines. A number of incidents, however, have occurred outside BLS polygons, raising the possibility of residual antivehicle mine contamination on land already cleared of antipersonnel mines. The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) has called on local mine action planning units to pay attention to areas such as old road alignments that may have antivehicle mines.
CAMBODIA

CAMBODIA’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010–19 (NMAS) aims to free Cambodia from the threat of landmines and to minimize risks from anti-tank mines and ERW. To achieve that, the Strategy sets four supporting general goals:

1. Reduce mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts.
2. Contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction.
3. Ensure sustainable national capacities to address residual mine/ERW contamination.
4. Promote stability and regional and international disarmament.

A review of the NMAS in 2013 found that Cambodia had ‘achieved significant learning on how to organize mine clearance operations to achieve the greatest efficiency’ and that its application on land release ranked among the most comprehensive of any major mine action program. Cambodia’s mine action has moved from an emergency phase to a development phase, proposes that ‘much of the remaining contamination will be dealt with’ within the present Article 5 deadline extension request. It would make casualty reduction the priority for mine action but states most resources should be allocated to supporting development and poverty reduction. As of April 2014, the draft plan was still under discussion by CMAA.

The CMAA hired a consultant in 2013 to draft a national strategic planning that would support implementation of the NMAS. The draft NSF, observing that Cambodia’s mine action has moved from an emergency phase to a development phase, proposes that ‘much of the remaining contamination will be dealt with’ within the present Article 5 deadline extension request. It would make casualty reduction the priority for mine action but states most resources should be allocated to supporting development and poverty reduction. As of April 2014, the draft plan was still under discussion by CMAA.

CAMBODIA’s mine action program has achieved significant productivity gains but has yet to lay out a coherent strategy harnessing the full range of mine clearance assets to clearly defined humanitarian and development goals. Cambodia is further ahead than many countries in integrating mine action into national development strategies on paper but in practice demining priorities framed by MAPUs at community level are only weakly linked to national goals for infrastructure development and land use. Moreover, MAPUs need far more resources and training to support planning, prioritization and land release. Meanwhile mine clearance reporting only encompasses operations by national and international NGOs engaged on tasks agreed with MAPUs and some donors.

The CMAA currently identifies priority communites for clearance on the basis of casualty data and BLS data but Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in the eight most mine-affected western provinces and seven mainly ERW-affected eastern provinces are responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working with local authorities to identify community priorities and in consultation with operators. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC) and the CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. The CMAA was preparing to set up nine more PMACs and MAPUs in 2014. MAPUs are responsible for identifying community priorities and in consultation with operators. The task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC) and the CMAA. In provinces without MAPUs, mine action is coordinated with provincial authorities. The CMAA was preparing to set up nine more PMACs and MAPUs in 2014. MAPUs are also responsible for quality assure land before release and verifying post-clearance use. However, MAPUs reportedly do not have BLS datasets to support decisions on prioritization and are acutely short of resources, from computers to vehicles, which result in delays releasing land on which survey or clearance have been completed.

CMAA guidelines and criteria for planning and prioritization, which came into effect at the start of 2012, specify that priority is given to clearing hazardous area polygons identified by the BLS and where casualties have occurred in the past five years. The guidelines call for MAPUs and operators to deploy 75% of assets to communities identified as priorities leaving the remaining 25% available for other tasks. They also foresee the CMAA giving guidance and direction to MAPUs on the criteria that define clearance priorities.

LAND RELEASE

After years of accelerating productivity in Cambodia the pace of mine clearance has levelled off but the amount of mined area released has continued to rise as a result of survey and application of land release procedures. Operators appear to have released a total of around 100km2 of land in 2013, including up to about 6km2 of mined area, but lack of clarity about some land release data does not make it possible to give precise figures or a comparison with last year. The amount of mined land subjected to full clearance remained at a little over 45km2 [see Table 3] but increased donor funding, particularly by the United States, for clearance of ERW in heavily bombed areas of eastern Cambodia is raising the amount of battle area clearance.

CAMBODIA reported release of a total of 2,76km2 through non-technical survey and 16km2 through technical survey by CMAC but data available did not indicate how much of this was mined or battle area.

In 2014, the CMAA set a target of clearing or releasing 1,085 minefields covering 82.87km2.

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

Total mined area clearance remained about the 45km2 in 2013 as in the previous year but the number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines destroyed dropped while commitment of more assets to clearance of battle area and cluster munition remnants saw the number of items of UXO rise close to 15%.

Demining NGOs have largely maintained rates of clearance despite most having to trim staff in the past two years as a result of fluctuating donor support. CMAC started 2014 with some 1,800 staff and with steadier funding commitments for 2014–15 expected to maintain that level of staffing. HALO reduced capacity in the second half of 2013 ending the year with 929 staff, including 671 deminers, and similarly expected to keep that staff level in 2014. HALO reduced capacity in the second half of 2013 ending the year with 929 staff, including 671 deminers, and similarly expected to keep that staff level in 2014. A third international operator, APPOD, received a provisional license from the CMAA in January 2014 and the same month, in agreement with CMAC and with Germany, as donor, took on management of its Siem Reap-based Demining Unit 6, with 352 staff, including 284 deminers.

CMAC, accounting for more than half the total mined area cleared, reported a slight (4%) increase in the amount of land subjected to full clearance in 2013 and says it does not see room for further big increases after the growth in clearance achieved in recent years with improved equipment and approaches to land release. HALO’s 2014 work plan, however, targeted release of 66km2 of mined area and 14km2 of battle area through clearance and survey, an increase of around half on its 2013 results.

HALO and MAG both reported slight reductions in area and items cleared in 2013. HALO has continued to commit resources to clearing antivehicle mines, including in areas outside the SHA5s identified by the BLS. Moreover, one-third of the antipersonnel mines HALO destroyed in 2013 were picked up in EOD call-outs. However, in 2014 local authorities have allowed HALO to return to a number of task areas on the densely-mined K5 mine belt where work was previously suspended because of border tensions. MAG, with 12 mine action teams, has focused operations on Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Pailin. In 2014, it has also received financing to revive two EOD teams in northern Ratanakiri province working in conjunction with CARE and responding to villager call-outs and has added BAC/EOD capacity in Mondulkiri province.

Table 3  Mined and battle area clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km2)</th>
<th>BAC (km2)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>28.69</td>
<td>18.98</td>
<td>11,521</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>3,475</td>
<td>110,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSHD</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,782</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3,581</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>10,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPMEC</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.85</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,618</strong></td>
<td><strong>498</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,337</strong></td>
<td><strong>128,661</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, land in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2010, Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. Cambodia’s national strategy for 2010–19, released in 2010 a year after submission of the extension request, called for demining operations to clear some 649km² of mined land and to release 1,099km² of suspected land through baseline survey and technical survey. These targets have been superseded by the results of the BLS but no new plan or strategy has yet emerged to replace them. The BLS in 124 provinces identified 79km² of dense mine contamination and 892km² of scattered contamination, but although it added clarity on the extent of Cambodia’s mine problem BLS findings do not determine clearance priorities: MAPUs may give higher priority to clearing polygons with scattered mines than to densely mined areas.

The draft NSP proposes that ‘much of the remaining contamination’ will be dealt with within the current extension request but does not distinguish between mine and ERW contamination. Based on clearance and funding patterns (see Table A), Cambodia can expect to clear more than 200km² of mined area in the coming five years.

ENDNOTES

1 Statement of Cambodia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 2014, Minutes of BLS Phase II meeting, 5 May 2014.
4 Data received by email from CMAA, 15 October 2013, and presented in Statement of Cambodia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 14.
5 Data received by email from Eang Harnrong, Database Manager, CMAA, 11 April 2013.
6 Interview with Prum Saphakhomkul, Deputy Secretary General, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 19 March 2013.
7 Compiled by the Monitor from CMIS database data for 2012, received by email from Nguon Monoketya, CMVIS Officer, CMAA, 14 March 2013.
8 The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is the leading national demining operator; but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term “center.” Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrounded this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.
10 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, CMAA, 10 October 2013.
11 Information provided by the CMAA in response to Landmine Monitor questions, 13 March 2014.
15 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, CMAA, 26 May 2014.
16 Interviews with mine action operators, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 10–16 March 2014.
18 Interviews with Cameron Imber, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 22 March 2013, and Alaskan Meyer, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 14 March 2013.
20 HALO reported canceling 3.7km² through NTS and CMAC reported release of 1.6km² through technical survey, up to 16.0km² in 2012. Data provided by Database Unit, CMAA, 1 May 2014.
21 Information provided by the CMAA in response to Landmine Monitor questions, 13 March 2014.
22 Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 13 March 2014.
23 Email from Adam Jasinski, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 7 March 2014.
24 Interview with Kim Warren, Country Programme Director, APOPO, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2014, and email 2 May 2014.
25 Interview with Heng Rattana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2014.
27 Interview with Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 14 March 2014.
28 Interview with Ben McCabe, Programme Officer, and Alistair Moir, Programme Manager, UNDP, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2014.
29 Email from Adam Jasinski, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 14 March 2014.
30 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2014.
31 Information provided by the CMAA in response to Landmine Monitor questions, 13 March 2014.
32 Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 12 March 2014.
33 “National Strategic Plan for Mine Action in Cambodia (Draft),” undated but 2014, pp. 15.
34 Email from Nguon Monoketya, CMVIS Officer, CMAA, 14 March 2013.
35 Detailed annual min action data are presented in Statement of Cambodia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 2014, which also includes a detailed discussion of the mine action budget and decision making for the current year.
36 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, Deputy Secretary General, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 19 March 2013.
38 The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is the leading national demining operator, but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term “center.” Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrounded this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.
40 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, CMAA, 10 October 2013.
41 Information provided by the CMAA in response to Landmine Monitor questions, 13 March 2014.
45 Email from Prum Saphakhomkul, CMAA, 26 May 2014.
46 Interviews with mine action operators, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 10–16 March 2014.
48 Interviews with Cameron Imber, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 22 March 2013, and Alaskan Meyer, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 14 March 2013.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The CMAA reports international support for mine action in 2013 amounted to US$22.76 million while the Cambodian government contributed an additional US$2.69 million.

Most international support for Cambodian mine action is agreed bilaterally between donors and recipients. Funding of US$4.6 million provided through UNDP’s Clearing for Results in 2013 represented one-fifth of total international support for that year. CFR Phase II had received or been pledged a total of US$25.7 million, exceeding the Phase II budget of US$24.5 million.

CAMBODIA

Table 4. Mine clearance in 2009–13 [km²]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>45.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>45.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>37.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>29.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Chad’s National Mine Action Authority is the High Commission for National Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Deminage, HCND). The National Demining Center (Centre National de Deminage, CND) serves as the national mine action center in Chad. The CND also possesses demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. In 2013, Chad had only one international demining operator, MAG, which withdrew from the country in early 2014 following an end to its funding.\(^1\)

Since 2008, Chad’s mine action program has suffered from a lack of international funding, weak government oversight, and persistent mismanagement within the CND, resulting in little or no demining until October 2012 when the European Union provided funding to MAG.\(^2\) In 2012, management problems at the CND resulted in the dismissal of its director and hundreds of employees. CND reduced its personnel from 720 to 230. A new director was appointed in 2013. CND demining operations have also been plagued by poor equipment and lack of funding.\(^3\) In an update to States Parties in April 2014, Chad noted that the CND had “experienced some difficulties” in presenting the results of its work.\(^4\)

ENDNOTES
1 Email from Greg Crowther, Regional Programmes Manager, MAG, 19 March 2014.
2 Presentation of Chad at African Union/ICRC Weapons Contamination Workshop, Addis Ababa, 3–5 March 2013; Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013, p. 11.
3 Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 May 2013; and interviews with Emmanuel Sauvage, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 April 2013.
4 InterViews with Emmanuel Sauvage, UNDP, in Geneva, 16 April 2013.
8 Ibid.
9 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Space Division, European External Action Service, 5 May 2014; and Anne Merrifield, Desk Officer, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2014; Germany CIM Article 1 Report, Form I, 5 May 2014; and Japan CIM Article 2 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014.

CHAD
CROATIA

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 7.0

GOOD

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Croatia is affected by mines and – to a much lesser extent – explosive remnants of war (ERW), a legacy of four years of armed conflict associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) reported that in May 2014, a total of 610 km² in 88 municipalities was still suspected hazardous area (SHA), of which mined areas accounted for all but 5.9 km² (containing only UXO).

In 2014, Croatia conducted new general (non-technical) and technical survey on military facilities, resulting in suspected mined area of 32.4 km². Almost 31.4 km² of the area is on military training sites. This is a much higher figure than the previously reported figure of 2.5 km². CROMAC believes the mined areas in the military facilities are not included in their overall SHA of 610 km². Croatia has also identified areas on its border with Hungary to be cleared as part of a cross-border cooperation program.

The total SHA has not been publicly reported. Twelve of Croatia’s twenty counties remain affected, although Croatia expected to complete clearance in two counties — Dubronik-Neretva and Vidovici — in 2014. Two-thirds of contaminated area (67%) is in forests, 19% in agricultural land, and 14% is in karst (rocky limestone areas) and macchia (shrubland). Priorities for clearance are agricultural land, forests with economic potential, and national parks.

Croatia was affected by the Balkan flood disaster in May 2014. On 23 May, CROMAC met with the directors of the mine action centers of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to 'analyse the situation in our countries and to agree about the future actions and cooperation immediately after land dries.' CROMAC experts worked in the field with the National Crisis Center to provide risk education to emergency response personnel. As of writing, Croatia had not allocated any emergency funding for mine action or made any changes to the annual plan. CROMAC did, however, identify three flood-affected SHAs of particular concern.

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In Vrbanja Municipality, CROMAC expressed concern that mines from the 0.66 km² SHA could be washed into previously demined lower-lying areas, saying: "The exact affected area is not easy to estimate because of unpredictability of the influx of the flood waters." The Somovac forest along the border with Serbia in Nijemci Municipality has an SHA of 1.4 km². CROMAC estimates that the cost of demining the flood-affected SHAs will be €4 million.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

CROMAC was established on 19 February 1998 as the umbrella organization for mine action coordination. CROMAC had 142 employees in early 2014. The CROMAC Council, an oversight and strategic planning body, consists of a president, appointed by the Prime Minister, and ten members, appointed from the Ministry of Defense, Finance, and Interior, as well as eminent persons. The council meets at least four times a year.

In April 2012, the government created the Office for Mine Action (OMA), reporting to the Prime Minister’s office, to function as a focal point for mine action, strengthening coordination among stakeholders and funding agencies, and raising public awareness about mine hazards. The OMA includes a Unit for European Union (EU) Funds tasked with promoting access of the mine action sector to a range of EU funds expected to become available as part of Croatia’s EU membership.

The establishment of OMA has elevated the status of mine action as the OMA can ‘politically pressure the government and international actors’ in ways that CROMAC, as a technical body, can not.

A Law on Humanitarian Demining was adopted in 2005 and entered into force on 5 January 2006. A 2007 amendment to the law elaborated responsibilities and human resource requirements, and a second amendment in 2008 clarified responsibilities for quality control.

The law assigns the Croatian army responsibility for clearing all military areas. In 2014, Croatia was in the process of drafting a new demining law, specific provisions were still under negotiation but were expected to bring standards more in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), enabling use of new technical survey methods to reduce confirmed mined areas and release land.

CROMAC founded the Centre for Testing, Development and Training (CTDT) in 2003, a state-owned company accredited to test and certify machines, mine detection dogs (MDDs), metal detectors, personal protective equipment (PPE), and prodders. CTDT also engages in research, training, and development of clearance and survey techniques and technologies.

Basic training of deminers is conducted by the Croatian Police Academy, but CTDT offers management-level training in mine action. CTDT has said that its enforcement of testing requirements has improved the quality of clearance equipment over the last few years.
STRATEGIC PLANNING

Croatia’s 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request set out annual demining targets and strategic goals, including elimination of any mine threat to housing and areas planned for the return of displaced people by 2010, to infrastructure by 2011, to agricultural land by 2013, and to forest areas by 2018. While clearance of the mine threat to housing and infrastructure is now complete, Croatia missed its target on agricultural land; by the end of 2013, to housing and infrastructure is now complete, Croatia cleared a total of 71.9 km² of mined area in 2013 (see Table 1), slightly more than in the previous two years (67.3 km² in 2012; 70.4 km² in 2011). A total of 32.3 km² was released through clearance, which was marginally higher than in 2012 (30.5 km²) and 2011 (27.7 km²); 39.56 km² was through general survey and technical survey (36.79 km² in 2012; 42.69 km² in 2011).

Table 1. Release of mined areas in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Area released (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAK UNIJA</td>
<td>729,992</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIOS-F</td>
<td>1,440,103</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>1,889,615</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credo</td>
<td>1,369,041</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demin-KA</td>
<td>216,102</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detektor</td>
<td>265,449</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dotonater</td>
<td>621,759</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIZ-EKO</td>
<td>1,122,212</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOK-ING</td>
<td>690,583</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hairpinia</td>
<td>939,669</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heksogen</td>
<td>4,156,268</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istraživa³</td>
<td>4,248,797</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>673</td>
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<td>Ivala Laron</td>
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<td>INSA PLUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MKA DEMING</td>
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<td>Mungos</td>
<td>3,536,977</td>
<td>530</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terra firma</td>
<td>807,520</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>858,358</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>28</td>
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<tr>
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<td>64,053</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zeleni Kvarat</td>
<td>2,565,200</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,343,774</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,771</strong></td>
<td><strong>775</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,412</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Land release was 54% of the amount foreseen for the year 2009–19 mine action strategy; clearance was 59% of target while survey was 51% of target.

In the Hungary-Croatia cross-border clearance program, Croatia cleared 1.56 km² from its side of the border in 2013, it has cleared a total of 7 km² along this border over the previous years. Some 1.5 km² of clearance in 2013 resulted in no mines being found (see Table 2).

Table 2. Mine clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
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This creates coordination problems across the many consortium partners and subcontractors. The average net price of mine clearance dropped in 2013 to HRK6.15 (approx. US$1.1) per square meter from HRK7.66 (approx. US$1.4) in 2012. This makes it difficult for firms to make a profit on clearance. Larger firms claim they are hampered by earlier investment in mechanical assets and equipment based on assumptions that funding would match the levels outlined in the 2009–19 mine action strategy. Some companies have sought to diversify with operations outside Croatia, but given the relatively higher wages of Croatian deminers, find it difficult to compete for tenders.

In 2013, the OMA raised concerns in 2013 of ‘price dumping’ by smaller and less established firms aiming to gain a market share by underbidding on tenders. According to the OMA director cited in the press in 2013, “Some companies are indeed playing a very dirty game here.” A trade union member also raised concerns about this practice, saying that “Whoever offers the lowest price gets the job. That comes at the expense of worker safety.” However, CROMAC stated that “It can’t do anything” about companies price dumping, except by making sure they pay their salaries and taxes and maintain standards in clearance, and by encouraging other government agencies to monitor compliance with relevant law.

The Croatian demining community faced a labor dispute in 2013, with deminers raising concerns about pay and working conditions and a significant number going on strike. However, the dispute was resolved through a new collective bargaining agreement that would raise salaries pending an increase in the demining budget. In another possible indication of labor discontent, many small firms are apparently started by deminers dissatisfied with working for larger companies.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, international donors provided USD$46.6 million to mine action. Croatian companies provided HRK46 million (almost USD$7.2 million) of which Croatian Forests contributed HRK30 million (more than USD$5.3 million). A further HRK7.96 million (almost US$1.4 million) came from private donors and companies provided HRK41 million (almost US$7.2 million) of which Croatian Forests provided HRK41 million (almost US$7.2 million).

Croatia is no longer receiving mine action funds from the World Bank and does not expect to do so in the future. Despite its entry into the EU, in 2013 and 2014, Croatia was still receiving money from the EU under its Instrument of Pre-accession. CROMAC believes that funding will increase in the coming years as Croatia was still receiving money from the EU under its Instrument of Pre-accession.

Besides increased funding, CROMAC believes that new techniques and technology offer best hope for speeding up survey and clearance. CROMAC stated that the current demining law constrains use of technical survey. CROMAC hopes the new law will enable area reduction, according to international standards. For instance, the total confirmed hazardous area is currently 302km², but CROMAC estimates this can be reduced to 80km² with international standards. For instance, the total confirmed hazardous area is currently 302km², but CROMAC estimates this can be reduced to 80km² with international standards.
Iraq is believed to be one of the world’s most heavily mined countries but is still violence that has persisted ever since the subsequent outbreak of insurgency. 

with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the US-led Coalition, and the (ERW), including cluster munitions, left by internal conflicts, the 1980–88 war 

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions, left by internal conflicts, the 1980–88 war.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Area</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.4

POOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Iraq is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munitions, left by internal conflicts, the 1980–88 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 invasion by the US-led Coalition, and the violence that has persisted ever since the subsequent outbreak of insurgency. Iraq is believed to be one of the world’s most heavily mined countries but is still working to produce a comprehensive estimate of the extent of the problem. Available data does not distinguish between mines and ERW.

A landmine impact survey (ILIS) was conducted in Iraq’s 18 governorates in two stages. The first, covering 13 governorates in 2004-06, identified 3,673 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 1,735km² of land and affecting 1,622 communities and 1.6 million people. Survey of the remaining five governorates was completed in 2012. The findings have not been released. However, non-technical survey (NTS) of the northern governorates of Erbil and Dohuk identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 70km², 8% less than the estimated size of the SHAs (85km²) identified in these areas by the ILIS.

Iraq’s Article 7 transparency report for 2013 estimated contamination totaling 1,838km² based on varying degrees of survey. This included 1,207km² of mined area in the six central and southern provinces (Basra, Diyala, Kirkuk, Missan, Muthanna, and Wasit) and another 315km² of SHA based on the ILIS. However, an introduction to the report reports that NTS of three southern governorates alone had found contamination totaling 1,456km². They included Basrah (1,273km²), Missan (71km²), and Wasit (112km²).

In northern Iraq’s four Kurdish governorates, the Article 7 report records 96km² of CHA and almost 224km² of contamination identified by what it termed ‘preliminary technical survey,’ a form of enhanced NTS intended to provide more precise data on contaminated areas.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Mine action in Iraq has two distinct components. In northern governorates under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), mine action is managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which in 2012 united with the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA). In central and southern Iraq, responsibility for mine action was transferred in 2008 to the Ministry of Environment, which set up a Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) to replace the National Mine Action Authority that had been attached to the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation but had become inactive and was closed down by the government in mid-2007.

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality management, and managing a mine action database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south. However, the DMA’s role has been weakened by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate. Other issues that the mine action community identifies as obstacles to effective planning, management, and regulation of the sector include the division of responsibilities between different ministries, poor communication between ministries, the absence of a functioning mechanism for coordinating policy, and corruption.

In May 2011, a Prime Minister’s order established a Higher Committee for Mine Action (HCMA) under the Prime Minister’s office comprising the Ministers of Defense, Environment, Interior, and Oil, together with representatives of the KRG and National Security Council. The HCMA was intended to create a policy framework and strategy for mine action. It was supported by a Technical Committee with the National Security Council’s Directorate for International Policy functions as its secretariat. However, in 2012 the HCMA’s functions passed to the National Security Council. The Ministry of Environment had not previously been a member of the NSC but was expected to attend meetings on mine action.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

The DMA reports that it has prepared a draft strategic plan for 2014, but as of May 2014, it still awaited approval by the Supreme National Council for Mine Action. The DMA expected the strategy to be adopted by the end of 2014.

The draft plan goes to priority to clearance of contaminated land near population centers, agricultural land, oilfields, clearance that reduces poverty, creates employment opportunities and promotes rural development. Operational priorities include completing NTS in all governorates by the end of 2015. The plan provides for clearance of the 10 least contaminated governorates to be conducted mainly by civilian defense units over four years to 2018 and for clearance of the five most contaminated provinces, including those bordering Iran, to be undertaken by a combination of army demining regiments, civilian defense units, and NGOs.

LAND RELEASE

Comprehensive data on the results of mine clearance in Iraq are not available. In the northern Kurdish governorates, IKMAA reported release of a total of 11.6km² of mined and battle area, of which 5.2km² was released without clearance. In central and southern Iraq, the DMA reported clearance of 3.9km² in six governorates in 2013, of which 3.4km² was in Basrah, but the DMA did not specify mined or battle area clearance or the operators involved.

IKMAA operated with more than 100 staff in its demining and three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, leading a sector with 17 commercial and NGO operators. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is the largest of the NGOs. IKMAA operates working on behalf of oil companies and by the army and civil defense. Organizations undertaking humanitarian demining, including national operator ICED and international NGO Danish Demining Group (DDG), engaged mainly in battle area clearance.
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013
The KRG released a total of 9 km² of mined area in 2013, fractionally less than the previous year and releasing more through survey. IKMMA expected to accredit significant additional capacity in the north in 2014, paving the way for accelerated survey and clearance. MAG cleared about half as much mined area in 2013 as the previous year but cleared more battle area than in 2012 keeping the total amount of land it released through clearance at about the same level (see Table 1).16

The scope, results and quality of demining in central and southern Iraq are not known. A comprehensive overview of commercial company clearance is unavailable. The army has reportedly undertaken extensive clearance on a 128km-long Shatt al-Alar irrigation waterway rated as a priority by Basrah governorate authorities, but details of the project were not publicly available.17 However, plans for the army to set up four regiments of deminers to conduct clearance of Iraq’s heavily contaminated border with Iran were stalled by the growing security challenge linked to reviving insurgency in central Iraq. Operators reported the military’s preoccupation with security issues also caused delays in demolitions of cleared ERW, which only the army is authorized to conduct.18

Table 1. Mine clearance in 201319

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKMMA</td>
<td>4.32</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>6,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>8,552</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>7,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

The DMA does not report comprehensively on the results of mine clearance, and incomplete reporting on clearance by operators makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress toward fulfilling its treaty obligations. In 2012, the Deputy Minister of Environment Kamal Latif predicted that Iraq would not meet its 2018 clearance deadline. Nothing has occurred in the two years since to challenge that conclusion.20 Iraq has passed the halfway mark to its initial Article 5 deadline but has yet to put in place a stable national mine action structure or with effective authority to direct, plan, or uphold the standards of mine action. The KRG’s more experienced mine action program has conducted survey and manages commercial and humanitarian clearance in the north. But in central and southern Iraq, authority over mine action is split between different ministries. The DMA and operators have made progress in conducting survey needed for planning and clearance but many governorates remain to be surveyed and stakeholders report clearance continues without effective coordination or oversight.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The DMA reported a budget of ID14.56 billion (US$10.23 million)21 in 2013, but it had no information about expenditure on mine action by the ministries of defense, oil, and industry, which conclude contracts separately with commercial demining companies that have conducted most of the clearance in recent years. The DMA’s proposed budget for 2014 was ID 15.41 billion (US$11.74 million).22 IMCO received funding of US$10 million from the US Department of State in 2013. It expected to receive about a quarter less in 2014, but this reflected reduced expenditure on security and it expected funding for operations would be higher.23 DDG received funding from SIDA of US$1.8 million as of 31 December 2013, but it had no information about the budget for 2014. The DMA reported a budget for 2014 of ID 14.56 billion (US$10.74 million).22

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Iraq** should present its mine action strategy detailing available capacity and its proposed deployment.
- **Iraq** should complete non-technical survey of central and southern governorates, where security permits, to establish a clearer baseline estimate of the extent of the landmine threat.
- **Clarity** is needed on the structure and leadership of mine action, including Iraq’s national mine action authority.
- **Mines** are bedeviled by bureaucratic blockages in government ministries and customs. Action is needed to streamline procedures for registration and accreditation of demining organizations, which can take years to complete.

ENDNOTES
1 Response to Monitor questionnaire by email from Siraj Barzani, Director General, IKMMA, 3 August 2011.
2 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Introduction, p. 3.
5 Emails from Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 23 and 29 August 2010.
7 Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 4 December 2012.
8 Interview with Essa Al-Fayadh, Director General, Directorate of Mine Action, in Geneva, 5 December 2013.
9 Iraq Mine Action Strategy 2010 to 2018, Annex B, received by email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 18 May 2014.
10 Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, DMA, 18 May 2014.
11 Email from Khatab Ahmed, Plan Manager, IKMMA, 10 April 2014.
12 Ibid, and email from Jacqui Brownhill, Desk Officer for the Middle East and North Africa, MAG, 23 May 2014.
13 Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 18 May 2014.
14 DDG released 0.42km² of battle area in 2013 clearing 1,208 items of UXO. Email from Jacqui Brownhill, Chief Operating Officer, IMCO, 10 April 2014.
15 Emails from Khatab Ahmed, IKMMA, 10 April 2014, and Jacqui Brownhill, MAG, 23 May 2014.
16 Email from Jacqui Brownhill, MAG, 23 May 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Email from Khatab Ahmed, IKMMA, 10 April 2014. MAG reported separately releasing 10.8km² of mined area by clearance, destroying 1,730 antipersonnel mines, 11 antivehicle mines, and 133 items of UXO. Email from Jacqui Brownhill, DDG, 23 May 2014.
20 “Iraq: Mine free 2018 target will be missed,” IRIN, 22 May 2012.
21 Exchange rate of US$1 = ID0.00084 as of 31 December 2013, Oanda, www.oanda.com/currency/converter/.
22 Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 18 May 2014.
23 Email from Rob White, IMCO, 10 April 2014.
24 Email from Lene Rasmussen, DDG, 20 March 2014.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Thailand’s 700km-long border with Cambodia, used as a base for Cambodian non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the 1980s and 1990s, is the worst affected, accounting for three-quarters of the LIS estimate of contamination and 51 of its 69 high-impacted communities. TMAC has identified 92km² of suspected contamination on its northern border with Lao PDR and western areas on the border with Myanmar.

The Monitor identified one fatality and 15 casualties caused by ERW in 2013, down from 20 casualties the previous year.2 Mine incidents on the Thai-Cambodian border in the last three years have killed one Thai soldier and injured 10 others and contributed to tensions between the two countries over border demarcation. The Thai military protested to Cambodia in March 2013 after a mine blast injured three rangers. Defence Minister Sukumpol Sawanatat stated that mines found at the location of the incident did not belong to Thailand, but said they might have been placed by illegal loggers.3 Cambodia denied responsibility.

Violent conflict in southern, mainly Muslim, provinces has continued since 2004, including use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of these victim-activated, but there were no reports of casualties caused by these devices in 2013.4

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC), set up in 2000 and chaired by the prime minister, has responsibility for overseeing the national mine action program, but has not met since 2008. TMAC was established in 1999 under the Armed Forces Supreme Command to coordinate, monitor, and conduct mine/UXO survey, mine clearance, mine/ERW risk education, and victim assistance throughout Thailand. TMAC is also responsible for establishing a program to meet Thailand’s obligations as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.5 However, TMAC has had to contend with limited funding and, as a military organization, with regular rotation of personnel at all levels.6 Its present Director General, Lieutenant-General Krisda Norapoompipat, who took over in October 2013, is the eighth since TMAC became operational in 2000 and the fourth in the last four years.

TMAC pressed for a change in its status to a civilian organization in 2005, prompted by the slow progress of demining and the armed forces’ limited budget for its operations. The NMAC agreed in principle to TMAC becoming a foundation in February 2007 but proposed to keep it under the armed forces. A final decision is still pending. NMAC decided in February 2007 to establish five sub-committees for victim assistance, coordination with foreign organizations, demining, RE, and monitoring and evaluation. The Demining and Monitoring and Evaluation sub-committees met once in 2012 and once in 2013.7

TMAC operated with four humanitarian mine action units (HMAUs) employing a total operations staff of around 287, including 132 deminers, 77 surveyors, 13 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians, and 20 mine detection dogs (MDDS).8 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has supported TMAC since 2011, operating one 10-man survey team, increased in 2012 to two teams, conducting non-technical survey in Surin province bordering Cambodia in cooperation with HMAU 3.9 In September 2013, NPA signed its third MoU since January 2012 with TMAC, and an updated Project Annex to run until December 2014. In July 2013, after completing its fourth Land Release pilot in Surin, NPA moved operations to work with HMAU 4 on the Thai-Myanmar border. In the first quarter of 2014, NPA adopted a ‘Part-completion initiative’ aiming to work with HMAU 4 and complete release of all known hazardous areas on the borders with Lao PDR and Myanmar by September 2015.10 In 2014, it embarked on five tasks covering 25.5km².11

Since October 2009, NPA has also supported TMAC’s database unit providing a data entry technician to help consolidate data and resolve gaps left by missing clearance reports, assisted by periodic visits by NPA’s regional information management adviser. The number of data gaps fell from 120 to 71 in 2013.12

APOPO, a Belgian NGO, worked in partnership with local NGO Peace Road Organization in 2011-12 conducting non-technical survey and ‘limited technical survey’ in Trat and Chanthaburi provinces on the Cambodian border. In 2013, APOPO conducted a survey in Ubon Ratchathani and Buriram provinces but ended operations in Thailand in 2013 as a result of lack of funding, relocating to Cambodia in 2014.13 As of May 2014, it was unclear what impact the military coup in Thailand would have on the mine action program.
**STRATEGIC PLANNING**

TMAC does not have a strategic plan but in 2013 it said it planned to present a revised strategic plan to the 2013 Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not do so.

**LAND RELEASE**

Thailand released a total of almost 32km² of mined area in 2013 (see Table 1), 53% more than the previous year, reflecting increased confidence in survey and land release methodologies. Only 0.3km² of the total, though, was released by clearance. TMAC gives priority to accelerating land release through non-technical and technical survey. A series of workshops conducted in 2013-14 have focused on developing criteria to classify and prioritize land for clearance according to socio-economic impact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cancelled by NTS (m²)</th>
<th>Area released by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed*</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TMAC</td>
<td>20,501,910</td>
<td>7,955,874</td>
<td>307,953</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>674,814</td>
<td>1,163,615</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>1,309,912</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,486,636</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,119,489</strong></td>
<td><strong>307,953</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,142</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Differences with the number of mines reported destroyed in 2013 may originate from delayed destruction of mines reported cleared in 2012.

**SURVEY IN 2013**

TMAC reported conducting survey on 39 SHAs in Sakaeo, Chanthaburi, Trat, Sisaket, Surin, Burirum, Nan, Mae Hong Son, and Chiangmai covering a total of 31.6km², of which only 0.3km² was confirmed as a hazardous area requiring full clearance.

NPA initially worked in Surin province with HMAU 3 but in May 2013 conducted a feasibility study and impact assessment in northern Chiang Mai province and with TMAC’s approval shifted its teams in July to undertake survey and land release on two confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) near the border with Myanmar, working in cooperation with HMAU 4. NPA released a total of 0.67km² of which 0.67m² was canceled by NTS and 1.16m² released by technical survey.

In 2014, NPA deployed a survey team to Phayao province bordering Lao PDR to complete an impact assessment and NTS of one task and another survey team to Mae Hong Son province to complete NTS of the four remaining known tasks in the north, northwest, and west located in the provinces of Chiangmai, Mae Hong Son, and Tak on the border with Myanmar.

**MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013**

Three of TMAC’s four HMAUs conducted full clearance in 2013, completing clearance of a total of 0.31km² (see Table 2), the same level of activity as the previous year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines found</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THMAU1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24,475</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAU3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>268,478</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>307,953</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,478</strong></td>
<td><strong>20</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the nine-and-a-half year extension granted by States Parties in 2008), Thailand is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2018.26

Thailand's extension request estimated the area requiring full clearance at 528km². It said Thailand would employ some 900 deminers and clear or release between 60km² and 65km² a year during the plan period, setting a target of 170km² in the first four years.27 TMAC, however, has not received the resources to fulfil this plan. TMAC has never had sufficient resources to work with the capacity envisaged in the extension request and the gap between land release targets and results continues to widen, albeit at a slower rate as land release methodologies become more efficiently applied. In the last five years, Thailand released less than one-third of the amount of land targeted in the extension request (see Table 3).

ENDNOTES
4 Email from Viosea Chavyour, Information Management and Operations Officer, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
5 Information provided by Database Unit, TMAC, 14 May 2014.
8 Based on Monitor analysis of media reports for 2002 and 2013. “Summary of Violence in the South of Thailand from Jan 2004 to February 2012.”
9 Email from Mr. William L. Tipton, NPA, 20 October 2012.
10 Email from Visavesa Chuaysiri, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
11 Document for the Sub-Committee Meetings; Monitor and Evaluation Subcommittee and Clearance and Demining Sub-Committee on 7 September 2012, at HMAU 4 conducted only NTS and TS.
12 Information provided by Database Unit, TMAC, 14 May 2014.
13 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Country Programme Director Cambodia (previously Programme Manager Thailand), APOPO, 2 May 2014.
14 Email from Col. Nippon Maneesai, Assistant Director-General, TMAC, 23 March 2013.
15 Email from Kim Warren, Country Programme Director Cambodia (previously Programme Manager Thailand), APOPO, 2 May 2014.
16 Email from Visavesa Chuaysiri, Information Management and Operations Officer, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
19 Email from Viosea Chavyour, Information Management and Operations Officer, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
20 Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Country Programme Director Cambodia (previously Programme Manager Thailand), APOPO, 2 May 2014.
21 Interview with Col. Nippon Maneesai, Assistant Director-General, TMAC, 23 March 2013.
24 Email from Mr. William L. Tipton, NPA, 20 October 2012.
25 Email from Visavesa Chuaysiri, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
26 Email from Visavesa Chuaysiri, NPA Thailand, 6 May 2014.
27 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 August 2008, p. 7.
31 Information provided by Database Unit, TMAC, 14 May 2014.
MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

 Problem understood 7
 Target date for completion of clearance 2
 Targeted clearance 2
 Efficient clearance 2
 National funding of program 6
 Timely clearance 1
 Land release system 6
 National mine action standards 6
 Reporting on progress 4
 Improving performance 1

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 3.7

VERY POOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Mines were laid in 1956–9 along 510km of the border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in order to prevent illegal border crossings; additionally, mines were laid around security installations. According to Turkey, all mines laid along its borders with Bulgaria, Georgia, and Greece have been cleared.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in March 2013, Turkey identified a total of 3,520 mined areas covering almost 215km² (see Table 1). This estimate was provisional as another 346 suspected mined areas have yet to be investigated, of which 279 are on the border with Iraq. The main mine-affected area is on the border with Syria (190km²), with small amounts on the borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq. A further 704 mined areas covering a total of 2.6km² have been identified around military installations inside the country. No update has yet been provided on the size or number of mined areas cleared in 2013.

Table 1. Mined areas as of March 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian border</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan border</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian border</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>14.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi border</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>5.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian border</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>190.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas inside Turkey</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3,520</td>
<td>214.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landmines were also emplaced by government forces during the 1984–99 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.

During the 1974 occupation of northern Cyprus, Turkish Armed Forces laid minefields to create a barrier on the northern side of the buffer zone that divides the island, and also in areas adjacent to the buffer zone. The UN identified 26 minefields laid by Turkish forces in the buffer zone. Cyprus reported in 2011 that one minefield remained in the buffer zone after clearance of 78 mined areas and 26,000 mines. In 2014, Cyprus reported other mined areas in areas under the control of Turkish forces in the north of Cyprus (see separate report on Cyprus).
MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Turkey still does not have a national mine action authority (NMAA) or national mine action center (NMAC). Currently mine action activities are decentralized with responsibility divided among various national authorities. The Turkish Army is responsible for contaminated areas around military installations; the Ministry of Interior oversees clearance activities in the eastern borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Iran; and clearance activities along the border with Syria fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense.1

Turkey reported that efforts were underway to centralize coordination of clearance activities through efforts by the Ministry of National Defense to establish an NMAA and NMAC. In 2013, it was reported that a draft law on the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC had been completed and was awaiting input from other ministries before delivery to the Prime Minister to submit to Parliament.16 The law was expected to pass through Parliament in 2014, but no progress was reported as of May 2014.18

In the meantime, an Interministerial Coordination Board (IMCB) within the Ministry of National Security reportedly began working on 26 October 2010 and was said to be ‘meeting regularly and practically functioning as the National Mine Action Authority’ to coordinate all government agencies involved in mine action, elaborate mine action standards, and discuss key issues, including appropriate mine clearance methodologies and risk education.19

Turkey’s Article 5 deadline extension request says it plans to complete clearance of all mined areas by 2022, including its borders with Armenia, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as well as mined areas around installations inside the country. Turkey gave priority to clearing the Syrian border, estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area. Officials observe it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.20 Delays in 2013 in implementing plans for demining the Syrian border left the prospects for early progress uncertain.21

Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common border.22 Turkey’s President ratified Law No. 5903 on the demining of minefields along the Syrian border on 16 June 2009, giving both the lead role as well as the responsibility for inviting tenders for demining to the Ministry of National Defense. If this process did not work, the responsibility for inviting tenders for demining to the Ministry of Finance would have the minefields cleared by means of a ‘service procurement.’ If this method also failed, the law said the government would invite companies to tender for demining in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.23

The law also provided for the possibility of ‘requesting the services of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency’ (NAMS).24 Turkey said in June 2011 that it had concluded a ‘sales agreement’ with NAMSA providing for quality management and technical support.15 A NAMSA advisor in Ankara provided technical support on such issues as tendering procedures and contract management.25 Officials told the Monitor in March 2013 that NAMSA was no longer involved in the tender process, but it would conduct quality control and assurance after clearance.26

Turkey announced in 2011 that tenders would be invited for clearance of the 91km-long Syrian border, divided into six separate areas, with a total mined area of 212km² (larger than the area subsequently reported in its Article 5 deadline extension request).37 The government had initially planned for a deadline of June 2011 for tenders with a view to starting clearance in 2011.38 However, Turkey told the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2012 that bids would be submitted only by 15 June 2012 for the first Syrian border clearance project, involving a 527km stretch between Cizre and Cakabey. Clearance would continue until 2016. Bidding for the second Syrian border project, involving 384km of border between Kobaney and Demizigeren, would begin only after ‘validation of the contract’ for the first section. Clearance of the second section would continue until the end of 2016.39 Eleven demining companies reportedly bid for the first project but, in July 2013, the Ministry of National Defence canceled tenders for clearing the border because of developments in Syria40 and as of May 2014 has not provided any information on future prospects for clearance in the area.

Turkey’s Article 5 extension request also sets out plans for a three-phase clearance of its eastern and southeastern borders, starting with the Armenian border and working south to the border with Iraq. It said that work would start before the end of 2014 and last for two years, although a table of the timelines showed the first two phases continuing through 2017 and the third phase being completed in 2018.41

Turkey did not record any land release in 2012, neither has it provided any information for the year 2013 although its Article 7 report for 2013 indicates that clearance activities did take place. In its 2013 extension request, Turkey indicated that since activities began, 1,15km² had been released along the Syrian border through clearance destroying 764 antipersonnel mines and 974 antivehicle mines. This amounts to less than 1% of the area currently identified as mined along the border with Syria. No land release has been reported in either the interior mined areas or in other border areas, although a total of 24,287 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. Demining has seemingly been limited to ensuring safe passage for military personnel.26

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

Turkey’s Article 7 transparency report for 2013 recorded 2,248 mines had been destroyed during the year (see Table 2) — a substantial increase in the number of mines destroyed compared with 2012 (685) and 2011 (224), bringing the total number of mines destroyed in mined areas since the start of demining in 2004 to 28,269.

Table 2. Progress in destruction of mines in mined areas in 2012–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Mines remaining by end 2012</th>
<th>Mines remaining by end 2013</th>
<th>Mines destroyed in 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian border</td>
<td>613,715</td>
<td>612,769</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi border</td>
<td>69,030</td>
<td>68,896</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian border</td>
<td>194,755</td>
<td>194,033</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian border</td>
<td>28,306</td>
<td>20,306</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijani border</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior areas</td>
<td>77,122</td>
<td>76,676</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>977,922</strong></td>
<td><strong>976,674</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,248</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LAND RELEASE

Turkey still does not record any land release in 2012, neither has it provided any information for the year 2013 although its Article 7 report for 2013 indicates that clearance activities did take place.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under its original Article 5 deadline, Turkey was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011, Turkey disclosed that clearance of its border with Syria would not be completed until 2016 and, a year later, it acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.26 Turkey submitted a request in March 2013 asking for an eight-year extension until 2022, but also said this was ‘provisional’ and only an ‘initial estimate’ of the time needed.27 It cited delays in setting up a national mine action authority, inconvenient weather, and insecurity among factors that had obstructed progress. But it also revealed that in the nine years since acceding to the Mine Action Authority, the clearance had not even begun.28

In 1998–2012, Turkey has reported contributing approximately 68.7 million Turkish Lira (equivalent to approximately US$30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.29

In its Article 5 extension request, Turkey estimated the budget needed for the three phases of its clearance plan for the border areas in 2015–18 as totaling almost €68.7 million, of which two thirds of the first two phases would be covered by the European Union under the ‘Pre-accession Financial Assistance Scheme.’30 Turkey has not allocated national funding for clearance of other mined areas, due to be undertaken in 2015–22, although it has estimated a budget of at least €5.3 million for this work.31

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 1998–2012, Turkey has reported contributing approximately €68.7 million Turkish Lira (equivalent to approximately US$30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.32 Turkey has not reported the amount contributed in 2013. In its March 2013 extension request, Turkey estimated the budget needed for the three phases of its clearance plan for the border areas in 2015–18 as totaling almost €68.7 million, of which two thirds of the first two phases would be covered by the European Union under the ‘Pre-accession Financial Assistance Scheme.’33 Turkey has not allocated national funding for clearance of other mined areas, due to be undertaken in 2015–22, although it has estimated a budget of at least €5.3 million for this work.34

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Turkey should prioritize clearance of areas where mine incidents are occurring. Clearance in these areas should not depend upon clearance of the border with Syria.
- Turkey should push ahead with the administrative and structural processes needed to accelerate mine clearance in the country, and not wait until 2015.
- Turkey should urgently overcome delays in the establishment of a Mine Action Authority and a Mine Action Centre.
- Turkey should overcome persistent delays in its tendering process for mined areas on the Syrian border and provide an update to States Parties on its progress.
- Turkey should report its clearance efforts more fully and present a budget for the clearance work to States Parties.

ENDNOTES

1 Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 26 April 2007.
2 Ibid., 23 May 2012, Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2013, p. 8.
3 Idem, pp. 10–12. The tables on pp. 11–12 report 1,265 mined areas on the Syrian border, covering 1,865km².
4 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elif Comoglu Ulgen, then-Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 July 2008.
5 Email from Brian Kelly, Spokesperson, UN Mine Action Centre, Cyprus Headquarters, 23 April 2007; and article with Brian Kelly, UN Mine Action Centre, Cyprus Headquarters, 23 April 2007.
7 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. 10.
8 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. 8.
9 Ibid.
10 ICBL interview with Serhan Yigit, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 4 March 2013.
16 Ibid., 23 June 2011.
18 ICBL interview with Serhan Yigit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 4 March 2013.
19 Ministry of National Defense, ‘Notification on designation of the mine clearance companies for mine clearance activity to be implemented by the Turkish ministry of National Defense over the existing minefields along the Turkey-Syria border.’
21 Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 23 May 2012.
24 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, p. 18. In addition, mine accidents have occurred in areas previously claimed to have been cleared (e.g., for example, the incident on 1 May 2013) in the Shur region near the border with Armenia that killed two military personnel. Hurriyat Daily News, ‘One million landmines pose risks for Kurdish comeback,’ 4 May 2013.
25 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form A.
26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form B.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form C.
29 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form E.
30 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form F.
31 ICBL, ‘Spotlight on Turkey,’ 19 February 2014.
32 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, Form G.
32 Ibid., p. 18.
MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
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<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 5.5

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and the coordination center of all mine action activities in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ. National mine action standards took effect in July 2013.

ZIMAC, and, since 2013, the HALO Trust, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), conduct land release activities. HALO has been given initial responsibility for survey and clearance of the border minefields running from Musengezi in Mashonaland Central to Rwenya in Northern Manicaland, originally estimated to cover some 139 km².

Zimbabwe’s reported clearance was almost 0.8 km² in 2013 (see Table 1).

Table 1. Mine clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mines areas released</th>
<th>Total area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ZIMAC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>740,067</td>
<td>*5,796</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,252</td>
<td>226**</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51,807</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>799,126</td>
<td>6,052</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ZIMAC also reported clearance of 210 IEDs. ** This figure includes 67 antipersonnel mines that were dealt with as call-outs from local communities.

HALO reported one very slight injury to a deminer during its demining operations in 2013.

LAND RELEASE

In 2013–14, NPA conducted non-technical survey (NTS) of 17.15 km² covering three mined areas in Zimbabwe that ZIMAC had allocated to it. Surprisingly, no land was released as a result. HALO conducted NTS of 7.8 km² of land on the Musengezi to Rwenya minefields. The survey as of early 2014 indicated that the ploughshare belt might be considerably narrower than the 400 meters assumed by Zimbabwe in its extension request, but the sample size was too small for definitive conclusions to be drawn.

Zimbabwe’s reported clearance was almost 0.8 km² in 2013 (see Table 1).
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Zimbabwe's latest Article 5 deadline is due to expire on 1 January 2015. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009 it has submitted a total of four extension requests, its latest request of 31 December 2013 seeking three additional years until 1 January 2018. This extension will enable further survey and clearance but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period.

Based on 2013 clearance rates and capacity, NPA expects clearance in its allotted areas to take between 11 and 17 years. It was, however, planning to increase capacity from 20 to 30 deminers in 2014 and to further increase operational capacity once additional funding has been identified. The possibility of using dogs or machines to speed up demining productivity was still under consideration as of early 2014.17

HALO Trust has been working to increase the number of deminers employed in its clearance operations from 34 in 2013 to as many as 80 in 2014. As of February 2014, it was negotiating the import of a demining machine.18

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, Japan, Norway, the US, and Ireland contributed a total of US$2.26 million toward clearance activities in Zimbabwe.19 In 2012, Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time since 1999.

International assistance in 201320

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Amount (national currency)</th>
<th>Amount ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Clearance</td>
<td>¥83,312,043</td>
<td>853,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Clearance</td>
<td>NOK4,050,000</td>
<td>689,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>$500,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Clearance</td>
<td>€165,000</td>
<td>219,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,261,848</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2013, the Government of Zimbabwe reported contributing $800,000 to its mine action program.21 A breakdown of this contribution has not been provided.

ENDNOTES

3 In addition, the quality of earlier clearance by the Zimbabwean army is open to question as accidents have been reported on cleared land.
4 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 3, 5.
5 Ibid, p. 6.
7 Interview with Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Harare, 9 June 2014.
8 Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.
12 Email from Christian Andersen, Desk Officer, Africa, NPA, 13 February 2014.
13 Email from Tom Dibbs, HALO Trust, 20 February 2014.
15 Emails from Christian Andersen, NPA, 13 February 2014, and Tom Dibbs, HALO Trust, 19 February 2014, and Statement of Zimbabwe, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 2014. Different figures were provided in Zimbabwe’s Article 7 Report for 2013.
16 Email from Tom Dibbs, HALO Trust, 20 February 2014.
17 Email from Christian Andersen, NPA, 13 February 2014.
18 Email from Tom Dibbs, HALO Trust, 19 February 2014.
21 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 22.
### MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
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<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 7.3**

**GOOD AND IMPROVING**
Algeria is affected by antipersonnel mines as a result of World War II, the French colonial occupation, and the insurgency of the 1990s. During Algeria's struggle for independence, mines were laid by the French along the Challe and Morice lines on the eastern and western borders of the country. Algeria has estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid, with a density of more than three mines per square meter in some instances. In 2011, Algeria declared that all suspected minefields located along its southwest border have been cleared, meaning that remaining contamination is located in the northwest and east of the country. Algeria conducted a first clearance phase from 1963 to 1988, during which some 500km² of mine areas were cleared by manual and mechanical means, resulting in the destruction of more than 7.8 million antipersonnel mines. A second clearance phase began in November 2004. Algeria has reported that as of end 2013, more than 68,7km² of mined areas were released by manual clearance, resulting in destruction of 897,751 antipersonnel mines, of which 79% were found during planned clearance operations. In April 2014, the Algerian Ministry of Defense announced that more than 75.7km² of mined areas had been released as of 31 March 2014.

In 2009, Algeria reported that two portions of the Challe and Morice mine belts had been preserved as 'historical sites' of its national liberation struggle. The two areas were located in Tizi Ouzou and Bechar. The mined area in Tizi Ouzou was cleared in October 2011 with the disposal of 927 antipersonnel mines (627 were destroyed and the remaining 500 were ‘neutralized’, meaning the detonator and explosive was removed). In May 2012, technical survey of the second area, in Bechar, found no mines and the area was released.

The precise extent of contamination today is not known, though Algeria reported in June 2011 that confirmed mined areas along the Challe and Morice lines covered more than 13.5km². Algeria reported that as of end 2013, a total of 23 communes with mined areas over a length of 295km remained in the east of the country, down from 25 in 2012: eight in El Tarf, seven in Souk Ahras, three in Oued El Khebb, and five in Tebessa. In the west, 10 minefields over a length of 188km remained to be addressed: eight in Tlemcen and two in Nâama.

Occasionally, ‘isolated’ antipersonnel mines are also found outside known mined areas. Between January 2007 and December 2013, 1,079 mines were found in such circumstances. In addition, the north of the country is said to be contaminated by an unknown number of artisanal mines and other explosive items laid by insurgent groups. The total number of mine survivors in Algeria is unknown. As of November 2013, the Monitor had identified 6,848 mine casualties since 1962 (3,265 killed and 3,583 injured). In April 2014, Algeria noted that no new victims have been reported during the past two years.

### MINE ACTION PROGRAM

In 2003, a presidential decree set up the Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which is the governmental focal point for all mine action activities. All demining activities are carried out by the Algerian army; their clearance capacity is not known.

In 2006, a joint mine action capacity building project was established with UNDP. The project was initially planned to last three years, but was extended until December 2013. In 2014, the UNDP Resident Representative in Algeria explained that the project aimed to facilitate implementation of Algeria’s mine action strategy as well as to support national authorities efforts on mine risk education. The outputs and outcomes of this project have not been publicly reported.

### STRATEGIC PLANNING

In 2011, Algeria calculated that six years would be needed to complete clearance of its remaining minefields in accordance with its extended Article 5 deadline of April 2017. It noted, however, that sometimes deminers are called away for urgent demining operations elsewhere in the country, which could impact on the ability to complete clearance in time. It also noted that demining is ‘particularly challenging’ in three mined areas in the northwest of the country: at Meghrar oasis, at Tinieb, and of a third close to the town of Ain Sefra.

Algeria’s August 2011 extension request included a detailed work plan for 2012-17 containing annual milestones against which progress could be compared. By the end of April 2014, Algeria projected that operations would be underway in four welayas (Nâama, El Taref, Souk Ahras, and Tebessa) and would have concluded in Tlemcen. Operations in Guelma would only start in 2015. As of April 2014, clearance was ongoing in Tlemcen, Nâama, Tebessa, Souk Ahras, and El-Taref.

### LAND RELEASE

The Algerian army conducts all land release operations in the country. Algeria reported in its August 2011 extension request that it would only use manual clearance during demining operations because machines were not considered a sufficiently reliable clearance method and could not be used in mountains or on rocky terrain. Algeria reported clearing more than 5.5km² of mined areas in six locations across three provinces in 2013, destroying more than 76,000 antipersonnel mines (see Table 1).

### SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Algeria has systematically funded its mine action program through its own resources, though it has never provided details of expenditure or cost estimates for clearance operations.

### ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2011, Algeria is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 April 2017.

In March 2011, Algeria requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, citing as justifications for its inability to complete clearance on time the delay in initiating clearance operations, the choice of purely manual demining, climatic conditions, and the extent of contamination. In August 2011, a revised extension request was submitted providing a clearer picture of the remaining problem.

In December 2013, Algeria stated that clearance operations were proceeding according to the work plan set out in its extension request. In April 2014, Ministry of Defense officials claimed that the pace of operations makes it likely that clearance would be completed by 2017.
ARGENTINA

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Algeria should maintain its demining efforts to meet its 2017 deadline.
- Algeria should ensure clear data on total mined area remaining to be released as well as the precise quantity of land cleared per region are publicly shared and available.

ENDNOTES

1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 5.
2 Article 7 Report, February 2014, p. 3.
3 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 6.
5 Ibid.
7 Article 7 Report, April 2014, Section 3.5.
8 Article 7 Report, February 2014, p. 5.
11 Ibid, Annex 2.2.
14 Algeria National People’s Army, El Djeich, Issue 609, p. 47.
17 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, pp. 21–2.
18 Ibid, p. 22.
21 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011, p. 7.
22 Article 7 Report, February 2014, Annex 1.1–1.3.
23 Ibid.
24 Article 7 Reports, February 2012, Section 5.1, and February 2014, Annexes 1.1–1.3.
26 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 August 2011.
28 Algeria National People’s Army, El Djeich, Issue 609, p. 47.

ARGENTINA

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.1 On ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming its rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the territory.2 The islands were mined, mostly by Argentina, during its armed conflict with the United Kingdom (UK) in 1982. Argentina has reported that no other territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected.3

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Office under the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces and a Humanitarian Demining Training Center (Centro de Entrenamiento de Desminado Humanitario).

LAND RELEASE

At the Second Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the ‘illegal occupation’ by the UK.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2009 by the Second Review Conference, Argentina is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020.

At the Second Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the ‘illegal occupation’ by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.4

ENDNOTES

1 Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 April 2010.
4 Ibid.
CHILE

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 5.4

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Chile is affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and, to a very limited extent, by explosive remnants of war, which may include cluster munition remnants.1

The mines were all laid on Chile’s borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s. The mined areas are generally difficult to access and mostly in unpopulated regions. Some minefields in the north are located as high as 5,000m above sea level, although the vast majority of the mines are located in two of the remaining five mine-affected regions.2

As of December 2013, 98 confirmed mined areas remained across the four regions of Arica y Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, and Magallanes y Antártica Chilena, containing an estimated 61,402 mines (see Table 1). A further 9,210 mines are located within suspect hazardous areas (SHAs, termed “danger areas” by Chile) in Arica y Parinacota, Antofagasta, and Valparaiso regions. As of December 2013, total contaminated area was estimated to cover 13.9km².3

Table 1. Confirmed mined areas in Chile4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Confirmed mined areas</th>
<th>Mines remaining</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarapacá</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antofagasta</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magallanes y Antártica Chilena</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>61,402</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The National Demining Comission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CNAD) is responsible for mine action in Chile. Its main functions are to advise the President, mobilize resources, coordinate demining with state agencies, and develop plans for implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. CNAD is chaired by the Minister of Defense and Chile’s mine action program is executed under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense.6

Demining is conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Peace and Demining Division (POMTA).

LAND RELEASE

Chile reported in December 2013 that they had cleared more than 40% of recorded mines (77,415 of the original estimate of 181,814 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and 9.3km² of contaminated area). This leaves 13.9km² and 104,399 mines to clear by March 2020.7

In 2013, Chile reported clearance of just 0.4km² of area in the Arica y Parinacota and Magallanes y Antártica Chilena regions in 14 mined areas, destroying in the process 15,470 mines.8 Chile did not report area cleared for the Antofagasta region but indicated that three mined areas had been released. In addition, it was indicated that the POMTA has continued demining operations on Isla Picton in the Magallanes region, but no details were provided. Chile reported that several areas in Antofagasta collapsed due to snow and severe rainfall in 2013 causing demining units to be moved to work in other areas and stopping demining efforts for some months.9

By February 2014, CNAD indicated that a further 2,070 mines had been destroyed, bringing the total to 79,485, or almost 44% of emplaced mines. No additional land release was reported between December 2013 and February 2014.

However, certification of the ‘extraordinary operations’ clearance activities reported in the Laguna Figueroa sector of the Magallanes y Antártica Chilena region10 has been challenged in the courts as the local population did not accept the validity of the demining activities in the area.11

In 2013, Chile’s demining capacity comprised five survey teams, five units of deminers, and five explosive ordnance disposal teams in addition to three mechanical teams, with a total capacity of 145 people dedicated to clearance operations.12
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2011), Chile is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020.

In its March 2011 extension request, Chile cited bad weather, remote mined areas in high altitudes, the difficult terrain, and the different types and conditions of the mines as the main reasons for needing additional time. In response to the Analysing Group of States Parties’ query regarding the need for an eight year extension for such a proportionately small area of contaminated land particularly with regard to the possibility of applying new land release methodologies, Chile cited the difficult terrain, weather, and logistics involved in demining operations in the country. Due to the weather conditions in Chile, clearance activities can only be conducted in October through March each year. Based on the remaining area and number of mines, it is calculated that Chile needed to clear approximately 2km² and destroy 16,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines per year to be able to meet its Article 5 obligations by 2020.

Despite the achievable yet conservative targets set, Chile’s clearance record has been falling behind its annual benchmarks due to a shortfall of more than 1.6km², achieving just 46% of its target to date. Nevertheless, CNAD officials have stated that Chile will meet its Article 5 obligations by its 2020 deadline. We have a rate of 10% per year in the number of mines destroyed, which allows us to think that we will meet the goal of liberating all the territory by 2020 and get certified as free of landmines.

In March 2013, Evo Morales, the President of Bolivia, accused Chile of failing to comply with its clearance obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, stating that the Chilean government had ‘paralyzed’ clearance operations along their shared border. Chile and Bolivia are embroiled in a border dispute following Bolivia’s appeal to the International Court of Justice in The Hague regarding its demands for a corridor of access through Chile to the Pacific ocean.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

According to Chile’s Article 5 deadline extension request, Chile intended to cover the full cost of meeting its Article 5 obligations, which was estimated to be more than US$1 million. Since 2003, the government of Chile has provided almost all funding toward its own mine action program having not received international funding since 2007. Chile has contributed over $4 million each year since 2008 and an estimated $40 million since 2003. In March 2014, the Executive Director of CNAD, Col. Juan Mendosa, said: “We manage a budget of four million dollars annually for this work, as well as some international donations.”

ENDNOTES

1 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2007.
2 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2010.
3 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.
5 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.
8 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C. The mines reported destroyed were not disaggregated between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.
9 Interview with Col. Juan Orlando Mendosa, Executive Secretary, CNAD, in Geneva, 11 April 2014; and Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F.
10 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G.
11 Email from Elir Rojas Calderon, Director, Centro Zonas Minadas, 26 April 2014.
12 Interview with Col. Juan Orlando Mendosa, CNAD, in Geneva, 11 April 2014.
15 Interview with Col. Juan Orlando Mendosa, CNAD, in Geneva, 11 April 2014.
19 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 April 2011.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Chile should increase its pace of land release significantly, applying all relevant methodologies to ensure annual targets are met.
- Chile should improve its reporting of progress, disaggregating clearance more clearly in terms of square meters cleared per annum, types of mines found and destroyed, and number of mined areas released.
In 2013, the Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, PAICMA) received reports of 2,672 events. These events occurred in 28 departments. Antioquia and Meta made up almost one third of the 2013 total. Each event is recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at PAICMA, which continues to undergo clean-up. By the end of 2013, half of the database entries had been cleaned up.

Colombia has stated that all existing mines and minefields laid by the Colombian Armed Forces prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty were cleared before its initial Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011. Remaining contamination is due to mine laying by NSAGs whose continued and irregular use of improvised devices makes it very difficult to obtain an accurate picture of contamination. Grant Salisbury, HALO Trust’s Program Manager for Colombia has commented that “Colombia is the first country that we’ve worked in, indeed the first country that I know of, where all the mines used are improvised [explosive devices] – every other country where we work, the vast majority of mines come from state factories.”

The possibility of conducting survey is limited by security conditions. As things stands, the full extent of the contamination is therefore unknown. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombings. Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombings. Explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is seeking to destroy coca plantations. In 2013, only 6% of the 368 casualties recorded in IMSMA were from UXO.

OTHER AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

COLOMBIA

MINING ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

| Problem understood             | 3 |
| Target date for completion of clearance | 7 |
| Targeted clearance             | 6 |
| Efficient clearance            | 6 |
| National funding of program    | 7 |
| Timely clearance               | 5 |
| Land release system            | 6 |
| National mine action standards | 7 |
| Reporting on progress          | 7 |
| Improving performance          | 7 |

**MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 6.0 AVERAGE**

MINING ACTION PROGRAM

Established on 30 July 2002 under Law No. 759/2002, the National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonal Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP) is the National Mine Action Authority responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance. Two new key actors for mine action in Colombia are the Victims Unit and the Land Restitution Unit, neither of which existed when CINAMAP was created. Changes to the law are needed in order for them to become full members of CINAMAP.

PAICMA, the technical secretary of CINAMAP, is responsible for coordinating implementation of the 2009–19 Integrated Mine Action Plan, with the aims of minimizing the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and of implementing sustainable development programs in affected communities. The Interagency Humanitarian Demining Group (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario), commonly referred to as the Instancia Interinstitucional, is the government’s decision-making body for humanitarian demining, comprising the director of PAICMA, the Minister of Defense, and the Inspector General of the army. It approves accreditation, national standards, tasks, and clearance priorities. The OAS and UNMAS are advisors to the Instancia Interinstitucional on accreditation and national standards.

COLOMBIA’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The precise extent of contamination remains unclear, though the national database contains information that at least 30 of the 32 departments may have a mine threat. The most affected departments are believed to be Antioquia, Arauca, Caquetá, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Tolima.

Contamination and Impact

In Colombia, the vast majority of mines come from state factories. As things stands, the full extent of the contamination is therefore unknown. The Organization of American States (OAS) has also reported that no mined areas have been found in Colombia that could be considered as high- or medium-density minefields. Nuisance mines have been found in schools, water sources, pathways, and stream crossings in order to allegedly intimidate or displace the local population.

In peace negotiations with the FARC in La Habana, Cuba, government negotiators announced that a pre-agreement had been reached whereby the FACR committed to support humanitarian demining and that once a final peace agreement has been signed demining of areas affected by mines and UXO will be conducted. Progress will depend on the continuation of the peace process by the newly elected government starting in August 2016.

Contamination also arises from abandoned or illegal ammunition storage areas, clashes between NSAGs and the Colombian armed forces, and aerial bombings. Explosive devices and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) are found in former battle areas, bombing sites, drug routes, and areas where the government is seeking to destroy coca plantations. In 2013, only 6% of the 368 casualties recorded in IMSMA were from UXO.

The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Battalion (Fuerzas Armadas del Batallón de Desminado Humanitario, BIDES) has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005, when it began clearance of 35 military bases. It completed the clearance in 2010.

In September 2013, HALO Trust became the first NGO to conduct demining in Colombia when it began clearance operations at the El Morro minefield, Nariño municipality, in Antioquia department. The other municipality assigned to HALO is San Rafael, also in Antioquia.

The Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia. The OAS is responsible for managing and implementing a national monitoring system on behalf of the Instancia Interinstitucional. The OAS also serves as an advisor to the Instancia Interinstitucional on accreditation of NGOs in Colombia.

Since 2010, UNMAS has been advising PAICMA on a legal and technical mine action framework to allow NGOs to conduct mine clearance. UNMAS also assists PAICMA in accreditation and monitoring procedures as well as management processes.

During 2013, OAS, UNMAS, and PAICMA provided technical assistance to the Humanitarian Demining Battalion on development of standing operating procedures (SOPs) for non-technical survey (NTS), quality management, manual and mechanical clearance and mine detection dogs, as well as on training and skills.
LAND RELEASE

The Instancia Interinstitucional has approved interventions by demining organizations in 19 municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, and Santander for clearance ‘events’. The BIDES is conducting clearance operations in some of these areas.

Municipalities prioritized in 2013 were Carmen de Viboral, Cocorná, La Unión, Narino, San Luis, San Rafael, Sonsón, Granada and San Francisco in Antioquia; Cóbordo, San Juan Nepomuceno, Carmen de Bolívar, San Jacinto and Zambrano in Bolívar; Samaná in Caldas; and Barrancabermeja, Sabana de Torres, Carmen de Chuquic, and San Vicente de Chuquir in Santander department. In 2013, NTS was conducted in eight of the nineteen municipalities prioritized for clearance; in addition, the municipality of San Carlos, which had been previously declared as ‘Free of Suspicion of contamination from landmines in 2012’, had NTS as part of Colombia’s Residual Risk Policy.11

During 2013, the clearance capacity of the BIDES was increased by adding two platoons to the existing eight. According to Colombia’s latest Article 7 transparency report, the BIDES has 10 platoons with 30 independent demining teams and 3 mechanical teams with 2 Hitachi mine sweepers, 2 Bozera mine sweepers, and 1 Mini Wolf donated by Japan.10 It is planned that two platoons will be added each year until 2020.10

BIDES continues to clear a significant number of suspicious hazardous areas that do not contain any explosive ordnance. In 2013, it almost doubled productivity compared to 2012, clearing almost 0.47km² but only destroying in the process 170 explosive items (see Table 1).10 The number of mines destroyed has not been reported.

ENDNOTES
1 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014; and Monitor analysis of available data.
2 An event involving a mine may be initially reported as a suspected hazardous area (SHA), the location of a mine accident, or a single mine encountered and destroyed by the army. Events also include incidents from improved explosive devices (IEDs) and UXO as well as military demining operations.
3 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
4 Statement of Colombia, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, December 2012;
5 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 13 August 2013.
8 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
9 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
10 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 29 June 2012.
11 Address from FAO: Impacto al menor de la mina de los mineros del narcotráfico,” El Tiempo, Bogotá, 17 May 2014.
13 Ibid.
15 Acta DINAMAP 02/2013, 2013/07/08, pp 3-14.
16 Province of Colombia, Decree 392 of 2007.
18 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 29 June 2012; and Marc Bonnet, Program Manager/Senior Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 15 September 2013.
21 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
26 Acra Instancia Interinstitucional No. 012, 2012/05/04, and “Accion CMC Program Colombia Executive Summary, External Monitoring Component 2012/2013.”
27 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014.
33 Ibid.
34 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 13 August 2013.
35 Email from Lisa D. Miller, Program Manager/Senior Technical Advisor, UNMAS, 28 April 2014; Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 2014; Email from Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014; email from Louis D. Martin, Public engagement and partnerships, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 9 April 2014; Belgium CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014; Germany CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 5 May 2014; Japan CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014; and Belgium CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 April 2014.
37 Ibid.
39 Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2014.
41 Ibid. p. 16.
42 Ibid. p. 10.
**CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

Cyprus is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. The island has been divided geographically and politically by a heavily mined, 180km-long buffer zone since 1974 when Turkish Armed Forces occupied the north of the island. Minefields were laid within and outside a UN buffer zone by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish Armed Forces. The exact extent of residual mine contamination is not known.

As of November 2013, Cyprus reported that no minefields under Cypriot control remained in the buffer zone after having completed the clearance of two mined areas in Dali in 2012 and a further single minefield located at Potamia by July 2013 in accordance with its National Plan.1 The sole remaining minefield in the buffer zone is located in Turkish-controlled area.2

The extent of contamination in areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces is not known, although Cyprus has claimed in its latest Article 7 transparency report that 21 minefields laid by Turkey’s occupation forces, mostly next to the buffer zone, ‘are known not yet to be cleared of anti-personnel mines. … Precise information on their size, on their composition (whether they include mines other than anti-personnel mines) and on how much land can be safely treated as arable when mines have been cleared are unknown.’3

Cyprus further reported that ‘before and during the invasion of 1974, the National Guard laid … 28 minefields north of Nicosia toward the Pentadaktylos mountain range, which are today located in the Turkish-occupied areas. The latter minefields included 1,006 anti-personnel mines, but the Republic of Cyprus is not aware of the current condition of these minefields and whether they have been cleared by the Turkish Armed Forces or not.’4

**MINE ACTION PROGRAM**

There is not known to be an operational mine action program in areas under the control of Turkish forces.

**LAND RELEASE**

In 2013 through July, Cyprus cleared 1,130 antipersonnel mines from a mined area near Potamia village.5 It is not clear whether there has been any clearance on territory controlled by the Turkish Armed Forces.

**ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with a three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2012), the Republic of Cyprus is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 July 2016. Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension but it did not request the additional time for clearance in Cyprus.

**ENDNOTES**

2 Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form C.
3 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, Form G.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), a result of years of conflict involving neighboring states, militias, and rebel groups. In 2011, the DRC claimed that contamination from mines and ERW existed across the territory, although ERW was more extensive than the mine threat. In August 2013, the Congolese Mine Action Centre (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) reported that the national database contained records on 1,540 open hazards in all 11 provinces, including 76 mined areas covering approximately 3.6km². Previously, in March 2013, the DRC launched a national survey, funded by Japan, to address large discrepancies in its data and to determine the full extent of contamination from mines and cluster munition remnants. The survey helped to produce an updated database and determine the resources needed to meet its Article 5 clearance obligation.

### MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
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<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 5.2**

### CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The DRC used the survey’s results as the basis for its second Article 5 deadline extension request, which it submitted in April 2014. By April 2014, following database clean-up and a new national survey, it was reported that 130 mined areas remained in eight provinces (Equateur, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, Maniema, North Kivu, Katanga, Province Orientale, and South Kivu) covering an estimated 1.8km², more than half of which is located in Equateur and Katanga provinces (see Table 1). The Aru and Dungu territories in Province Orientale were not surveyed due to insecurity.

### Table 1: Mined areas as of April 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>Size (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equateur</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>593,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Occidental</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>404,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasai Oriental</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>463,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maniema</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>159,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Kivu</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province Orientale</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>193,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kivu</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,823,292</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of April 2014, 2,516 victims of mines/ERW had been reported in DRC (1,063 dead, 1,447 injured, and six unknown). Of this total, 856 were caused by mines, and half of all recorded mine incidents occurred in South Kivu (256 victims, 30%) and Equateur (173 victims, 20%) provinces.

### MINE ACTION PROGRAM

On 9 July 2011, national mine action legislation was signed into law by the DRC president. The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC), established in 2002 by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), coordinates mine action operations in the DRC through offices in the capital, Kinshasa, and Goma, Kalemie, Kananga, Kisangani, and Mbandaka. It maintains de facto responsibility for planning, managing, and monitoring all mine action activities on behalf of the government. UNMACC is part of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) peacekeeping mission. UN Security Council Resolution 1925 mandated UNMACC to strengthen national mine action capacities and support reconstruction through road and infrastructure clearance.

In March 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2098 called for transfer of demining activities to the UN Country Team and the Congolese authorities. With the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2107 in March 2014, demining activities are no longer included in MONUSCO’s mandate, meaning that as from July 2014, MONUSCO will no longer fund humanitarian demining in the DRC. The Congolese Mine Action Centre (CCLAM) was established in 2012 with support from UNMACC.

Five international operators are accredited for mine action in the DRC: DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Mine Tech International (MTI), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

As of April 2016, these operators were based in five offices across the country:
- HI and Mechem were located in the Northern regional office in Kisangani, covering both Province Orientale and Maniema province.
- DCA, MAG, Mechem, and MTI were located in the Eastern regional office in Goma, covering both North and South Kivu provinces.
- MAG and NPA were located in the central regional office in Kananga, covering Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental provinces.
- Mechem and MAG were located in the Western regional office in Mbandaka, covering the provinces of Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, and Kinshasa.
- Mechem and MAG were located in the Southern regional office in Kalémie, covering the province of Katanga.

MAG and NPA are training teams in the DRC armed forces (FARDC) and the National Police (PNC) to conduct demining, battle area clearance (BAC), and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Mechem is operating under UN auspices.

Ne national organizations in DRC were accredited to conduct clearance activities. National organizations are responsible for carrying out non-technical survey and risk education.
STRATEGIC PLANNING

DRC's national mine action strategic plan for 2012–16 sets the goal of clearance by the end of 2016 of all areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines or unexploded submunitions, as well as for transition of the mine action program from UN to full national ownership. 11

LAND RELEASE

In 2013, 82 mines were found during clearance of 0.1km² of contaminated area in the DRC. Since 2009, demining organizations have cleared a total of about 2km² of mined areas (see Table 3). Between 2002 and 2011, the DRC reported that 7.5km² were demined. 14

Table 3. Mine clearance in 2009–13 (m²) 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>110,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>354,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>346,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>265,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>984,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,079,606</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 2009, demining organizations have cleared a total of about 2km² of mined areas (see Table 3). Between 2002 and 2011, the DRC reported that 7.5km² were demined. 14

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty in accordance with the 26-month extension request granted by States Parties in 2012, the DRC is required to destroy all operators for the failure to meet its deadline, although poor management and insufficient national ownership of the program were also major factors. In June 2011, however, at the Standing Committee meetings the DRC informed States Parties it was seeking only an interim two-year extension and that it would present a definitive extension request in 2014. 15 It subsequently requested a 26-month extension that States Parties approved at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012. While clearance operations continued during the extension period, the main activity was the national survey described above, which aimed to provide the DRC with the information needed to submit another extension request in 2014. 16

On 7 April 2014, the DRC submitted a second request to extend its Article 5 deadline, this time by six years, starting in January 2015. The extension indicates that at least 30% of the total mined areas can be released through technical survey, indicating that some 1.3km² would need to be cleared. 17 The extension request estimates that an average 0.2km² will be cleared each year. 18 The extension request includes annual projections of progress to be made during the extension period, though without providing a detailed work plan with a monthly breakdown of activities for each operator in each area in order to achieve these. 19 It also foresees expenditure of US$20 million, of which some $19.4 million will go to demining the 130 mined areas, while the remainder will be spent on survey and clearance in Aru and Dongu. 20

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

If its extension request is granted by States Parties, the DRC should immediately start developing a detailed work plan setting out activities to be carried out in 2015–20.

As soon as the security situation allows, the DRC should conduct surveys in Aru and Dongu territories.

ENDNOTES

1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 September 2011.
3 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michele Healy, Program Officer, UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC), Kinshasa, 29 April 2013; and email, 30 August 2013.
5 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 10.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 80.
8 UNMAS, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Overview,” last updated August 2013; and Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 12.
9 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, pp. 73–5.
11 Ibid.
15 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michele Healy, UNMACC, Kinshasa, 29 April 2013.
16 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 50.
17 Ibid., pp. 36–7.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 51; and Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michele Healy, UNMACC, Kinshasa, 29 April 2013.
23 Email from Papy Ditshia, Program Associate, UNMACC, 15 April 2014.
24 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michelle Healy, Program Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014; and email from Lisa D. Miller, Public engagement and partnerships, Office MFA, 9 April 2014.
25 Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Programme Officer, UNMACC, 9 April 2014; and Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 89.
26 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, p. 14; and Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2011, pp. 3, 49.
27 Statement of the DRC, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 21 June 2011.
28 Ibid., 27 May 2013.
29 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 48.
30 Ibid., p. 69.
31 Ibid., p. 81.
32 Ibid., p. 12.
33 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Simone van der Post, Policy Officer, Dutch MFA, 9 April 2014; Email from Ingvar Vale, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian MFA, 28 April 2014; Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014; and email from Lisa D. Miller, Public engagement and partnerships, US Department of State, 9 April 2014; Belgium CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014; Germany CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 5 May 2014; Japan CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014; and United Kingdom CCM Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2014.
34 Email from Papy Ditshia, UNMACC, 16 May 2014.
35 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 April 2014, p. 52.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, eight donors contributed a total of US$78.76 million to mine action in the DRC, which represents a decline of about 30% from 2012. 19 About 96% ($78.5 million) of international contributions were allocated to clearance operations. The DRC also received almost $6.85 million through UN assessed peacekeeping funds used for support to mine action, a decrease of $1 million from 2012. 21 In 2013, the combined total of all contributions toward DRC’s mine action program was just over $15.6 million.

The DRC has never reported any national contributions to its mine action program. However, in its Second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2014, the DRC announced its willingness to contribute to FC579,831,000 (about US$660,000) a year starting in January 2015. 22
MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem understood</th>
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<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
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<td>Improving performance</td>
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MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.9

ECUADOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Three provinces in the south of Ecuador (Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe) remain contaminated with antipersonnel mines and, to a much smaller extent, antivehicle mines and UXO, resulting from the 1995 conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Condor Mountain Range (Cordillera del Cóndor), which was at the center of the conflict. In its 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request, Ecuador reported that 128 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) covering an estimated 0.5km² in 2010. Ecuador and Peru exchanged information on mined areas located on and across their shared border. As a result, Ecuador inherited 13 SHAs covering almost 1.5km², tripling its 2008 estimated contaminated area across the five provinces of El Oro, Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe with 11,524 antipersonnel mines. As of December 2013, Ecuador reported that remaining mine contamination covered almost 0.3km² and contained 12,363 recorded mines in 27 mined areas (see Table 1). Morona Santiago is the most mine-affected province both in terms of the number of mined areas and the number of mines.

Table 1. Mined areas reportedly remaining as of December 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Mined areas</th>
<th>SHA (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morona Santiago</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>213,055</td>
<td>8,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75,919</td>
<td>4,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastaza</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>298,974</td>
<td>12,363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Orellana province has been declared clear of mines based on results of survey in the province while Loja and El Oro provinces were declared cleared of mines in 2012 following clearance operations.

The true extent of Ecuador’s contamination problem remains somewhat fluid due to the continued process of information exchange between Ecuador and Peru on mined areas. Peru is said to have handed over the last of its mined areas in January 2014, but new areas may be found and exchanged between Ecuador and Peru due to topography and terrain.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Ecuadorian Demining Center (CENDESMI) is an interministerial body responsible for coordinating mine action operations, which are conducted by the Army’s Demining General Command. CENDESMI is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Until October 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) provided technical oversight and quality assurance of clearance. OAS monitoring of demining was conducted by military personnel through the OAS Inter-American Defense Board. OAS activities in Ecuador were scaled down across all aspects throughout 2013 as it focused on strengthening national capacity in preparation for full national ownership of the mine action program. An extensive risk education program coordinated by OAS with the Army’s Demining General Command concluded in June 2013 with a final workshop in Morona Santiago province to train local authorities and teachers from 13 Shuar indigenous communities. By October, the OAS’s monitoring support structure at the military base in Morona Santiago province had been dismantled.

Under the Binational Cooperation Program (Programa Binacional de Cooperación) established in 2000, Ecuador and Peru adopted in April 2013 a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining (Manual Binacional de Desminado Humanitario) with a view to unifying the demining procedures of both countries in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In December 2013, the joint Ecuador-Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit of 30 deminers conducted its first demining exercise in Morona Santiago on the Ecuadorian side of the border. A second exercise was planned for the Peruvian side of the border for April 2014.
LAND RELEASE
In 2013, land release in Ecuador continued at a slow pace with reported release of a total of 19,163 m² of contaminated area through cancelation of 6,832 m² and technical survey and clearance of 12,331 m² (see Table 2). Three mined areas were released through cancelation and clearance and 75% antipersonnel mines were destroyed.1 This equates to roughly a third of the 57,000 m² reported released in 2012 and 42% of the 47,757 m² reported for the previous year.2
The rate of release in 2010–12 can be attributed to the fact that areas subject to mechanical clearance in Loja and El Oro provinces proved not to be mined, having already been excavated by commercial companies seeking construction materials.3

Table 2. Land release in 2009–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined areas cleared</th>
<th>Area canceled by survey (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²) released (m²)</th>
<th>Total area</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines cleared</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,832</td>
<td>19,163</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47,106</td>
<td>57,293</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>47,757</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>38,500</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,191</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69,605</td>
<td>101,299</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significantly lower rate in 2013 may be due to Ecuadorian demining personnel being able to work just 42% of its planned 180 work days between January and end September 2013, losing 105 work days to a combination of weather, helicopter unavailability, holidays, and other unspecified factors.4 In addition, Ecuador conducted an impact study in Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe provinces in May–July 2013 that resulted in a temporary increase of 80 SHAUs until it was determined that they were outside Ecuadorian national borders.5

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2008), Ecuador is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as seen as possible but not later than 1 October 2017.
At the June 2011 Standing Committee meeting on mine clearance, Ecuador reiterated its commitment to the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty, noting that clearance was occurring in accordance with the timeline set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request and that it had increased the number of deminers from 60 to around 100 as planned.10 In its Article 7 report for 2013, Ecuador reported that an area of 298,974 m² remained to be released.11 Ecuador has planned to release approximately 35% of the remaining contamination by December 2016, totaling some 0.1 km², leaving 65% or 0.2 km² to be released within 10 months until October 2017.12 Ecuador claimed in April 2014 to be on track to meet its extended clearance deadline.13 But given low annual clearance rates and total release of less than 265,000 m² since demining operations began14 — less than the total estimate of remaining contamination — this is open to doubt. Indeed, Ecuador questioned its own ability to meet its deadline in 2012 when a Ministry of Defense brochure disseminated at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva stated that Ecuador expected to complete clearance by 2023.15 With the possibility of discovery of new SHAUs and more canceled work days, Ecuador’s release projections for the next few years appear optimistic at best and unrealistic at worst.

ENDNOTES
2 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 20.
4 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C, 28 April 2014. These figures include the final two SHAUs totaling 68,000 m² handed over from Peru in January 2014. Data in email from Léon Aviles, Léon Aviles, Minister, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 20 April 2014.
5 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C, 28 April 2014.
7 Email from Léon Aviles, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 6 May 2014.
8 Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, Washington, 19 March 2014.
9 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 19 March 2014.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid., and email from Léon Aviles, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 9 May 2014.
15 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 21 April 2014.
16 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 23 April 2014.
17 Email from Léon Aviles, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 5 May 2014.
18 Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, Washington, 19 March 2014.
19 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 19 March 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
24 In Spanish, “CGDEOD ha planificado terminar con el proceso de liberación de tierras de las minas antipersonales en el país hasta el año 2023.” (“The CGDEOD—General Commander of Demining and EOD—has planned to complete the process of release of antipersonnel mined areas in the country by 2023.”) Comando General de Desminado, “Unidad Militar de Ingeniería Que Trabaja Por Su Seguridad” (“Military Engineering Unit That Works For Your Safety”), Undated.
ERITREA

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

- Problem understood: 5
- Target date for completion of clearance: 2
- Targeted clearance: 5
- Efficient clearance: 5
- National funding of program: 7
- Timely clearance: 3
- Land release system: 6
- National mine action standards: 6
- Reporting on progress: 5
- Improving performance: 5

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.9 POOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Eritrea is affected by mines dating back to World War II, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000. Despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in 2013 in five regions across an estimated area of 9km², Eritrea’s ongoing non-technical survey (NTS) has identified only 33.5km² of remaining mine contamination over 434 mined areas (see Table 1) — a two-thirds reduction on the last estimate of 99km² from June 2011 and significantly lower than the 129km² identified by the Landmine Impact Survey of 2006.8

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT (cont.)

Eritrea is affected by mines dating back to World War II, but largely as the result of the struggle for independence in 1962–91 and its armed conflict with Ethiopia in 1998–2000. Despite finding 49 previously unrecorded suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in 2013 in five regions across an estimated area of 9km², Eritrea’s ongoing non-technical survey (NTS) has identified only 33.5km² of remaining mine contamination over 434 mined areas (see Table 1) — a two-thirds reduction on the last estimate of 99km² from June 2011 and significantly lower than the 129km² identified by the Landmine Impact Survey of 2006.8

LAND RELEASE

In its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea reported that 67.3km² of contaminated area had been canceled through non-technical survey and 5.7km² was cleared in 38 mined areas in 2011–13. If its request is granted, Eritrea has projected that up to 15.4km² of mined area could be cleared within five years.

SURVEY IN 2013

In 2013, Eritrea reported that it had released 157 SHAs totaling 33.5km², leaving 385 mined areas of 25km² to be surveyed.9 Forty-nine new mined areas were discovered in five of the country’s six regions during NTS in 2013: in Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri.

Table 1. SHAs by region (end 2013)8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zoba (region)</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Estimated area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semienawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9,442,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anseba</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>10,230,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gash Barka</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6,252,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debub</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,894,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maakel</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,423,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debubawi Keih Bahri</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,169,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>434</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,432,818</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Eritrea mine action program is entirely nationally managed. The Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA), established in July 2002, is responsible for policy development, regulation of mine action, and implementation of mine clearance operations. The EDA reports directly to the Office of the President.

Demining is primarily conducted by the engineering units of the Eritrean defence forces under the supervision of EDA, which also carries out quality assurance (QA) and quality control in accordance with Eritrea’s National Mine Action Standards. According to its second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in January 2014, Eritrea planned to deploy ‘at least’ five demining teams during its second extension period, the same number as currently, but might increase the number if adequate financial and logistical support were found. However, Eritrea’s demining units may be re-tasked toward infrastructure building such as construction of roads and dams ‘at any point’. Following expulsion of international NGOs in 2005, Eritrea does not allow any international humanitarian demining operators to conduct survey or clearance in Eritrea.

In its 2014 Article 5 deadline extension request, Eritrea reported that 67.3km² of contaminated area had been canceled through non-technical survey and 5.7km² was cleared in 38 mined areas in 2011–13. If its request is granted, Eritrea has projected that up to 15.4km² of mined area could be cleared within five years.
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

In 2013, Eritrea seemingly cleared approximately 2.26 km² of mined area, almost twice the amount cleared in 2012 (1.2 km²) (see Table 2). The number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines destroyed in 2013 has not been reported.

Table 2. Mine clearance in 2009-13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = Not reported

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2011), Eritrea is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2015. In January 2014, Eritrea submitted a second Article 5 deadline extension request seeking a further five years to continue clearance and complete resurvey of SHAs, but not to fulfill its clearance obligations under the treaty. Resurvey during the second extension period is planned to involve both technical and non-technical survey in all remaining impacted areas across six regions. Resurvey is planned to run concurrently with clearance efforts in priority areas located in the Anseba, Maakel, and Semienawi Keih Bahri regions.

Based on a predicted clearance rate of 384,000 m² per team per year and 1-2 km² per five teams per year, Eritrea has estimated that five teams operating at this optimum pace could clear almost 15.4 km² in the five-year period. However, this clearance rate was acknowledged by Eritrea as “ambitious” due to the “inevitable collaboration … of the demining teams with the survey teams.” In addition, while Eritrea seems to have set reasonable estimates for its clearance rates that approximately match its progress in previous years with similar capacity, this accounts for only less than half of the total area Eritrea has estimated as requiring either clearance or resurvey (33.5 km²), leaving approximately 18 km² unaccounted for in the work plan.

Eritrea projects that costs for the extension period will amount to more than US$7 million, all to be raised nationally. For the last two years, Eritrea has managed to raise only $257,000 annually. As of December 2013, Eritrea had not received international funding for mine clearance and in its statement at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Eritrea said that progress in clearing mines would be slow because it “had limited resources and capacity of one small poor nation.” It is therefore unclear how Eritrea intends to raise the finances necessary for its survey and clearance activities, particularly in light of its policy not to accept international technical assistance.

In April 2014, at the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee meetings Eritrea stated that the extension period was designed to gain greater clarity of its mine contamination problem at which point Eritrea ‘could plan and think about the financial resources to be allocated for mine action.’ It was further stated that Eritrea won’t complete clearance in the next five years, and will likely require a third extension.

ENDNOTES

1 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.
2 Eritrea’s reply to questions from Analysing Group about Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 June 2011, p. 2.
4 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8.
5 Ibid, p. 5.
6 Ibid, p. 10.
7 ICBL Interview with Habtom Sigfried Frezghi, Deputy General Manager, EDA, Eritrea, 10 April 2014.
8 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 7.
9 Article 7 Report (for 2012), Form F, 5 February 2013, p. 16.
10 Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, 1 March 2012, 30 March 2012, and 5 February 2013 (for 2011 and 2012, respectively), and Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8.
12 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 10.
13 ICBL Comments on Eritrea’s Article 5 Extension Request, March 2014.
14 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 11.
16 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 April 2014 (ICBL meeting notes).
17 Ibid.
18 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2011, p. 22.
19 Statement of Eritrea, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 9 April 2014 (ICBL meeting notes).

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Since 2008, Eritrea has contributed approximately US$257,000 per year toward its mine action program. UNDP provided operational support for the demining teams until 2011 while Eritrea covered the salaries. Eritrea has not reported receiving international support since 2011. Despite Eritrea’s acknowledgement that it lacks adequate funding, the government of Eritrea has persistently refused to accept the return of international demining NGOs since their expulsion in 2005 which would bring in extra capacity and financial resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Eritrea should ensure that its demining units are not reoriented to other tasks but focus on survey and clearance operations.
- Eritrea should reconsider its policy of excluding international technical assistance from the country, which would support more efficient land release and re-open international funding paths.

UNMEE demining before the UN was required to leave © UNMEE

OTHER AFFECTED STATES PARTIES
Problem understood 5
Target date for completion of clearance 4
Targeted clearance 5
Efficient clearance 5
National funding of program 3
Timely clearance 0
Land release system 7
National mine action standards 7
Reporting on progress 3
Improving performance 0
MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 3.9

OTHER AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

ETHIOPIA

As of March 2014, the precise extent of remaining contamination was unclear, although Ethiopian officials claimed during a meeting with ICBL that 5.5km² of scattered contaminated areas remained to be released. In 2004, a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in ten of Ethiopia’s eleven regions, with 1,916 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) across more than 2,000km² impacting more than 1,492 communities. The Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions accounted for more than four-fifths of impacted communities.

The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) believed that the LIS had overestimated the number of both SHAs and impacted communities, citing lack of military expertise among the survey teams as the major reason for the overestimate. Subsequent technical survey (TS) and non-technical (re)survey (NTS) of SHAs identified during the LIS confirmed contamination in only 136 SHAs and found 66 previously unrecorded hazardous areas, covering a total of some 38km². Of this area, EMAO had cleared 37km² by June 2012 leaving 0.56km² to clear, all in the volatile Somali region.

Additionally, 358 SHAs across an area of 1,200km² from the LIS data remain to be re-surveyed, four-fifths of which is located in the Somali region. In 2012, however, EMAO claimed that only some 6.5km² of this area remained to be released, bringing the overall total of outstanding areas to be released to 7km². While EMAO expected to clear approximately 3km² per year – thus completing clearance by the end of 2013 – Ethiopia has not provided a detailed update on its survey and clearance activities since September 2011, nor provided information on its plans to re-survey these areas. It appears that no further clearance has taken place since the transfer of EMAO’s responsibilities to the Ministry of Defence in 2012.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

In February 2001, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, Ethiopia’s Council of Ministers established EMAO as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and mine risk education. EMAO developed its operational capacities effectively with technical assistance from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), UNDP, and UNICEF. In 2011, however, EMAO’s governing board decided that the Ministry of Defence was better placed to clear the remaining mines because Ethiopia had made significant progress in meeting its Mine Ban Treaty clearance obligations and the remaining threat did not warrant a structure and organization of the size of EMAO. It further asserted that a civilian entity such as EMAO would have difficulty accessing the unstable Somali region.

In response to the decision to close EMAO and transfer demining responsibility to the army’s Combat Engineers Division (CED) division, NPA ended its direct funding support and had completed the transfer of its 49-strong mine detection dog (MDD) capacity to EMAO by end April 2012, with some MDD handlers and support staff transferred to the Federal police. The CED assumed management of the MDD Training Centre at Entoto where it conducted training in demining in early 2012. In March 2013, a representative from the Ministry of Defence confirmed that transfer of all demining assets had been completed and reported that it was preparing to deploy survey and clearance teams to the Somali region, the only confirmed mine-affected region remaining. Since then, however, Ethiopia’s demining capacity has been reduced due to secondment of three demining groups to the UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan.

Transition of the mine action program from EMAO to the Ministry of Defence was described as ‘ongoing’ in April 2014 and was expected to be concluded ‘soon’. Ethiopia also stated that it had spent 2012–13 building its own demining capacity by ‘developing mine action standards through combat engineer teams’ with the aim of being able to conduct training and clearance activities at minimal cost from the units’ own budgets.
LAND RELEASE
In 2002–03, Ethiopia cleared approximately 60km² of land, predominantly in the Afar, Somali, and Tigray regions, destroying in the process 9,278 antipersonnel mines and 1,266 antivehicle mines.1 In its most recent Article 7 transparency report, covering 2011, Ethiopia reported total release of 770km² through survey and clearance since 2005.2 As of mid-April 2014, Ethiopia had not submitted an Article 7 report covering 2012 or 2013. In April 2014, Ethiopia reported to the Standing Committee on mine clearance that in January–November 2013 its rapid response teams had visited more than ten ERW-impacted communities in Amhara, Oromiya, south and Somalia regional states’ clearing more than 100,000 items of unexploded ordnance.3 No details were given to the exact location of the spot tasks.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
In 2012, EMAO reported it needed US$10 million to clear the remaining mined areas yet secured just $2.5 million for clearance and victim assistance activities combined in 2012. No international funding has been reported for 2013. No national funding has been reported for 2012 or 2013.

ENDNOTES
2 ICBL meeting with Muez Gebre Tsadik, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.
5 Interviews with Gebriel Lager, Deputy Director, EMAO, in Ljubljana, 14 April 2008, and in Geneva, 6 June 2008.
12 Email from Audrey Sutherland-Pillai, Programme Manager, NPA, 22 August 2012.
Contamination and Impact

Jordan is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination is the result primarily of the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

Jordan announced it had completed clearance of all known mined areas on 24 April 2012 after Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) finished clearance of the mine belt along its northern border with Syria the previous month but subsequently acknowledged that not all mines along the border had been accounted for.

In fact, Jordan appears to still contain mined areas on its territory, as the obligation in Article 5 is to clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under a State Party’s jurisdiction or control.

NPA was due to check some 10.5km² of land adjacent to the mine belt for close to 9,000 mines from the mine belts unaccounted for and which may have been removed during unrecorded army clearance operations or by smugglers, or may have shifted due to weather, floods, or land erosion. When operations halted in February 2013 due to security issues on the northern border, NPA had completed work on 8.2km², leaving 2.3km² to be verified, while the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) had inspected 6.8km².

Jordan is also continuing verification and clearance in the Jordan Valley. The Army’s Royal Engineering Corps (REC) cleared the area and declared completion in 2008 but the NCDR concluded operations had not met national standards and clearance operations in 2013 alone found 241 mines, including 218 antipersonnel mines (see Table 1 below). The total ‘project area’ was 15.6km² and as of May 2014 a total of 5.4km² remained to be addressed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Verified areas</th>
<th>Verified area (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,163,000</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Jordan established the NCDR as ‘the primary national mine action authority’ under a 2000 law while an April 2002 royal decree appointed its board of directors, which includes representatives of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, NGOs, landmine survivors, and the media. The NCDR became fully operational in 2004 when Prince Mired Raad Zeid al-Hussein became its chair.

The NCDR was responsible for preparing and overseeing implementation of a national mine action plan and for ensuring mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies. It is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality-assuring all mine action organizations as well as for fundraising.

Strategic Planning

The NCDR’s 2010–15 National Plan, published in June 2010, aimed to complete clearance of all known mines, including 65,000 mines from the northern border, by May 2012, and to clear all ERW by December 2012. It is unclear when this target will be attained by 2015.
LAND RELEASE

NPA expected to complete verification of the northern border by the end of June 2013 but was able to work only until mid-February 2013 when security issues related to the conflict in Syria brought operations to a halt. In January and February, it verified 640,000m², destroying in the process twenty antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine. At the time operations ceased, some 2.3km² remained to be verified.Army engineers continued verification and sampling in the Jordan Valley, releasing about 4km² in 2013, about half the amount of the previous year, and destroying about one-third fewer antipersonnel mines (see Table 2). In May and June, NPA also supported the Jordan Valley sampling and verification project but in the aftermath of Jordan’s announcement that it had completed clearance of all known mined areas it was unable to attract donor funding and ended its Jordan program. NPA decided to keep its office in Amman open to provide regional administrative and logistical support until the end of 2014.

Table 2. Jordan Valley Sampling and Verification Project in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Verified areas</th>
<th>Verified area (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
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<td>190</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>1,163,000</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>23</td>
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</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012 treaty deadline set as a result of the three-year extension granted by States Parties in 2008. It submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012. Jordan’s announcement came after NPA completed demining of minefields along the northern border with Syria. Announcing completion, however, Prince Mired acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced.” Jordan has subsequently noted that completion of northern border verification will depend on security conditions. At the 2013 Standing Committee meetings, Jordan said it expected Jordan Valley verification efforts on the remaining 4.4km² to last two more years. Since then, new information leading to a higher estimate of area requiring verification as of end 2013 makes it appear that Jordan will need more time to complete work in the area.

Given the obligation in Article 5(1) to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas, Jordan still has outstanding Article 5 survey and clearance obligations to fulfill, in particular in the Jordan Valley.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Jordan should identify the time needed to complete full clearance of contaminated areas in the Jordan Valley and request a new extension to its Article 5 deadline for this period.
- In light of the closure of NPA’s program, Jordan should clarify how verification of the north border will be concluded.

ENDNOTES

1 “Jordan First Arab country free of landmines,” UNDP, 24 April 2012; and Mohammad Ghazal, “Jordan first Middle East country to be free of minefields,” Jordan Times, 25 April 2012.
2 Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 May 2012, and email from Mikael Bold, Program Manager, NPA, 12 February 2012. NPA estimated the number of mines missing from the mine belt at between 9,345 and 10,083. NPA’s verification procedure involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to the mine belt, “ground preparation” with mechanical assets and some involvement of manual deminers, and full technical survey of areas where evidence and experience pointed to a risk of contamination.
3 Email from Jamal Odeh, Operations Reporting Officer, NCDR, 8 May 2014.
4 Email from Jamal Odeh, NCDR, 20 May 2014.
6 Email from Mona Alalul, NCDR, 31 July 2011.
9 Email from Jamal Odeh, NCDR, 18 March 2014.
11 Email from Jamal Odeh, NCDR, 18 March 2014.
12 Email from Jonas Zachrisson, Program Manager, NPA, 25 and 31 March 2014.
13 Email from Jamal Odeh, NCDR, 18 March 2014.
14 Implementation Support Unit, “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines,” Press release, 24 April 2012; “Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction,” submitted by Jordan, 4 December 2012.
15 “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines,” Press release, 24 April 2012.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Northern Mauritania is affected by mines and other ordnance primarily as a result of the conflict over Western Sahara in 1975–8. A 2006 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) found a total of 65 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 76km² and affecting 66 communities. In March 2010, Morocco provided detailed maps of minefields laid during the Western Sahara conflict. The minefields were cleared using military standards prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ Based on information collected during the LIS and provided by Morocco, as well as results of land release activities conducted by Mauritania, it was estimated in September 2010 that 64km² across 20 SHAs remained to be addressed.²

In 2013, clearance was completed in two of the three contaminated provinces, Tiris Zemour and Adrar. According to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) an initial non-technical survey (NTS) of the province of Nouadhibou in December 2013 identified just over 8km² requiring technical survey and clearance.³ NPA informed the Monitor that the majority of the hazardous areas identified during the survey are located near the border with Western Sahara and might be considered as outside of Mauritanian territory and thus not under its jurisdiction.⁴

As of the beginning of May 2014, following consultations between NPA and the National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), it was estimated that 14 tasks, in five communities in Nouadhibou (Swaideyyat, Swasyat, Guerguera, Zafati and Boucoui), covering approximately 1.7km² remained to be released.⁵ There is also a need for clarity surrounding mined areas in Western Sahara that may fall within Mauritania.

The impact of contamination is predominantly social and economic rather than humanitarian, blocking access to pasture and other community resources as well as occasionally killing livestock.⁶ The last reported mine casualties were in 2010 when three people were injured.⁷

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The PNDHD coordinates mine action operations in Mauritania.⁸ Since August 2007, the program has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization, with oversight from an interministerial Steering Committee, set up by decree in September 2007. The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, and a regional mine action center in Nouadhibou.⁹

In accordance with a 2006 decree, all clearance activities have been conducted by the Army Engineer Corps operating under the PNDHD. In March 2011, NPA signed an agreement with Mauritania to provide support for mine and battle area clearance (BAC) in the country. NPA has been since working in Mauritania both as an operator and in a capacity-building role.¹⁰ In June 2013, NPA trained two Army Engineer Corps clearance teams, which were then deployed to Nouadhibou province.¹¹

In 2014, NPA was planning to reduce its operational role and focus more on its advisory work. Clearance capacity was provided by seconded Engineers Corps personnel working to complete clearance of contaminated areas in Nouadhibou province.¹² NPA and the PNDHD were also planning to develop the Engineers Corps’ capacity to respond to residual threats after completion of clearance operations.¹³

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Mauritania’s extension request included a detailed work plan for 2010–15 containing annual milestones of area to be released each year and against which progress could be compared. By the end of 2011, operations would be over in the localities of Tiris Zemour and Adrar. This was finally achieved in 2013.

In 2013, a total area of almost 14km² covering four areas was due to be released.¹⁴ In May 2013, at the Standing Committee meetings, Mauritania reported to states parties that in fact some 23km² would be released during the year – approximately 9km² more than forecast in its five-year work plan.¹⁵
LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2013

NPA reported that in December 2013, initial NTS of Nouadhibou province was completed in partnership with the PNDHD, identifying just over 8,800m² requiring further survey and clearance.19 However, as some of the areas identified during the NTS were considered to be located outside of Mauritania’s territory, this estimate was revised downwards following consultations between NPA and the PNDHD. As of May 2014, 1.9km² remained to be released affecting five communities.20

Clearance in 2013

In 2013, NPA reported releasing 23 mined areas covering approximately 16,841km², of which about 20% was released through technical survey (TS) and full clearance, destroying in the process 46 antipersonnel mines and 48 antivehicle mines.19 In contrast, Mauritania reported that in total 19.9km² were released in 2013 through NTS, almost 0.6km² through TS, and nearly 2.6km² during clearance operations (see Table 1). According to the PNDHD, 91 antipersonnel mines and 47 antivehicle mines were destroyed during the process.18 Different figures were provided by NPA, which managed all the demining teams.20

Table 1. Land release in 201321

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>N/R</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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During 2013, four demining teams were operating in the provinces of Tiris Zemmour and Adrar. Two additional teams were working in the Nouadhibou province from August to December 2013.20 Mine clearance results were slightly lower in 2013 than in 2012 (see Table 1), due to a focus on clearance of cluster-munition-contaminated areas during 2013.20

Mine clearance figures were provided by NPA, which managed all the demining teams.20

Table 2. Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km²)24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENDNOTES

1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 September 2010, p. 3.
2 Ibid.
3 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 18 March 2014.
4 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 April 2014.
5 Ibid, 7 May 2014.
7 Email from Alison O. Mohamed El Hacen, Director, PNDHD, 17 April 2011.
8 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007.
9 Decree No. 60135/MDAT/MDN establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.
10 NPA, “Humanitarian Disarmament in Mauritania.”
11 Alison O. Mohamed El Hacen, Tiris Zemmour and Adrar. Two additional teams were operating in the Nouadhibou province from August to December 2013.20
13 Ibid.
14 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2010, p. 19.
17 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 7 May 2014, and Alison O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 12 May 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Email from Alison O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 14 May 2014.
20 In 2013, NPA reported that 13.3km² were released through NTS, 2.4km² through technical survey, and 0.8km² through clearance operations, destroying 45 antipersonnel mines, 48 antivehicle mines, and 124 items of UXO. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Melissa Andersson, NPA, 18 March 2014.
21 Email from Alison O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 12 May 2014.
23 Ibid.
24 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 September 2010, p. 11. NPA Annual Report 2012 to PNDHD, p. 3.
27 Ibid, 27 May 2013. Notes from ICBL.
28 Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian People’s Aid, 18 March 2014.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Mozambique is contaminated with mines, mostly antipersonnel, a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. Mozambique has made considerable progress in clearing mined areas and was planning to complete all clearance by the end 2014, consonant with its extended Article 5 deadline. As of May 2014, however, it appeared uncertain whether it would meet the deadline.

A joint survey led by National Institute for Demining in July to August 2013 with involvement of the Mozambican Border Authority and the four international demining NGO operators concluded that eight of the original thirteen border minefields were in fact located inside Zimbabwe.

The joint survey team also determined that one additional border minefield extends into Mozambique (Kahira Luia in Cahora Bassa district). In July 2013, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed demining of the Messambuzi border minefield in Sussendenga, bringing the total number of border minefields remaining in Mozambican territory to five: Kahira Luia, Mucedo, Mudododo, Nhamacuarara, and N Soluwamunthe.

As of 20 March 2014, Mozambique reported that 5.38km² of contamination remained in four provinces: Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, and Tête. By far the greatest contamination (3.4km²) was in Sofala province.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The National Institute for Demining (IND) serves as the national mine action center in Mozambique. It reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provincial demining commissions have been created to assist in planning mine action operations. Since 1999, UNDP has provided technical assistance; currently support is provided under a three-year program due to expire in 2015.

Mozambique has four international mine clearance operators: APOPO, HALO Trust, Handicap International (HI), and NPA conduct land release activities. HI works in Inhambane and Sofala provinces. HALO Trust has been working in Manica, Maputo, and Tête provinces. Demining has also been conducted by the Mozambican army and a number of commercial operators.

LAND RELEASE

Mozambique has not reported disaggregated results by operator or land release methodology for demining in 2013. In March 2014, it reported that a total of almost 9.33km² from 592 hazard areas had been released during 2013. It further noted that a total of 111 districts had been officially declared ‘Mine-Free’ out of a total of 128 districts, including all districts in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Gaza, Nampula, Niassa, and Zambezia. Mozambique released 8.6km² in 2012 through a combination of survey and clearance on 255 tasks.

In 2013, NPA conducted non-technical survey (NTS) as part of integrated manual technical survey (TMS)/clearance teams. APOPO had 47 rats engaged in survey supported by an NTS survey team of four and reported cancelation of 1.4km² and release by TMS of 0.15km². APOPO had 125 deminers working on clearance in 2013, achieving clearance of 0.56km².

NPA reported clearance of 0.6km², destroying in the process 789 antipersonnel mines and 4 antivehicle mines. In addition to this clearance, NPA verified an area of 22.977m² in Cahora Bassa that had been previously cleared, destroying in the process 113 antipersonnel mines. NPA believes that either the mines were washed out after the original clearance, which resulted in destruction of more than 12,000 mines, or that the mines were too deep to be detected at the time but following heavy rains, the top soil was washed away revealing the mines.

Sixty-six antipersonnel mines were destroyed by NPA in a spot task in Chiwijo minefield located on the border with Zimbabwe. In an attempt to cultivate the land local people had removed the mines and piled them in four different spots. Demining operations in that minefield were suspended after joint survey led by IND concluded it was located within Zimbabwe.
COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 5

Mozambique’s second extended Article 5 deadline is due to expire on 1 January 2015. Its initial Article 5 deadline, which expired on 1 March 2009, has been extended twice, once until 31 March 2014, and, most recently, for an additional ten months until the end of 2014.

On 5 December 2013, the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties granted Mozambique’s second extension request, but noted that, while completion was within sight, implementation of Mozambique’s plan, by 31 December 2016, was contingent upon assumptions that might not hold. First, meeting the deadline was subject to the successful conclusion of a cooperation agreement with Zimbabwe. Second, it would require demining to occur throughout 2014, which was not the case in 2013. Third, ‘temporary insecurity’ had impeded demining in the past, any additional incidents could delay impact completion of clearance. The Meeting noted that, should Mozambique not complete implementation by 31 December 2016, it would find itself in a state of non-compliance with the Convention.17

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, international contributions to mine action in Mozambique totaled US$15.7 million, an increase of 15% from 2012.18

ENDNOTES

2 Second Article 5 deadline: Extension Request, 25 May 2013, p. 9.
3 Mozambique, Chico Cacado, Chivi, Machangana Chips, Mugusi, Chavaza, Pialungo, Mapungu North and Mapungu South.
4 Mozambique, ‘Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction’ (from 1 March 2016 to 31 December 2016), April 2016, p. 7.
5 IND, ‘Remaining hazard areas as of 28 February 2016’.
7 Mozambique, ‘Progress Report on completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction’ (from 1 March 2016 to 31 December 2016), April 2016, p. 5.
8 Ibid.
9 Email from Maria Nutes, Program Manager, NPA Mozambique, 24 February 2014.
10 Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APPOPO, 24 February 2014.
11 Ibid.
12 Email from Maria Nutes, NPA, 24 February 2014.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. The name that part of the minefield in Zimbabwe is Border Streams while Chivi is the name of closest village on Mozambican side.
15 Of the 74.9km length of mined areas straddling the border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe, only 19 km can be easily accessed from Mozambique. The remaining 56km is more easily accessible from Zimbabwe with seven of the 13 border minefields only accessible from Zimbabwe. This necessitates close coordination with Zimbabwe’s authorities on cross-border movements to reach them.
16 Heavy rains fall in the first quarter of 2013 and floods that extended to the second quarter obstructed access to demining sites and slowed down demining operations. Another problem was insecurity in the central province of Sofala, particularly Chikwawa district, which forced demining operators to halt operations and move out of the concerned areas.
17 Decisio of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013. See also Presentation of Analysis of Mozambique’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request by the President of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2013, p. 1.
20 Email from Mary Ryan, Emergency and Recovery Section, 13th AAD, 15 April 2014, Response to Monitor questionnaire by Simone van der Post, Policy Officer, Dutch MFA, 9 April 2014, and MBF Article 7 Report, Form 2, 30 April 2014; email from Ingemir Valen, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian MFA, 28 April 2014; Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014; email from Zach Rubens, Policy Analyst, Security and Justice Team, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, Department for International Development, UK, 9 May 2014; email from Luis D. Miller, Public engagement and partnerships, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 9 April 2014, Australia CCM Article 7 Report, Form 1, 19 April 2014; Belgium CCM Article 7 Report, Form 1, 30 April 2014; Germany CCM Article 7 Report, Form 1, 5 May 2014; and Sweden CCM Article 7 Report, Form 1, Table 1, 25 April 2014.
MINING ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

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MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.3 POOR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Niger is affected by both antivehicle and antipersonnel mines. Mine contamination is known to exist especially in the Agadez region, in the north of the country, where the army has been fighting a non-state armed group, the Niger Justice Movement (Mouvement des NiGERiens pour la Justice, MNJ) and some splinter factions. Between 2002 and 2006, Niger consistently reported the existence of known and suspected mined areas in the country as a result of the armed rebellion in 1999–2000. However, at the Standing Committee meetings in 2008, Niger declared that no areas on its territory were suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, adding it had evidence only of the presence of antivehicle mines.

In May 2012, more than two years after the expiry of its Article 5 clearance deadline, Niger reported to States Parties that it was contaminated with antipersonnel mines in at least one area. The minefield, located in Madama military post in the Agadez region, was identified during an ‘assessment mission’ conducted in June 2011 and covers some 2,400m². The minefield is in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirhou, and as of April 2014 no mine incident involving humans had been reported in this area.

Niger has also reported a further five suspected mined areas in the Agadez region: in the localities of Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga. In April 2014, at the Standing Committee meetings, Niger informed States parties that a non-technical survey (NTS) had been conducted of all five areas. The results concluded that the areas did not contain antipersonnel mines, though antivehicle mines are suspected to be present. Niger noted that the areas contain wells and water sources.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Niger also indicated that the National Commission for the Collection and control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale Pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) had identified other suspected areas consisting of ‘roads and paths’. In April 2014, Niger informed the Monitor that these areas were only contaminated with antivehicle mines. Between 1999 and the end of 2012, the Monitor identified a total of 383 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties, of whom 103 were killed and a further 280 injured. The CNCCAI reported a total of 400 casualties as of April 2014.

MINING ACTION PROGRAM

Mine Action is under the authority of the CNCCAI, which reports directly to the President. In 2008 a working group on mine action was established. All demining activities are carried out by the Nigerien army.

In April 2014, Niger declared that the Danish Demining Group was interested in establishing a partnership to improve Niger’s information management capacity and ensure quality control.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Niger’s extension request included a work plan for 2014–15 requiring clearance of Madama mined area, the conduct of a technical survey in the northern Kawar region, and the verification of other suspected mined areas. It foresaw expenditure of US$810,000, including $295,000 on demining operations, $200,000 on purchase of equipment, and $137,000 on capacity building. The work plan expected that technical survey and the preparation for demining operations would be carried out in 2014, whereas actual demining would only start in 2015. A technical survey started in Madama in April 2014.

TRANSPARENCY

Niger submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report in 2002, but has since failed to provide updated information systematically on an annual basis. Niger’s most recent Article 7 report is from 2012, covering January 2009 to December 2011.
LAND RELEASE
In May 2013, the CNCCAI reported having conducted survey and clearance on 'several hundred kilometers' of road but gave no details.17
In April 2014, at the Standing Committee meeting on mine clearance, Niger reported that the five areas where the presence of antipersonnel mines was previously suspected are only contaminated by antivehicle mines.18

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the two-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Niger is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 January 2016.

In granting the two-year extension, States Parties regretted the delay between the discovery of contamination and the beginning of demining. States Parties requested that Niger provide information on the source of the contamination, and details of methods used to identify the areas known and suspected to contain antipersonnel mines.

In 2011, after the expiry of its original deadline to implement Article 5, Niger identified one previously unknown mined area and five suspected mined areas. In July 2013, Niger noted that desert environment, insecurity, and lack of funding may challenge the implementation of its work plan.19

In 2014, Niger called on technical and financial partners to provide support so it may meet its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.20 However, with only one small mined area to clear, Niger should be able to fulfill its Article 5 obligations in a very short period of time without the need for outside assistance.

ENDNOTES
3 Ibid, 28 May 2012.
4 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, p. 5.
6 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, pp. 5–6.
7 Telephone interview with Allasan Fousseini, Mine Action Expert, Demining Unit, National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (CNCCAI), 7 May 2014.
9 Ibid.
10 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, p. 7.
11 Interview with Mamadou Youssoufou Maga, Director, CNCCAI, and Issoufou Garba, First Secretary, Department for Conventional Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
12 Ibid.
14 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, pp. 7 and 9–14.
17 Email from Allasan Fousseini, CNCCAI, 14 May 2015.
19 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013, p. 16.
21 Ibid.
22 Interview with Mamadou Youssoufou Maga, CNCCAI, and Issoufou Garba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
The Government of Niger funded all mine action activities carried out in 2013.21 The amount of this support has not been disclosed.
In its extension request, Niger indicated it would contribute to funding its two-year work plan with a financial contribution of $250,000, meaning that more than $500,000 remained to be acquired for its desired budget. As of April 2014, Niger was still lacking the funds to implement its work plan.22

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION
As soon as technical survey is completed in Madama, Niger should complete clearance of its sole, small mined area without further delay.
**MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE**

<table>
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<th>Performance</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.9**

**POOR**

**CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

Mine contamination in Peru is the result of internal armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, and a brief conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 over a longstanding border dispute. During this conflict, part of the two states’ common border was mined, affecting four departments in Peru: Amazonas, Cajamarca, Piura, and Tumbes. The most heavily mined section was an area known as “Cordillera del Cóndor” (the sparsely populated Amazonas department), which was at the center of the conflict. In April 2014, Peru reported remaining contamination was 438,254 m² across 135 mined areas and containing 10,313 recorded mines.

In February 2012, Peru suffered further mine contamination along its border with Chile following mine displacement caused by torrential rains and floods in the Arica–Parinacota region in northern Chile. The floods caused mines laid in the 1970s to surface near the main highway linking Arica (Chile) with Tacna (Peru) in an area called Quebrada de Escritos. Peru and Chile commissioned Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to clear the mines, which it completed in December 2012, destroying some 300 mines in the process.

**LAND RELEASE**

Clearance on the border areas with Ecuador has been under the responsibility of the Directorate General for Humanitarian Demining Army of Peru (DIGEDEHUME). As of April 2014, Peru reported that a total of 107,304 m² had been cleared since 2007 in the Cordillera del Cóndor with the destruction of 8,798 mines (see Table 1 for clearance in the last five years).

**MINE ACTION PROGRAM**

Chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peru’s national mine action authority, the Interministerial Executive Council of the Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS) is responsible for setting strategy and priorities in addition to plan and budget approval. CONTRAMINAS is responsible for overall management and day-to-day coordination of mine action activities. At the end of 2013, the Organization of American States (OAS) concluded its program of technical and financial assistance to Peru’s mine action operations, which it initiated in May 2001 through its Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en América del Sur, MARMINAS). The OAS has continued to support a victim assistance project, which was due also to close in late 2016. RONCO Consulting concluded its work with CONTRAMINAS in March 2013.

In April 2013, under the Binational Cooperation Program established in 2000 Peru and Ecuador issued a Binational Manual for Humanitarian Demining with a view to unifying the demining procedures of both countries in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In December 2013, the joint Ecuador–Peru Binational Humanitarian Demining Unit conducted its first demining exercise in Morona Santiago in Ecuador. A second exercise was planned to be conducted in Peru during the course of 2014.

In 2013, Peru reported demining capacity of some 150 deminers, five explosive ordnance disposal personnel, six mine detection dogs, and one mechanical excavator. As of March 2014, transfer of demining units from the specialized unit of the national police under the Security Division of CONTRAMINAS (División de Seguridad, DIYSEC), planned for 2012, had not yet occurred, although it was due to occur very soon.

Regarding additional mined areas identified in 2012, Peru noted that clearance would require a substantial increase in the resources of the Peruvian State to provide greater capabilities to humanitarian demining process in order to comply with the obligations assumed before the Convention and finish the cleanup and destruction of mines in the territorial national before March 1, 2017.

**Table 1. Mine clearance in border area in 2009–13 (m²)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16,017</td>
<td>2,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>13,791</td>
<td>4,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>46,572</td>
<td>1,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24,927</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td><strong>103,140</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,084</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

Peru reported clearance of 16,017m² in the Cenepa river area in 2013, with the destruction of 2,391 antipersonnel mines. Clearance occurred during 11 work periods of 20 days each. This represents an increase of 2,226m² from the 13,791m² cleared in 2012 when the exceptionally low output was attributed to the high elevation of the river area that had required building a new camp, transport of equipment, and construction of bridges and heliports for demining. The small increase in mined area cleared may be attributable to an increase in deminer capacity from 60 in June 2013 to the 150 reported in March 2014, in addition to use of (as yet unexplained) new mechanical and manual demining techniques.

Demining in the ‘Cordillera del Condor’ area has been described as a challenging endeavor due to its topography as a mountainous jungle prone to heavy rain for much of the year, and reaching heights of 2,900m which means that it is only accessible by a two-hour helicopter flight.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2008), Peru is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2017.

On 29 February 2012, Peru’s Minister of Defense, Alberto Dávila, said the border with Ecuador “would be free of landmines by 2016.” He continued, “I think in 2016 or 2017 we can say that our borders will be free of mines, as all the boundaries of democratic countries that respect the right to life of its citizens, must be.” In May 2012, at the Intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Peru said they would clear all remaining mined areas “as quickly as possible.” In 2014, the Coordinator General of CONTRAMINAS stated: “We are still working according to our deadline.”

It is unclear, however, if Peru can indeed meet its Article 5 deadline in 2017. The 48 mined areas found to be in Peruvian territory rather than in Ecuador in 2012 increased significantly the area and number of mines to clear. In combination with Peru’s low clearance rate in recent years, whether Peru can clear the remaining areas by 2017 with current capacity is seriously in doubt. It its statement to the Standing Committee meeting on mine clearance in April 2014, Peru stated that the additional mined area meant that Peru needs a substantial increase in resources to expand demining capacity in order to comply with its Article 5 clearance obligations by the March 2017 deadline. CONTRAMINAS reports having reviewed its operational plans in light of the additional mined areas from Ecuador and created a new draft national plan.

As noted above, the content of the plan has not yet been disclosed publicly.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Peru contributed the equivalent of US$1.6 million to its own national mine action program in 2013, less than in 2012. In addition, the US Department of State allocated $1 million to Peru for the period October 2012–April 2013. Peru estimated a budget of $26 million would be needed to complete clearance in its revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request in 2008 of which $17.8 million would be provided by its national budget in 2008–17 with the remaining $8 million to be sought from external sources. So far, Peru has raised $22 million of the projected total needed. These figures, however, do not take into account the need for increased resources due to additional mined areas identified.

Peru has not provided a projection of the extra financial resources needed to complete clearance, nor indicated how it intends to raise those funds.

ENDNOTES

1 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20 August 2008.
2 Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 April 2009.
3 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, General Coordinator, Peruvian Mine Action Centre (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antiguo-plantadas, CONTRAMINAS), 21 April 2014.
4 Manuel Vigo, “Peru-Chile border closed due to landmines,” PeruThisWeek.com, 20 February 2012.  
5 Manuel Vigo, “Peru asks Chile to remove landmines from border,” PeruThisWeek.com, 28 May 2012.  
6 Manuel Vigo, “Peru-Chile border cleared of landmines, Norwegian NGO says,” PeruThisWeek.com, 20 December 2012.  
7 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 20 July 2009.  
8 Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines and Assistance for Control of Arms and Munitions, OAS, Washington, 18 March 2014.  
9 Ibid.  
11 Ibid, and email from Leon Arias, Minister, Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 9 May 2014.  
12 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 June 2013; and Presentations of Peru at the National Directors and UN Advisors Meeting, Geneva, 21 March 2012 and 21 June 2013.
19 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 June 2013.
20 Ibid, 26 June 2013.
21 Ibid, 18 June 2013.
23 Ibid.
24 Manuel Vigo, “Peru and Ecuador agree to clear border landmines by 2014,” PeruThisWeek.com, 29 February 2012.
26 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.
29 Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, CONTRAMINAS, 21 March 2014.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Peru should urgently increase its national clearance capacity, specifically by deploying police demining units to the border areas with Ecuador as soon as possible.
- Peru should share with States Parties its revised national clearance plan to account for the 48 additional mined areas inherited from Ecuador.
- Peru should inform states of its exact needs for assistance and resource shortfall, and provide a clear plan on how Peru intends to raise the additional funding needed.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Senegal is affected by mines and other explosive ordnance as a result of fighting between the Senegalese armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Contaminated areas are located in the Casamance region of Senegal between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

An Emergency Landmine Impact Survey (ELIS) in 2005–06 had estimated that 11km² of land and 63km of tracks/paths were mine-affected across 149 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in 93 ‘localities.’ In 2008, Senegal acknowledged that the ELIS “might have overestimated the number of affected areas.” At the same time, however, it was not possible to visit certain suspected areas during the ELIS. Subsequently, 11 SHAs were identified in 2011 in Gouréul in Ziguinchor region that were not included in the ELIS.

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of contamination, although in December 2013 Senegal reported that confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covered an estimated 333,415m² in four departments: Goudomp (149,537m²), Oussouye (112,000m²), Ziguinchor (53,478m²), and Bignona (18,400m²). Survey was said to be required in 296 localities covering an estimated area of 1.4km².

Following abduction of 12 deminers in May 2013, Senegal ordered a halt to all survey and clearance activities, which lasted eight months. In November 2013, clearance activities resumed, and Mechem, operating as a humanitarian demining operator with funds administered by UNDP, was tasked to clear sections of the main trunk road, the RN6, and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6. Senegal has cited its politico-security situation to justify the deployment of its clearance assets in these areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.

The task orders have been criticized as they related to areas without credible risk of mine contamination and requests from operators to conduct surveys prior to deploying clearance assets were denied. According to Handicap International (HI), as of November 2013 – when task orders were given – only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sinedone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.

From November 2013 to April 2014, HI identified in Sinedone and in Kaour two previously unreported SHAs near the RN6. Seven suspected paths and five suspected polygons were found in the department crossed by the RN6 in Southern Casamance (between the Casamance river and Guinea-Bissau).

In contrast, recent reports indicate that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases. But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed—as they are under the control of the Senegalese armed forces—they have not been cleared or considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas were confirmed as contaminated by non-technical survey (NTS) and are recorded in the IMSMA database, such as the village of Djirack. Others remain as either SHAs, or as credible if unrecorded and unconfirmed reports by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.

HI carried out clearance around military installations in 2007–12 in Darsalam and Gonoum during which 177 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese armed forces. Between November 2013 and April 2014, HI conducted NTS in Adeane, Djibanar, and Kaour communities. The seven military bases located in these communities were surveyed and no evidence of mines was found. Only one abandoned military base in a deserted village was identified as an SHA.

In 2013, Mechem’s clearance operations in Mpack military site resulted in destruction of all the mines found that year during all clearance operations. As of March 2014, Senegal had identified a total of more than 800 mine/ERW casualties.
MINING PROGRAM
The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the National Mine Action Authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS). Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor.

Sporadic technical assistance, in particular through a technical or chief technical advisor, has been provided to the program by UNDP since June 2008. In May 2012, Senegal said that “slowness in the procedures of certain partners” had “significantly delayed the initiation and conduct of projects.” In 2014, Senegal requested UNDP to provide assistance for resource mobilization and an advisor was due to be appointed by mid-April 2014.

HI remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012 when new clearance capacities were brought with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

In 2013, Mechem teams were in the department of Ziguinchor while NPA was operating in the departments of Goudomp and Oussouye. HI was conducting NTS in the departments of Kolda and Ziguinchor. HI remained the sole international demining operator in Senegal until mid-2012 when new clearance capacities were brought with the arrival of Mechem and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).

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In 2014, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of ‘government-imposed limitations on demining activities,’ which prevented NPA from deploying demining resources where the necessary work could be done safely and from undertaking NTS in areas believed to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed. This withdrawal resulted in the loss of funding from Norway, Germany and the European Union.

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STRATEGIC PLANNING
Senegal’s national mine action strategy for 2007–15 set clearance of contaminated areas as a key objective, though without providing a clear work plan with annual benchmarks or a specific timeline. It also lists prioritization criteria for clearance operations.

A revised strategic mine action plan was adopted by the National Commission in November 2009. In March 2012, Senegal reported that a demining plan had been validated and was being implemented in the framework of funding provided by the European Commission, but without providing details.

LAND RELEASE
During the past five years, Senegal cleared a total of only 0.52km², with 90% of this clearance conducted in 2012 and 2013.

Five-year summary of land release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and in accordance with the seven-year extension request granted in 2008, Senegal is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2016.

In granting the extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that Senegal “does not yet have a clear knowledge of size and location of areas that will actually warrant mine clearance.” It further observed that “the commitment made by Senegal to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure may result in implementation that proceeds much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested and in a more cost-effective manner.”

At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed the hope it would fulfill its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continued. Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period except for “truly exceptional circumstances.” Concerns remain, however, that Senegal will fail to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.

In December 2013, at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Senegal declared it was planning to accelerate demining operations in order to be able to complete clearance by March 2016. Senegal also explained that its ability to meet its deadline depends on security conditions. In April 2014, CNAMS director informed the Monitor that Senegal has the technical capacity to clear its territory in a timely manner, noting, though, that security issues and lack of funding could affect its ability to meet its deadline. Senegal will only be able to assess its capacity to meet its Article 5 deadline by the end of 2014.

By April 2014, however, Senegal’s clearance capacities were considerably limited. HI was only carrying out NTS, risk education, and victim assistance, and was seeking funds to restart its TS and clearance operations. Mechem’s funding was likely to run out by June 2014, and NPA had closed its program. NPA’s withdrawal prompted Norway, Germany, and the European Union to end their financial support to the program.

In addition, following abolition of Mechem’s deminers in 2013, Senegal announced that all demining operations would first be approved by the MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials. As of April 2014, operators were not allowed to participate in these meetings, and communication and information-sharing mechanisms between CNAMS, demining operators, and the Senegalese armed forces seemed to be lacking. As a consequence, the slow pace of demining, as well as Senegal’s reluctance to clear its military bases make it doubtful that Senegal will be able to complete clearance by 2016.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, Senegal received US$2.4 million in international assistance from five donors. More than 80% ($1.9 million) of international contributions were earmarked for clearance.

Since 2009, Senegal has contributed more than US$1.5 million, or 15% of its total mine action budget. In June 2013, Senegal reported it would double its national contribution to $650,000 per year starting in 2013. However, Senegal reported contributing €205,000 (US$265,000) to its mine action program in 2013, compared with $230,000 in 2012, an increase of 65%. No details of expenditure have been given.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT
Serbia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is a legacy of the armed conflict associated with the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Serbia’s mine problem is confined to its southern border with Kosovo (and contamination exists within Kosovo itself: see also separate report on Kosovo).
Serbia reported that as of end 2013 mine contamination remained only in the municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo, which had a total of 1.2km² of confirmed mined area (CMA) and 2km² of suspect hazardous area (SHA). The affected areas are mainly hilly, are close to populated areas and important to local communities as grazing land for cattle, tobacco cultivation, and for access to forest products.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM
Serbia does not have an interministerial national mine action authority. The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) was established on 7 March 2002. A 2004 law made it responsible for coordination of demining, collection and management of mine action information (including casualty data), and survey of SMAs. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, license demining organizations, and conduct risk education.
SMAC does not carry out demining or employ deminers but does conduct surveys of areas suspected to contain mines, cluster munition remnants, or other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Demining is conducted by commercial companies and NGOs, which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF Enhancing Human Security. Only Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) personnel seconded to SMAC have conducted surveys in Serbia as well as undertaking clearance, but its operations ended in 2013 and all staff were laid off at the end of the year.

STRATEGIC PLANNING
Serbia conducts mine action according to annual plans that are approved by the government and determined largely by availability of donor funding. In 2013, Serbia was granted a five-year extension of its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2019. The extension request assessed confirmed and suspected mine contamination at 3.3km². It set out plans for survey of 2.1km² and clearance of 2.28km² at a projected cost of €2.5 million (US$3.2 million) but says ‘1km² of this ‘will be canceled. The projected survey was expected to lead to cancelation of about half the suspected area. The extension request foresaw state funding of €150,000 a year to cover the costs of survey and SMAC activities, and expected donors to cover all the clearance costs.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem understood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 5.0 AVERAGE
LAND RELEASE

Serbia released half a square kilometer of suspected mined area in Preševo in 2013 as a result of non-technical survey by NPA staff seconded to SMAC. Operations confirmed another 110,000 m² of mined area. In 2013, as in three of the last four years, Serbia conducted no mine clearance (see Table 1). SMAC had hoped to clear a small amount of mined area in 2013 funded through ITF and had reported that Russia’s Emercom Demining would start under a three-year 2013–15 humanitarian demining program funded by Russia. In the end, however, SMAC said it received no funding for mine clearance from donors, who had requested resources be allocated to clearance of cluster munition remnants and other UXO.

Table 1. Mine and battle area clearance in 2009–13 (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
<th>BAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>7.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013, Serbia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019.

With confirmed and suspected mine contamination estimated at less than 5 km² outside Kosovo, Serbia as late as May 2012 still held out hope of meeting its deadline, but in March 2013 it applied for a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to complete the task.

In granting the request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties noted that Serbia ‘could benefit from developing a resource mobilization strategy as soon as possible’ and that this ‘could benefit from Serbia covering part of the demining cost and that demonstrating national ownership in this manner could help facility cooperation and assistance efforts.’ The States Parties further noted that the plan presented by Serbia was ‘workable but lacks ambition.’

Serbia’s claim to continued jurisdiction over Kosovo entails legal responsibility for remaining mined areas under Article 5 of the treaty. But Serbia did not include such areas in its Article 5 extension request estimate of remaining contamination or plans for the extension period.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Serbia should take ownership of its small mine contamination problem and commit more national resources toward the annual cost of meeting its Article 5 obligations, including for clearance.

ENDNOTES

1 Email from Sladana Košutić, International Cooperation Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 22 April 2014.
5 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, Programme Manager, NPA, Belgrade, 13 March and 29 April 2014.
6 Interview with Petar Mihajlović and Sladana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010.
7 Average exchange rate: €1=US$1.28163 at 31 March 2013.
8 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 26 March 2013, pp. 23 and 24. The Extension Request said about 2 km² of land required survey but “we estimate 1.02 km² will be canceled.”
9 Email. from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, Belgrade, 13 March and 29 April 2014.
10 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 30 April 2013.
11 Ibid, 22 April 2014.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–8 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than twenty years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

According to the UN, antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were newly laid as recently as 2012 in the disputed regions of Sool and Sanaag in the north of the country. Sovereignty over these territories is claimed by both the self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland and Puntland. According to HALO Trust, as of April 2014, 221 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) remained to be cleared in Somaliland. The CHAs covered 19.9 km² of mined land of which 9.9 km² required full manual clearance while the other 10 km² required only mechanical verification. Already in 2013, HALO planned to deploy a Road Threat Reduction (RTR) system to address contamination on secondary roads. As of April 2014, however, the mechanical unit was not in Somaliland and its arrival was foreseen some time before the end of the year.

In Puntland, mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Centre (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Centre (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal and the northern part of Mudug. The LIS was conducted from February to April 2005 and identified 35 affected communities in 27 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs). Of the 35 communities, nine were categorized as ‘high impact’ and nine as ‘medium impact’; eight sites were identified for spot clearance tasking. The LIS estimated that about 19,000 people – around 6% of the population of approximately 2.5 million – live in mine affected communities. No estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in south central Somalia. However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in ten was contaminated by mines and/or ERW. Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The UN implements its mine action activities in Somalia according to three geographical regions in the country: south central Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. The respective centers responsible for mine action in each of these areas are the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), PMAC, and the Somaliland Mine Action Centre (SMAC). All three programs design their strategies, set priorities, and operate under the supervision of, and with the support of, the UN Somalia Mine Action program (UNSOMA) and UNMAS.

On 4 December 2011, the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) was established under the supervision of the Office of the President with authority to coordinate, oversee, and implement mine action activities in Somalia. In addition, it is responsible for approving national strategies and implementing all obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other disarmament treaties binding on Somalia.

South central Somalia

On 6 August 2013, the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, signed a law establishing SEMA as the mine action center for south central Somalia under the authority of the SNMAA. On 9 April 2014, the Director of SEMA, Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, reported to the Monitor that before demining can take place in south central Somalia, a stable administration needs to be established and further survey undertaken to determine the extent to which mines are present in that region. According to SEMA’s Director, no systematic or planned mine clearance operations were conducted in south central Somalia in 2013.

SEMA reported that in 2013 a ‘major increase in capacity took place in South Central Somalia, mainly due to increased access to newly accessible areas.’ And that ‘funding from the EU, UK, Italy, and Japan made it possible to train and deploy Police EOD teams across South Central Somalia, with bases in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beletweyne.’ In 2013, AMISOM deployed 19 EOD teams, while the Somali government counted 13 Police EOD teams. Moreover, in 2013 the mine action support to Somalia UNMAS/UNSOMA, provided four demining teams and two mechanical MineWolf 330. In addition, Danish Demining Group (DDG)’s capacity in south central Somalia consists of five EOD/survey teams for private stockpile destruction and EOD spot tasks. In 2014, the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is expected to deploy three multitask teams for EOD tasks and BAC operations.
Puntland
PMAC was established in Garowe with the support of UNDP in 1999. Since then, PMAC coordinates mine action on behalf of the regional government with several local and international partners. PMAC also runs the only police EOD team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. As of May 2014, UNMAS was providing funds for operations and capacity building and technical advice to PMAC and the police EOD team.11 In 2014, the Puntland police was due to increase its capacity to two EOD teams.14

MAG conducted training, and operational and administrative supervision to the police EOD and risk education teams from 2008 until 2013. In 2013, MAG changed its strategy to focus on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PPSM) and Community Safety and Security (CSS) activities.15 DDG implements clearance of unexploded ordnances and private stockpile destruction through one EOD team in Puntland.20

Somaliland
In 1997, UNDP assisted the Government of Somaliland in establishing SMAC which has since undertaken responsibility for coordinating and managing all humanitarian demining in Somaliland.21 Officially SMAC is under the authority of the Office of the Vice-President of Somaliland, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee.22

Since 2009, UNMAS has worked with SMAC to develop a transition plan to a locally owned program. At the end of 2011, three of the four benchmarks had been met: a written commitment by Somaliland authorities to continue supporting mine action, disbursement of US$20,000 by the authorities to the SMAC for vehicle replacement, and resumption of mine action interministerial committee meetings. These measures were made possible by contributions from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.22

In 2008, the Somaliland police forces counted five EOD teams which continue to constitute the national EOD capacity today.24

Commercial and NGO operators
DDG began operations in the country in 1999 with mine and ERW clearance in Somaliland. In 2007, DDG initiated a mine action program in south central Somalia (in Mogadishu) and in Puntland.25 DDG’s mine action program in Somaliland ceased mine clearance in 2006. As of April 2014, it retained two small EOD teams.26
HALO’s program in Somaliland was established in 1999 and since then has employed more than 600 national staff members. As of April 2014, HALO operated from two locations in Somaliland: an office in Hargeisa supporting operations in the west of the region, and an office in Burao for operations in the east.27 In the future, HALO plans to focus its efforts on the Sanaag and Sool regions and continue a village-by-village clearance of mines and ERW.28 As of April 2014, HALO estimates that, with existing assets, funding, and a stable political and security environment, Somaliland could be declared cleared of mines by 2017 or 2018.29

In 2013, MAG conducted non-technical survey and EOD tasks in Puntland. MAG halted its mine action program in Puntland in August 2013 in agreement with donors due to changes in strategy and a worsening security situation.30

In 2014, NPA was invited by the Somaliland authorities to implement a program in south central Somalia. As of April 2014, the NPA’s Humanitarian Disarmament program was still being established. By the end of 2014, the project is planned to consist of three multitasking teams able to perform survey, mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), EOD spot tasks, and RE. Within the same framework, NPA is assessing what needs to be done in order to build the capacity of national demining authorities and operators.31

In 2012, The Development Initiative (TDI), the first commercial demining company in south central Somalia, recruited, trained, and deployed four manual clearance teams, six EOD teams, and seven RE teams.32 Under a UNOPS contract, TDI operated along the border with Ethiopia with bases in Delow and Hiraan.33 All TDI’s operations ended in December 2013 due to lack of funds.34

LAND RELEASE
All clearance operations in south central Somalia are implemented primarily on a response/call-out basis. Mine action operations are largely EOD and spot clearance tasks.35 Non-technical survey (NTS) activities have been conducted when security, safety, and access allowed. Almost 2.4km2 of mined area were cleared in 2013 (see Table 1), almost all of which took place in Somaliland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/region</th>
<th>Mine clearance</th>
<th>BAC</th>
<th>Area released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Central Somalia</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2.465</td>
<td>5.32</td>
<td>7.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2014, clearance of the center of Mogadishu was completed of all known explosive contamination. On 9 April, the Somali Prime Minister and representatives from the European Union and UNMAS declared clearance complete in all 13 contaminated districts in central Mogadishu.36 In addition, according to SEMA, EOD teams from UNMAS and DDG conducted mine clearance operations in 2013 along the Somali–Ethiopian border in Gedo and Hiraan regions, clearing 2,500 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.37 In April 2013, during clearance operations in Hiraan an UNMAS EOD team came under small-arms fire with local militia. The incident did not result in casualties but one UNMAS vehicle was damaged.38

In Puntland, very little mine clearance has been conducted since the landmine impact survey was completed in 2005. According to MAG, the impact from mines is still unclear and further NTS and technical survey are required to ensure cost effectiveness and impact of future clearance. In 2013, MAG Somalia reported having cleared 12,500m² of mined land in Puntland.39 The Puntland police EOD teams, supported by UNMAS, MAG, and DDG, also collected and destroyed 5,882 items of ERW and small arms ammunition across the Puntland region.40

In Somaliland, HALO Trust, the only operator conducting mine clearance in Somaliland, released a total of 4.8km² of land through mine clearance and BAC in 2013.41 Of the almost five square kilometers released, 2.4km² were mined areas, 2.16km² were battle areas, and 0.2km² was canceled through non-technical survey (NTS). During the operations, 124 antipersonnel mines, 29 anti-vehicile mines, 2,221 items of UXO and 391 items of AXO were found and destroyed.42

In 2013, HALO deployed two BAC teams in the western regions of Awdal and Waqooyi Galbeed. Other two EOD teams conducting village-by-village ERW clearance were deployed in the regions of Awdal, Waqooyi Galbeed and Sool in the eastern regions of Togdheer, Sool and Sanaag.43 DDG in Somaliland focused its work on small village-by-village EOD tasks. In 2013, through spot/roving clearance and EOD tasks, DDG destroyed 1,632 items of AXO in four different tasks.44

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Somalia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 October 2022.

In seeking to meet this deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland.
Governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Germany and Finland. In the Department of State Office of Weapons Removal & Abatement (PM/WRA), the support humanitarian programming and support to the Somali security sector.

Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and The Julia Burke Foundation. The major contributors for HALO’s operations were the US Department of Defense (DOD), and £19 million (US$23 million) from Japan. For the period 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, the UN General Assembly assessed US$42.4 million for the mine action component (UNMAS) of the UN Support Operation for AMISOM (UNOSOM). These funds were allocated for mine action activities and for capacity building and explosive-management support to AMISOM. In 2013, an additional US$14 million were provided by the governments of Japan, the UK, and Italy via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). For 2014, UNMAS Somalia was seeking US$73 million to support humanitarian programming and support to the Somali security sector.

In 2013–14, combined international assistance was US$73.4 million, making Somalia one of the largest recipients of mine action support. The main recipient organizations in 2013 were: DGD with US$17.1 million for activities in Puntland, south central Somalia, and SEMA; HALO Trust with US$4.2 million for its activities in Somalia; MAG with US$2.4 million for activities in Puntland, and TDI with approximately US$5 million from UNOPS for its 2012–13 program in south central Somalia. DGD was expecting a slight increase of funding from the same donors in 2014.

Six international donors contributed US$4.2 million to HALO for its activities in Somaliland. The major contributors for HALO’s operations were the US Department of State Office of Weapons Removal & Abatement (PM/WRA), the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Germany and Finland. In 2013, HALO in Somaliland was also funded by the United Kingdom (DFID), £3.1 million (US$4.9) from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), and ¥29 million (US$3.2 million) from Japan. For the period 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, the UN General Assembly assessed US$24.4 million for the mine action component (UNMAS) of the UN Support Operation for AMISOM (UNOSOM). These funds were allocated for mine action activities and for capacity building and explosive-management support to AMISOM. In 2013, an additional US$14 million were provided by the governments of Japan, the UK, and Italy via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF). For 2014, UNMAS Somalia was seeking US$73.4 million to support humanitarian programming and support to the Somali security sector.

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In December 2013, South Sudan had 184 confirmed mined areas in seven states (Central Equatoria, East Equatoria, Jonglei, West Equatoria, Upper Nile, Unity, and West Bahr El Ghazal) and a further 86 SHAs may contain antipersonnel mines. In addition, due to the current instability in Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states, access to a number of areas has been extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to identify or address contamination. In April 2014, UNMAS reported 316 ‘minefields’ in South Sudan as ‘open hazards’. The number of antipersonnel mine victims doubled from 22 in 2012 to 46 in 2013.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) – now named the National Mine Action Authority, NMAA – was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Thus, UNMAS, with the NMAA, has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, and Yei. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the Information Management System for Mine Action (AIMSMA), and tasking operators. The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.

While it is planned that eventually the NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–16 notes that the government did not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the programme in providing technical and financial assistance.

International demining operators comprised four NGOs in 2013: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S OM), MECHEM, MineTech International (MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). The Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS) was the sole functioning national demining operator.

In 2013, South Sudan had a total mine action capacity of 26 multitasking teams (MTT) (trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), manual mine clearance, technical survey (TS) and battle area clearance (BAC)).

Table 1. Land release in 2009–13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Area canceled (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines cleared</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>1,304</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>6,896</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>5.41</td>
<td>3,158</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>20.99</td>
<td>37.24</td>
<td>15,712</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

In 2013, a total of 82 confirmed mined areas were released through technical survey and clearance over 4,279 m², destroying in the process 675 antipersonnel mines, 89 antivehicle mines, and 1,693 items of UXO. Non-technical survey (NTS) activities canceled a further 16,913 m², bringing the total mined area released to 21,228 m². Commercial companies accounted for almost 60% of the total area released in 2013, with G4S and TDI combined responsible for almost 78% (see Table 2).

Table 2. Release of mined area by operator in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared or released by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Canceled (m²)</th>
<th>Total area released (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>1,756,738</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,756,738</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4S OM</td>
<td>1,246,519</td>
<td>8,283,519</td>
<td>9,547,838</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>1,069,528</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,069,528</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>47,485</td>
<td>12,381</td>
<td>59,866</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMAS</td>
<td>186,720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>186,720</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>6,579</td>
<td>7,397,933</td>
<td>7,404,512</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEChem</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,331,369</td>
<td>16,913,833</td>
<td>21,255,202</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most mined areas cleared or otherwise released in 2013 were in the states of Central, West, and East Equatoria, respectively (see Table 3). While these states were the most heavily contaminated, the states of Jonglei and Upper Nile have been identified as home to a significant proportion of internally displaced people and refugees and as such were high priority areas. The relative low level of clearance activities in these states in 2013 by comparison to the Equatoria and East Equatoria states can be explained by lack of access in Jonglei and Upper Nile due to the long rainy season and flooding that meant the majority of operations there had to be completed in January-May 2013.

Table 3. Mined areas released in 2013 by state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Minefields</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Equatoria</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Equatoria</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bahar El Ghali</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bahar El Ghali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan expects to have surveyed and recorded all SHAs by the end of 2016 to facilitate the next strategic mine action planning phase, and to release approximately 5km² of confirmed hazardous area per year through technical survey and/or clearance, corresponding to 25km² in 2012-16. In 2012 and 2013, South Sudan were not far behind their clearance targets; however, with new contamination and decreased access to contaminated areas caused by the fighting at the end of December 2013, in addition to the continued identification of suspected and confirmed mined areas, it is highly uncertain whether South Sudan can sustain this pace of land release in 2014 and beyond. NPA has reported that its deployment to several states had been suspended or delayed in Upper Nile and the equatorial states in early 2014 due to the heavy fighting.

Given the current security situation, it is too early to know if South Sudan can meet its 2021 Article 5 deadline.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

South Sudan received more than US$15.8 million in international funding in 2013 for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance from twelve donors – two more donors but a decrease of $1.1 million in total compared with 2012. The decrease in international support was due to reduced funding from the European Union, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and the US compared to 2012, and a decrease in the value of the yen. While 2013 marked an increase in support from Denmark and Sweden and included three donor States (Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) that had not contributed the previous year, these increases were not sufficient to match the level of funding in 2012.

No national funding was reported for the Government of South Sudan to its mine action program, but it has been previously stated that the government provides a budget to the NMA to cover salaries and limited operational costs.

Italy, Japan, and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) provided funding through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. In addition, South Sudan received more than $2.0 million in UN assessed peacekeeping funds for mine action, an increase of almost $3 million from 2012.

The combined total of all contributions toward South Sudan’s mine action program in 2013 was just over $18.5 million. This is in excess of the 2013 annual budget projection of some $45 million envisaged as needed under the National Mine Action Strategy 2012-16.

ENDNOTES

6   Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form J.
13 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rory Logan, NPA, 29 April 2014.
14 Ibid; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mike Rashid, NMAA, 9 May 2014.
17 Information on 2013 in email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, South Sudan, 8 May 2014.
19 Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form J, April 2014, and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mike Rashid, NMAA, 9 May 2014.
24 Ibid, Form J.
25 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, South Sudan, 8 May 2014.
27 “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2012-2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. 27.
SUDAN

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Sudan is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW) primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war that ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. The CPA ultimately led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states have resulted in additional antivehicle mine contamination. The precise extent and impact of Sudan’s mine contamination is, though, still unclear.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) manage Sudan’s mine action program. In 2005, UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the CPA established the legal framework for UNMAO to manage quality assurance of all mine action activities in Sudan in the frame of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). That same year, the NMAC started working in partnership with UNMAD, the NMAA was set up, and a National Mine Action Policy Framework was developed, revised, and then approved by August 2006.

Following UNMIS and UNMAD’s closure in July 2011 upon the independence of South Sudan, NMAC assumed full ownership of national mine action activities responsible for coordinating all mine clearance activities, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. UNMAS, which had opened an emergency program in Sudan in 2002, continued to provide assistance to mine action in Sudan through technical support to NMAC through to the end of 2013. UNMAS support in Sudan came through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Action. As of January 2014, UNMAS ceded its lead in UN mine action efforts in Sudan to UNDP, which is expected to continue its support to NMAC until December 2016. UNISFA did not have a mandate for peacekeepers to conduct mine clearance. In November 2012, Security Council Resolution 2075 expanded UNMAS’s role to include identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone around Abyei. It also facilitates access by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.

In 2001, heavy conflict in Abyei between Sudan and South Sudan over the disputed border area resulted in the destruction of the town of Abyei and surrounding villages, the displacement of more than 100,000 people, and additional mine and UXO contamination. In response, the UN Security Council authorized a UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) to monitor the activities of the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in area, but did not have a mandate for peacekeepers to conduct mine clearance. In May 2013, the UN Security Council increased the number of peacekeepers in Abyei and noted concerned that a residual mine and ERW problem was hampering the return of displaced people.

In December 2013, Sudan reported that 11.3km² of area had been released in 2013 across a total of 248 areas of which 126 are dangerous areas, 61 are minefields, and 67 are suspect hazardous areas (SHAs), leaving approximately 38km² of mine/ERW contamination remaining. In 2013, Sudan registered thirty-two new DAs, and four minefields, while in January–March 2014 one dangerous area and one minefield was newly registered in NMAC’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. As of March 2014, the National Mine Action Center (NMAC) reported 221 hazardous areas remaining 198 dangerous area, 57 minefields, and 66 SHAs (see Table 1).

Sudan’s estimated remaining contamination affects 10 of the 18 states that comprise Sudan: Blue Nile, Central, East, North, South, and West Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan. Of the 10 states, only Blue Nile, Kassala, and South Kordofan have confirmed mined areas (totaling 51), which account for more than 85% of total estimated contamination. Both Blue Nile and South Kordofan are inaccessible due to ongoing conflict.

Table 1. Contaminated areas in Sudan as of March 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Dangerous areas</th>
<th>Confirmed mined areas</th>
<th>SHAs</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gadaref</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Darfur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Darfur</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Darfur</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Darfur</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Darfur</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, non-state armed groups operating in South Kordofan state have been accused of using landmines. Landmines in border states threaten the lives of pastoralists, farmers, and traders who regularly cross the border as they practice their livelihoods.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem understood</th>
<th><strong>4</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 4.1

POOR
In the Darfur region, under the umbrella of the African Union–UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities.32 UNAMID contracted the Development Initiative (TDI) in 2012 to assess, survey, mark/identify, and clear contaminated areas in all five Darfur states.33 TDI activities depend on availability of security forces and on receipt of permission from the Government of Sudan and the UN Special Representative for Political Affairs.34 Darfur mine action is funded completely through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.

Two international mine clearance NGOs have closed down their operations because they faced substantial government restrictions that impeded their operations.32 DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012.28 In June 2012, because they faced substantial government restrictions that impeded their activities, including in areas not originally surveyed.33 Sudan’s revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request of July 2013 included a total of 27km² that remained to be addressed consisting of 38 dangerous areas measuring more than 17km², 58 minefields measuring around 3km², and 28 SHAs measuring more than 6.5km².24 In 2013, Sudan released some 10.3km² of area (see Table 2), most of which was canceled through survey (almost 7.8km²). Almost all land release occurred in Kassala state (93%).35 In addition, Sudan assessed a total of 2,660km² of roads in 2013, all in the Darfur region.

### LAND RELEASE

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted in 2007–09 covering Blue Nile, Gedaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan states. Since then, and hitherto, reports of additional mine/ERW contaminated areas have been registered as dangerous areas in the database, causing the LIS baseline of 321 hazards to expand significantly, including in areas not originally surveyed.33 Sudan’s revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request of July 2013 included a total of 27km² that remained to be addressed consisting of 38 dangerous areas measuring more than 17km², 58 minefields measuring around 3km², and 28 SHAs measuring more than 6.5km².24

In 2013, Sudan released some 10.3km² of area (see Table 2), most of which was canceled through survey (almost 7.8km²). Almost all land release occurred in Kassala state (93%).35 In addition, Sudan assessed a total of 2,660km² of roads in 2013, all in the Darfur region.

### MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

In 2013, Sudan cleared almost 2.4km² of mined area and 0.95km² of battle area during which 1,053 antipersonnel mines, 254 antivehicle mines, and 1,925 UXO were destroyed.36 All mined area clearance occurred in Kassala and Gedaref states.25 Access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states has been limited due to instability caused by internal conflict since 2011.37 Clearance has not been disaggregated between different operators.

Reported clearance in 2013 was a significant improvement on 2012 when Sudan cleared some 0.55km² of mined area,38 but still significantly below clearance output achieved in 2010–11.

### MINE RISK EDUCATION IN 2013

Sudan has engaged extensively in risk education, particularly in Blue Nile, South Kordofan states, Darfur region, and the Eastern states, reporting a total of more than 2.7 million beneficiaries by end March 2014, of which 66,458 people received MRE in 2014, and 211,722 in 2013.39

### ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2019. Despite hopeful prospects in June 2011 for completion of Sudan’s Article 5 clearance obligations by its original deadline of 1 April 2014,40 a combination of factors has been asserted for the failure to do so: funding shortfalls, ongoing instability, lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, (formerly) prioritization of clearance in areas now within South Sudan, discovery of new hazardous areas, and departure of international NGOs. In March 2013, Sudan requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline.41

Under the extension request, Sudan plans to clear all the contaminated areas in the states of Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea by 2016 when clearance is due to begin in Blue Nile and Kordofan states.41 In addition, Sudan undertook to continue general mine action assessment (GMAA) in areas requiring survey or resurvey. Sudan indicated that the GMAA would be completed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan within six months of survey beginning (dependent on an improved security situation).42 Sudan also indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators through maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs), BASMAR, and South Sudan’s GMAA in areas requiring survey or resurvey. Sudan indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators through maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs), BASMAR, and South Sudan’s GMAA in areas requiring survey or resurvey.
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Although the total funding data for Sudan in 2013 is incomplete, Sudan received a total of US$2,067,790 combined in international funding from the Common Humanitarian Fund, the European Union (EU), Italy, and the US, all through the Voluntary Trust Fund, an increase from the $4.7 million contributed in 2012. UNAMID is the sole source of funding for mine action in Darfur. In 2012, through assessed peackeeping funds, UNAMID received $10.1 million for mine action.

Although information is not yet available for 2013; On 8 May 2013, at the Standing Committee meetings, Sudan reported that it had pledged $1.3 million to its national mine action program, similar to previous years. However, by 22 May, Sudan indicated that it had committed $6 million to mine action for 2013. No updated information is available on the amount contributed by Sudan in 2013.

Sudan estimated that $2.2 million would be needed for land release in 2013–14, while an additional $19 million would be needed in 2014–15 out of a total of $67 million for 2014–19.

ENDNOTES


5 Sudan, Article 7 Report for 2013, p. 4, Form C.

6 In Sudan, a dangerous area is an area suspected to contain mines or ERW reported as a result of a mine incident/ERW investigation by risk education teams, local population, or military personnel.

7 In Sudan, an area suspected of containing mines or ERW can be identified by impact survey, other form of survey, or a claim of presence of an explosive hazard.

8 SHA refers to an area suspected of having a mine or ERW hazard. An SHA can be identified by impact survey, other form of survey, or a claim of presence of an explosive hazard.


11 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

12 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

13 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

14 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.


16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.


19 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 6.

20 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 3.

21 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 3.

22 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 3.

23 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 3.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


28 “Sudan causes frustration among NGOs,” News24, 13 June 2012.

29 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

30 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

31 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

32 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

33 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

34 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

35 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

36 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

37 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

38 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

39 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

40 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

41 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

42 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

43 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

44 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

45 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

46 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

47 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

48 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

49 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

50 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.

51 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 21.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT
Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan were mined by Russian and Uzbek forces in 1991–98 while the central region of the country was contaminated as a result of the 1992–97 internal conflict. A national survey in 2003–05 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) estimated the area of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination at 50km².1

As of January 2013, the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC) had reduced total suspect hazardous area (SHA) to 7.2km² through non-technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), and clearance of which 4.9km² of SHA’s were along Tajikistan’s Afghan border and almost 2.3km² were in the central region.2 In September 2013, however, TMAC unexpectedly revised its estimate of remaining contamination to almost 11.7km² of contaminated land; 9.3km² of mined area and almost 2.4km² of battle area.3 The basis for this new estimate was unclear.

In March 2014, TMAC reiterated its estimate of contaminated area of 11.7km², but claimed that 8.9km² contained mines while 2.8km² contained ERW. No cluster munition-contaminated area is now reported by TMAC.4 The estimates did not, however, include area covered by 110 minefield records that were made public for the first time by TMAC in September 2013.5 According to TMAC, survey of the areas covered by these records would take place in 2014.6 The 110 records concern areas where security constraints have prevented survey activities in the past.1

In 1992–2012, TMAC recorded 846 mine/ERW casualties (368 killed, 478 injured). Of that total, almost 36% were children (101 killed and another 142 injured) and 88 were women.8

MINE ACTION PROGRAM
The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) is Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the Government’s socio-economic development policies.9

In June 2003, the Government of Tajikistan and UNDP established the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre with the intention that it become a nationally owned program in the near future.10 TMAC was made responsible for coordination and monitoring of all mine action activities.5 Since then, TMAC has acted as the executive body of the CIIHL to which it reports.11

Tajikistan’s mine action program is not yet fully nationally owned.12 TMAC has no legal status and does not report directly to a line ministry. Lack of legal recognition has presented problems for TMAC.13 For example, without legal status, TMAC cannot open a bank account to receive and disburse funds.14 The importance of clarifying TMAC’s status was also highlighted in the 2012 evaluation of UNDP support to mine action in Tajikistan.15 The Ministry of Justice is leading the government effort in nationalizing TMAC, and a commission has been established to study the issue and make recommendations on the structure of the center. A decision was expected sometime in 2014.16

The Ministry of Defense plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption by the Ministry of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–16) in July 2013, the Ministry focuses on three main objectives: to further support humanitarian demining; enhance national capacities; and create the conditions for a sound national mine action program.17

Following the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2009, the Ministry established a Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU). Since 2010, the OSCE has supported the HDU via the Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST). The UST was contracted by the OSCE in order to provide project management and administrative support to the HDU in 2010–13.18

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. FSD started its operations in 2003. Since then, it has conducted surveys (in 2004–05 and 2007–09) and clearance; provided technical assistance to TMAC, and, by November 2010, supported the development of UST’s capacity.19 NPA started operations in Tajikistan after signing an MoU with the government in 2010. NPA’s arrival significantly increased the demining capacity of Tajikistan’s mine action program and made a positive impact on clearance output.20

The OSCE Office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: support to national capacity building in humanitarian demining; and foster regional cooperation in borders management and security issues.21 Its work focused on supporting the Government in cooperation with neighboring states and fostering dialogue through a regional mine action cooperation project in Central Asia.22

OTHER AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

TAJIKISTAN

MINE ACTION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Problem understood</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target date for completion of clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted clearance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient clearance</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National funding of program</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely clearance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land release system</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National mine action standards</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporting on progress</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving performance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MINE ACTION PERFORMANCE SCORE: 5.0 AVERAGE
STRATEGIC PLANNING

In May 2011, the national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) for 2010–15 was approved by the Government. Among the plans specific objectives TMAC was to ensure that all priority areas – 7.5 km² of SHAs – are cleared by the end of 2015; survey activities could initiate along the Tajik-Uzbek border; and that a plan for nationalization of TMAC is established. According to the NMASP, TMAC was to be fully nationalized by the end of 2011. As of April 2014, however, TMAC was still not established as a national entity, remaining a nationally-executed UNDP project.

During the Mid-Term Review workshop (MTR) on the NMASP in Dushanbe in June 2013, nationalization of Tajikistan’s mine action center was discussed at length. As a consequence of the review, a revised national strategic plan was expected, with a clear and definite plan for TMAC’s nationalization. As of writing, however, a revised national strategy was still awaited.

In collaboration with the EU and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, TMAC organized an Article 5 completion workshop in Dushanbe in September 2013. The aim was to clarify the extent of remaining contamination, and to agree on a work plan to achieve Tajikistan’s Article 5 clearance deadline in 2020. TMAC committed to revise its completion work plan (2014–20). As of April 2014, the plan was still under development.

According to the GICHD, there is little commitment from the Government to assume ownership of the mine action program. Unless UNDP acts effectively, the GICHD sees a real risk of no real progress in the nationalization process in the near future.

LAND RELEASE

Survey in 2013

No areas were canceled by NTS in 2013. Following an operational efficiency assessment in June 2013, the GICHD recommended NTS in the districts bordering Uzbekistan. Survey activities were conducted by FSD to confirm if SHAs were on Uzbek territory. Survey was completed at the end of 2013. FSD, jointly with TMAC, concluded that no contaminated areas were located in Tajikistan.

Clearance in 2013

In 2013, FSD, NPA, and the Ministry of Defense’s HDU released 47 contaminated areas covering 2.97 km² of land (see Table 1). During clearance operations 22,486 antipersonnel mines, 3 antivehicle mines, and 872 items of UXO were destroyed. Of the 2.97 km² of land released, 2.27 km² were released by clearance and 0.70 km² by technical survey (TS). No battle area clearance (BAC) was conducted in 2013.

Table 1. Release of mined area in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Areas released</th>
<th>Area canceled by NTS (km²)</th>
<th>Area released by TS (km²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Total area released (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6,882</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>10,994</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UST/MoD</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>6,610</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>22,486</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TMAC had planned to release 2 km² of contaminated land in 2013. It expected to release another 2 km² of contaminated land in 2014. In 2014, demining activities were planned to be concentrated in the central region.

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 6.75 km² of mined area (see Table 2).

CAPACITY

As of April 2014, three demining operators in Tajikistan comprised capacity of one survey team, thirteen manual demining teams, five mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and three mechanical demining machines.

From 2012 to 2014, FSD capacity decreased from seven to two manual demining teams. Due to lack of funding it was expected that FSD would close its program in Tajikistan by end 2014 after handing over its capacity to a local NGO. In the same period, NPA capacity increased from six to eight manual demining teams. In addition, in April 2014 NPA deployed an additional demining team consisting entirely of women. Due to the type of contamination in Tajikistan, the NPA’s MDD team (10 dogs) was canceled.

In 2013, the OSCE financed the operational costs of the HDU’s Mini MineWolf, which was procured and delivered by the US Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing program in 2012. Between 2012 and 2013, the HDU increased its demining capacity by adding a manual demining team, which has been financed by the US’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and by Luxembourg via the OSCE Office in Tajikistan.
ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10 year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 April 2020.

In granting the request, the states parties noted that, while no demining had taken place until more than four years after entry into force, since that time significant progress has been made, particularly by release of land through resurvey. The States Parties further noted that use of mechanical demining assets might help Tajikistan to find itself in a situation wherein it could proceed with implementation much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested. The Analyzing Group mandated to analyse extension requests under Article 5 of the treaty had also noted shortcomings in Tajikistan’s original estimate of the size and locations of mined areas and recognition by Tajikistan of the need for resurvey.

More recently, the extent to which Tajikistan is making best efforts to complete its Article 5 obligations is unclear, in particular given the significant increase in suspected mined area in 2013.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2010–15 was estimated at US$30 million. In 2012, international contributions came from five states, UNDP, and the OSCE for a total of US$6.6 million. Germany, Norway, and the US provided two-thirds of the funding while NPA and FSD for a total of US$6.6 million. Germany, Norway, and the US were the major donors in 2013 contributing NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of Defense Foreign Military Financing (FMF) in 2012 to US$4.5 million in 2013. The Government of Tajikistan contributed US$1.7 million in 2012, which is likely to be increased in future years. The Clean Fuels Program for 2012 estimated the size and locations of mined areas and recognition by Tajikistan as US$30 million.44 In 2012, international funding for 2014 was expected to receive less funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of Defense for full ownership of the national mine action program.

In 2014, NPA was expecting to receive less funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of Defense for full ownership of the national mine action program. Additionally, in 2013 the OSCE office in Tajikistan channelled funds for US$610,000 directed to mine action, capacity building, regional cooperation, and borders management. In 2014, TMAC was expecting to receive less funding. As of March 2014, committed funding was about US$4.5 million. Germany was providing FSD with US$300,000 for handover of capacity to a local NGO. But donors had not committed to support Tajikistan’s MDD and mechanical demining teams. TMAC feared lack of funds would affect land release in 2014 and that its target of releasing 2km² might not be achieved.51

In 2014, NPA was expecting to receive less funding from Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, NPA planned to increase its demining capacity by adding a female demining team funded by the US Department of Defense for full ownership of the national mine action program. The OSCE in Tajikistan was expecting to receive more funding for 2014. Funding allocated by the OSCE Unified Budget for 2014 was estimated at US$60,000, while extra funding for 2014 and that its target of releasing 2km² might not be achieved.51

ENDNOTES

4 Email from Parviz Medozovich, Operations Manager, TMAC, 6 March 2014, and email from Muhhabat Ibrohimov, Director, TMAC, 19 March 2014.
6 Email from Muhhabat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.
7 Statement of Tajikistan, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 2013, p. 6; and email from Muhhabat Ibrohimov, TMAC, 19 March 2014.
9 Article 5 Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 4.
13 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdulmain Karimov, TMAC, 11 June 2013.
16 Ibid., pp. 27–29.
19 Email from and telephone interview with Luba Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 18 March 2014, and response to Monitor questionnaire, 8 April 2014.
22 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luba Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
23 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 18.
28 Ibid., p. 6.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
30 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
31 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. FSD will remain in Tajikistan with a small advisory capacity to assist the local NGO.
40 Email from Resad Junuzagic, Country Director, NPA, 19 March 2014.
42 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luba Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
46 Email from Ahsa Mahmoudov, Program Officer, TMAC, 24 June 2013.
48 Ibid, and response to Monitor questionnaire by Luba Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.
50 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
55 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Luba Buhin, OSCE, 8 April 2014.
56 Ibid.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

1. Tajikistan should survey the new 110 minefield records as soon as possible so as to clarify the actual extent of mine/SDD contamination.
2. It should then revise its Article 5 completion plan and its mine action strategic plan for the period 2014–20 with precise and clear milestones.
3. In order to improve operational efficiency and strategic planning, TMAC and the Tajik Government must enhance their commitment to assume full ownership of the national mine action program.

TAJIKISTAN

OTHER AFFECTED STATES PARTIES
A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in 2000 identified suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) containing mines and explosive remnants of war (ERWs) covering an estimated 922km² and affecting 592 mine villages across 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates. Yemen’s first Article 5 deadline extension request stated in 2008 that 710km² had been released and 457 areas covering 213km² remained to be addressed.

However, additional mine contamination resulted from the 2010 insurgency in northern Sada’a governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. YEMAC reported that insurgents in Sada’a had laid homemade mines, later clearing some but missing others. In 2011, under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Republican Guard reportedly laid thousands of mines in the Bani Jarmoz area near Sana’a. The number of mines and the extent of the area affected remain to be determined.

Information provided to YEMAC by local inhabitants in February 2014 suggested 25 villages were affected.

Yemen is contaminated with mines from a series of conflicts dating back five decades (in 1962–9, 1970–83, and in 1994) but instability and conflict in the last three years have added significant new contamination. Mines were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and again in the 1994 internal conflict. The precise extent of contamination remaining is, though, unclear.

Yemen established a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) in June 1998 by prime ministerial decree to formulate policy, allocate resources, and develop a national mine action strategy. NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries.

YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country. It is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAC) and a National Training Center in Aden also set up in 1999 and another REMAB in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate) added in March 2004. REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

UNDP started a program to support YEMAC in May 1999, switching from UN execution to national implementation in October 2003. In March 2008, YEMAC developed a strategic plan for April 2009 through September 2014, within the period it sought in its first Article 5 deadline extension request. In December 2013, Yemen applied for a second five-year extension until 2019, identifying remaining mined area for clearance at 8.14km².

The request foresaw clearance of more than 1.6km² of mined area a year between June 2014 and May 2019 and allows another year for clearing any additional hazards identified during the extension period. The request identifies total expenditure of more than US$65 million over the five years, equivalent to more than $13 million a year, compared with average annual expenditure of less than $2 million over the past five years.

YEMAC’s 2014 work plan calls for clearance of a total of 2.3km² of ERW-affected areas, including 1.7km² of mine-affected land. It makes no reference to non-technical survey but sets a target of conducting technical survey on areas totaling 38.27km².
LAND RELEASE

YEMAC reported releasing a total of 7.2 km² in 2013, more than double the area released in 2012. Release through mine clearance in 2013 was severely constrained by shortage of funds and by insecurity, factors that have carried over into 2014.15

Table 1. Mine and battle area clearance in 2013-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Battle area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEMAC</td>
<td>1,161,280</td>
<td>6,057,737</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mine clearance in 2013 was conducted mainly in Amran, Hadramaut, and Ibb governorates. YEMAC has around 1,000 staff, including 539 field operations personnel operating in six manual demining teams and three mine detection dog teams, as well as 12 technical survey teams and eight EOD teams. Plans for expansion were constrained by lack of funds. YEMAC reported conducting non-technical survey in two districts of Abyan in 2013 (Zinjibar and Khanfar) identifying 61 SHAs affected by mines and ERW covering a total of 124 km² and affecting 37 villages. It said it did not cancel any land as a result of non-technical survey in 2013.16

UNDP said technical survey was conducted over an area of 65.4 km² in 2013, resulting in 58 km² being ‘reduced’ and 7.4 km² marked as minefield.17

In March 2014, YEMAC said it suspended all clearance operations because of delays in receiving funding pledged by donors.18 However, it was able to deploy a technical survey team and a clearance team to the area of Bani Jarmoz north of the capital Sanaa to begin demining of areas around 25 villages in two districts affected by mines displaced by the Republican Guard in 2011.19

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2008), Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2015.

In December 2013, Yemen submitted a request for a second five-year extension until 1 March 2020. The request foresees clearance of 8 km² of confirmed mined areas at a rate of 1.6 km² a year for five years through 2019, leaving the final year for tackling additional mined areas identified during the extension period.20 It also reported 438 SHAs covering 338 km² and says YEMAC has yet to survey significant areas of suspected contamination in Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a provinces.21

The request, however, raised concerns. Contamination data was not consistent with information provided in Yemen’s 2013 Article 7 report. The request foresees expenditure of $65 million, averaging over US$13 million a year, more than triple recent levels of support available to mine action in Yemen. Further, Yemen states in the request that many of its objectives are “based on speculation of what will be identified” during non-technical and technical survey and offered to provide yearly updates on the progress of survey.22 Yemen officials acknowledged the financial constraints on operations and described the request as an interim document to give it time to more clearly define the remaining contamination.23

Among comments on the request at the Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in April 2014, Norway expressed its wish for a revised extension request containing more precise information.24 ICBL, noting inconsistencies between data presented in Yemen’s 2013 Article 7 report and the extension request, called on Yemen to conduct a comprehensive review of data and submit a revised request in 2014 or by early 2015.25

Yemen reported receiving US$46 million in 2013, mostly from UNDP, of which $492,000 was carried forward into 2014. YEMAC planning was based on a budget of $7.2 million in 2014 but said it would adjust the plan according to funds received.

ENDNOTES

1 Email from Mansour al-Ali, Director, YEMAC, 28 August 2011.
3 Article 7 Request (for year to 31 March 2011), Form I.
5 Article 7 Request (for year to 31 March 2011), Form I.
7 Article 7 Request (for year to 31 March 2013), Form I.
8 Data presented in the extension request suggests that three governorates accounted for 87% of the total suspected area: Sada’a had 274 SHAs covering 15 km², Shabwah 11 SHAs covering 92 km², and Abyan 42 SHAs covering more than 87 km².
9 Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 December 2013, p. 12.
10 Email from YEMAC, 19 March 2014.
11 Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.
12 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.
14 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 10.
15 YEMAC, Work Plan of YEMAC for (Jan-Dec) 2013, 24 November 2013, p. 10.
16 Email from Al-ai al-Kadri, General Director, YEMAC, 16 March 2014.
17 Interview with Ali al-Kadri, YEMAC, and John Dingley, Senior Technical Adviser, UNDP, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
18 Email from Ahmed Awaji, IMSMA Director, YEMAC, 11 March 2013, information from YEMAC forwarded by email from Rosemary Wiley-Al’sanah, UNDP, 27 April 2013.
19 Email from YEMAC, 20 March 2014.
21 Interview with Al-ai al-Kadri, YEMAC, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
24 Ibid, p. 15.
25 Ibid, p. 16.
26 Interview with Al-ai al-Kadri, YEMAC, in Geneva April 2014.
29 Email from YEMAC, 20 March 2014.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Yemen should adopt terminology consistent with international mine action standards.

Recommendations for Action

- Yemen, with technical support, should audit and rationalize its data on ERW contamination and provide a summary document setting out as of the end of 2013 the extent of confirmed and suspected mined areas by governorate.
- Using cleaned-up data and realistic projections, a revised extension request should be submitted as soon as possible.
- Yemen should adopt a revised extension request that is consistent with international mine action standards.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The United Kingdom (UK) is affected by antipersonnel mines by virtue of its control and assertion of full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which were contaminated during the armed conflict between the UK and Argentina in 1982. The conflict resulted in many thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the islands, most by Argentina. Following land release in 2011–12 (see below), 113 mined areas remained to be released, covering a total area of more than 9km², and which contain some 19,000 mines.

No civilian mine casualties have ever occurred on the islands. The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and two more were injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.

Over the years, however, there have been numerous instances where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence reported ‘infringement’ of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008. On 6 December 2008, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falklands but were not injured. In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 (then US$1,503) for entering a minefield on Goose Green. It is a criminal offense on the Falkland Islands to enter a minefield.

The socio-economic impact of contamination on the islands is said to be minimal. All mined and suspect hazardous areas are reported to have been ‘perimeter-marked’ and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. According to the UK, the mined areas represent ‘only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.’ A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animal’s deaths.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) composed of both the UK and the Falkland Islands governments was established in 2009 to oversee clearance of mined areas. The Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted the UK’s undertaking to provide regular reports on the establishment of an NMAA “and other implementation bodies.”

In August 2009, the UK contracted Colin King Associates to manage a Falkland Islands Demining Programme Office (DPPO) mandated to execute the policies of the NMAA and to coordinate mine action activities on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. In 2011, the contract for the DPPO was awarded to Fenix Insight. In mid-October 2009, Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment and Consultancy International Limited (BACTEC) won the first in a series of contracts for clearance and land release leading to the start of operations at the beginning of December 2009.
LAND RELEASE

No clearance or land release took place in the 2013–14 austral winter demining season. The UK said it was instead focused on agreeing a multi-year plan for the next round of mine clearance operations. The UK gave no timelines for starting the next phase but said it aimed to release details of the plan as soon as possible. 

BACTEC conducted battle area clearance (BAC) south of Stanley between January and the end of March 2012 releasing 3.7km² of suspect hazardous area and destroying 79 items of UXO. Fenix Insight, managing the Falklands clearance or technical survey and 13,660 m² that was subject to a combination of mechanical technical survey and manual follow up. The remaining land was released by survey or clearance to 4.7km² since operations started in 2009.

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013–14

For the second time in three years, no mine clearance occurred in the 2013–14 demining season. The UK had reported that in early 2013 BACTEC had conducted technical survey, mine and battle area clearance (BAC), clearing five minefields and destroying 296 antipersonnel mines, 32 antivehicle mines, and 6 booby traps. It did not give details of the amount of land cleared or released in this operation.

Fenix reported that at the end of the operation, the UK had released a total of 4.7km² of battle area, including 22,053m² that had been subjected to full manual clearance or technical survey and 13,660m² that was subject to a combination of mechanical technical survey and manual follow up. The remaining land was released through non-technical and technical survey and BAC.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension request granted by States Parties in November 2008), the UK is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 1 March 2019.

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties in December 2008 agreed to the UK’s request for a 10-year extension but noted the UK had agreed to provide, not later than the end of June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5. As of May 2014, the UK had not fulfilled this commitment.

At the June 2010 Standing Committee meetings, the UK stated that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) would analyse data gathered from the Phase 1 operations on four sites in 2009–2010 and make recommendations for future work based on this analysis. It added: “We intend to report the findings of our analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.” In June 2011, the UK stated that it had planned a two-year pilot project in its extension request before it would be in a position to set out a full plan to meet its legal obligations. On that basis the UK was due to present the full plan in 2013. The FCO said in May 2014, it would release details of plans for a fourth phase of demining “as soon as possible.”

ENDNOTES

1 There is a sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas with Argentina.
2 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2. Argentina, in 2006, estimated the number of mines remaining to be cleared at higher than 16,000. See Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 May 2006.
6 UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 1.
7 Ibid.
12 Telephone interview with David Hewitson, Director, Fenix Insight, 28 October 2013.
14 “Mine Clearance Begins In The Falklands,” Bag of UK Ambassador John Duncan.
15 Email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK, 21 May 2014.
17 Email from David Hewitson, Fenix Insight, 30 October 2013.
19 Email from David Hewitson, Fenix Insight, 30 October 2013.
22 Ibid, 21 June 2011. Notes by the ICBL.
23 Email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, FCO, UK, 21 May 2014.
Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Armenia is primarily the consequence of its armed conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–94, which saw landmines laid by both sides. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines with Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and other territories controlled by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Forces. Armenia’s border with Georgia has been cleared of mines, whereas the border with Turkey, also mined during the Soviet era, is still contaminated.1

The 2005 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 102 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in five districts bordering Azerbaijan. The LIS estimated contaminated area at more than 321km2 of land, affecting 60 communities.2 In August 2012, HALO Trust conducted a partial survey of 17 sites and was able to cancel 80% of the area identified by the LIS for these sites. However, HALO activities were suspended following a grant awarded by the US Department of State to the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) to resurvey fully Armenia.3 FSD started a non-technical survey (NTS) in September 2012, which was completed in May 2013.4 According to FSD and the Armenian Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE), the survey found 131 dangerous areas in four districts bordering Azerbaijan. These areas cover a total of 47km2 of land, of which 17 SHAs cover 26km2 and 114 CHAs cover 21km2.5 Approximately 35,000 people in 42 communities were found to be impacted by contamination. However, these figures do not include two communities known to be contaminated which, during the FSD survey, were not accessible for security reasons.6

FSD was mandated by the Government of Armenia to conduct surveys of impacted communities outside the military restricted zone. Therefore, 50 SHAs which fall inside the military perimeter were not included in the survey. The NTS was conducted only within the internationally recognized boundaries of Armenia.7 During NTS, FSD teams collected information on 271 non-recent mine victims. These records were submitted to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which maintains a mine victim database in Armenia.8 In addition, the ACHDE is the coordination body to which all casualty data are submitted for inclusion into the national IMSMA database.9 Territory seized from Azerbaijan during the conflict is believed to be significantly contaminated by mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions.10 However, the precise extent of contamination in those districts is unknown.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

In 2002, the ACHDE was established under the Ministry of Defence as a state agency for mine action activities.11 In February 2012, the Government of Armenia changed the legal status of the ACHDE to a civilian, non-commercial state organization responsible for conducting surveys, identifying contaminated areas, and implementing mine clearance operations. Under its new status ACHDE can negotiate with international demining organizations, accept international funding, sign contracts, and receive assistance.12

In January 2014, the Foundation for Demining and Demolition (FDD) was established as a national, civilian, and non-commercial demining organization in Armenia with support from the ACHDE, Geowulf LLC, FSD, and the Government of Armenia.13 Its main tasks are to conduct humanitarian demining and to destroy expired or obsolete arms and ammunition in Armenia.14

FSD has been present in Armenia since 2012.15 In mid-2012, HALO Trust briefly operated in Armenia mainly in NTS activities and, at the end of 2013, it deployed staff in one of Armenia’s affected regions with a view to starting technical survey (TS) and clearance activities in April 2014.16

STRATEGIC PLANNING

In March 2013, a discussion was held at the Ministry of Defence on the nationwide survey carried out in 2012–13.17 The Chair of ACHDE’s Council, Ara Nazaryan, stated that: “the drafting of a national mine action program, its approval and subsequent implementation are priority tasks for comprehensive demining activities in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”18 Based on the NTS findings, ACHDE will develop a national mine action plan to be submitted to the Armenian Government, which will be implemented by ACHDE following governmental approval.19

One of the objectives of the Armenian Mine Action Strategy 2007–11 was reduction through TS and clearance of 2.2% (7km2) of the SHAs identified by the LIS and 6.8% of the SHAs outside the restricted military zone.20 Little progress was achieved in this regard.21

In 2013, with the assistance of FSD, ACHDE developed the Armenian National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which have been submitted to the Government for approval. With the support of FSD, ACHDE has set up and manages the national IMSMA database.22
LAND RELEASE
Armenia does not report systematically on its mine clearance operations. In the past, demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates low, with the Ministry of Defence reporting only some 2km² of mined land cleared from 2002 to the end of 2008. During 2013, only NTS operations were conducted by FSD with the support of the ACHDE.

In September 2013, HALO opened an office in the Kapan region in order to initiate its new demining activities under a US$600,000 grant awarded by the US Department of State for a two-year period (2013–15). On 1 April 2014, HALO’s demining and survey teams, together with manual demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units of Armenia’s Peace Keeping Engineering Battalion (PKEB) started TS and clearance operations near the town of Kapan, in Armenia’s most contaminated region of Syunik. The demining project aims to release 100,000m² of mined area by November 2014, while training the PKEB to international standards so that they can manage demining operations by the end of 2015. Preparations will be coordinated and conducted under the authority of the ACHDE with technical support from FSD.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although Armenia has not adhered to the Mine Ban Treaty, it voluntarily provides information on antipersonnel mines to the UN and to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for transparency and confidence-building. Whatever information is provided, however, is not publicly available.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
Armenia has not reported on its support to mine action in the last four years. In August 2009, Armenia reported providing all financial resources for ACHDE since 2008. No details were provided.

In fiscal year 2012, the US Department of State awarded FSD a US$391,000 grant to conduct the survey in order to further reduce the 102 SHA’s of the 2005 LS. In 2013, FSD received US$132,000 and in 2014 another US$300,000 from the Office of Weapons Removal andAbatement in the US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA). In addition, FSD contributed US$45,563 of its own funds to support mine action in Armenia.

In 2013, HALO Trust received US$600,000 from the US Department of State for September 2013 to September 2015 to conduct TS and clearance and train Armenian demining personnel.

Between 2009 and 2012, ITF Enhancing Human Security implemented the first phase of a Victims Assistance project, “Socio-Economic Reintegration Program for Mine Victims in Armenia,” financed by the Austrian Development Agency and South Korea. At the end of 2012, the same donors provided $246,445 for a three-year Phase 2 of the project.

ENDNOTES
1 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, Director, Armenian Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (ACHDE), 19 March 2014; and interview in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
3 Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 17 February 2014; and Valeria Fabbroni, Head of Operations, FSD, 26 February 2014.
4 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014; and US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2013,” Washington DC, August 2013, p. 33.
5 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014.
9 Ibid.
10 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
15 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 20 March 2014.
16 Ibid, 19 March 2014.
17 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.
18 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 17 February 2014.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
23 See, e.g. V. Bahle, N. Wegen, EC-Funded Mine Actions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 2009, pp. 26–27.
24 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 19 March 2014.
26 Email from Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, 26 February 2014.
27 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, Geneva, 1 April 2014.
29 Interview with Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, and HALO, “HALO begins mine clearance in Armenia and finds first mine.”
33 Email from Maj. Armen Zakeryan, Armenian Ministry of Defence, 10 August 2009.
36 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, ACHDE, 21 February 2014; and Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 6 March 2014.

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161
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–94 armed conflict with Armenia – which saw landmines laid by both sides – and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see separate report).

Since 2001, surveys have reduced the total extent of suspected contamination within areas under the control of Azerbaijan. In 2003, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 970 suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 736km².1 In 2006, resurvey reduced the estimated contamination to 306km².2 By the beginning of 2014, further survey and clearance operations had reduced mined area in areas under Azeri control to an estimated 120km².3

The precise extent of contamination in the seven districts occupied by Armenia is unknown. The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) suggests contamination may cover between 350km² and 830km².4

In 2013, ANAMA recorded a total of eight casualties (all male; four killed, four injured).5 This compares with 19 casualties in 2012.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

A 1998 presidential decree established the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), which is tasked with planning, coordinating, managing and monitoring mine action in the country. ANAMA also conducts demining operations, along with two national operators that it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (Dayag-RA) and the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF). No commercial companies are active in mine action in Azerbaijan.

STRATEGIC PLANNING

ANAMA’s mine action strategy for 2009–13 foresaw resurvey, area reduction, and clearance of some 170km² of accessible SHAs. For 2013, the strategic plan expected to release a total of some 35km², 28.5km² by survey and 6.5km² by clearance.7 This was not achieved.

As of the beginning of 2014, mine clearance capacity consisted of three manual demining teams (ANAMA, Dayag-RA, and IEPF) of 40 staff each, six flails, and 36 MODUs and their handlers, the same capacity as in 2012. No major changes in capacity were expected in 2014.12

Azerbaijan submitted voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009 but has not submitted an Article 7 report in the last four years.

LAND RELEASE

ANAMA has reported clearance for 2013 of more than 4.6km² of mined land (see Table 1): 1.8km² through manual clearance and 2.8km² with mine detection dog (MDD) support.

Table 1. Release of mined area by clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas cleared</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANAMA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,257,488</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEPF</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>644,961</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>734,520</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4,636,969</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further 12.4km² was canceled by non-technical survey (NTS) and 2.4 km² released by technical survey (TS) (see Table 2). The program’s flails are used mainly for TS operations.1 In addition, 16km² of battle area was cleared.10

Table 2. Release of mined area by survey in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area canceled by NTS (m²)</th>
<th>Area released by TS (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12,380,098</td>
<td>2,430,812</td>
<td>4,636,969</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>117*</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This includes four antivehicle mines cleared during BAC and a further four cleared during roving tasks.

As of the beginning of 2014, mine clearance capacity consisted of three manual demining teams (ANAMA, Dayag-RA, and IEPF) of 40 staff each, six flails, and 36 MODUs and their handlers, the same capacity as in 2012. No major changes in capacity were expected in 2014.12

From 1998 to end 2013, Azerbaijan found and destroyed a total of 322 antipersonnel mines, 692 antivehicle mines, and 687,619 items of UXO. This is an extremely small number of mines given the extent of reported clearance of 14.5km² of mined area (see Table 3).13

Table 3. Five-year summary of land release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Release by survey (km²)</th>
<th>Total release (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>30.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>29.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>22.28</td>
<td>29.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>19.71</td>
<td>31.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td><strong>14.51</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.15</strong></td>
<td><strong>79.89</strong></td>
<td><strong>138.88</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES
7 Ibid.
8 Email from Ahmad Manafov, Planning and Development Department Officer, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
9 Ibid.
11 Email from Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
12 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
14 Email from Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
15 Ibid.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION
In 2013, the Government of Azerbaijan contributed more than US$10.4 million to the mine action program from the state budget and a further €1.6 million (more than $4.1 million) to the NATO PfP Trust Fund Project on clearance of Jeyranchel from mines and UXO.14

UNDP Azerbaijan contributed US$255,755 to support its mine action program. The NATO PfP Trust Fund Project received €556,111 from international donors (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the USA).15

Azerbaijan’s plan for clearance operations in 2009–13 [in accessible territory] estimated a total funding requirement of US$53 million. Some $50 million was provided. Since 2008, the Government of Azerbaijan has contributed more than 80% of the cost of its mine action program.

ENDNOTES
7 Ibid.
8 Email from Ahmad Manafov, Planning and Development Department Officer, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
9 Ibid.
11 Email from Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
12 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
14 Email from Ahmad Manafov, ANAMA, 19 February 2014.
15 Ibid.

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT
Despite earlier statements to the contrary, China remains affected by landmines. The extent of contamination is not known.

In the 1990s, the US reported that China had emplaced mines along its borders with India, the Russian Federation, and Vietnam.1 China’s military estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.2

China conducted clearance operations along its border with Vietnam between 1992 and 19993 and between 2005 and 2009.4 In 2009, China said it had completed demining along the Yunnan section of its border with Vietnam and that this “represents the completion of mine clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s territory.”5 However, casualties from landmines continue to be reported in parts of Yunnan bordering Vietnam where some areas are marked as mine-affected.6 Press reports say one to two people are injured in landmine incidents in this region every year.7

Moreover, in September 2011 a Foreign Ministry official reported to Landmine Monitor that China maintains a small number of minefields “for national defense.”8 Two months later, at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, China said large-scale demining activities had “on the whole eliminated the scourge of landmines in our territories.”9 China has not reported on mine contamination along its borders with Russia and India or on operations to clear them.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM
There is no formal mine action program in China. Mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity.

LAND RELEASE
Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three ‘campaigns’ in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first was in 1992–4, and the second in 1997–9. Press reports cited claims by the Chinese military that this second clearance operation was the largest in world military history.10

However, these two campaigns did not deal with minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines covered an estimated 30km.11 After a technical survey of mined areas, China embarked on a third clearance campaign in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province in 2005. China stated in 2009 that it had completed clearance of this border after clearing a total of 5.15km.12

ENDNOTES
2 Li Huizi and Li Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
3 Ministry of Defense, “Postwar Demining Operations in China,” December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than 3500 minefields covering a total area of more than 300km².
4 Interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008; and Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
8 Email from Lan Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.
10 Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
11 Statement of China, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.5

ENDNOTES
2 Li Huizi and Li Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
3 Ministry of Defense, “Postwar Demining Operations in China,” December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than 3500 minefields covering a total area of more than 300km².
4 Interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008; and Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
8 Email from Lan Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011.
10 Huizi and Yun, “Chinese soldiers nearly done with landmine sweeping on the Sino-Vietnam border.”
CUBA

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years. Cuban authorities maintain minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo in the southeast of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out ‘a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of antipersonnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national security.’ According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly ‘marked, fenced and guarded’ in accordance with CCW Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate ‘at least once a month,” but it has not been possible to independently confirm this claim.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

There is no mine action program in Cuba. Cuba has not conducted any mine clearance in its minefields around the US naval base at Guantánamo over the last 10 years.

ENDNOTES

3 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines]… described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding…” Daniel P. Erikson, Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution (USA, Bloomsbury, October 2008), pp. 196–7.

EGYPT

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Egypt is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially UXO from World War II. Most of the battles took place in the area between the Quattara depression and Alamein at the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan border.

The precise extent of contamination remains unknown and no credible estimate for mine contamination has yet been provided. An April 2009 assessment by the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) cautioned that accumulated data needed to be carefully analyzed in order to not misrepresent the overall mine problem as well as to avoid reporting areas for demining that had already been cleared. In August 2010, the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (Executive Secretariat) reported to donors than the army had destroyed 2.9 million mines while clearing 38km² in five areas, leaving ‘more than 16 million mines’ covering an estimated area of 248km². This appears to be confusing mines and UXO. A government statement reported the existence of a further 5.5 million ‘mines’ in the Sinai and the Eastern Desert. The government of Egypt has planned to link mine clearance and development of the northwest coast area. Most projects will require demining support before starting. Population movement and population increases have put increased pressure on land usage, placing an ever-growing number of people close to mined areas. Irrigation projects, a priority for Egypt, have experienced delays because of the need to clear mines and UXO.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

There does not appear to be a functioning mine action program in Egypt, although nominally an Executive Secretariat has been created at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation to serve as a coordination unit between civilian Egyptian Government departments, the military, and civil society, with the support of UNDP in a project due to end in 2014. All clearance to date has been performed by the Egyptian army. No results have been publicly reported over recent years. In April 2013, a contract was agreed for Egypt to purchase an Armtrac 400 mine-clearance vehicle from the United Kingdom. The contract is said to be worth $1.2 million.

ENDNOTES

Georgia is contaminated with mines around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia.

Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the residual mine problem has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 suspected mined areas were located at Akhalqalaqi, Geno Firing Range, Kopinari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.1 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totaled more than 4.5km² in estimated area.2 Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO Trust cleared five of the minefields with a humanitarian impact and identified one additional small minefield.3 It is not known if any of the other military areas have been cleared.

There is also an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.4

Since the 1990–2 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. According to HALO, there has been persistent low-level mine-laying, primarily in areas between Georgian- and South Ossetian-controlled villages. Although HALO has been unable to gain sufficient access to South Ossetia to assess the mine threat fully, it noted at least 15 mine casualties reported in 2008–10. HALO has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but has not been granted access.5

ENDNOTES
1 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.
2 Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 March 2010.
5 HALO Trust, “Georgia, The Problem.”

India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of large-scale mine-laying by government forces on and near the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani forces during the 2001–02 stand-off between the two States. Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, as well as around infrastructure and a number of villages. Despite occasional official claims that all the mines laid were subsequently cleared, reports of contamination and casualties have continued. According to one report in November 2013, the government has reported that about 2,000 hectares (20km²) of irrigated land was still mined in Akhnoor sector alone.1

India has no civilian mine action program. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed by non-state armed groups. Media reports have indicated police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs in states dealing with insurgency.

ENDNOTES
Kurdistan are located in Baneh and Marivan regions, the mountains to land lower down and closer to inhabited areas. Rainfall that washed mines down from military border posts located high in the Lut desert spanning central and eastern Iran where incidents in early 2014 confirmed reports of contamination in Khuzestan, since certain cleared areas need to be surveyed and cleared anew. Kurdistan MP Omid Kariman, reacting to a mine incident in October 2013 that injured seven children in Marivan, called for survey and clearance of a wider area around military posts.

The presence of antivehicle mines in eastern Iran is public knowledge but Iran’s National Police commander Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam denied that police lay mines, which would be against policy, but might use ‘mobile explosive traps’ to interdict drug traffickers or armed groups crossing into eastern Iran. Other media reports, however, have cited warnings by the police not to use certain routes because of the presence of landmines and that travellers should check with police or they would not be responsible for any accidents.

In 2013, the Landmine Monitor recorded 69 mine/ERW incidents in Iran causing 104 casualties. These included 53 antipersonnel mine incidents in 2013, all in the five western provinces, which resulted in 64 casualties, and four antivehicle mine incidents that caused four casualties. Two other incidents by unidentified devices that killed ten military personnel may have been caused by antivehicle mines.

Table 1. Mine/ERW contamination in five western provinces (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Kermanshah</th>
<th>Khuzestan</th>
<th>Kurdistan</th>
<th>West Azerbaijan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimates of contamination in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan have fluctuated significantly in recent years. In 2011, IRMAC estimated contaminated area in Kurdistan at 12km² and in West Azerbaijan at 453km². In 2013, it estimated each province had 15km² of contaminated area. Most contaminated areas in Kurdistan are located in Baneh and Marivan regions, and in West Azerbaijan in Oshnaviyeh, Piranshahr, Salmas, Sardasht, and Urmia regions. Contamination by mines and ERW is now believed to be larger than previously estimated.

Some recently identified contamination has occurred as a result of heavy rainfall that washed mines down from military border posts located high in the mountains to land lower down and closer to inhabited areas. But senior officials in some western regions also complain they continue to be affected by mines and are still experiencing casualties, including on cleared land.

Local authorities in Kermanshah were critical of an official ceremony staged in February 2013 to celebrate the end of clearance operations in the province. The interim governor of Kermanshah’s Qasr-e-Shirin county reported in January 2014 that 36 villages that were among the area’s most prosperous before the war remained unfit for habitation and difficult to access because of mines. A Kermanshah MP identified 14 areas of Qasr-e-Shirin as still hazardous and called for continuing clearance to a depth of 80mm, reporting that mine accidents in the area between 21 March 2013 and the end of the year had killed three people and injured 11.

In April 2013, the General Director of Border Management Department of the Governorate of Khuzestan stated it is difficult to determine precisely the extent of contamination in Khuzestan, since certain cleared areas need to be surveyed and cleared anew. Kurdistan MP Omid Kariman, reacting to a mine incident in October 2013 that injured seven children in Marivan, called for survey and clearance of a wider area around military posts.

In 2013, the Landmine Monitor recorded 69 mine/ERW incidents in Iran causing 104 casualties. These included 53 antipersonnel mine incidents in 2013, all in the five western provinces, which resulted in 64 casualties, and four antivehicle mine incidents that caused four casualties. Two other incidents by unidentified devices that killed ten military personnel may have been caused by antivehicle mines.

**MINING ACTION PROGRAM**

Iran’s Council of Ministers assigned the Minister of Defense as the president’s special representative for mine action in December 2005; tasked with organizing and accelerating the work of the sector, specifying that his decisions would be tantamount to those of the president and Council of Ministers, and would be binding. IRMAC was also set up in 2005, taking the place of a Mine Action Committee in the Ministry of Defense and responsible for planning, data, managing survey, and procurement. It also sets standards, provides training for clearance operators; concludes contracts with demining operators (military or private), and handles international relations. IRMAC also oversees victim assistance and risk education but has partly delegated these roles to entities such as the Social Welfare Organization and the Iranian Red Crescent Society.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING**

IRMAC drew up a five-year plan in 2006 that targeted clearance of some 1,775km² a year for the first two years, 1,675km² in the third year, and 2,238km² a year for the remaining two years. IRMAC said in February 2014 it is considering issuing an updated plan but IRMAC’s director announced in April 2014 that clearance of all remaining mined areas would be completed in one year.
LAND RELEASE

Comprehensive data on clearance and land release of mined areas in 2013 is not available. A summary of land release presented by IRMAC indicated Iran had released 41,750km² in the 25 years to 20 March 2013 (end of the Iranian year 1391) averaging 1,670km² a year but did not indicate how much was mined or battle area (see Table 2).

Table 2. Land release in 1988–2013 [km²]1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Estimated contamination as of 21 March 1988</th>
<th>Total release</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khuzestan</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>16,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>16,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>41,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SAFETY OF DEMINING PERSONNEL

Demining incidents reported by Iranian media in 2013 killed one deminer and injured 27, which represented a spectacular improvement over previous years. In 2012, 29 deminers were killed and 42 injured.23 IRMAC director Mohammad Hussein Amir-Ahmadi had reported in 2012 that 28 deminers were killed and 70 injured in the Iranian year 1390 (ending in March 2012).24 The Army has reported losing 170 deminers killed and 735 injured in 21 years to March 2011.25 Some observers attribute the improvement to greater use of mechanical assets in clearance operations.26

Companies that conduct industrial projects, notably in the oil and gas sectors, pay for clearance of their operations sites, as well as for risk education for their workers. These sites normally require clearance to a greater depth than standard demining operations and such higher value contracts attract the best-resourced demining/explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operators in the private sector and the military.

Private operators say IRMAC is seriously underfunded and pays such low rates that they cannot cover costs.24 A private demining company chief executive said his company stopped working on demining projects in Iran because the compensation provided was so low that it made it impossible to perform the work according to standards the company considered acceptable.27

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

IRMAC is financed by the Ministry of Defence under a budget item entitled ‘Clearance of minefields in coordination with the Ministry of Interior.’ This amounted to 284,000 million rials (US$11.5 million) in Iranian year 1392 (ending 20 March 2014) and in the following year.28 The Ministry of Interior provides life and disability insurance for deminers.28

IRMAC director Mohammad Hussein Amir-Ahmadi affirms that Iran has not received any international support of any kind for its mine action program.29

ENDNOTES

4 Ministry of Defense, “Commander Dehghan in the ceremony of World Mine Awareness Day: In Iran 28,000 hectares of land are landmine-contaminated,” 8 April 2014.

6 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
7 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
8 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
9 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
10 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
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26 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
27 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
28 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
29 Endnotes are page numbers from the document being cited.
ISRAEL

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Israel is affected by landmines dating back to World War II and mines that Israel later laid along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. The exact extent of overall contamination is not known. The total area ‘not essential to Israel’s security’ affected by mines is estimated at 128km².1 This includes ‘minefields in the sea’ – areas in the Dead Sea – estimated to cover 0.5km².2 From the results of mine clearance projects, actual contamination is thought likely to extend cover between 5% and 10% less than this. In August 2011, Israel’s military reported planting new mines to reinforce minefields and other defenses along its de facto border with Syria in the Golan Heights.3

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Israel’s Parliament enacted a law on minefield clearance in March 2011 establishing the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) to undertake a ‘comprehensive program of mines clearing projects inside Israel.’4 The act said its aim was ‘to create a normative infrastructure for the clearance of minefields that are not essential to national security, and to declare then as free from landmines with the highest degree of safety to civilians, in accordance with the international obligations of the State of Israel, and within the shortest period of time possible.’5 INMAA was established in the Ministry of Defense with ministry staff responsible for planning mine action, while commercial companies were hired to conduct clearance using a separate supervising company to conduct quality assurance. INMAA also sets national standards ‘taking into consideration the procedures of the Israeli Defense Forces that will be as compatible as possible with the International Mine Action Standards.’ The IDF also conducts mine clearance according to its own mine action plans that are executed by their military methods and techniques and implements an annual program that includes maintenance of protection of minefields and suspected areas.6

STRATEGIC PLANNING

Israel reports that INMAA has a multi-year clearance plan for 2014−17 that calls for clearance of areas in the Golan Heights and Galilee in the summer and in the Jordan Valley and Arava Plain in the winter, but gave no details. It said demining operations clear on average 1.5−2km² a year. Israel said INMAA would also manage projects in the West Bank that are funded by donations.7

LAND RELEASE

Israel released 2.2km² through clearance by commercial operators contracted by INMAA in 2013, bringing the total area cleared in the last two years to 3.3km².8 The amount of land cleared or released by the Israeli Defence Forces is unknown.

Clearance in 2013 (see Table 1) was split between northern and southern Israel. Eilat Lidor Projects cleared tasks in Majdal Shams and Had Nes in the Golan Heights, the north central area of Valley of Springs and around Eliat, and the Arava desert in the south. IMAG cleared a little over 1km² in the vicinity of Sapir in the south. Quadro Mine Clearance undertook a small project on behalf of Roots of Peace at the village of Husan on the West Bank.9

Table 1: Mine clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined areas released</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMAG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eilat Lidor Projects</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,197,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,006</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INMAA identified four clearance projects to be undertaken in 2014, including in the Arava Plain (0.8km²), the Valley of Springs (1.1km²), Upper Galilee (0.7km²), and in the West Bank (67,000m²).10

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

INMAA has an annual budget of NIS27 million (approx. US$7.7 million) for mine action.

ENDNOTES

1 Email from Eran Yuvan, Deputy Director, Arms Control Policy Department, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014.
2 Ibid, 6 May 2012.
3 “Israel army plants new mines along Syria border,” Associated Press, 13 August 2011.
4 Minefield Clearance Law (5771-2011) of March 2011. See CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form A, April 2011. Form A refers to details provided in Form D, but information in Form D has been deleted.
6 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, and Eran Yuvan, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 May 2012.
7 Email from Eran Yuvan, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, July 2013.
8 Email from Eran Yuvan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, 29 April 2014.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid, Israeli Consulate General, San Francisco, “A Bay Area organization is helping to clear landmines from Israel,” 16 July 2013.
11 Email from Eran Yuvan, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 May 2014.
KYRGYZSTAN

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Kyrgyzstan is contaminated by mines, although the precise locations and extent of the residual threat are not known. According to the Minister of Defense, contamination in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000, was cleared by Uzbek forces in 2005.1 It was reported, however, that rainfall and landslides had caused some mines to shift.2

In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities estimated that Uzbek forces had also laid mines around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–05 and that they had completely cleared mines around the Shakhimardan enclave in 2004.3

Kyrgyzstan has admitted using antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but has claimed that all the mines were subsequently removed and destroyed.4

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Kyrgyzstan has no functioning mine action program.

ENDNOTES

1 Fax from Abibilla Kudaiberdiev, Minister of Defense, Ministry of Defense, dated 4 April 2011.
3 Sultan Zhimagulov (Bishkek) and Olga Borisova (Tashkent), “Kyrgyzstan Tries to Defend Itself from Uzbek Mines,” Navigator (Kazakhstan), 14 March 2003; and “Borders are becoming clear,” Blog, www.uzbekistan.wordpress.com.

LAO PDR

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

All sides in the war in Lao PDR laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. A Handicap International survey in 1996 found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages, and one clearance operator has estimated Laos PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.4 The remote location of many of these areas means that mines had little impact and made up only 0.2% of the more than 80,000 items of ERW cleared by operators in 2012.5

Official figures presented in 2010 show landmines are responsible for 17% of victims since 1998 — almost as many as bombs (20%) — although few mine victims have been reported in recent years.6 The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), however, has stated that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”7 It has further noted that mined areas exist in some border regions “as legacies of disputes or tensions with or within neighbouring countries.”8

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The mine action program in Lao PDR is directed toward clearance of ERW, particularly cluster munition remnants although mines are cleared each year during battle area clearance operations. The NRA was created by government decree in 2004 and has been active since mid-2006. The NRA’s role includes setting policy, coordinating and regulating the clearance sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management.

ENDNOTES

1 Interview with Michael Hayes, Program Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Vientiane, 5 February 2004.
5 Ibid, accessed in May 2014.
LEBANON

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a legacy of 15 years of civil conflict and two Israeli invasions and occupations of south Lebanon (1978 and 1982) that ended in May 2000. The July–August 2006 hostilities by Israel also resulted in heavy new contamination from cluster munition remnants in southern Lebanon.

Mine contamination affects the north and south of the country, though most contamination is found in the south. The Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) earlier identified 2,598 mined areas over 191km² in Batroun, Chouf, Jbeil, and Jezzine, north of the Litani River, in the Bekaa valley, and across Mount Lebanon. Non-technical survey (NTS) and clearance have since reduced the problem to 1,152 mined areas covering 30km², of which 950 areas are close to the 118km-long Blue Line bordering Israel (the line of withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces).1

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Mine action in Lebanon is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. In 1998, the Council of Ministers established the Lebanese Mine Action Authority (LMAA). LMAC, which is part of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), manages and implements mine action policy set by LMAA. Since 2009, a regional base in Nabatiye oversees operations in the south of Lebanon. LMAC also manages risk education and victim assistance.4

In 2013, mine clearance was conducted by DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Lebanon had a total of seven mine clearance teams operating.5 In addition, the LAF had four multi-tasking teams, four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and seven mine detection dog teams.6 LMAC has consistently raised concerns over lack of capacity to address mine and cluster munition remnants contamination, which it ascribes to funding shortfalls.7 In March 2013, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) closed its cluster munitions clearance program due to lack of funding.8 Lebanon’s BAC capacity dropped from 28 teams at the start of the year to 22 by December 2013, again due to lack of funding.9 Overall, however, international contributions for mine action in Lebanon increased in 2013 (see Support for Mine Action section).

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in 197810 to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred only in 2000) and to assist the Government of Lebanon in reestablishing its authority in the area.11 The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear paths through minefields in order to place 470 markers on the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not generally conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-meter-wide lanes into mine areas.12 In 2013, UNIFIL’s capacity consisted of eight manual mine clearance teams, one mechanical clearance team, and six explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams from Belgium, Cambodia, China, Finland, Ghana, Italy, Korea, and Malaysia.13 The UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), an UNMAS project, coordinates mine clearance operations with LMAC. It trains the UNIFIL demining units and monitors and validates UNIFIL mine clearance on the Blue Line to ensure it complies with the International Mine Action Standards.14 It also provides resource mobilization assistance to LMAC. UNMAST operating funds are from the assessed peacekeeping budget for UNIFIL.15

STRATEGIC PLANNING

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–20.16 The plan calls for clearance of all cluster munition remnants by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance, except for the Blue Line, by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity and both fell short of planning targets in 2013.17 Demining the area bordering Israel is said to be dependent on ‘political developments’ that will allow the LAF to conduct technical survey and clearance.18

LAND RELEASE

In 2013, Lebanon reported release of 0.57km² of mined areas and 2.47km² of land containing cluster munition remnants. To date, Lebanon has reported that more than 70% of cluster bomb strikes, 35% of dangerous areas, and 48% of minefields (excluding the Blue Line) have been cleared.19 Lebanon has cleared more than 3.26km² of mined areas in the last five years (see Table 1).

SURVEY IN 2013

In 2011, the LAF completed the national Non-Technical Survey (NTS) project that began in 2005 and as a result canceled 1,007 SHA’s covering 159km².20 SHA’s were canceled if the land was in use and had been cleared prior to the earlier Landmine Impact Survey. An NTS that began in October 2011 had surveyed up to 66% of the Blue Line by the end of March 2013 (600 of 854 minefields).21 In October 2013, MAG was tasked with surveying 139 areas covering approximately 4km², which was completed by March 2014, the results of which had not been released publicly as of writing.22

Table 1. Mine clearance in 2009–13 (km²)20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINE CLEARANCE IN 2013

In 2013, Lebanon reported cancelation of 34,391m² in two mined areas and release by clearance of 28 mined areas covering almost 0.54km², destroying 12 antipersonnel mines, 5 antivehicle mines, and 294 items of UXO (see Table 2). An addition, 2.47km² was cleared through battle area clearance (BAC), while LAF Rapid Response teams destroyed 10,828 items of UXO during 1,083 roving clearance tasks.24

Table 2. Mine clearance in 201325

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine areas cleared</th>
<th>Mine area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>337,396</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>62,770</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>74,935</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62,490</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>537,591</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decrease in mined area cleared in 2013 compared with the almost 1km² reported in 2012 was accredited to high metal contamination of the land demined23 while the reduction in battle area cleared was said to be due to difficult terrain and the lower number of BAC teams operating (from 28 at the beginning of 2013 to 22 by the year’s end).22

UNIFIL reported clearing 14,274m² of mined area in 2013 and 1,466m² of battle area, with the destruction of 457 antipersonnel mines. An additional 6,705m² was cleared through EOD/roving clearance in 2013 in five areas.23 UNIFIL’s demining facilitated placement of 300 marker barrels along the Blue Line.24

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2013, Lebanon received US$91 million in international contributions from 11 donors for clearance, victim assistance, and risk education – an increase in international contributions overall from the $71.3 million reported in 2012, but with four fewer international donors than in 2012. In addition, Lebanon has reported contributing an average of US$6 million to its own program over recent years, bringing total contributions in 2013 to approximately $28 million.25 Lebanon’s Mine Action Strategy 2011–20 had estimated the need for more than $32 million a year in 2011–13, and $43 million a year for 2014–16. UNIFIL also received $1.2 million in UN assessed peacekeeping funds.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- Lebanon should commit to full mine clearance from its territory and adhere to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible.
- UNIFIL should be specifically mandated to conduct humanitarian demining and its Memorandum of Understanding with Lebanon on demining should be renewed.

ENDNOTES


5. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Imdad Odiemi, Director, LMAC, 2 May 2014.

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid., p. 42. As of April 2013, the international demining operators were DCA, HI, NPA, and MAG. The lone national operator is POD.


11. UNIFIL, “UNIFIL Mandate.”


13. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Programme Manager, UN Mine Action Support Team (UNMAST), 7 May 2014.


25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. CCM Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F, 15 April 2014.


30. The exact figure of the national contribution in 2013 has not yet been reported. The average national contribution of US$9 million was reported in Lebanon’s CCM Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F, 15 April 2014.
CONTOHINATION AND IMPACT

Libya is contaminated with mines, cluster munition remnants, and a wide array of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of internal and international armed conflict in 2011, as well as earlier conflicts with neighboring countries. Libya has contamination from mines left by the desert battles of World War II and by conflicts with Egypt in 1977 and Chad in 1980–7, which resulted in mines being laid on those borders. Its border with Tunisia is also affected. During Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s four decades in power, mines were also employed across a number of sensitive locations, including military facilities and key infrastructure.1

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Under the Gaddafi regime, the Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each had responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Civil Protection Unit was said to have carried out clearance in affected communities.4

Since the change of regime, mine action has felt the effects of a breakdown of centralized government that followed the change of regime.5 A new director, Colonel Mohammad Turjman was appointed in December 2013 and took up his position early in 2014, subsequently renaming the center LibMAC. In April 2014, LibMAC closed temporarily as a result of internal staff disputes.6

Mines were used by both sides in the 2011 conflict leading to Colonel Gaddafi’s overthrow. There was reported instance of antivehicle mine use by rebels in Ajdabya, while pre-government elements laid mines in a number of locations including Brega, Khusha, Misrata, and the Nafusa Mountains. Anti-personnel mines were used by government forces in Ajdabya, Khusha, Misrata, and al-Qawalish. The most commonly used antipersonnel mine type was the low-metal content Brazilian T-AB1 mine, but evidence has also been found of Belgian NR 413 stake and bounding fragmentation mines (PRB NR 462).7

An UNMAS Joint Mine Action Coordination Team (JMACT) became operational in April 2011 and provided initial coordination for international NGO, liaising closely with the Army Chief of General Staff,8 resulting in tension with LMAC. In July 2012, UNMAS became integrated into the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section. In August 2013, UNMAS assigned an operations officer and quality assurance to LMAC to develop data management, tasking, and quality assurance capacity.9 UNDP has been working with national authorities to draft a law to provide a framework for mine action.10 It also has a capacity-building mandate overlapping with UNMAS’ mandate under Security Council Resolution 2095 “creating a confusion for national counterparts.”11

Since 2011 clearance operations have been conducted by international NGOs, including DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, and Santa Barbara Foundation, and commercial operators Mechernich and Ukroboronservices. National NGOs included Free Fields, Salama, and No Mines No War.12 Due to lack of funding from January 2014, Norwegian People’s Aid closed its mine action program in Libya in late 2013.

LIBYA

ENDNOTES

2  Ibid, and email from Jenny Reeves, Weapons Contamination Coordinator, (JIC), Tripoli, 22 February 2012.
4  Interview with Dr. Taher Siala, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Tripoli, 12 May 2005.
6  Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 10 March 2012; interview with Max Dyke, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012; and email from Stephen Bryant, Programme Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Liby, 23 July 2012.
8  Telephone interview with Tripoli-based international mine action stakeholder requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.
9  Telephone interview with Tripoli-based international mine action stakeholder requesting anonymity, 30 July 2012.
10 Email from Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Liby, 20 July 2013.
11 Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012, and interview with Max Dyke, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.
12 Email from Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Liby, 20 July 2013.
15 Email from Jenny Reeves, Capacity Building Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 April 2014; and Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS, Liby, 20 July 2013.
17 Interview with Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 2 April 2014.
18 Telephone interview with Tripoli-based mine action stakeholders, 30 May 2014.

Strategic planning

A draft National Strategic Plan states that ‘the strategic goal of the Government and its development partners over the 2011–2021 period is to reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by landmines and unexploded ordnance to the point where a residual amount of contamination remains that poses no significant impact on the population or infrastructure, and where capacity remains to take account of the needs of future development.’ The UN noted that the objective of the program is to develop and modernize national structures to implement a national mine action program.11 As of April 2014, the plan awaited government approval.12

LAND RELEASE

Libya for the moment lacks an active program for clearing landmines. International and national organizations working with LibMAC are focused on explosive ordnance disposal and small arms and ammunition storage. Some mine clearance has occurred in the course of technical survey or clearing battle area tasks. In mine action there is no active program of accreditation, planning, survey, tasking, information management, or quality assurance.13

UNDP observed in 2013 that ‘humanitarian mine action stakeholders in Libya have been thwarted in their attempts to effect the sound implementation of mine action in the country due to a void in established governance within the sector. The resultant lack of confidence and the delays in recognizing a properly mandated National Mine Action Authority with the necessary resources and capacity by the government has only compounded the issue.’14

19 Interview with Stephen Bryant, UNDP Liberia, 20 July 2013.
20 Email from Stefanie Carmichael, JMACT, 20 March 2012, and interview with Max Dyke, Team Leader, JMACT, in Geneva, 28 March 2012.
21 Email from Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Liby, 20 July 2013.
22 Email from Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS Programme Manager, Liby, 20 July 2013.
25 Email from Jenny Reeves, Capacity Building Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 11 April 2014; and Dick Engbrecht, UNMAS, Liby, 20 July 2013.
27 Interview with Stephen Bryant, UNDP, in Geneva, 2 April 2014.
28 Telephone interview with Tripoli-based mine action stakeholders, 30 May 2014.
29 “2nd Quarter Progress Report, [PI] Supporting the Capacity Development of Central and local stakeholders in mine action activities in Libya [Phase two],” UNDP, July 2013, p. 3.
**CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT**

Morocco remains significantly affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially in territory under its control in Western Sahara, on the west side of the Berm. Its contamination is largely a result of the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) and Polisario Front forces over Western Sahara. Morocco has pledged to clear minefields it has laid as soon as the conflict is over.1

The exact extent of contamination is not known, though according to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), ‘the areas surrounding the Berm are believed to be some of the most heavily mined in the world.’3 In the past, Morocco declared, highly improbably, that a total of 120,000km² of area was contaminated.4 A separate report exists on contamination and clearance in Western Sahara east of the Berm.5

In its most recent voluntary Article 7 transparency report, Morocco identified 10 areas as having been mined by the Polisario Front since 1975: Bir Anzarane, Douieb, Gerret Auchfaght, Gor Lbard, Gor Zalagat, Hagounia, Idiriya, Imlili, Itgui, and Tarf Mhkinza.6 The area of Glibat Jadiane, which had been listed as contaminated in earlier years, is no longer included on the list of mined areas.7

In 2012, mines and ERW caused 36 victims on the west side of the Berm, of whom 32 were injured and 4 were killed. Morocco reported a total of 195 casualties between January 2007 and October 2013, but did not provide any information as to where the casualties occurred.8 Between April 2013 and March 2014, the RMA reported 12 incidents west of the Berm, resulting in one person killed and 18 injured.1

**MINE ACTION PROGRAM**

Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or a mine action center. Morocco initiated major demining efforts in 2007, following an increase in the number of mine accidents. The RMA conducts land release activities manually. In 2010, Morocco declared it has employed 10,000 deminers, although only 400 detectors were at their disposal at that time.10 This raised serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of clearance figures being reported. Morocco has not adopted national mine action legislation or standards, but reported, most recently in April 2013, that ‘normal safety and environmental protection standards have been followed.’11

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) coordinates mine action activities with both parties to the conflict. In this respect, MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre organized meetings in 2012 with the RMA and the Polisario Front on information sharing, demining methodologies, risk education, and victim assistance.12

**LAND RELEASE**

The UN Secretary-General reported that, between April 2013 and March 2014, the RMA ‘cleared’ more than 259km², destroying in the process 1,542 items of explosive ordnance, including antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and UXO.13 Morocco reported clearing a total of 220km² in 2012, destroying 509 antipersonnel mines, 1,678 antivehicle mines, and 3,271 items of UXO.14 According to voluntary Article 7 reports submitted by Morocco since 2008, the RMA cleared approximately 2,270km² between January 2007 and December 2012.15 At the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Morocco claimed that 3,928km² had been ‘cleared’ between January 2007 and October 2013.16 These figures must describe primarily land release by means other than physical clearance.

**SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION**

No information is publicly available on Morocco’s funding of its mine action operations.

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**ENDNOTES**

1 The Berm refers to the defensive wall built by Morocco between 1982 and 1987 to secure the northwestern corner of Western Sahara. It is constituted of earthen walls some three meters in height. Morocco controls the area located on the west side of the Berm.2

2 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2013.


5 See report on Western Sahara in Annex 2.

6 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form C, April 2013.

7 Ibid, April 2011.

8 Statement of Morocco, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, 2 December 2013.

9 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2014/218, 10 April 2014.


11 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, April 2013.

12 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2013/220, 8 April 2013.

13 Report of the UN Secretary-General on Western Sahara, UN doc. S/2014/218, 10 April 2014.

14 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, April 2013.


CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Myanmar has extensive contamination by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of decades of post-independence struggles for autonomy by ethnic minorities.

Mines are believed to be concentrated along parts of borders with Bangladesh, China, and Thailand, but are a particular threat in eastern parts of the country. No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but some 50 townships in Kachin, Kayin (Karen), Kayah (Karenni), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, as well as in Bago (Pegu) and Tanintharyi (Tenasserim) regions are believed to suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from antipersonnel mines. Karen (Kayin) state and Pegu (Bago) division are suspected to contain the heaviest mine contamination and have the highest number of recorded victims. The Monitor has also received reports of suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) in townships on the Indian border of Chin state and in the Sagaing Region.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Myanmar agreed in principle in 2012 to the creation of a national mine action center (NMAC) under the Myanmar Peace Center (MPC), headed by Minister U Aung Min, which is responsible for coordinating negotiation and implementation of peace agreements with Myanmar’s ethnic minorities. By the start of 2014, however, the MPC had yet to present plans for the mine action center to the President for his approval but had agreed to hire five dedicated mine action staff who would work in the NMAC since created.

The MPC worked with international mine action operators in 2013 to elaborate a national mine action strategy on the basis of an initial draft by a UN consultant. It also drew up national standards in cooperation with the operators. As of early August 2013, the MPC had not presented the strategy or standards for government approval.

Since 2012, international demining NGOs DanChurchAid, HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) each opened offices in Yangon and have discussed with the MPC possibilities for conducting surveys and clearance, but as of early 2014 no agreement had been reached to begin operations.

ENDNOTES

1 Myanmar is divided up into both states and regions. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups, and are always named after one or more areas, which are not seen as the home area of a specific ethnic group, are called divisions. Internal state and division names are given in their common form or with the name adopted by the government in parentheses.

2 Research by the Monitor. Data sources have included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings, and reports by NGOs and other organizations of use, as well as interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel.

3 Interview with Nay Myo Naing, Assistant Executive Director, MPC, in Geneva, 12 April 2013, and email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Program Manager, Myanmar, NPA, 28 February 2014.

4 Telephone interview with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 17 March 2014.

5 Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 29 May 2014.

LAND RELEASE

No formal mine clearance or land release had started as of the beginning of 2014.

NPA received permission to conduct a “pilot” non-technical survey of eight villages in areas of Mon state under the control of the New Mon State Party in January 2014. The survey uncovered six historical accidents but no SHAs. All areas where accidents had occurred were in use and the local population had no fear of mines. The NSMP requested NPA to conduct non-technical surveys in 19 more Mon villages.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The precise extent of the mine problem in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is not known. North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the north and south of the peninsula. The affected areas are reported to be marked and fenced. In early 2006, officials commented to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in the country, despite fears that, among others, sections of the east coast were also mined.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

North Korea has no functioning mine action program.

ENDNOTES

2 Email from Kerry Brinkert, Director, ISU, 1 February 2006.

Pakistan remains affected by mines and other ordnance from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89) and three wars with India, but more recent and continuing conflicts areas bordering Afghanistan have added further contamination.

Pakistan asserts that it ‘faces no problem of uncleared mines.’ In supporting this statement, it acknowledges that the army laid mines on its eastern border with India during an escalation of tensions in 2001–02 but says those mines were all cleared and the army has not laid any more since then. However, it has also reported IED attacks ‘including’ antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action program. Pakistani military engineering units are believed to be responsible for mine clearance in contaminated conflict zones while the Frontier Constabulary has said it conducts mine clearance in contaminated areas of Balochistan, FATA, and other conflict zones in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
PALESTINE

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Palestine is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The precise scope, scale, and impact of the contamination are not known but hazards encompass minefields, military training zones, and areas of confrontation where many explosive devices are left behind.

A 2013 survey by the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC) found that Palestine has mined areas covering a total of 19.9 km², only marginally less than its previous estimate (20.4 km²). A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 99 minefields, including 13 laid by the Jordanian military in 1968–69, and 77 minefields laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River following the 1967 war. Most minefields are located in ‘Area C’ along the border with Jordan, which covers approximately 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control regarding security, planning, and construction. There are believed to be 14 minefields in other parts of the West Bank and two others in the ‘no man’s land’ between Israel and the West Bank. Many minefields and hazardous areas are located in fertile agricultural and grazing land and, in some cases, inside or in the vicinity of villages, obstructing socio-economic development and posing a threat of injury to farmers, shepherds, Bedouins, and particularly children. Marking and fencing of minefields are often poor, with some operational minefields not marked at all.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

An authorization issued by the Palestinian Authority’s prime minister on 25 March 2012 set up PMAC, appointed its director and also set up a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body with 27 members representing the ministries of health, justice, education, foreign affairs, interior, military liaison, red crescent, intelligence, and police which is to develop mine action legislation and allocate resources for the sector. The Palestinian Authority was reported in 2012 to be preparing legislation to reflect these actions but no law has yet been adopted.

PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS. The committee has also established a number of subcommittees internally to deal with risk education, technical issues, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.

PMAC is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Palestinian Civil Police, and Civil Defense. PMAC has 30 personnel on its team trained by UNMAS for demining but not yet equipped to do so. The Palestinian Civil Police have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, and Qalqilyah, which conducts rapid response to locate and remove UXO.

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control, and Area C (approximately 60% of the West Bank) where Israel has full control of security, planning, and construction.

LAND RELEASE

Israel has not authorized demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operations were conducted by or on behalf of PMAC in 2013.

Israeli commercial operator Quadro Projects and Technologies, contracted by California-based Roots of Peace and approved by the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), cleared 7,000 m² of mined area at the village of Husan in May 2013, destroying in the process six antipersonnel mines.

HALO Trust, working with the approval of PMAC and INMAA and employing 16 Georgian deminers and four mechanical assets, started demining a 67,000 m² site at a-Nabi Elyas village in April 2014.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

PMAC did not disclose details of its funding. It reported that HALO Trust had received funding from the US ($1.41 million for September 2011 to June 2014), the Netherlands ($0.97 million for July 2012 to June 2016), New Zealand ($2.46 million for January 2014 to December 2015) and the United Kingdom ($0.39 million for February 2014 to January 2015).

ENDNOTES

1 Email from Brigadier Joma Mousa, Director, PMAC, 31 March 2014.
3 Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Email from Imad Mohanbe, PMAC, 31 March 2013.
8 Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 6 and 19 July 2012.
9 Email from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 6 July 2012.
10 Email from Brigadier Joma Mousa, PMAC, 31 March 2014.
11 Email from Eran Yuvan, Deputy Director, Arms Control Policy Department, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2014; Roots of Peace, “Landmines Echo in the Fields of Bethlehem,” 11 December 2013.
12 Emails from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 14 May 2014; and Brigadier Joma Mousa, PMAC, 31 March 2014.
13 Email from Brigadier Joma Mousa, PMAC, 31 March 2014.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–6 and 1999–2009), and minor conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem. In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mine contamination affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development. In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mine-affected, including 165km² of farmland and 79km² of woodland.

As of 2011, according to UNICEF, 3,112 civilians, including 772 children, had been killed (731) or wounded (2,401) by mines and ERW in Chechnya since 1994. Data collection, which was conducted by a local NGO partner Voice of the Mountains, was suspended in January 2011 due to lack of funding.

Alleged use of mines in Crimea in 2014

On 8 March 2014, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, reported that ‘Russian combat engineers were seen placing mines in the land bridge connecting the [Crimean] peninsula to the mainland in order to foil any Ukrainian attempt to retake Crimea.’ The photographer Evgeny Feldman of the Russian publication Novaya Gazeta, photographed an apparent minefield laid near a road leading into Crimea and close to the villages of Chongar and Nikolaevka, in Kherson Province, Ukraine. The photographs show a line of mounds of earth in a field and ‘Danger Mines’ warning signs.

Members of the local population have informed Ukrainian partners of ICBL that Russian Special Forces operating in Kherson Province have laid minefields, but it was not possible to confirm the reports, including if any mines laid were antipersonnel or antivehicle. On 7 March 2014, Ukrainian media reported that the Russian military had mined areas around the main gas line into Crimea, but this allegation was not independently verified. Russia has denied all use of antipersonnel mines, suggesting only trip flares (also known as signal mines) have been used.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).

In 2012, the head of the Armed Forces’ engineers, Lieutenant-General Yuri Stavitsky, reportedly announced that the Federal Ministry of Defense had sent military engineers to Chechnya to undertake clearance of about 0.5km² of farmland. He said a special battalion of deminers employing contract servicemen was undergoing training for deployment in Russia’s southern military district, including Chechnya.

In May 2010, a representative of the Chechen branch of Russia’s MES claimed that 2.47km² of land had been cleared during the past five years, and that 5,143 explosive devices and 21 air-dropped bombs had been ‘neutralized.’ On 4 November 2010, the Chechen Government announced on its website that the Russian Federal Government had allocated 2.26 billion rubles (some €55 million) to demine agricultural areas in Chechnya.

ENDNOTES

4 Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF Vladikavkaz, 2 May 2011.
6 “Между Крымом и Украиной уже минные поля, армейские лагеря и бронемашины” (“Between Crimea and Ukraine there are already minefields, armoured vehicles and army camps”), Novaya Gazeta, 8 March 2014, www.novayagazeta.ru/photos/62620.
8 Ibid.
10 See, e.g., “It is planned to establish special groups for demining of lands within MES,” Caucasian Knot, 23 July 2009; and “Autumn demining is completed in Chechnya,” Vesti Kavkaza, 28 October 2009.
11 “Russia begins mine clearing in Chechnya,” Novosti, 4 April 2012.
13 Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF Vladikavkaz, 2 May 2011.
CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT
The Korean War left mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in southern Korea, and because of a security threat, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) laid barrier minefields along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north.

The DMZ and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, in 1978, and in 1988. In May 2006, South Korea indicated that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites that cover an area of about 3km² in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon provinces, below the CCZ.1

A report by the National Defense Committee in 2010 said South Korea had about 1,100 ‘planned’ mined areas covering 20km² and some 209 unconfirmed or suspected mined areas covering 97.82km².2

MINE ACTION PROGRAM
There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in South Korea. Demining is conducted by the South Korean army, which has undertaken limited clearance of the DMZ and CCZ and has concentrated mostly on demining military bases in rear areas.

In November 2013, the Ministry of Defense said it had submitted a bill on landmines to the parliament to allow civilian organizations to remove mines laid during the Korean War to facilitate ongoing military clearance. “The bill is aimed at making legal grounds and a process to allow both the military and civilians to remove mines so as to protect lives and the property of people,” the ministry said in a press release.3

ENDNOTES
1 Response to the Monitor by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN, New York, 9 May 2006.
Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Most (71%) of contamination is in the north, the focus of three decades of armed conflict between the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), which ended in May 2009. However, national estimates of total mine and ERW contamination have fallen sharply: from 506 km² at the end of 2010 to 98 km² at the end of 2012 and less than 84 km² at the end of 2013 (see Table 1). Operators report a need to clear some residential areas in the north and significant amounts of agricultural land but increasingly see contamination as an obstacle to development rather than a humanitarian threat.

Much the densest remaining mined areas lie in northern Sri Lanka to the north of Elephant Pass marking the former frontline between the army and the LTTE and covering about 14 km². Both sides made extensive use of mines, including belts of blast antipersonnel mines laid by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), and long defensive lines with a mixture of mines and improvised explosive devices laid by the LTTE defending approaches to the northern town of Kilinochchi. Operators have encountered a wide range of LTTE devices, including antipersonnel mines with antitilt and antilift mechanisms, and often containing a larger explosive charge (up to 140 g) than government-laid mines (30 g). They also encountered tripwire-activated Claymore-type mines, and, though to a lesser extent, antivehicle mines. However, much of the extensive mining by the LTTE in northern districts has now been cleared and remaining contamination in the eastern provinces (Ampara, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee) is thought to be light.

### Table 1. Confirmed hazardous area (km²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>End 2012</th>
<th>End 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffna</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>3.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilinochchi</td>
<td>19.45</td>
<td>18.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullaitivu</td>
<td>20.14</td>
<td>16.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vavuniya</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mannar</td>
<td>25.99</td>
<td>16.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trincomalee</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batticaloa</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ampara</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anuradhapura</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polonnaruwa</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>83.85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ministry of Economic Development is the lead agency for mine action as chair of the interministerial National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), which sets policy and is supposed to ‘manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors.’ Its policies and decisions are implemented by the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), set up in 2010 with responsibility for liaising with government ministries and development partners to determine mine action priorities; preparing a strategic plan; and setting annual work plans to put it into effect. It is also responsible for accrediting mine action operators, setting national standards, and acting as the secretariat of the NSCMA.

Clearance operations in the field are coordinated, tasked, and quality managed by Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAs), working in consultation with District Steering Committees for Mine Action. The Committees are chaired by Government Agents heading district authorities.

The National Mine Action Strategy released in September 2010 a year after the end of the war with the LTTE sets a vision of Sri Lanka ‘free from the threat of landmines and ERW.’ The strategy gives priority to clearance of land for resettlement of people displaced by the conflict and land needed to support livelihoods, offer access to schools, hospitals, and religious centers, or which are within 3 km of villages and main roads. It assigned medium priority to land needed for infrastructure development and low priority to hazards in jungle areas with no immediate impact.

In 2012, the NMAC started working on a plan to transfer mine action to the Ministry of Defense by the end of 2013. No further details have emerged, but NMAC also reported in 2013 plans to revise Sri Lanka’s strategic plan, partly to address an expected reduction in donor support. As a result of reduced funding, Indian demining organizations Horizon and Sarvatra stopped working in September 2012.

In mid-2013, UNDP ended a long-running program of support for mine action which had including provided a technical advisor to NMAC until 2012 as well as support for the IMSMA database and regional mine action offices in Vavuniya and Jaffna, which have closed.
TABLE 2. Mine and battle area clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Battle area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DASH</td>
<td>375,892</td>
<td>630,308</td>
<td>21,791</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>228,541</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>4,151</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>442,349</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,441</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>1,867,697</td>
<td>38,250</td>
<td>24,790</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>6,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>423,156</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,329</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA-HDU</td>
<td>3,102,219</td>
<td>1,422,838</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,441,855</td>
<td>2,095,436</td>
<td>72,296</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>50,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearance in 2014 looked likely to fall further with the closure in 2013 of one of the bigger demining programs, that of FSD. MAG started 2013 with four demining teams and eight mechanical assets but cut capacity to two teams and five machines after the mid-year conclusion of some donor grants. In 2014, with additional funding from Japan, it raised capacity to five mine action teams and nine machines. HALO remains the biggest international operation with 1,113 staff at the start of 2014, including more than 900 deminers, a level it expected to maintain or possibly increase in the course of the year.

Survey in 2013
Sri Lanka did not report results of survey in 2013 but at the request of NMAC, HALO resurveyed Vavuniya, Mannar, and Mullaitivu districts, canceling 15.5km² of suspected hazard and adding 24 new minefields covering 0.5km². It conducted further survey and resurvey canceling suspected in other parts of its operating area. HALO demining teams also worked on minefields in Mugamalai and Nagarkovil that are among the most densely contaminated areas in Sri Lanka. These continued to be a focus of HALO’s clearance operations in 2014.

ENDNOTES
4 Telephone interview with Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 April 2014.
6 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO Trust, 11 April 2014, and interviews with demining operators, Colomba, 29 March–4 April 2010.
8 The cabinet formally approved the creation of NMAC on 10 July 2010.
9 Email from Antamari Wickramasinghe, Programme Officer – Peace and Recovery, UNDP, Colomba, 11 March 2011.
12 Email from Allan Poston, UNDP, 11 September 2012.
13 Interview with Monty Ratnarasa, Director, NMAC, in Geneva, 11 April 2013.
14 NMAC, “Mid-year Mine Action Progress Report as at 31 June 2013,” HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that it had cleared 1.88km² of mined area in 2013, destroying 35,326 antipersonnel mines, 2,610 antivehicle mines, and 1,451 items of UXO. In addition, HALO reported that its survey/EOD teams destroyed 324 antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines, and 3,456 UXO in resurvey/clearance tasks, a tiny amount compared with 18,348 antipersonnel mines and 17 antivehicle mines mine teams destroyed in 2012. Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 11 April 2014.
16 Email from Greg Sembd, Country Program Manager, MAG, 15 April 2014.
17 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO Trust, 11 April 2014.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
MINE ACTION PROGRAM

There is no functioning mine action program in Syria and no national mine action authority or mine action center.

In March 2012, UNMAS established an office in Damascus, initially as part of the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) but this was closed in August 2012 and UNMAS does not currently have a presence in Syria. An UNMAS risk education project was included in the Syrian humanitarian response plan proposed for 2014 but Syrian authorities have not approved any visas for staff to implement it. To assist humanitarian relief agencies and eventual reconstruction, UNMAS has maintained a database based largely on open source material recording locations of armed clashes.1

LAND RELEASE

No formal demining program is conducted in Syria but clearance is reportedly conducted by government and rebel troops and by some civilians on an ad hoc basis. Media reported the death of two Syrian army engineers in the course of conducting ‘demining’ in Homs Old City after the explosion of a mine in May 2014 but it was unclear if they were engaged in clearing mines or in explosive ordnance disposal.2 As an example of spontaneous clearance by local inhabitants, a video posted online by Human Rights Watch in March 2012 reported that a team of five local people had removed 300 antipersonnel mines from the village of Hasanieh near the border with Turkey.3

Turkish defense minister Ismat Yilmaz was quoted by media in 2013 as saying that 1,734 mines had been removed from the Syrian-Turkish border but gave no details.4

Kurdish groups in the north eastern town of Ras al-Ain reported removal of some 60 tripwire-activated mines placed by jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham in the nearby town of Tel Halaf.5

ENDNOTES

1 Email from Flora Sutherland, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, New York, 28 May 2013.
11 Email from Flora Sutherland, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNMAS, New York, 28 May 2013.
14“Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border,” Middle East Monitor, 21 November 2013.

SYRIA

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UNMAS

NEW YORK CITY

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UZBEKISTAN

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Uzbek forces have laid mines along its international borders at various times, including on its borders with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000. In 2010, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon criticized as ‘unacceptable’ Uzbekistan’s placing of landmines along parts of its border that have not been delineated.1

Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Survey on the Tajik side of the border over several years had identified a total of 57 suspect hazardous areas (size unknown) as of December 2008, which were subsequently deemed to be on Uzbekistan territory (see Tajikistan report). Uzbekistan had reportedly cleared 95% of the minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007 in demining operations conducted by Uzbek army deminers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.2

In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.3 According to the most recent information available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

There is no functioning mine action program in Uzbekistan.

ENDNOTES


VIETNAM

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Vietnam is heavily contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly UXO and mostly dating back to the war with the US in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s. This includes some of the most extensive contamination from cluster munition remnants in the world. Vietnam has a smaller, also undefined, problem of mines. Most were left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighboring Cambodia and China and affect areas close to its borders with those countries. Some mines are also found around former US military installations.

Vietnam cleared an area up to 1km deep along its northern border under an agreement with China, but areas further inland from the border are still contaminated with mines emplaced by the military of both countries. Since 2004, military engineers have reportedly cleared around 95km² of contaminated land in the northern provinces of Lang Son, Cao Bang, Ha Giang, Lai Chau, and Quang Ninh bordering China under a project known as ‘Program 120.’1 Cambodian border areas were affected by randomly placed mines reflecting the more irregular nature of the fighting there,2 but the Engineering Command reported in 2013 that the problem had been eliminated.3

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

Vietnam’s mine action program is undergoing a period of transition. A Prime Minister’s Decision in 2006 assigned the Ministry of National Defense to oversee mine action at the national level with clearance undertaken by the Army Engineering Corps of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN),1 and with BOMICEN, part of the Ministry of National Defense, acting as a central coordinating body for clearance and survey by national operators. International NGOs are required to conclude an agreement with PACOM and separate agreements with authorities in each of the provinces where they work.

An inter-ministerial National Steering Committee (NSC) launched in December 2011 and chaired by the prime minister oversees mine action, supported by a 21-member Standing Committee or Executive Office, chaired by the Vice Minister of Defense, Senior Lieutenant-General Nguyen Chi Vinh.1 The Executive Office, which is supposed to meet quarterly, decides mine action priorities and makes recommendations to the NSC.1

ENDNOTES

In 2013, Vietnam announced plans to establish a national mine action center (VNMAC) reporting to the Prime Minister’s office, to strengthen direction and coordination of mine action. The center is to be the focal point of mine action operations, the location for a national mine action database, and responsible for mobilizing international and national resources. Fundraising for the center was due to start in 2014 and the center is expected to be operational within two years. Work is also under way drafting a new mine action law that will replace the 2006 decree, putting the Ministry of National Defense in charge of mine action and establishing it as a civilian program under the prime minister.9

Strategic planning

The new mine action center falls within a National Mine Action Plan for 2013–15 released in May 2013. The plan calls for clearance of 1,000km² a year to support socio-economic development giving priority to provinces with the highest levels of contamination and accidents. Engineering Command estimates that to achieve such a target it would need to at least double the number of clearance teams.

LAND RELEASE

Clearance is undertaken mostly by the Army Engineering Corps, operating with some 250 mine/UXO clearance teams each comprising 20 to 25 personnel. As of June 2013, these included teams operated by 52 military companies.10 Clearing mine contamination in northern Vietnam is the responsibility of provincial army commands.11 Four international NGOs operated in 2013 but conducted battle area clearance and roving explosive ordnance disposal, not mine clearance. Army engineers cleared 4,500km² of ERW contamination in 201212 but were said to have cleared 1,000km² in 2013. How the increase was achieved was not immediately apparent.13 Army clearance reporting does not provide details of mine clearance.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

Vietnam reportedly spent "US$20 to 30 million" on mine clearance operations in 2013.14

ENDNOTES

1 Information provided by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in email received from VVAF, Hanoi, 24 September 2012, and in interview in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
3 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Head of Bomb and Mine Department, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.
4 Prime Minister’s Decision No. 69/2006/QD-TTG, 4 May 2006.
5 Email from Col. Nguyen Trong Dac, Ministry of National Defense, 6 August 2006.
6 Prime Minister’s Decision No. 223/QD-TTg, 22 December 2010 (unofficial translation by VVAF); email from BOMICEN, 4 April 2012; and interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
7 Email from Executive Office of the National Steering Committee, 6 August 2012.
9 Interview with Maj.-Gen. Pham Quang Xuan, Director, VNMAC, in Geneva, 31 March 2014.
12 Ibid.
13 Interview with Maj.-Gen. Pham Quang Xuan, Director, VNMAC, in Geneva, 31 March 2014.
14 Ibid.
KOSOVO

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Kosovo is contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants, primarily as a result of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army in the late 1990s and the conflict between the FRY and NATO in 1999. The UN reported in 2002 that ‘the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated’ but further investigation revealed considerably more contamination. A survey of Kosovo by the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) and HALO Trust completed in 2013 identified 130 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 10.36km². Mines are found mainly on Kosovo’s borders with Albania and Macedonia but also in the area of the Dulie Pass in south central Kosovo. The KMAC-HALO survey confirmed 79 mined areas covering 2.76km², a significantly greater number of areas than the total of 48 CHAs and suspect hazardous areas (SHAs) identified at the end of 2012.

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

In January 2011, the EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Coordination Management Section became KMAC under the Ministry of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). KMAC is responsible for managing all mine action, including clearance of mines and ERW. It prepares an annual workplan in cooperation with demining NGOs and coordinates operations of both NGOs and the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).

Three NGOs have supported mine action in Kosovo in recent years: HALO Trust, the Bosnia-based Mine Detection Dog Centre (MDDC), and Mines Awareness Trust (MAT).

LAND RELEASE

Kosovo released a total of 0.4km² of contaminated area in 2013, less than half the land released in 2012, reflecting a downturn in donor funding. Owing to lack of funding, the MDDC and MAT did not conduct any clearance in 2013.

HALO Trust, working with five clearance teams and 71 operations staff, reported clearing 0.11km² of mined area, destroying 18 antipersonnel mines and six items of UXO, and 0.17km² of cluster-munition-contaminated area, destroying 151 submunitions. The total area cleared by HALO was more than 50% above the previous year’s result but its ability to sustain operations at this level in 2014 depended on its ability to attract funding.

Mine and cluster munition remnants clearance in 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KSF</td>
<td>113,907</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>286,784</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>400,691</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KSF EOD operated with three platoons with a total of 75 deminers also trained for battle area clearance (BAC), and a fourth platoon with 25 deminers also trained for explosive ordnance disposal who conduct both area clearance and spot EOD tasks. It cleared almost one-third less area in 2013 than the previous year but destroyed more submunitions and UXO.

ARTICLE 5 COMPLIANCE

Although widely but not universally recognized as an independent state, arguably Kosovo still falls within Serbia’s obligations as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty (see report on Serbia). This means that clearance of mined areas containing antipersonnel mines must be completed by 1 March 2019, following a five-year extension granted to Serbia by States Parties in 2013. Kosovo is not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

KMAC operates with a budget of approximately €900,000 (US$1.23 million) a year and hoped that completion of the survey of Kosovo to define remaining contamination would encourage donors to increase support. HALO Trust, KMAC’s partner in the survey and the biggest NGO operator, was also seeking new donors after support by Belgium representing close to half its total 2013 funding of €480,097 (US$657,733) ended in 2013, leaving it funded only by Switzerland.

ENDNOTES

3 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 20 February 2014.
5 Ibid, 20 February 2014.
6 Ibid, 1 August 2012.
7 Ibid, 20 February 2014.
8 Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 27 February 2014.
9 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 20 February 2014.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 27 February 2014.
All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 1988–94 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A feature of the conflict was the extensive use of antivehicle mines but antipersonnel mines were also used.1

As of September 2013, remaining mined area was 1.6km² (down from 50km² in 2000), of which 0.88km² across 34 different areas contained antipersonnel mines and 0.73km² across 15 different areas contained antivehicle mines. A total of 39.5km² of battle area also remained across 79 areas.2 Around 70% of the remaining contamination – consisting mainly of antivehicle mines – is in areas occupied by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Forces outside Soviet-era boundaries.3 HALO Trust has operated in these areas since the beginning of its presence in Nagorno-Karabakh but, in recent years, HALO’s activities have been reduced due to difficulties in attracting funds to operate in these areas.4

MINE ACTION PROGRAM

A mine action coordination committee is primarily responsible for liaising between the de facto government ministries, other NGOs, and local communities.5 In 1995 and 1996, HALO Trust trained local Karabakh personnel in demining and local national staff to manage operations. In 1999, HALO returned to find the program had very significant failures, including many accidents and a breakdown of management.6 Since 2000, HALO has been the sole organization conducting demining in Nagorno-Karabakh.

New contamination was added in 2013. In July, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, was reported to state that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijan line of contact east and north of the disputed territory.” General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijan’s troops.7 In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the ICBL to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny that mines had been used. He stated that, “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan … today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He noted further that, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”8

Since 1995, HALO Trust has recorded 268 mine incidents resulting in some 330 casualties, including 73 killed.9

ENDNOTES

3 Email from Andrew Moore, Balkans and Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
9 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
10 Ibid.
13 Ibid; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
17 Ibid.
18 US Agency for International Development (USAID), De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh, September 2013, p. 3.
19 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.
20 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 15 April 2013.
21 Ibid, 19 March 2014.
22 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 19 March 2014.
MINE ACTION PROGRAM

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) manages a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), which was upgraded from a mine 'cell' in February 2008. MINURSO MACC supports mine action activities, which are implemented through a partnership between AOAV and Mechem, a commercial contractor. A total of 56 demining personnel were operating in 2013. The program had one mechanical team with three mechanical assets including one MineWolf and, since October 2013, one vehicle-mounted mine detection system (VMMDS), comprising one Casspar and one Tapir. Mechanical assets have been used to support minefield clearance operations in the southern Mirij region. In addition, the VMMDS supported MINURSO with road verification.

In 2005, the Polisario Front committed to a ban on landmines by signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in which it committed to cooperate in and undertake mine clearance. In September 2013, the Polisario Front established a local mine action coordination center (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is responsible for the coordination of mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm and for land release related activities. SMACO was established with UN support, and started its activities in January 2014. Since then, AOAV and MINURSO MACC have been working with SMACO to develop its capacity in trainings planned to be completed in April 2014.

In June 2012, AOAV started working on the first of the 38 confirmed mined areas, in Mirij, which alone is estimated to cover approximately 73km². Clearance of this minefield was prioritized as it was preventing the local population from accessing water and using land for grazing. Release of the area was expected before the end of 2014. With existing capacity, AOAV has estimated that total mine clearance in Western Sahara will require more than 20 years of work.

ENDNOTES

2. Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and Geographic Information System Manager, AOAV, 18 May 2010, incorporating information from James Mosop, Information Management System for Mine Action Officer, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Mine Action Co-ordination Centre.
8. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, an increase of some $800,000 on contributions in 2012. Norway provided its support to AOAV, and Spain made its contribution via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action. Switzerland provided in-kind assistance to UNOPS.
9. Ibid.
13. Email from Sarah Holland, MINURSO, 7 March 2014.
15. Email from Karl Greenwood, Chief of Operations, AOAV/Mechem Western Sahara Programme, AOAV, 20 June and 18 July 2013.
16. Email from Sarah Holland, MINURSO, 24 February 2014.
18. Email from Sarah Holland, MINURSO, 7 March 2014.
19. Ibid.
20. Email from Johan Smith, MINURSO, 17 March 2014.
21. Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian MFA, 28 April 2014, and Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UNMAS, 7 April 2014, and Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014.

WESTERN SAHARA

CONTAMINATION AND IMPACT

Western Sahara remains significantly affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) due to the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces. A defensive wall (the Berm) was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west side, and the Polisario Front on the east side.

The exact extent of contamination in Western Sahara is not known, but according to Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) [1] “the areas surrounding the Berm are believed to be some of the most heavily mined in the world.” A separate report on Morocco addresses contamination and clearance west outside the buffer strip covered an estimated 155km² – a 15% increase on the 134km² reported in March 2011, while total mine contamination was estimated as of March 2014, the high and medium mine threat east of the Berm and for land release related activities. With existing capacity, AOAV has estimated that tens of thousands of mines and other explosive devices remain inside the buffer strip.6

The total number of mine/ERW victims in Western Sahara is not known, though estimates suggest some 2,500 victims since 1975.7 The UN Secretary General reported that between April 2012 and April 2013 nine accidents caused by mines/ERW injured two civilians to the east of the Berm.8

ENDNOTES

2. Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and Geographic Information System Manager, AOAV, 18 May 2010, incorporating information from James Mosop, Information Management System for Mine Action Officer, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Mine Action Co-ordination Centre.
8. Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara, an increase of some $800,000 on contributions in 2012. Norway provided its support to AOAV, and Spain made its contribution via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action. Switzerland provided in-kind assistance to UNOPS.
9. Ibid.
13. Email from Sarah Holland, MINURSO, 7 March 2014.
15. Email from Karl Greenwood, Chief of Operations, AOAV/Mechem Western Sahara Programme, AOAV, 20 June and 18 July 2013.
19. Ibid.
20. Email from Johan Smith, MINURSO, 17 March 2014.
21. Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Norwegian MFA, 28 April 2014, and Eugen Secareanu, Resource Mobilisation Unit, UNMAS, 7 April 2014, and Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Programme Officer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 15 April 2014.