MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE FOR DOWNLOAD AT **WWW.MINEACTIONREVIEW.ORG**

1 August 2025

A REPORT BY MINE ACTION REVIEW FOR THE THIRTEENTH MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

- *Global contamination from cluster munition remnants*

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by Nick Cumming-Bruce, Rula Daoud, Laurène Deglaire, Alex Frost, Emil Hasanov, Lucy Pinches, Frances Smith, and Louise Wilson. The Mine Action Review project is managed by Lucy Pinches. The report was edited by Stuart Casey-Maslen and laid out by Optima Design in the United Kingdom. Mine Action Review would like to thank Global Affairs Canada, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for funding its work. We would also like to thank all those who contributed data and information, including national mine action authorities and mine action centres, clearance operators, UN agencies, and other expert mine action organisations.

Disclaimer

The report and the views expressed in it are the work of the authors. The designation of armed non-state actors, states, or territories does not imply any judgement by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Global Affairs Canada, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs or any other organisation, body, or individual regarding the legal status of such actors, states, or territories, or their authorities and institutions, or the delimitation of their boundaries, or the status of any states or territories that border them.

Other information

Mine Action Review is an independent research project published by NPA.

This publication is available for download at **www.mineactionreview.org**

The report focuses on cluster munition remnant land release data for the calendar year 2024, with information on other aspects of survey and clearance programmes included up to August 2025 where possible.

Mine Action Review welcomes comments from national authorities and other relevant stakeholders.
Please send any comments to **MineActionReview@npaid.org**

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS

CONTENTS

KEY FINDINGS 1

OVERVIEW 2

Summary of Progress 2
Global CMR Contamination 2
CMR Clearance in 2024 3
States That Have Completed CMR Clearance Since 2010 5
Clearance Deadlines and Progress in Article 4 Implementation in CMR-Affected States Parties 6
Programme Performance in Affected States Parties 7
Gender and Diversity 10
Environmental Policies and Action in Affected States Parties 12
Lausanne Action Plan 13
Outlook 14

STATES PARTIES 16

Afghanistan 17
Chad 25
Chile 33
Germany 41
Iraq 49
Lao PDR 59
Lebanon 78
Mauritania 91
Somalia 101
South Sudan 111

SIGNATORY STATE 126

Democratic Republic of Congo 127

NON-SIGNATORIES 136

Armenia 137
Azerbaijan 144
Cambodia 158
Ethiopia 166
Iran 171
Libya 175
Myanmar 183
Serbia 185
Sudan 191
Syria 200
Tajikistan 212
Ukraine 222
Vietnam 252
Yemen 260

OTHER AREAS 268

Kosovo 269
Western Sahara 277

ANNEX 282

CCM Article 4: Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munition Remnants and Risk Reduction Education 283

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 285

KEY FINDINGS

- Global clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area totalled 227.90km^2 in 2024, an increase of almost 18% on the previous record, set the year before, of 193.94km^2 (revised up from 185.03km^2 based on new 2023 clearance data provided by Ukraine). A total of 133,654 unexploded submunitions were destroyed worldwide during clearance, survey, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations in 2024, also a significant increase on the 96,553 destroyed the previous year.

- As in previous years, more contaminated area and more cluster munition remnants (CMR) were cleared in State Party Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) than in any other country. Its clearance of 71.7km^2 was the highest recorded in a State in a single year since the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. Lao PDR again destroyed more submunitions than any other mine action programme in 2024 (71,106), up from 58,382 the previous year.

- Significant clearance occurred in State not party Ukraine, which cleared 11km^2 suspected or confirmed to contain CMR in 2024 and destroyed the second highest number globally of submunitions (25,893)—reflecting the huge contamination it faces as a result of the ongoing war with Russia.

- The five most heavily contaminated States in the world—Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Ukraine, and Vietnam—saw by far the greatest amount of clearance during the year, together accounting for 90% of all recorded clearance worldwide.

- Globally, at least 24 States were affected by CMR as at 1 August 2025, along with two "other areas".[1] This included 10 affected States Parties (from the total of 111 States Parties[2]): Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, South Sudan, and Somalia.

- Signatory State the Democratic Republic of Congo is believed to have cluster munition-contaminated areas remaining on its territory. A further 13 States not party—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen—are affected by CMR, along with two other areas (Kosovo and Western Sahara).

- Of the 10 affected States Parties to the CCM, only Lao PDR is massively contaminated (where cluster munition-contaminated areas cover more than 1,000km^2 of land), while heavy contamination exists in Iraq (defined as extending over more than 100km^2). In the eight other affected States Parties, the extent of contamination is medium or light.

- Clearance in the 10 affected States Parties in 2024 covered a total of 84.55km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area, an increase of 6% on the previous year. Every State Party except for Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, and Somalia conducted clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024.

- No State Party to the CCM declared fulfilment of its Article 4 clearance obligations in the course of 2024 or 2025 through to 1 August, and disappointingly no State Party was on track to fulfil its Article 4 obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM in 2026. However, given the extent of CMR contamination and the clearance resources available if adequate funding can be secured and/or maintained, eight States Parties to the CCM—Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan—could all be cleared of CMR by the time of the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention in 2031. For Chad, Somalia, and South Sudan this will also be dependent on safe access to CMR-contaminated areas, and in South Sudan, long-term flooding, including of hazardous areas, is a further challenge.

1 These are territories not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in his capacity as treaty depositary for the CCM.

2 Lithuania formally withdrew from the CCM in March 2025, the first State Party to do so. Withdrawal is a retrograde action, both for Lithuania and for the Convention as a whole.

OVERVIEW

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

A new annual record was set in 2024 for global clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area – **227.90 square kilometres**. This is an increase in clearance output of almost 18% on the previous record, set the year before, of 193.94 square kilometres (revised up from 185.03km^2 based on new 2023 clearance data provided by Ukraine). As in previous years, more contaminated area and more cluster munition remnants (CMR) were cleared in State Party Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) than in any other country. Its clearance of 71.7 square kilometres was the highest recorded in a State in a single year since the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2008. In addition, a total of **133,654 unexploded submunitions were destroyed worldwide** during clearance, survey, and spot tasks in 2024, also a significant increase on the 96,553 destroyed the previous year.

Once again, considerably more clearance was recorded in 2024 in the 13 affected States not party to the CCM than in its 10 affected States Parties. Significant clearance occurred in State not party Ukraine in 2024—reflecting the huge contamination it faces as a result of the ongoing war with Russia—while States not party Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Vietnam once more increased their clearance output compared to a year earlier, Azerbaijan by half (based on Mine Action Review estimates), Cambodia by 44%, and Vietnam by 9%. Together Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ukraine, and Vietnam released a total of 138.38 square kilometres of affected land through clearance in 2024 – 60% of global clearance. In disappointing news, no clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area took place in States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, or Somalia during 2024. In 2025, five States were seeking extensions to their CCM Article 4 deadlines from the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September: Afghanistan, Chile, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia.

New CMR contamination was recorded in Lebanon in 2024 as a result of conflict with Israel, following the detonation of non-State armed group (NSAG) cluster munition stockpiles. An Israeli newspaper reported that Iran fired at least three missiles containing cluster munitions at Israel during the June 2025 conflict, but it was not known whether unexploded submunitions resulted from those attacks[1] There was also an unconfirmed report on use of cluster munitions by Myanmar in May 2025[2] and there were reports of use of cluster munitions by Thailand during the cross-border armed clashes with Cambodia in July 2025.[3] A Thai military spokesperson said that such weapons can be used "when necessary" to achieve military objectives.[4]

A total of 14 States have freed their territory of CMR since the CCM entered into force in 2010, but no State completed clearance of all known cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024 or the first half of 2025 (although Angola was removed from the list of affected States last year). The last State Party to complete clearance was Bosnia and Herzegovina, which successfully met its twice extended Article 4 deadline of 1 September 2023.

It is deeply regrettable that Lithuania formally withdrew from the CCM in March 2025, the first State Party to do so. Withdrawal is a retrograde action, both for Lithuania and for the Convention as a whole.

GLOBAL CMR CONTAMINATION

Globally, at least 24 States were affected by CMR as at 1 August 2025. In addition, two "other areas"—Kosovo and Western Sahara—which are not recognised as States by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) in his capacity as CCM depositary, are still contaminated with CMR. The global total of affected States is the same as a year earlier, when **Ethiopia** was added to the list as a result of the use of cluster munitions in the armed conflicts in the Tigray region, and likely from earlier use too during the international armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998–2000. In this year's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants*, Mine Action Review has included a country profile on Ethiopia for the first time. Whether, in addition to this, States not party **Israel** and **Myanmar** have cluster munition-contaminated area on their respective territory, was not certain at the time of writing and they have not been included in the global total.

1 B. Peleg, O. Yaron, and E. Solomon, 'How Three Iranian Cluster Missiles Hit Seven Israeli Cities', *Haaretz*, 4 July 2025, https://bit.ly/44w1IRe.

2 Depayin People's Defense Force, cited in "Death Toll From Myanmar Junta Airstrike on School Rises to 24", *The Irrawaddy*, 14 May 2025; see also "Myanmar junta airstrike kills 22 at school: witnesses", *Agence France-Presse*, 13 May 2025.

3 Niem Chheng, "CMAA condemns Thai use of cluster munitions", *Phnom Penh Post*, 25 July 2025.

4 "Thailand/Cambodia: Protect Civilians Amid Border Clashes", Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2025; "Thai Army clarifies use of cluster munitions, insists they are aimed at military targets only", *The Nation*, 25 July 2025; and "Thailand and Cambodia trade fresh attacks and accusations as allies call for a ceasefire", *Associated Press*, 26 July 2025.

Reports of use of cluster munitions by Thailand in July 2025, during the international armed conflict with Cambodia, may have added to Cambodia's CMR contamination.[5] The global CMR contamination situation is summarised in Table 1.

Asia (including the Middle East) is the most affected continent by number of countries, with 10 CMR-contaminated States, four of which are party to the CCM. **Africa** is the second most affected region with eight contaminated States along with other area Western Sahara (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, an African Union member). In **Europe**, five States, including State Party Germany, along with other area Kosovo are still CMR-affected. In the **Americas**, only State Party Chile still has CMR on its territory.

Table 1: CMR-affected States and other areas (at 1 August 2025)

CCM States Parties	CCM Signatories	CCM Non-signatories	Other areas
Afghanistan	Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)	Armenia	Kosovo
Chad		Azerbaijan	Western Sahara
Chile		Cambodia	
Germany		Ethiopia	
Iraq		Iran	
Lao PDR		Libya	
Lebanon		Serbia	
Mauritania		Sudan	
Somalia		Syria	
South Sudan		Tajikistan	
		Ukraine	
		Vietnam	
		Yemen	
10 States Parties	**1 Signatory**	**13 Non-Signatories**	**2 Other areas**

State Party **Lao PDR** has by far the greatest extent of contamination, which is massive in extent (greater than 1,000km^2). A national baseline survey continues to be conducted, at the same time as ramping up clearance of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). Non-signatories Cambodia, Ukraine, and Vietnam also have huge, but unquantified area contaminated with unexploded submunitions, followed by State Party Iraq. Several decades of clearance will be needed in each of these four States. Moreover, use of cluster munitions was continuing in **Ukraine** on a huge scale by Russian armed forces while Ukraine was also deploying significant numbers of the weapons. Table 2 below summarises what is known or believed about the extent of CMR contamination in affected States. It is an independent assessment by Mine Action Review of the extent of CMR contamination based on available evidence.

Table 2: Extent of CMR-contaminated areas in affected States (at 1 August 2025)*

Massive (>1,000km^2)	Heavy (100–1,000km^2)	Medium (5–99km^2)	Light (<5km^2)
Lao PDR	Cambodia	**Afghanistan**	Armenia
	Iraq	Azerbaijan	**Chad**
	Ukraine	**Chile**	DR Congo
	Vietnam	**Mauritania**	Ethiopia
		South Sudan	**Germany**
		Syria	Iran
		Yemen	**Lebanon**
			Libya
			Serbia
			Somalia
			Sudan
			Tajikistan

* CCM States Parties are in bold. In addition, other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara are believed to have medium and light CMR-contamination respectively.

5 Ibid.

Disappointingly, no State Party is on track to fulfil its Article 4 obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM in 2026. However, given the extent of CMR contamination and the clearance resources available if adequate funding can be secured and/or maintained, eight States Parties to the CCM—Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan—could all be cleared of CMR by the time of the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention in 2031. For Chad, Somalia, and South Sudan this will also be dependent on safe access to CMR-contaminated areas, and in South Sudan, long-term flooding, including of hazardous areas, is a further challenge. With the necessary political will, funding, and application of efficient and effective land release methodology signatory State the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) and non-signatories Armenia, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, and Tajikistan could join this list. It may take a little longer in Azerbaijan, given the extent of contamination in the areas that have come under its control since 2020 and depending on whether CMR are prioritised above other types of explosive ordnance contamination, which is not currently the case. Whether Sudan, Syria, and Yemen will also be free of CMR by the Fourth Review Conference in 2031 depends in large part on achieving a sustained cessation of hostilities in each of these three non-signatory States. The most promising of these three situations at the time of writing was Syria, although the extent of CMR contamination will only be known once a countrywide survey of contamination has been conducted.

CMR CLEARANCE IN 2024

A total of **227.90km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2024** as Table 3 summarises. This is a new annual record, up almost 18% from the previous record of 193.94km² achieved in 2023 (revised up from 185.03km² based on new 2023 clearance data for Ukraine). In the course of 2024, a total of **133,654 unexploded submunitions were destroyed worldwide during clearance, survey, and spot tasks**, a significant increase on the 96,553 destroyed the previous year.[6]

The five most heavily contaminated States in the world—**Cambodia**, **Iraq**, **Lao PDR**, **Ukraine**, and **Vietnam**—saw by far the greatest amount of clearance during the year, together accounting for 90% of all recorded clearance worldwide. In **Azerbaijan**, clearance was conservatively estimated at 12km² of cluster munition-contaminated area (its mine action programme is unable to disaggregate clearance of CMR from that of other explosive ordnance, but it destroyed 2,882 submunitions during the year, allowing for a reasonable estimate to be made). Although reported CMR clearance in Ukraine is slightly lower than in Azerbaijan, at 11km², destruction of submunitions amounted to 25,893, a reflection of the huge and persistent use of submunitions in the trench warfare between Russian and Ukrainian forces.

Lao PDR registered a significant increase in reported clearance in 2023, up from more than 56km² in 2023 to 71.7km² in 2024. Lao PDR again destroyed more submunitions than any other mine action programme in 2024 (71,106), up from 58,382 the previous year. Clearance output in Iraq, however, fell for the second successive year. States not party Cambodia and Vietnam, though, increased the extent of CMR clearance for the third year running.

Of the affected States Parties, **Afghanistan**, **Chad**, **Chile**, and **Somalia** did not clear any cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024. Afghanistan and Chad have stressed that lack of funding is impeding their ability to implement Article 4 and have appealed to the international community for financial assistance. Chile reduced a significant amount of suspected area through technical survey (TS) in 2024, releasing 8.1km² from its previous estimate of contamination of 29.3km² but without destroying any submunitions. It did not conduct clearance in 2024 as it had in 2023, which was the first time it had cleared submunitions since becoming a State Party to the CCM in 2011. Furthermore, Chile failed to secure national funding for CMR clearance in 2025 and was requesting international assistance. In Somalia, ongoing insecurity continued to prevent access to cluster munition-contaminated areas. Aggregate clearance in 2024 by the 10 affected States Parties was more than 88km²—up from the 2023 figure of almost 78.5km²—and amounting to 38% of the global clearance total for the year.

Clearance output in 2024 of States not party (including CCM signatory the DR Congo) along with the two other areas affected totalled 141.35km² and included the destruction of 50,103 submunitions. The huge increase in the number of submunitions destroyed in States not party reflects the 25,893 destroyed in Ukraine. Clearance results for 2024 worldwide and the comparison with 2023 are summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Global CMR clearance in 2024 and comparison to 2023

States Parties	Area cleared in 2024 (km²)	Submunitions destroyed*	Area cleared in 2023 (km²)	Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²)
Afghanistan	0.00	1,506	1.03	-1.03
Chad	0.00	0	0	0.00
Chile	0.00	0	1.44	-1.44
Germany	1.21	327	0.87	+0.34
Iraq	7.58	7,424	13.26	-5.68
Lao PDR	71.70	71,106	56.67	+15.03

6 The global total of CMR clearance in 2024 is likely to be higher, given that several affected States have either not reported at all on clearance progress or have done so only partially or inaccurately. Mine Action Review figures are, though, deliberately conservative, to avoid exaggerating progress.

Table 3 continued

States Parties	Area cleared in 2024 (km²)	Submunitions destroyed*	Area cleared in 2023 (km²)	Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²)
Lebanon	0.41	1,607	0.66	-0.25
Mauritania	0.10	29	0	0.10
Somalia	0.00	0	0	0.00
South Sudan	3.55	1,552	4.30	-0.75
Subtotals	**84.55**	**83,551**	****78.49**	****+6.06**
Signatory State	**Area cleared in 2024 (km²)**	**Submunitions destroyed***	**Area cleared in 2023 (km²)**	**Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²)**
DR Congo	0.04	17	0.02	+0.02
Subtotals	**0.04**	**17**	**0.02**	**+0.02**
Non-signatories	**Area cleared in 2024 (km²)**	**Submunitions destroyed***	**Area cleared in 2023 (km²)**	**Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²)**
Armenia	0.08	10	0.21	-0.13
Azerbaijan	est. 12.00	2,882	est. 8.00	+4.00
Cambodia	55.25	8,678	38.24	+17.01
Ethiopia	0.00	0	0	0.00
Iran	0.00	0	0	0.00
Libya	0.004	14	0	+0.004
Serbia	0.34	11	0	+0.34
Sudan	0.00	0	0	0.00
Syria	2.12	1,103	1.96	+0.16
Tajikistan	0.39	178	0.57	-0.18
Ukraine	11.00	25,893	***9.00	+2.00
Vietnam	60.13	10,857	55.26	+4.87
Yemen	0	17	0	0.00
Subtotals	**141.31**	**49,643**	**113.24**	**+28.07**
Other areas	**Area cleared in 2024 (km²)**	**Submunitions destroyed***	**Area cleared in 2023 (km²)**	**Comparison to 2023 clearance (+/- km²)**
Kosovo	1.51	89	1.92	-0.41
Western Sahara	0.49	354	0.27	+0.22
Subtotals	**2.00**	**443**	**2.19**	**-0.19**
Totals	**227.90**	**133,654**	******193.94**	**+33.96**

* Includes destruction during mine clearance, technical survey, and spot tasks.
** Includes clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.26km² and destruction of 545 submunitions. Bosnia and Herzegovina completed clearance in 2023.
*** Revised CMR clearance total for 2023 provided by the Ukrainian government in 2025. This was previously reported in last year's Mine Action Review report as 0.09km² of CMR clearance in 2023, based only on NGO operator data.
**** Includes BiH clearance of 0.26km² for 2023 and a revised 2023 clearance total for Ukraine of 9km², compared to 0.09km² reported previously.

STATES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CMR CLEARANCE SINCE 2010

A total of 14 States—all but three of which are States Parties to the CCM—have completed release of cluster munition-contaminated area in territory under their jurisdiction or control since 2010, the year of the Convention's entry into force.[7] **Bosnia and Herzegovina** did so in 2023 and Mine Action Review removed signatory State **Angola** from the list of CMR-affected States in 2024 as the problem is almost certainly only one of a residual threat of a small number of unexploded submunitions and there are no known or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas. Mine Action Review again encourages Angola itself to consider declaring completion of clearance of CMR.

7 Zambia completed CMR clearance two months ahead of the Convention's entry into force on 1 August 2010.

Table 4: States that have completed CMR clearance since 2010 (at 1 August 2025)

State	Year of Completion
Angola	2024
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023
Georgia	2022
Croatia	2020
Montenegro	2020
United Kingdom[8]	2020
Colombia	2017
Mozambique	2016
Norway	2013
Grenada	2012
Republic of Congo	2012
Guinea-Bissau	2012
Thailand	2011
Zambia*	2010
Total	**14 States**

* Zambia completed clearance in June 2010, two months prior to the CCM's entry into force.

Five of the States that have completed clearance are from Africa, six are from Europe and the Caucasus, two are from the Americas, and one is from Asia. All are party to the CCM except signatory State Angola and non-signatories Georgia and Thailand.

CLEARANCE DEADLINES AND PROGRESS IN ARTICLE 4 IMPLEMENTATION IN CMR-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

Article 4 of the CCM requires affected States Parties to complete CMR clearance **as soon as possible**, but **not later than ten years** from the date they become party to the Convention. In 2023, after two extensions to its original ten-year deadline, Bosnia and Herzegovina completed clearance just before its deadline expired on 1 September 2023. With South Sudan legally becoming party to the Convention on 1 February 2024, the number of affected States Parties remains at 10. Table 5 sets out the details of progress towards fulfilment of the survey and clearance obligations under the Convention. Only two States Parties—Germany and South Sudan—are currently on track to meet their Article 4 obligations by their respective deadlines.

Table 5: Progress in Implementing CCM Article 4 Obligations (at 1 August 2025)

State Party	Article 4 deadline	Status of progress towards deadline	Observations
Afghanistan	1 March 2026	Not on track. Three-year extension sought to 1 March 2029.	The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination has committed to complying with the CCM's clearance obligations, but the government faces significant financial challenges. It is, however, optimistic that if funding is secured it can complete clearance in the new extension period.
Chad	1 October 2026	Not on track (interim deadline).	Chad's second interim deadline extension period is intended to allow survey to take place in the northern province of Tibesti and any requisite clearance to be planned. The requisite survey is, however, dependent on donor funding —still not secured —and on security conditions permitting safe access.
Chile	1 June 2026	Not on track. Thirty-month extension requested to 1 December 2028.	Chile finally began clearance in 2023. Although no clearance was conducted in 2024, Chile reduced 8.1km^2 through TS, leaving 21.25km^2 of contamination remaining on three military training ranges.
Germany	1 August 2030	On track.	Germany was granted a new five-year extension to 1 August 2030. If Germany can sustain clearance capacity and output despite the planned tender process, and if environmental conditions allow for sufficient controlled burning during the extension period, it should be able to complete by its deadline.
Iraq	1 November 2028	Not on track. Will need further extension given the extent of contamination.	Iraq will need multiple extensions in order to fulfil its Article 4 clearance obligations. Poor management and continuing challenges in securing funding mean the programme is struggling to make meaningful progress against huge contamination.

8 The United Kingdom did not consider itself to have an unfulfilled obligation under Article 4 of the CCM and therefore did not formally declare completion.

Table 5 continued

State Party	Article 4 deadline	Status of progress towards deadline	Observations
Lao PDR	1 August 2030	Not on track. Will need multiple extensions given the extent of contamination.	Lao PDR will need multiple extensions in order to meet its Article 4 clearance obligations. In recent years, clearance capacity has been upscaled significantly, with 75km^2 of clearance in 2024, a record. Survey continues to add significant amounts of CHA and is expected to continue to do. Lao PDR is still many years away from establishing a robust baseline of contamination.
Lebanon	1 May 2026	Not on track. Four-year extension requested to 1 May 2030.	Lebanon continues to see a drop in clearance capacity, a reduction in international funding, and the absence of national funding to clear CMR. Furthermore, new CMR contamination was added to Lebanon's existing baseline, as a result of kick-out from ammunition storage areas of NSAGs. Without additional support it is unlikely to complete CMR clearance before 2030.
Mauritania	1 August 2026	Not on track. Two-year extension requested to 1 August 2028.	Mauritania will need to secure additional international funding to conduct planned CMR clearance and fulfil its Article 4 obligations by the extended deadline requested. The programme conducted limited clearance in 2024, solely with national funding.
Somalia	1 March 2026	Not on track. Four-year extension requested to 1 March 2030.	Somalia has made little to no progress to determine a baseline of CMR contamination and address cluster munition-contaminated areas since becoming a State Party in 2016. Lack of access to CMR-contaminated areas due to ongoing insecurity continued to prevent CMR survey and clearance in 2024.
South Sudan	1 February 2034	On track.	South Sudan is making good progress towards meeting its original 10-year Article 4 clearance deadline.

Thus, as at 1 August 2025, among States Parties only **South Sudan** was clearly on track to meet its Article 4 deadline of February 2034. Germany also looked capable of meeting its extended deadline of 2030. In 2024, Chad, Germany, and Lao PDR were granted extensions at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in September. In 2025, extension requests were requested by Afghanistan, Chile, Lebanon, Mauritania, and Somalia, which were due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties. Given the extent of contamination of their territory, Iraq and Lao PDR will need multiple extensions before they complete CMR clearance.

All affected States and territories are obligated under international human rights law to clear unexploded submunitions as soon as possible on the basis of their duty to protect life. One State not party, Serbia, has set a specific target to complete clearance. In its most recent Article 5 deadline extension request of 2022 under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Serbia included a work plan with the aim of completing CMR clearance by the end of 2025, albeit contingent on securing funding. In addition, other area Kosovo is aiming to complete CMR clearance by 2030.

In contrast, Sudan's earlier target to complete clearance of all explosive ordnance by 2027 was blown off course by the outbreak in 2023 of a major non-international armed conflict. The conflict was continuing to rage at the time of writing. With contaminated areas still being found, Tajikistan likewise does not have a realistic target date for the completion of CMR clearance. No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine, nor is it realistic to expect one for the foreseeable future given the ongoing hostilities. Indeed, cluster munitions continue to be very widely used by Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine.

PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

To help affected States Parties and their partners focus their capacity building and technical assistance efforts on areas of need, and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of survey and clearance programmes, a performance scoring system is used by Mine Action Review. The scoring criteria were developed in consultation with international demining operators The HALO Trust (HALO), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). For their survey and clearance work in 2024, each of the ten affected States Parties was scored on the basis of the following eight criteria:

- Understanding of contamination,
- National ownership and programme management,
- Gender and diversity,
- Environmental policies and action,
- Information management and reporting,
- Planning and tasking,
- Land release system, and
- Land release outputs and Article 4 compliance.

In the scoring, given their relative importance, double weighting is accorded to two criteria: Understanding of contamination, and Land release outputs and Article 4 compliance. An average is then calculated that determines the overall score. The results of the scoring for 2024 are

summarised in Table 6. The country-specific assessments of the eight criteria, which should be viewed alongside the recommendations for action in the country reports, are intended as an implementation tool to assist States Parties to identify and overcome challenges and fulfil their Article 4 obligations as efficiently as possible. The text box below outlines the eight programme performance criteria and key factors affecting scoring in detail. A score of 8 or more is ranked Very Good. A score of 7.0–7.9 is ranked Good. A score of 5.0–6.9 is ranked Average. A score of 4.0–4.9 is ranked Poor. A score of less than 4 is ranked Very Poor.

MINE ACTION REVIEW CRITERIA TO ASSESS NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE OF STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
UNDERSTANDING OF CLUSTER MUNITION CONTAMINATION (20% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Has a national baseline of cluster munition remnant (CMR) contamination been established and is it up to date and accurate? ■ If no national baseline, or only a partial or inaccurate baseline, exists, is survey and/or re-survey being conducted or is it planned? ■ Are CMR-contaminated areas disaggregated from areas with other types of explosive ordnance (e.g. other explosive remnants of war (ERW) or mines)? ■ Is CMR contamination classified into suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), based on whether there is indirect or direct evidence of CMR respectively? ■ Is there a high ratio of CHAs to SHAs?
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Is there a national entity, such as a national mine action authority, overseeing mine action? ■ Is there a national mine action centre coordinating operations? ■ Are the roles and responsibilities in mine action clear and coherent within the national programme? ■ Is the mine action centre adequately staffed and skilled? ■ Are clearance operators involved in key decision-making processes? ■ Does national legislation, or other suitable administrative measures, effectively underpin the mine action programme? ■ Have the authorities created an enabling environment for mine action? ■ Has the government facilitated the receipt and efficient use of international assistance? ■ Is there political will for timely and efficient implementation of Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)? ■ Does the affected state contribute national resources to support the cost of the mine action centre and/or survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas? ■ Does the affected state have a resource mobilisation strategy in place for Article 4 implementation?
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Does the national mine action programme have a gender policy and implementation plan? Do the main mine action operators have one? ■ Is gender mainstreamed in the national mine action strategy and national mine action standards? ■ Are women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities? ■ Are survey and community liaison teams inclusive and gender balanced, to facilitate access and participation by all groups, including women and children? ■ Are the needs of women and children in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities? ■ Are ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas consulted during survey and community liaison activities? ■ Do survey, clearance, and community liaison teams include representatives from different ethnic or minority groups, to facilitate access and participation by all groups? ■ Are the needs of ethnic or minority groups in communities affected by CMR-contaminated areas considered in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance activities? ■ Is relevant mine action data disaggregated by gender and age? ■ Is there equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams, including for managerial level/supervisory positions?

Criteria continued

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	■ Does the national mine action programme have an environmental management policy? ■ Does the affected State have a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action? If yes, is it in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13? ■ Are environmental assessments conducted to support informed decision-making on the planning and delivery of survey and clearance tasks? ■ Where required, are measures implemented to prevent or minimise environmental harm, including to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, during demining operations, at demining camps, at mine action centres, and during travel? ■ When planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, is the affected State considering climate-related or extreme weather risks (such as increased risk of flooding that may cause operations to be stood down or potentially displace submunitions or even displace people into contaminated areas)?
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Is there a national information management system in place (e.g. IMSMA), and is the data accurate and reliable? ■ Are data collection forms consistent and do they enable collection of the necessary data? ■ Is data in the information management system disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release? ■ Is the data in the information management system accessible to all operators? ■ Are ongoing efforts being made to ensure or improve the quality of data in the mine action database? ■ Does the affected state party to the CCM submit accurate and timely annual Article 7 reports on Article 4 progress? ■ Are Article 4 extension requests of a high-quality and submitted in a timely manner? ■ Is the survey and clearance data reported by the affected state party (e.g. in Article 7 reporting) accurate and disaggregated by type of contamination (i.e. CMR from other ERW and landmines) and method of land release? ■ Does the affected state party report on progress in Article 4 implementation at the Meetings of States Parties, and is reporting accurate and consistent between reporting periods?
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Is there a national mine action strategy in place and does it include realistic goals for land release? ■ Is there a realistic annual workplan in place for land release? ■ Are there agreed and specified criteria for prioritisation of tasks? ■ Are key stakeholders meaningfully consulted in planning and prioritisation? ■ Is clearance of CMR tasked in accordance with agreed prioritisation? ■ Are task dossiers issued in a timely and effective manner? ■ Where relevant, is there a plan for dealing with residual risk and liability? Is it realistic and sustainable?
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Does the affected state have national mine action standards in place for land release? ■ Do the standards enable or impede efficient evidence-based survey and clearance? ■ Are national standards reflected in SOPs? ■ Are standards and SOPs periodically reviewed against IMAS and international best practice, in consultation with clearance operators? ■ Is there an effective and efficient: i) **non-technical survey** capacity, ii) **technical survey** capacity, iii) **clearance** capacity in the programme? Does this include national capacity? ■ Are areas being cleared that prove to have no CMR contamination? ■ Where relevant, is there national survey and clearance capacity in place to address CMR contamination discovered after the release of CMR-contaminated areas or post completion? ■ Is there an appropriate range of demining assets (manual, mechanical, and animal detection systems) integrated into land release operations? ■ Is there an effective quality management system in place for survey and clearance operations? ■ Where an accident has occurred within a mine action programme was there an effective investigation? Were lessons learned shared between operators?

Criteria continued

Criterion	Key Factors Affecting Scoring
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% OF OVERALL SCORE)	■ Is the affected state seeking to clear all CMR from territory under its jurisdiction or control, including contamination along national borders, in and around military installations, and in hard-to-access CMR-contaminated areas? ■ Have national mine action authorities set a target date for the completion CMR clearance and is this within the state party's Article 4 deadline? ■ Is the target date for completion realistic based on existing capacity? ■ Is the target date sufficiently ambitious? ■ What were the outputs of survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated area in 2024, and were they greater or lesser than the previous year and why? ■ Are survey and clearance outputs in line with plans and Article 4 obligations? ■ Is the affected state on track to meet the target completion date and/or Article 4 deadline?

With respect to performance in 2024, no State Party was ranked as Very Good. This was also the case for 2023. Germany was the top scoring State Party which, along with Lao PDR, Lebanon, and South Sudan, maintained a ranking of Good. Afghanistan, Chile, Iraq, and Mauritania were again ranked as average. Chad remained Poor, while Somalia rose from Very Poor to Poor. Somalia's improvement reflects 2024 efforts to strengthen national mine action standards in non-technical survey (NTS), as well as its clear identification of the eleven remaining SHAs to be surveyed once security conditions permit access.

Table 6: Mine Action Programme Performance in Affected States Parties

State Party	Ranking for 2024	2024 Score	2023 Score	Change in score
Afghanistan	Average	5.7	5.6	+0.1
Chad	Poor	4.1	4.3	-0.2
Chile	Average	6.3	6.4	-0.1
Germany	Good	7.5	7.3	+0.2
Iraq	Average	5.7	5.9	-0.2
Lao PDR	Good	7.3	7.1	+0.2
Lebanon	Good	7.3	7.3	0
Mauritania	Average	5.7	5.7	0
Somalia	Poor	4.1	3.8	+0.3
South Sudan	Good	7	7	0

Overall, four States Parties increased their scoring for their CMR survey and clearance programmes in 2024 compared to the previous year—Afghanistan, Germany, Lao PDR, and Somalia—while the scores for Chad, Chile, and Iraq all dropped. Performance in States Parties Lebanon, Mauritania, and South Sudan were unchanged from a year earlier. The greatest drop in scoring was for Chad and Iraq.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

There was valuable progress in mainstreaming gender and diversity in CMR survey and clearance programmes in 2024 after a disappointing stagnation in 2023. In several States, the participation of women improved, and a number of organisations made new, meaningful commitments to gender and diversity. That said, more work is needed by national mine action authorities and clearance operators to meaningfully start mainstreaming other diversity considerations such as race, ethnicity, language, religion, disability, sexual orientation, social class, and age into mine action programmes.

The mainstreaming of gender and diversity is in line with Action 4 of the CCM Lausanne Action Plan for all States Parties to: "Ensure that the different needs, vulnerabilities and perspectives of women, girls, boys and men from diverse populations and all ages are considered and inform the implementation of the Convention in order to deliver an inclusive approach, as well as strive to remove all barriers to full, equal and meaningful gender-balanced participation in implementation activities at the national level and in the Convention's machinery, including its meetings."

Policies and strategies are typically supportive of gender equality in recruitment, but overall, the picture continues to be a work in progress. With respect to Mine Action Review's assessment of the performance of States Parties with respect to the "gender and diversity" criterion, Lao PDR improved its performance compared to the previous year, and joined Lebanon as the joint top-scoring country for performance in 2024. Both these States Parties, which achieved a rating of "very good" in the gender and diversity criterion, provide a good example to other CMR-affected States Parties on what efforts can be taken to mainstream gender and diversity.

Examples from Mine Action Review's research on the ten affected States Parties are included below, but for additional information please see the *Gender and Diversity* section of the individual *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2025* country reports. The country reports also each include the percentage of women working at national mine action centres and at clearance operators, including the proportion of women in managerial and supervisory roles and also in operational positions.

In **Afghanistan**, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) remains committed to mainstreaming gender and says the government permits employment of women in mine action, but operators say their activities are restricted and women's employment in the sector has fallen further as a result of funding cuts. In practice, although operators continue to deploy women in "maharam" (a female staff member and male relative) teams for risk education and victim assistance, their involvement is limited. Operators say it depends on what local authorities permit, which is not consistent, and that it limits outreach to women and children. Not all implementing partners have gender focal points. MCPA, which employed six women in its staff of 133, said they would be out of a job in May 2025 as a result of funding cuts.

Chad's 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request paid limited attention to gender and diversity. Chad did, however, highlight the strong socio-cultural norms prevailing in Tibesti and planned to recruit women from the province to support survey teams during field interviews. That said, women made up less than 4% of HCND staff in 2024. The only woman employed for clearance, an EOD Level 3 expert, is reported to have left the sector.

Chile's new extension request noted that "instructions have been issued to encourage the voluntary participation of women in CMR clearance activities". While there are no gender-based restrictions on joining explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units, no women participated in the EOD units involved in survey and clearance in 2023 and 2024. The EOD units include four women – three in the air force and one in the army.

In **Germany**, qualified women and men are said to have equal access to employment in EOD, including the clearance of CMR. That said, in practice women make up only a small proportion of the sector. At the end of 2024, 16% of all mine action personnel at Wittstock were female, a slight uptick on 2023.

Iraq's 2023–28 mine action strategy acknowledged the importance of gender and diversity to the sector although gender issues became politically sensitive in the last two years. Conservative societal norms keep women's employment low despite legislation to encourage it, but mine action authorities and operators continue actively to encourage recruitment of women. Thus, for instance, NPA has increased outreach and advocacy to local communities, and in 2024 its CMR programme increased the number of women in managerial roles from four a year earlier to six. This included an NTS team leader and a senior logistics officer, and overall, the number of women in its operations rose from nine to ten. NPA has a gender focal point position to promote mainstreaming which is funded until 2025, and of a total workforce of 493 in Iraq at the end of 2024, it employed 114 women.

In **Lao PDR**, the "Safe Path Forward III" strategy for 2021–30 emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming in the national CMR programme. In 2024, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) took significant steps to strengthen gender and diversity mainstreaming in the UXO sector, including updating policy documents, approving a new Gender and Inclusion Code of Conduct, and appointing Gender Focal Points for technical working groups (TWGs), with the Lao Women's Union conducting a sector gender analysis to inform planning. Of the humanitarian clearance operators in the country, The HALO Trust's proportion of female staff was achieved by setting quotas during recruitment drives. HALO continued to prioritise the hiring of women into operational roles during recruitment in 2024, ensuring that half of its total staff were women as well as half of its management and operations staff.

In **Lebanon**, gender and diversity considerations are included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and the national mine action centre, LMAC, has a gender work plan in place. The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but the proportion of women at LMAC is more than double the 5% average of the Lebanese armed forces, and LMAC seeks to improve this ratio further. But the number of women in operational positions decreased from seven in 2023 to only two in 2024. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) had women filling more than a quarter of all operations positions, the only clearance operator to exceed 25%.

Mauritania's 2023–26 mine action plan recognises that it has yet to develop a specific gender and diversity policy. This remained the situation in 2024 and Mauritania's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request did not indicate plans to establish one. Nevertheless, by the end of 2024, women made up 39% of the PNDHD's 26 staff, with four women in managerial or supervisory positions (half of the total), including the risk education/victim assistance department director. The programme has a gender focal point, who is tasked with promoting greater inclusion, particularly in management and risk education.

Somalia does not have a strategic mine action plan in force with the previous strategy having expired in 2020. The Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), which serves as the de facto national mine action authority for the country, has advocated action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams, but there has been little success in gender mainstreaming in Somalia's patriarchal society. Clan affiliation is also an important consideration in Somalia. SEMA has a dedicated gender, diversity and inclusion (GDI) officer. It asserts that gender equality will be promoted during the proposed extension period and that significant efforts will be made, working with mine action partners, to recruit women into a variety of roles. Finally, Somalia pledges that the right to inclusion of persons with disabilities and those from minority clans will also be considered. During 2024, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) delivered training on gender

and diversity to SEMA, and the authority continued to collaborate with The HALO Trust on these issues.

In **South Sudan**, a National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action developed by the GICHD in partnership with the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) was completed in 2024 and adopted by the Government in March 2025, and an associated work plan was under development as at June 2025. Commercial firms and international NGOs have sought to improve gender balance in their staff but redressing the gender imbalance remains a long-term challenge. Data provided to Mine Action Review indicated that the overall proportion of female staff remained low – less than a quarter of all positions. MAG had the highest percentage of women in its programme among the international NGOs with women comprising one third of all staff and just under one third of operations staff. MAG continues to ring-fence spaces on all trainings for female staff. Overall in the programme, ethnic identity is said to be reflected within both survey and clearance teams, but only to a limited extent.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION IN AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

In last year's Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants report, Mine Action Review introduced a new criterion on "Environmental policies and action" to the framework used to annually assess the performance of national mine action programmes in CCM States Parties. There continued to be significant advances in protecting the environment in certain States Parties in 2024. In some instances, the achievements were regulatory in nature while in others, it was practical progress in the field. Every mine action programme should systematically assess, and where possible prevent or mitigate, possible adverse environmental impacts of their activities. There is also significant potential for mine action to support efforts to stem, but also adapt, to the effects of climate change and to proactively protect the environment.

International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on environmental management in mine action, first published in 2017, was revised and adopted in 2024 and is now entitled "Environmental management and climate change in mine action".[9] It provides a valuable framework for action by the mine action sector. In addition, a Technical Note on Mine Action (TNMA) 7.13/01,[10] published in January 2025, provides further guidance and a list of practical measures to be used by national mine action authorities (NMAAs), mine action centres, and mine action organisations to support the implementation of IMAS 07.13. All affected States should elaborate and implement a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management and climate change, in line with IMAS 07.13 Second Edition.

Every State Party seeking an extension to its Article 4 deadline is required to describe the environmental implications of that extension.[11] While some Article 4 deadline extension requests considered and granted by States Parties have briefly referred to the environment, most make little or no reference to the environmental implications of land release operations. We encourage States seeking an extension to include, for example, how environmental considerations will be addressed during planning and tasking for survey and clearance, in order to minimise potential harm from land release activities, and how climate change may impact planned operations or the affected country's prioritisation for clearance.

A new Mine Action Review policy brief, ***Environmental Protection in Mine Action: A Review of Good Policy and Practice***, published in November 2024, is available for download on the Mine Action Review website. The Review is based on the premise that every NMAA and mine action operator should be embedding environmental and climate-change considerations at each stage of the mine action process – from planning to operations to post-clearance activities. The aim is to inspire and equip all mine action stakeholders to elaborate, adopt, and implement policies and practices that minimise environmental harm; contribute to climate resilience; and maximise the positive benefits of land release on both the human beneficiaries and the planet we all share. The Review serves three main purposes: guiding policy development; showcasing good practice; and advocating for greater donor engagement.

In addition, we encourage affected States and their implementing partners to make use of environmental assessment tools, such as the **Green Field Tool (GFT)** — an environmental assessment and screening tool developed by NPA and the Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS). It is designed to support environmentally responsible planning and implementation of mine action activities, including the consideration of the potential risks from the impact of climate change on mine action activities and affected communities. The tool and its supporting guidance are available on the resources page of the **environmentinmineaction.org** website. Environmental assessments should ideally be conducted as early as possible in the planning process, including during programme design, community engagement, and NTS which has the added benefit of saving workdays and reducing costs.

Examples of some of the latest developments in affected States Parties to the CCM are included below, but for additional information please see the Environmental Policies and Action section of the country report for each State Party. As they had done a year earlier, Germany, Lebanon, and South Sudan again achieved the highest scores for their performance in 2024 with respect to Mine Action Review's assessment criterion of "Environmental policies and action".

9 IMAS 07.13, Edition 2: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", available at: https://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/07-13/.

10 IMAS Technical Note for Mine Action, TNMA 07.13/01: "Environmental management and climate change in mine action", available at: https://bit.ly/3IYaWNW.

11 Art. 4(6)(h), CCM.

Afghanistan has a national standard on environmental management in mine action, AMAS 07.06 Environmental Management, which makes environmental impact assessments mandatory in land release activities. It has reported that all destruction of CMR is "carried out in accordance with the safety and environmental standards, to minimize damages to the private and public properties and to the environment." Afghanistan's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request states that the programme will give priority to clearance of contaminated areas located on hillsides to reduce the effects of climate change and to avoid the risk of items being washed down by rainfall. Gullies close to contaminated areas would also be searched for items that may have been washed down. Additionally, it calls for special attention to be paid to removal of vegetation, while banning the burning of vegetation. Among demining operators, HALO was completing a project focused on regenerative agriculture in Kandahar province. It takes advice on post-clearance activities from Ecology and Conservation of Afghanistan (ECO-A), a local non-profit NGO.

In contrast, **Chad** lacks a policy, national standards, and a designated focal point for environmental management in mine action. It has not reported any specific measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts of clearance operations. In 2024, Chad was impacted by massive flooding, prompting the need for emergency clearance. Climatic change is increasing the intensity of such natural hazards, underscoring the need for stronger environmental safeguards.

Chile does not have an environmental management policy in mine action, though national environmental laws establish the legal framework for environmental protection, and apply to clearance and destruction of explosive ordnance. Chile also conducts clearance in accordance with the provisions of IMAS 07.13, but says environmental impact of clearance activities is minimal, noting that the effects on ecosystems, soil quality, and biodiversity are negligible. The areas where CMR remain are in arid and desert regions with almost no vegetation, where the terrain is sandy and with caliche soil (a mineral deposit of gravel, sand, and nitrates).

Germany lacks a dedicated management policy or national mine action standard on the environment, but clearance is governed by strict environmental procedures due to the Wittstock site's protected status under German and European Union law. Controlled burning of heathland is a prerequisite for clearance but is tightly regulated to protect wildlife, avoiding bird-breeding seasons and active periods for ground fauna, such as when insects and lizards are in their hibernation habitats. Burning and subsequent ploughing deplete soil nutrients, supporting Natura 2000 goals to maintain native flora adapted to dry, nutrient-poor conditions. But burning also produces carbon emissions. Conservation rules limit burning to between 2km^2 and 3km^2 per year, confined to a few suitable days.

Iraq ranks among the five most vulnerable nations to effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat, all of which pose a growing operational challenge. While Iraq has yet to elaborate a policy or national mine action standard on environmental management in mine action, the GICHD and the Ministry of Environment conducted a workshop in 2024 to develop approaches to environmental management in mine action. Demining organisations mostly apply their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) for managing the environment and minimising harm from operations. NPA appointed an Environmental Advisor for the Iraq programme in August 2024.

Lao PDR has a dedicated NMAS on environmental management, but this needs to be revised, to review its compatibility with the new edition of IMAS 07.13 and with national environmental norms. As at June 2025, the NMAS was being reviewed as part of a review of all NMAS that was due to be complete by the end of the year. In 2024, MAG launched the "UXO Climate and Environment Forum" for operators, initially involving HALO, HI, and NPA. The forum aims to facilitate knowledge sharing on environmental and climate change issues, identify best practices, and address field challenges, such as waste management and disposal of hazardous materials. MAG also partnered with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Vientiane office to map US bombing data against protected areas.

In **Lebanon**, LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region, their impact on the clearance operation, and the measures to be taken. In 2024, MAG's Beirut office became fully solar powered and MAG Lebanon began a baseline carbon footprint assessment to inform the development of a work plan and country-level environmental policy.

Mauritania has a short environmental protection national standard that was drafted at the end of 2024, and which was under review in 2025. Environmental considerations are briefly mentioned in its 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request. Mauritania noted that, due to the low population density and the desert conditions in Tiris Zemmour (where CMR are found), the environmental impact of clearance is likely to be minimal.

In **South Sudan**, the National Mine Action strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself. UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the national mine action authority. The National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) on Health and Safety, Social and Environment is updated annually, and was due to be reviewed and brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13.

LAUSANNE ACTION PLAN

The five-year Lausanne Action Plan was issued at the Second Review Conference of the CCM at its second session in September 2021 due to the pandemic. The Lausanne Action Plan supports States Parties in their efforts to complete survey and clearance as soon and as safely as possible. The Action Plan has actions with measurable indicators. A baseline of the current status of implementation has been established, against which progress is being measured year-on-year through to the Third Review Conference, which will be held in 2026 under the CCM presidency of Lao PDR.

MONITORING THE LAUSANNE ACTION PLAN

In addition to the official CCM monitoring of the Lausanne Action Plan, Mine Action Review is providing civil society monitoring and analysis of its implementation with respect to survey and clearance. This is based on our broader research, which includes not only official treaty reporting (Article 7 reports and official government statements and updates under the Convention), but also liaison with national authorities, clearance operators, UNMAS, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The results of Mine Action Review's 2025 monitoring of survey- and clearance-related indicators can be found on the Mine Action Review website. This separate publication also includes a guide describing the Lausanne Action Plan actions and indicators relevant for survey and clearance, along with supporting commentary on the meaning and importance of each action, with regards to efficient and effective Article 4 implementation.

As the results of the 2025 assessment of relevant indicators illustrate, States Parties have not yet fully implemented the actions applicable to them. But the hope is that through the efforts of national authorities, with the support of implementing partners, they can identify where there are gaps and make progress in addressing them, which will then be reflected in progress in the indicators each year between now and the Third Review Conference in 2026. Mine Action Review welcomes feedback from States Parties and other stakeholders on the results of the 2025 assessment.[12] Please send an email with any feedback or additional information for Mine Action Review's consideration to **MineActionReview@npaid.org**.

OUTLOOK

The huge increase in CMR clearance in 2024 compared to the previous year is extremely welcome. But this should not be used to mask underlying problems in Article 4 implementation in a number of States Parties to the CCM. Chad, Chile, Mauritania, and Somalia need to improve programme performance if they are to meet their Article 4 deadlines in the coming years. This is also contingent on international donors funding CMR survey and clearance, and—particularly for Chad and Somalia—on security conditions allowing safe access to CMR-contaminated areas. The best performing programmes in 2024—Germany, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and South Sudan—each face significant, though widely differing challenges. Iraq and Lao PDR will both require multiple extension requests due to the extent of CMR contamination.

Based on current progress, disappointingly no State Party is on track to fulfil its Article 4 clearance obligations by the Third Review Conference of the CCM in 2026. Hopes that Chile will do so faded in 2024 and after it failed to secure national funding for CMR clearance in 2025. The Fourth Review Conference in 2031 will be another important milestone in the life of the Convention. With the requisite effort, Afghanistan, Chad, Germany, Lebanon, Mauritania, Somalia, and South Sudan could also be free of cluster munition remnants by then, an achievement to be celebrated. But there are also dark clouds on the horizon. Lithuania formally withdrew from the CCM in March 2025, the first State Party to do so, and may acquire and potentially use cluster munitions. Withdrawal is a retrograde action, both for Lithuania and for the Convention as a whole. As highlighted in the statement of the Philippine's Ambassador, Carlos D. Sorreta, President of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM, Lithuania's withdrawal risks eroding the norms and principles that prohibit the use of cluster munitions, which have caused indiscriminate harm and suffering over the past decades. He also stressed that, "Though withdrawal is allowed by the Convention and is a sovereign prerogative, we hope there will be no others, for the integrity of the Convention and for the sanctity of international humanitarian law."[13]

History and extensive empirical research reveal that cluster munition remnants disproportionately harm civilians, with children being particularly vulnerable.[14] Unexploded submunitions are highly sensitive to movement, pressure, or tampering, and their significant explosive load makes them extremely hazardous to local communities. These characteristics also present a greater and deadlier challenge to deminers during survey and clearance operations compared to other types of explosive remnants of war. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions banned these weapons "to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions." This rationale remains as compelling today as it was when the Convention was adopted. States Parties must uphold and implement the treaty both in times of peace and in periods of increased tension and conflict.

12 See the *Guide to the Lausanne Action Plan and Results of 2024 Monitoring*, available on the Mine Action Review website.

13 "Statement of the 13MSP Presidency on Lithuania's effective withdrawal from the Convention on Cluster Munitions" 6 March 2025, CCM website.

14 See casualty data in annual publications by the Cluster Munition Monitor. Civilians represented 93% of all cluster munition casualties in 2023 and children accounted for 47% of casualties where the age group was recorded, according to the Monitor's report in 2024.

STATES PARTIES

AFGHANISTAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Three-year extension requested to 1 March 2029

CMR CONTAMINATION: 8.99KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	0	1,029,908
Technical survey	0	0
Non-technical survey	331,513	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	1,506 (330 during BAC and the remainder in spot tasks)	*977

* DMAC previously reported 1,139 submunitions destroyed in 2023, but revised the figure to 977 in its 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024

- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Afghanistan cancelled 0.3km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area through non-technical survey (NTS) in 2024, but due to lack of funding did not conduct any clearance. In early 2025, it requested a two-year extension to its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 deadline which it later increased to three years. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025. In January 2025, the United States, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA)'s principal donor, halted funding, leading to cuts in the UN's Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC) and operating capacity.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) government should commit funding to support implementation of Afghanistan's CCM Article 4 deadline extension request.**
- **International donors should expedite funding for the MATC to underpin critical coordination, planning, information management, and quality management functions.**
- **International donors should also seek to support survey and clearance of the nine remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas, to enable Afghanistan to fulfil its Article 4 obligations.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Afghanistan assesses its CMR contamination as covering almost 9km^2 although it acknowledges survey may add to the present national estimate.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	The MAPA is nationally managed but is dependent on donor funding, which has fallen sharply since the August 2021 Taliban takeover and as a result of US aid cuts in 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	3	4	The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) remains committed to mainstreaming gender and says the government permits employment of women in mine action, but operators say their activities are restricted and women's employment in the sector has fallen further as a result of funding cuts.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Afghanistan has a national standard on environmental management and operators have standing operating procedures to mitigate the adverse impact of mine action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	6	5	Information management stabilised in 2024 and DMAC prepared in 2025 to start upgrading the database from IMSMA New Generation to Core with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	4	Afghanistan submitted an Article 4 deadline extension request that included a detailed work plan, but implementation depended on attracting donor support.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Afghanistan has national standards compliant with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and DMAC released updated standards for NTS, technical survey (TS), and clearance at the end of May 2025. It plans to follow IMAS TNMA 08.20/2 on cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) to confirm CMR-contaminated area and release it.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	5	No clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas occurred in 2024 due to lack of funding and the only area released was 0.3km^2, which was cancelled after re-survey.
Average Score	**5.7**	**5.6**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA)
- Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
- Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA)
- Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
- Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
- Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
- Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan estimated that areas containing cluster munition remnants (CMR) totalled 8.99km^2 in May 2025,[1] down 3% from 9.28km^2 at the end of 2023. Contamination is concentrated in two south-eastern provinces (see Table 1). Three-quarters (77%) of the total is in Paktya province with another 20% in Nangahar, consisting of what remains of 248,056 US submunitions dropped between October 2001 and early 2002. There are additionally small confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in Bamyan, which contain Soviet-era submunitions, and in Samangan, where unexploded US BLU submunitions remain.[2]

Until 2021, armed conflict limited access to areas affected by CMR, resulting later in persistent discoveries of previously unrecorded hazardous areas.[3] Since then, security and access have improved and DMAC acknowledges that survey in previously inaccessible areas may find some further areas of contamination. None was reported in 2024, but most submunitions destroyed by implementing partners (IPs) were in areas outside established CHAs.

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at end 2024)[4]

Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)
Bamyan (Central region)	1	258,887
Nangarhar (Eastern region)	3	1,824,132
Samangan (Northern region)	2	11,715
Paktya (South-eastern region)	10	6,894,263
Totals	**16**	**8,988,997**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

CMR pose a much smaller threat than do landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). This includes 391km^2 of mined area[5] and 166km^2 contaminated by a wide range of ERW other than CMR, not including 38 former NATO firing ranges. DMAC assessed these ranges as covering 632km^2 but said it is confident the size will be substantially reduced by survey.[6]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

MAPA's management structure has remained unchanged since the Taliban takeover of government in 2021. The mine action sector falls under the authority of a High Commission for Disaster Management led by a first deputy prime minister and supported by an interministerial board.[7] Afghanistan's National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) remains in the role of a national mine action authority, setting overall policy, while DMAC continues to be responsible for strategic planning, managing and coordinating survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, and quality management (QM). The IEA-appointed director of DMAC has commented that the only change resulting from the change of government was in the personnel running it.[8]

DMAC's capacity remains severely constrained by international sanctions imposed on the IEA regime and a sharp downturn in the donor funding on which the MAPA has always been largely dependent. DMAC completed the transition from being a project of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to national management in 2018. By 2021, the Government of Afghanistan paid salaries of only 15 of DMAC's 155 staff, the rest being paid by UNMAS and the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) through ITF Enhancing Human Security.[9]

After August 2021, international sanctions imposed on the IEA ended the cooperation agreement between UNMAS and DMAC, and DMAC technical staff on internationally funded salaries mostly transferred to UNMAS. In March 2025, DMAC employed 13 civil servants, including its director, and one contractor. Other DMAC staff included the QM Senior Manager, the Chief of Operations, the Head of Coordination, and managers of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), planning, mechanical demining, mine detection dogs (MDDs), risk education, information, and investigations.[10]

1 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 Extension Request, submitted June 2025, p. 2.

2 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F; and email from Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 20 May 2025.

3 Afghanistan's Article 4 deadline extension request reported a total of 30 CHAs covering 17.4km^2 were identified between becoming a party to the CCM in 2013 and 2023 (p. 4). DMAC data received annually by the Mine Action Review between 2018 and 2022 recorded 28 hazardous areas covering 20.4km^2. These comprised two areas/1.6km^2 in 2018; four areas/3.26km^2 in 2019; three areas/1.7km^2 in 2020; eleven areas/5.7km^2 in 2021; and twelve areas/8.1km^2 in 2022.

4 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 7.

5 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025. The total includes 103km^2 of anti-personnel mines, 79km^2 of improvised mines, and 209km^2 of anti-vehicle mines.

6 2024 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

7 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, pp. 9–10.

8 Interview with Qari Nooruddin Rustamkhail, Director, DMAC, in Kabul, 4 June 2022.

9 Email from Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, DMAC, 17 March 2021.

10 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

A UN Security Council resolution in March 2022, renewed in 2025, mandated UNAMA to "advise and coordinate explosive ordnance threat mitigation measures in support of humanitarian and development initiatives, support the coordination of the humanitarian mine action sector."[11] DMAC and UNMAS cooperated through a series of interim arrangements designed to continue UN coordination and technical support for the MAPA, but they proved short term due to disagreements and financial shortfalls.[12] These culminated in an October 2023 agreement on the UN providing cooperation through a Mine Action Technical Cell (MATC).

The MATC employed 51 people at the end of 2024, supporting planning and prioritisation, operations coordination (six staff), information management (five staff), and QM (14 staff), along with risk education, victim assistance, and gender and diversity. It also operated four regional offices in Kabul (covering the central region), Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz. All except the Kabul office closed at the end of 2024.[13]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

National funding for mine action since 2021 was limited to the government paying the salaries of 14 DMAC staff and "some operational expenses," reportedly amounting to a total of about $40,000 a year.[14] Afghanistan's updated Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in 2025 reported DMAC had established a Resource Mobilisation Team which met ANDMA's leadership in December 2024 and later with the Prime Minister's Office. The team concluded that "it is highly likely that the IEA will consider some funding" for clearance of explosive ordnance, including CMR.[15]

Historically, international funding for CMR survey and clearance came largely from the United States. Afghanistan's first Article 4 deadline extension request in 2021 said that PM/WRA had committed to providing the funding needed to complete its CCM obligations.[16] MATC, which survived on a series of short-term donor agreements in 2024, was due to receive PM/WRA funding for the period January through October 2025. PM/WRA suspended funding for the MAPA in January 2025, resulting in MATC cutting its staff by 70% to 14, and closing three of its four provincial offices (Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz) with the loss of regional staff.[17]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Draconian Taliban policies excluding women from public life have still left some space for their engagement in sectors such as health and mine action. Afghanistan's Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2024 said that DMAC, in consultation with IPs, had developed a gender and diversity mainstreaming policy for the MAPA.[18] The Article 4 deadline extension request affirms that its mine action programme is gender sensitive; that planning and prioritisation take into account the needs and priorities of women, men and children; and that IPs have gender focal points. It says implementing gender and diversity policies will be a goal of the new National Mine Action Strategy due for release in 2025.[19]

DMAC says it has government permission for women to work in the mine action sector and they can operate without facing any issues in all 32 provinces with the exception of Kandahar and Uruzgan.[20]

In practice, IPs report that, although they continue to deploy women in *maharam*[21] teams for risk education and victim assistance, their involvement is limited. Operators say it depends on what local authorities permit, which is not consistent, and that it limits outreach to women and children. Not all IPs have gender focal points and funding cuts are contributing to the drop in the number of women employed in the sector. MCPA, which employed six women in its staff of 133, said they would be out of a job in May 2025.[22]

11 UN Security Council Resolution 2626, 17 March 2022, operative para. 5(j). Operative para. 3 of Council Resolution 2777 of 17 March 2025 extended UNAMA's mandate until 17 March 2026 "as defined in" Resolution 2626.

12 For more details on mine action coordination and the role of the UN after August 2021 see *Clearing the Mines 2023*, pp. 31–34.

13 Emails from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Senior Technical Adviser, Mine Action Section, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 12 March 2025; and Mohammad Akhbar Oriakhil, Mine Action Operations Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 11 June 2025.

14 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 12 January 2025.

15 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 12 January 2025; and updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 15.

16 2021 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12. Afghanistan later specified that the PM/WRA committed to clear all CMR tasks listed in three provinces: Bamyan, Paktya and Samangan. Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

17 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025; and 'Funding Cessations Impact on Mine Action Coordination, MATC PowerPoint Presentation, 7 April 2025.

18 2024 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 41.

19 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, pp. 17–18.

20 Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025.

21 Maharam teams combine a female staff member and male relative.

22 Email from Mir Mohammad, Executive Operations Manager, MCPA, 27 March 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Afghanistan has a national standard on environmental management in mine action, AMAS 07.06 Environmental Management, which makes environmental impact assessments mandatory in land release activities. It has reported that all destruction of CMR is "carried out in accordance with the safety and environmental standards, to minimize damages to the private and public properties and to the environment."[23]

Afghanistan's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request states that the programme will give priority to clearance of contaminated areas located on hillsides to reduce the effects of climate change and to avoid the risk of items being washed down by rainfall. Gullies close to contaminated areas would also be searched for items that may have been washed down. Additionally, it calls for special attention to be paid to removal of vegetation and bans burning of vegetation. It said that the MAPA had also halted use of "machinery with environmental impacts" but did not specify the types of machinery covered by this restriction.[24]

IPs apply a range of measures to mitigate the environmental impact of demining in line with the AMAS and their own in-house standard operating procedures (SOPs). Among national IPs, MCPA said it prioritises manual over mechanical clearance to minimise soil disruption.[25] The HALO Trust, in addition to applying its global SOPs, said it is completing a project focused on regenerative agriculture in Kandahar province and that it employs solar panels to power offices and demining camps. It takes advice on post-clearance activities from Ecology and Conservation of Afghanistan (ECO-A), a local non-profit NGO.[26]

Warmer temperatures and reduced snowfall resulting from climate change have increased the seasonal access to some contaminated areas in Paktya province[27] but IPs also identified increasingly unpredictable weather patterns and flooding that displaces ordnance as a challenge in 2024.[28]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The MAPA is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation database overseen by DMAC with support in 2024 of five IM staff from MATC. After major disruption in information management between the change of regime in August 2021 and DMAC's agreement with MATC in October 2023, it inherited a backlog of around 28,000 unprocessed reports. It reported clearing the backlog in 2024 alongside the year's reports of IP operations. MATC retained five IM staff in 2025 despite sharp workforce cuts imposed in January 2025 as a result of suspension of PM/WRA funding.[29]

DMAC had planned to upgrade the database to IMSMA Core since before the change of government in August 2021. DMAC expected to start the upgrade in May 2025 with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and said that the process would last more than a year. The GICHD visited Kabul in May 2025 to conduct a preliminary assessment and planned to hold two workshops later in the year.[30]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Afghanistan's Article 4 initial deadline extension request, submitted in January 2025 and revised in March, asked for two years to clear all remaining known CMR contamination, which consists of 16 CHAs in four provinces covering almost 8.99km^2.[31] A second revision of the request, submitted in June 2025, asked for an extension of three years until the end of February 2029 to tackle the same area. It explained that "stakeholders" had recommended a longer extension period to allow more time to mobilise the necessary resources.[32] It said DMAC's Resource Mobilisation Team had already met ANDMA and the government, and that some funding from the national budget was "highly likely". DMAC and ANDMA had also approached potential regional donors and welfare foundations for funding and said initial contacts were "quite promising". DMAC had been asked to prepare concept notes and detail the funding required, the request noted.[33]

23 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form B.

24 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 17.

25 Email from Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025.

26 Email from Farid Homayoun, Programme Manager, HALO, 16 April 2025.

27 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 9.

28 Email from Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025.

29 Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025.

30 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March 2025; and from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 12 March 2025; and interview with Russell Bedford, Country Director, and with Mats Hektor, Senior Technical Adviser, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 5 May 2025.

31 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 13 March 2025.

32 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 8.

33 Ibid., pp. 11–12.

A detailed work plan included in the revised request planned for clearance of 3,778,887m^2 in the first year, completing release of three small remaining CHAs in Bamyan and Samangan provinces totalling 0.2km^2, one CHA in Nangahar totalling 0.9km^2, and four CHAs in Paktya totalling 2.6km^2. In the second year, the plan called for clearance of 2,885,723m^2: two CHAs in Paktya totalling 2.3km^2 and one in Nangahar amounting to 0.58km^2. In the third year, the plan provided for clearance of 2,324,387m^2: one CHA of 0.4km^2 in Nangahar and four CHAs in Paktya totalling 1.97km^2.[34]

The plan calls for deploying six teams with a total of 60 deminers in the first year, dropping to five teams/50 deminers in the second year and four teams/40 deminers in the third. It projects total costs amounting to US$2,227,777, including $935,275 in the first year dropping to $714,216 in the second year and $575,216 in the third.[35] The request said MAPA Quick Response Teams qualified for survey, EOD, and risk education were available to deal with any residual contamination.[36]

Afghanistan has reportedly prepared a national mine action strategic plan as part of a national strategic plan for disaster management, but the plan was said to be under review by DMAC's parent body, ANDMA, and the details were unknown at the time of writing.[37] The English version of the strategy was planned to be launched in August 2025.[38]

DMAC holds monthly meetings of IPs, the UN and international agencies and donors. Tasking is determined by the availability of donor funding. DMAC also proposed to hold monthly meetings of a resource mobilisation team established in early 2025 to raise funds for mine action.[39] As at the end of May 2025, no funding had been confirmed for CMR clearance.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Afghanistan has comprehensive national mine action standards that are IMAS-compatible and before August 2021 were subject to regular review. CMR survey and clearance are addressed in AMAS 06.02 (Battle Area Clearance).[40] The third iteration of the 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request stated that all standards were under review by a technical working group on standards and that DMAC planned to update all standards by August 2025.[41]

Release of CMR hazardous areas in the past relied on NTS and clearance but the Article 4 deadline extension request makes a point of including technical survey (TS), using the cluster munition remnant survey (CMRS) methodology in planned interventions. This followed consultation with IPs and taking account of their experience clearing large battle areas and finding relatively few items. The extension request stipulates that IPs will conduct new NTS on all cluster munition-contaminated areas, cancelling areas with no explosive ordnance threat, followed by TS/CMRS. The MAPA will conduct the technical survey as per the IMAS Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA) TNMA 08.20/02 on CMRS, to identify the confirmed hazardous area for clearance and release the remaining area through area reduction.[42]

Operators identified the search depth previously required on battle area tasks as a significant operational challenge, but reported that DMAC had held meetings and tests to resolve the issue.[43]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The MAPA had a total of 285 operational teams at the end of 2024 employing a total workforce of 2,450 people and covering clearance, weapons and ammunition destruction, risk education, and victim assistance. This represents a sharp fall from the 360 MAPA teams employing 3,600 people a year earlier.[44] By the start of March 2025, the MAPA's active capacity had fallen to a total of 188 teams and 1,649 staff, including survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. In the absence of funding, no teams were engaged on tasks related to CMR.[45]

34 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, Cluster Munitions Survey and Clearance Plan, 2026–2029.

35 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 13.

36 Ibid., p. 19.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 16.

40 Statement by Mohammed Shafiq, Director, DMAC, at GICHD workshop, Geneva, 26 March 2019.

41 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 9.

42 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, pp. 8 and 12.

43 Email from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025.

44 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC999, 26 March 2025; and Nick Pond, Chief of Mine Action Section, UNAMA, 26 May 2024.

45 MAPA Operational Teams and Workforce, DMAC, 3 March 2025. Of the total, 139 teams employing 1,463 were active on survey and/or clearance.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Afghanistan's release of cluster munition-contaminated areas was largely at a standstill in 2024 because of a lack of funding. Resurvey by MATC quality management teams in September and October 2024 resulted in cancellation of 0.3km^2 (see Table 2) but no other area was released through either survey or clearance in 2024.[46] As a result, EOD spot task operations accounted for most of the submunitions destroyed in 2024.

Table 2: Land release outputs in 2024[47]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	0	
Technical Survey	0	
Non-Technical Survey	331,513	205,479m^2 attributed to a joint assessment by MATC QM staff and DRC, and four tasks totalling 126,034m^2 in joint assessment by MATC QM and MCPA.
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	1,506	Most items destroyed in EOD operations. HALO reports destroying 330 submunitions during BAC.

DMAC initially reported destruction of 718 submunitions, 36% less than the previous year, but after processing a backlog of reports it revised the number to 1,506, a 32% improvement on 2023.[48] IPs, however, recorded destroying 1,061 submunitions in 2024. HALO reported destroying 330 submunitions in the course of battle area clearance and another 307 items in spot tasks, mostly Soviet-era submunitions. These included 101 in the Kabul area, which has 11 scrap metal-processing factories that collect substantial amounts of explosive ordnance.[49] MCPA reported destroying 322 submunitions in spot EOD tasks and DRC 102.[50]

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR AFGHANISTAN: 1 MARCH 2012

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2022

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (4 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2026

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (3 YEARS): 1 MARCH 2029

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Afghanistan is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. It will not meet this deadline.

Afghanistan submitted a deadline extension request in January 2025, updated in March 2025, seeking two more years until the end of February 2028 to clear the remaining 8.9km^2. In June 2025, it submitted an updated request, now seeking a three-year extension until 1 March 2029.

The request says Afghanistan can complete CMR clearance by deploying six clearance teams in the first year, five teams in the second year and four teams in the third year at a cost of a little over US$2.2 million.[51] The MAPA has more than sufficient manpower and experience to complete clearance of the remaining 8.9km^2, but prospects for meeting the deadline without funding from national or international sources are remote. By March 2025, the MAPA had a total of 23 projects operational, but none related to survey or clearance of cluster munitions.[52] Moreover, MATC's funding for critical planning, coordination and information management functions was running out on 1 July 2025.

46 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March and 24 April 2025.

47 Emails from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 26 March and 20 May 2025.

48 Ibid.

49 Emails from Farid Homayoun, HALO, 16 April 2025; and Thomas Claughton, HALO, 24 April 2025.

50 Emails from Mir Mohammad, MCPA, 27 March 2025; and Hannah Rose Holloway, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament, DRC, 1 May 2025.

51 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, pp. 14–15.

52 MAPA Operations, Teams and Workforce, February 2025, DMAC, 3 March 2025.

DMAC set up a resource mobilisation team (MRT) at the end of 2024 with three sub-groups tasked to approach 1) the government, banks, and the private sector; 2) regional donors including the Gulf States; and 3) UN agencies and other international donors. The MRT had held several meetings with the government which it reported had given a positive response to its request for funding. As at the end of May 2025, though, it had not received any firm commitments of financial support.[53]

Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	0
2023	1.0
2022[54]	1.6
2021	3.6
2020	0
Total	**6.2**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Afghanistan has not provided a detailed blueprint for addressing residual contamination but said IP Quick Response Teams qualified for survey, EOD, and risk education were available to deal with any residual contamination. The MAPA also has established a number for communities to call to deal with any missed devices or residual contamination.[55]

53 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025.

54 DMAC initially recorded release of 3.4km^2 in 2022, but later revised the figure down to 1.6km^2. Email from Aimal Safi, DMAC, 20 May 2025.

55 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, June 2025, p. 19.

CHAD

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 OCTOBER 2026 (INTERIM DEADLINE)

Not on track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Believed to be light but no national baseline estimate

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical survey	0	0
Non-technical survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024

- National High Commission for Demining (HCND)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in September 2024, Chad was granted a second interim extension to its Article 4 clearance deadline to October 2026. The extension is to allow Chad to conduct non-technical survey (NTS) to confirm or deny the presence of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in Tibesti province – its last remaining suspected region. Since Chad's initial request for an extension in 2022, following the conclusion of the four-year European Union-funded PRODECO project, no progress has been reported due to a lack of funding and limited international support. In the first half of 2024, the National High Commission for Demining (HCND) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) deployed limited resources for battle area clearance (BAC) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks in Hadjer-Lamis province. Operations were, however, halted in June. Emergency clearance operations were conducted in response both to the explosion at the main army's ammunition depot in the Goudji neighbourhood in the north of the capital, N'Djamena, and to severe flooding that affected Chad's northern provinces during the summer of 2024.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Chad should urgently conduct the requisite NTS in Tibesti province to confirm or deny the presence of CMR and develop a comprehensive work plan to fulfil its Article 4 obligations.**
- **Chad should reinforce its resource mobilisation efforts to raise the necessary national and international funds to enable it to carry out the requisite survey.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	5	Tibesti province – the last region suspected of being contaminated by CMR—requires NTS to confirm or refute the presence of CMR and other explosive remnants of war. Planned since 2022, the survey is intended to cover five departments (Aouzou, Bardaï, Emi Koussi, Wour, and Zouar), although the total area to be surveyed has not been specified.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	In 2024, the Chadian government allocated some US$1.45 million to the HCND, consistent with previous years. The funding supported the deployment of seven teams for emergency clearance operations following the ammunition depot explosion near N'Djamena and severe flooding in the north. A restructuring of the HCND was reportedly underway in 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	The 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request paid limited attention to gender and diversity. It highlighted the strong socio-cultural norms prevailing in Tibesti but planned to recruit women from the province to support survey teams during field interviews. Women made up less than 4% of HCND staff in 2024. The only woman employed for clearance, an EOD Level 3 expert, has reportedly left the sector.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	2	2	Chad lacks a policy, national standards, and a designated focal point for environmental management in mine action. It has not reported any specific measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts of clearance operations. In 2024, Chad was impacted by massive flooding, prompting the emergency clearance referred to above. Climatic change is increasing the intensity of such natural hazards, underscoring the need for stronger environmental safeguards.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	The HCND's mine action database underwent extensive data clean-up by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) in 2020–21, but has not been updated since. Information management support is limited to an annual training in Senegal. Chad submitted its CCM Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2024 on 15 May 2025. Chad did not attend the intersessional meetings in April 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	In its 2024 extension request, Chad set out plans for an initial four-month period to mobilise resources and conduct NTS in Tibesti. A comprehensive CMR work plan was to follow, based on the contamination identified. As of May 2025, however, no concrete steps had been taken in this regard.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	5	5	The 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request listed 22 national mine action standards, reportedly aligned with IMAS, including a standard on NTS. The last review was in 2021.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	4	Chad has not reported CMR survey or clearance since the conclusion of the EU-funded PRODECO project in 2021. In 2024, it was granted a second extension at the 12MSP, with a new deadline of October 2026. As at May 2025, Chad had not secured funding and assistance to carry out the planned NTS.
Average Score	**4.1**	**4.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- HCND
- Army Engineers
- General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (for battle area clearance)

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Chad has never produced a baseline estimate of CMR contamination, although it initially described the threat as significant. At the 2008 signing conference of the CCM, Chad stated that "vast swathes of territory" were contaminated with mines and unexploded ordnance, including cluster munitions, but it provided no supporting data.[1] To date, the extent of CMR contamination remains uncertain. It is believed to affect the northern province of Tibesti, which has never been fully surveyed. In 2012, some NTS were conducted in parts of Tibesti, specifically in Bardaï, Yebibou, and Zoumri. Chad has, though, stated that these areas will need to be re-surveyed due to subsequent armed conflicts. It also said that additional suspected hazardous areas may be identified in the future.[2]

Between 2017 and 2021, the PRODECO project saw technical survey (TS) and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in Borkou and Ennedi West provinces. In Ennedi West, at Delbo, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) cleared 742,657m^2, destroying 11 A01-SCH submunitions. In Borkou, the HCND reported the destruction of three cluster munition containers at Kaourchi.[3] Additionally, MAG had cleared 1,353,959m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area at Chicha (also in Borkou), destroying 28 submunitions in 2019.[4]

In 2021, Chad announced it had completed clearance of all known CMR hazards and intended to declare compliance with its Article 4 obligations.[5] This position was revised in 2022, as the government acknowledged that it did not have a "precise reading" of possible contamination in Tibesti and committed to conducting further survey.[6] No international operator was able to access Tibesti during the PRODECO project's duration due to security concerns.[7]

In its 2024 extension request, Chad explained that the Tibesti region has experienced several decades of armed conflict, making it not only the most heavily mined area in the country but also the most contaminated by explosive remnants of war (ERW), with a high likelihood of encountering CMR.[8] Chad identified a lack of funding as the primary obstacle to conducting the requisite NTS. Additional challenges included limited data collection and reporting capabilities; seasonal weather disruptions; poor road conditions; and restricted access due to security risks.[9] In 2023, mine clearance at the Hadjar-Magdoud site in Tibesti was suspended after deminers were kidnapped.[10] Access to the region remains restricted due to political instability, security risks, and tensions over informal gold mining.

Chad's explosive ordnance contamination primarily stems from its 1987–88 conflict with Libya, which affected the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region (as it was then known). The region, which covered nearly one-third of the country, has since been divided into four provinces.[11]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Chad is significantly contaminated by ERW, particularly across its northern provinces of Borkou, Ennedi West and East, and Tibesti, as well as its eastern border with Sudan.[12] As at the end of 2024, the national database recorded 57 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering a total area of 5.8km^2.[13] The conflict in 2021, which was marked by clashes between armed groups and the national army that led to the death of President Idriss Déby, left thousands of items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) that national capacity started to clear in 2022 and continued in 2023.[14] By the end of 2023, Chad had 178km^2 of recorded battle area, though a single CHA in Kanem province comprised 177km^2 of this.[15] These figures remained unchanged in 2024, with only limited BAC conducted in Hadjer-Lamis and none in Kanem.[16]

The national territory is also contaminated by anti-personnel (AP) mines, with 71 CHAs totalling almost 56km^2 and 48 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering more than 21km^2 recorded at the end of 2024.[17] As part of its Article 5 deadline extension request under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Chad developed a five-year provisional work plan in 2024, prioritising the Tibesti province as it contains the largest extent of AP mined area.[18] In February 2024, Chad said it was

1 Statement of Chad, CCM Signing Conference, Oslo, 3 December 2008.
2 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
3 Ibid., p. 5; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F.
4 Emails from Daniel Davies, Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 21 May 2021; and Caroline Bruvier, Chad Project Manager, MAG, 5 August 2020 and 23 May 2025.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F; and Statement of Chad, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) 19th Meeting of States Parties, 15–19 November 2021.
6 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
7 Online interviews with Caroline Bruvier and Francois Fall, HMA Advisor for West Africa, MAG, 16 April 2024; and Seydou Gaye, HMA Specialist, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 22 April 2024.
8 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
9 Ibid., p. 12.
10 Interview with Gen. Brahim Djibrine, Coordinator, and Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations and Logistics, HCND, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.
11 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
12 Statement of Chad on Article 5, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.
13 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
14 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11–14 September 2023, p. 10.
15 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 15 August 2024.
16 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 11 June 2025.
17 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
18 2024 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 35 and 53.

confronted with an increasing threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) laid by non-State armed groups, particularly in the Lake Chad Basin.[19] In March 2024, an explosive device killed seven Chadian soldiers during a patrol in the west of the country, near Lake Chad.[20] Another similar incident involving an explosive device took place in May, injuring three soldiers.[21] See Mine Action Review's Clearing the Mines report on Chad for further information on the mine problem.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Chad's mine action programme is coordinated by the HCND, which was set up by government decree in 1998 with a mandate to implement a humanitarian programme to tackle mines and other explosive ordnance.[22] The Commission, which is under the Ministry of Economy, Planning and International Cooperation, is responsible for preparing the national demining strategy, annual work plans, and corresponding budgets, and for implementing the mine action programme.[23]

Since 2007, the HCND reports to a Steering Committee which meets twice a year in ordinary session.[24] Headquartered in N'Djamena, the HCND was reorganised in 2019 into four departments: Operations and Logistics; Planning, Monitoring, and Victim Assistance (VA); Administration and Finance; and Human Resources and Training.[25] In 2024, it maintained four operational provincial offices in Bardaï (Tibesti province), Faya-Largeau (Borkou province), Fada (Ennedi West province), and Abéché (Ouaddaï province), as well as one sub-provincial office in Amtiman (Salamat province).[26] The HCND informed Mine Action Review that a new organisational chart for the Commission was pending approval from the Ministry in 2025. This new chart does not include the three offices that remained non-operational in 2024: Bol (Lake province), Amdjarass (Ennedi East province), and the sub-office in Zouar (Tibesti province).[27]

Mine action in Chad has been consistently hampered by a lack of funding. Government financial support has long been limited to payment of staff salaries and some administrative costs. In 2017, following an audit commissioned by the Government and conducted by the Ministry of Control and Moralisation, a decree ordered a restructuring of the HCND, reducing the number of personnel by more than half – from 744 to 329. This drastic downsizing and the non-payment of salaries for the reduced workforce led to a long-term strike by some deminers starting in 2018, which prevented planned survey and clearance activities in Tibesti during the PRODECO project.[28] At the end of 2024, the HCND counted 419 staff, of whom only 16 were women.[29]

In 2024, the government allocated 873,420,000 CFA francs (approximately $1.45 million) to the HCND, consistent with previous year and the planned funding outlined in its 2024 extension request. The annual subsidy was intended to cover staff salaries, running costs, and limited operations. It enabled the HCND to deploy seven teams comprising a total of forty-nine personnel to respond to emergencies following two major incidents.[30] The first was the explosion of the General Directorate of the Strategic Reserve (DGRS) military ammunition depot on the night of 18 June in a northern N'Djamena neighbourhood, which killed nine and injured another forty-six.[31] Clearance was conducted by three HCND teams over the course of several weeks.[32] The second response involved a short-term deployment to Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti provinces following severe flooding that hit the country in the second half of 2024.[33]

At the 27th UN National Directors Meeting in Geneva in 2024, Chad said it had renewed contact with several donors, including Japan, Norway, and the United States.[34] During the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in June 2024, France made a statement in support of Chad's resource mobilisation efforts and regretted being the sole donor to the country at the time.[35] Chad pledged to contribute, both financially and in-kind, to the NTS in Tibesti, while emphasising the need for international assistance to address all of its CMR contamination.[36] As at the end of June 2025, Chad reported that no donor support had yet been secured.[37]

19 Presentation by Chad, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024, p. 7.

20 Africanews and Associated Press, "Tchad: au moins 7 soldats tués par un engin explosif", *Africanews*, 26 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aQ8Vvz.

21 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024.

22 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

23 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 11 and 12.

24 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 11 June 2025.

25 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

26 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

27 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April and 11 June 2025.

28 Email from Romain Coupez, Country Director, MAG, 4 March 2019; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2020), p. 9.

29 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

30 Ibid.

31 "Tchad: un incendie dans un dépôt de munitions militaires fait plusieurs morts", *Le Monde*, 19 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4krNJkA.

32 "Tchad: fin des opérations de déminage après l'incendie", Le Monde, 3 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4jf2eHf; and email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

33 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025; "Inondations au Tchad: au moins 487 décès et des moyens très insuffisants pour aider les sinistrés", RFI, 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3YUo77E; and "On sait où elles sont mais avec les inondations, tout a changé: au Tchad, la vie entre les mines après la guerre", *Libération*, 4 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43u7Qrx.

34 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

35 Statement of France, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024.

36 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

37 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Chad's national plans make no reference to gender and inclusion. Its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request also gave limited attention to gender and diversity considerations, mentioning them only briefly in relation to mine risk education and disaggregated victim data. The request did note, however, that socio-cultural norms are particularly strong in Tibesti province. To address this, the HCND aims to recruit local women to support survey teams during field interviews.[38]

The HCND employed 16 women in a total of 419 staff at the end of 2024, representing only 4% of the workforce (see Table 1). Among them were the deputy director of finance, an EOD Level 3 expert, and several women serving as department heads, managers, and assistants in various administrative sections.[39] Unfortunately, the EOD Level 3 expert has since left the sector.[40]

Table 1: Composition of operators by gender (at end 2024)[41]

	Staff employed	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
HCND	419	16 (4%)	16	8 (50%)	15	1 (7%)
MAG	27	5 (19%)	7	1 (14%)	12	1 (8%)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Chad's 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request did not address environmental considerations. The HCND informed Mine Action Review that it has no policy, standards, or focal point for environmental management in mine action. Chad has not reported any specific measures to prevent or mitigate environmental impacts during clearance. That said, the HCND stated that operations are temporarily suspended during flooding or wadi water overflow to prevent accidents caused by mines displaced by rainwater run-off.[42] MAG, the only international clearance operator in 2024, does not have a policy or standing operating procedures (SOPs) on environmental management for mine action in Chad.[43]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The HCND maintains an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, which underwent a major clean-up supported by the Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) during the PRODECO project from 2017 to 2021. This process cancelled many duplicate entries, including eight hazardous areas that were deleted in 2021 alone.[44] Since the project ended, however, the database has not been updated due to no new areas being discovered though the HCND considers it still accurate. It is managed by an IMSMA unit chief and a database operator, who received basic training in Senegal in 2024 with support from HI.[45] MAG, the only international clearance operator in-country in 2024, did not have ready access to the database.[46]

38 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
39 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
40 Email from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025.
41 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025; and Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
42 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024 and 25 April 2025.
43 Email from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025.
44 Emails from Moussa Soultani, HCND, 27 April 2020; and Eugenio Balsini, Programme Manager, FSD, 28 April 2022.
45 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
46 Email from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Chad has never had a strategic plan for CMR survey and clearance. A series of Article 7 reports indicated plans to conduct NTS to identify the location of cluster munitions in Tibesti (and previously also Ouaddaï) province and to clear any contamination found, but in the absence of international funding and assistance, and owing to the volatile security situation, this has not been possible.[47]

Chad's 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request planned for an initial period of four months that included two months to mobilise resources and five weeks to deploy five teams (four NTS teams and one risk education/victim assistance team) to carry out the survey in Tibesti. A detailed work plan covering the remaining period will be drawn up based on the results of the NTS.[48] The NTS budget has been estimated at €115,038 of which Chad said it would contribute €15,244 and provide in-kind support of four vehicles and communication equipment.[49] In its extension request, Chad reported having the necessary equipment and trained personnel to carry out survey and clearance, but said it needed international financial support to do so.[50]

In approving Chad's extension request, the Meeting emphasised the importance of providing annual updates through its Article 7 reports and at meetings of States Parties or review conferences. It encouraged Chad to report specifically on progress in resource mobilisation, NTS activities in Tibesti, updated CMR contamination data, annual work plans and budgets, land release through survey and clearance, and any obstacles to meeting its Article 4 obligations within the extended timeframe.[51] Chad did not attend the CCM intersessional meetings in April 2025 but submitted a brief Article 7 report on 15 May 2025 covering calendar year 2024. The report explained that the planned NTS in Tibesti had not taken place due to a lack of funding.[52]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In its 2024 extension request, Chad reported having 22 national mine action standards (NMAS), including one for NTS, all said to be aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[53] However, none of these standards is specific to CMR clearance.[54] FSD had completed a three-year revision of Chad's national mine action standards in 2021,[55] and no updates have been made since.[56]

Clearance in Chad can be done either manually (by excavation or using detectors or a magnetic probe) or mechanically. Chad has two clearance machines, both owned by the HCND.[57] The first is an ARMTRAC 100-350, in use since 2014, which has been operated by MAG. This machine is capable of clearing both CMR and AP mines, though it has only been used for AP mine clearance to date. The second is a GCS 200 (Ground Compaction System), introduced in 2018, which was used by HI during the PRODECO project to conduct TS at the Delbo site.[58]

During the PRODECO project, the HCND staff benefited from technical assistance and different trainings took place including on survey; EOD Levels 1, 2, and 3; quality assurance and control; drone piloting for survey; and IMSMA.[59]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Since the conclusion of the PRODECO project in 2021, no operators have specifically addressed cluster munition-contaminated areas. The project, with a budget of €23 million, was implemented by a consortium of four organisations: HI and MAG conducted survey and clearance, including in CMR-contaminated areas; FSD provided technical support; and Secours Catholique et Développement (SECADEV) led on victim assistance.[60] HI and FSD concluded their mine action work in Chad with the end of the project. Since 2022, MAG is the only international clearance operator active in the country.[61]

47 Article 7 Reports (covering 2019), Form F; (covering 2021), Form I; (covering 2022), Form F; and (covering 2023), p. 3; and 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4, 8, and 12.

48 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10 and 12.

49 Ibid, p. 11.

50 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11 to 14 September 2023; and 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11.

51 Final Report of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM, 18 September 2024.

52 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), p. 3.

53 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.

54 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024 and 11 June 2025.

55 Email from Eugenio Balsini, FSD, 28 April 2022.

56 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 June 2024 and 25 April 2025.

57 Presentation by Chad on Article 4, CCM Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 11 to 14 September 2023; and 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 23 and 24.

58 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 23 May 2025; and Seydou Gaye, HI, 26 May 2025.

59 2024 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.

60 EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, "PRODECO: déminage humanitaire, une approche novatrice et participative", 31 January 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3tHBOY5.

61 Email from Matt Wilson, Head of Operations, FSD, 22 May 2024; and online interview with Seydou Gaye, HI, 22 April 2024.

In the first half of 2024, MAG and the HCND implemented a clearance project in Massaguet, Hadjer-Lamis province, which was funded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project involved BAC, spot tasks, and risk education. However, operations were suspended following the explosion of the ammunition storage area at Goudji on 18 June 2024. In response, the HCND redirected its efforts toward emergency clearance. MAG, in collaboration with the HCND and the DGRS, expanded its United States-funded Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) programme and supported destruction of 154 tons of munitions transported from the explosion site to the Massaguet firing range.[62] MAG maintained a team of 27 national and international staff throughout 2024, supplemented by deminers seconded to it from the HCND (see Table 2). In the aftermath of the ammunition depot explosion, 40 personnel from the HCND, military engineering units, and the DGRS were seconded to MAG to support the ammunition destruction efforts.[63]

Over the course of 2024, the HCND deployed seven teams, comprising a total of 49 personnel. Three teams were tasked to clear the ammunition storage area following the explosion; and three additional teams were deployed in response to the unprecedented torrential rains that struck the far north in the second half of the year. For these operations, the Chadian government allocated emergency funds to the HCND for post-flood disaster response, enabling it to clear roads of AP mines that had been displaced by floodwaters in Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti.[64]

Table 2: Operational capacities for 2024[65]

Provinces*	Operator	Teams	Personnel	Comments
Hadjer-Lamis (Massaguet battle area)	MAG with HCND seconded deminers	6	22	BAC and EOD spot tasks halted in June 2024. (3 MAG field managers and 19 deminers were seconded by the HCND: 3 for NTS, 8 for TS, 8 for BAC).
Hadjer-Lamis (Massaguet firing range)	MAG with seconded national deminers	2	42	Ammunition destruction (2 MAG managers and 40 personnel seconded by the HCND, the Military Engineers, and the DGRS).
N'Djamena (Goudji neighbourhood)	HCND	3	21	Emergency clearance after the ammunition storage area explosion.
Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti	HCND	3	21	Emergency clearance following severe flooding.

* Chad initially said that a team had been assigned to carry out spot tasks in North Kanem and Bahr El-Gazel, but later clarified that none had been deployed.[66]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Chad did not report any release of cluster munition-contaminated areas through survey or clearance in 2024.[67] Its 2024 interim deadline extension request is meant to conduct the NTS of Tibesti to confirm or deny the presence of CMR, and to develop a comprehensive work plan if contamination is confirmed.

In 2024, MAG, in collaboration with the HCND, cleared 140,000m^2 of battle area in Massaguet, Hadjer-Lamis Province—part of a larger contaminated area totalling 1,607,438m^2—and destroyed 213 ERW during operations in March and June. As part of its WAM programme, MAG also supported the destruction of 154 tons of munitions transported from the ammunition depot explosion site to the Massaguet firing range.[68]

DEMINER SAFETY

In August 2023, 11 HCND staff were abducted when conducting clearance at Hadjar-Magdoud site, in the Kori-Bogodi area of Tibesti province. At the end of April 2024, they were released after nine months in captivity.[69]

62 Emails from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March and 23 May 2025.
63 Ibid.
64 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
65 Emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025; and Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March and 23 May 2025.
66 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 11 June 2025.
67 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.
68 Email from Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 17 March 2025.
69 Interview with Gen. Brahim Djibrine and Soultani Moussa, HCND, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and emails from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 7 and 17 June 2024.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHAD: 1 SEPTEMBER 2013

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 SEPTEMBER 2023

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (13 MONTHS): 1 OCTOBER 2024

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (TWO YEARS): 1 OCTOBER 2026

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM (and based on a two-year extension granted in 2024), Chad is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2026. As at May 2025, no funding had been secured to conduct the NTS planned for Tibesti.[70]

The most recent CMR clearance in Chad was conducted by HI during the PRODECO project between September 2020 and April 2021 in Delbo village, Ennedi West Province. HI released a total of 742,657m^2 (330,647m^2 through TS and 412,010m^2 through clearance) resulting in destruction of 11 AO1-SCH fragmentation submunitions and one cluster munition dispenser.[71] Additionally, Chad reported discovering three containers in the Kaourchi district of Borkou Province, although no submunitions were found inside.[72] In 2019, MAG had cleared 1,353,959m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in Chicha, also in Borkou province, destroying 28 submunitions in the process.[73]

Owing to difficulties in securing funding for the remaining survey and potential clearance, Chad submitted a first Article 4 deadline extension request at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM, which granted a 13-month extension until 1 October 2024. As Chad could not meet this new deadline, it submitted a second extension request at the Twelfth Meeting of State Parties, which granted a further two-year extension until 1 October 2026. In this second request, Chad indicated plans to mobilise resources and survey the five departments of the Tibesti province to properly assess the extent of contamination. If evidence of CMR contamination is discovered during the NTS, Chad will develop a comprehensive work plan and may request a further extension to address any cluster munition-contaminated areas identified during the survey and to complete its Article 4 obligations.[74]

Table 3: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2024	0
2023	0
2022	0
2021	0
2020	412,010
Total	**412,010**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The new HCND organisational chart, under validation at the time of writing, includes a multi-task rapid response unit designed to respond to explosive ordnance incidents and address all residual contamination in towns and extended urban areas.[75] There has been no active planning for the management of residual contamination.

70 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

71 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F, p. 4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form B, p. 7.

72 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

73 Emails from Daniel Davies, Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 21 May 2021; and Caroline Bruvier, MAG, 5 August 2020 and 23 May 2025.

74 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

75 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 25 April 2025.

CHILE

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Thirty-month extension requested to 1 December 2028

CMR CONTAMINATION: 21.25KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	0	1.4
Technical survey	8.1	0
Non-technical survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	229

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024

- Air Force EOD Unit

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

After releasing one of its four cluster munition-contaminated areas through manual clearance in 2023, Chile reduced 8.1km^2 at the Delta-Zapiga site through technical survey (TS) in 2024. As at the end of 2024, 21.25km^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) remained across three military training ranges located in two regions of the north of Chile. Survey is now complete and only clearance is now required. Given the slow pace of implementation and the lack of national funding, Chile has submitted a request for a fourth extension to its Article 4 deadline. In this request, Chile has officially sought international financial assistance to acquire clearance equipment and complete its obligations by 1 December 2028. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Chile should secure the necessary financial resources to acquire the protection and detection equipment required to clear its three remaining cluster munition-contaminated areas.**
- **Chile should ensure that it fulfils its Article 4 obligations within its fourth deadline extension period.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	7	In 2024, Chile further reduced one of its three remaining confirmed hazardous areas by 8.1km^2. Surveys have now been completed and the three remaining military ranges, covering 21.25km^2, only require clearance.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	7	8	Despite having a clear institutional framework and national capacities, Chile's Congress did not provide national funding for clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2024 or 2025, which prevented procurement of required equipment and halted operations. The fourth extension request does not foresee operations resuming until the middle of 2026, and only after securing international assistance, suggesting limited political commitment to CMR clearance.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	Chile's new extension request noted that "instructions have been issued to encourage the voluntary participation of women in CMR clearance activities". While there are no gender-based restrictions on joining explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units, no women participated in the EOD units involved in survey and clearance in 2023 and 2024. The EOD units include four women – three in the air force and one in the army.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Chile does not have a specific environmental policy for mine action, though a range of national environmental laws are applicable and considered adequate by the authorities for implementing CMR clearance. Chile also indicated that survey and clearance are conducted in compliance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.13.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	In 2024, no resources have been secured to upgrade Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) V6 to a latest version. Chile's reporting is, however, accurate, timely, and disaggregated by type of contamination and method of land release. Chile reports on progress in Article 4 implementation at the meetings of States Parties. In December 2024, it requested a two-and-a-half-year extension to its Article 4 deadline, and responded to queries from the Article 4 Analysis Group in March 2025.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Chile updated plans to clear all cluster munition-contaminated area in its fourth extension request, beginning in the second half of 2026. Chile has also determined its annual clearance targets and the associated resource requirements.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	6	Chile follows the IMAS and associated guidelines. It has allocated responsibility for clearing the three remaining contaminated areas to specific units within its army and air force. In 2024, Chile published a manual focused on demining and clearance of unexploded ordnance for use by its armed forces.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	4	5	At the end of 2024, Chile still had 21.25km^2 to address by clearance. Progress has been slow due to competing national priorities and insufficient funding. In December 2024, Chile submitted a fourth deadline extension request until 1 December 2028. It is seeking international funding to renew protective and detection equipment.
Average Score	**6.3**	**6.4**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Ministry of National Defence, International Relations Division, (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, División de Relaciones Internacionales)
- Department for the Implementation of Conventions on Explosive Remnants of War (Departamento de Implementación de Convenciones sobre Restos de Explosivos de Guerra, DICOR)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- EOD Units of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force)
- Training Centre for Demining and Destruction of Explosives (CEDDEX)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Chile has a reasonably accurate baseline of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination resulting from the use of cluster munitions during peacetime military exercises between 1997 and 2008. At the end of 2024, three military training ranges, classified as CHAs, and covering almost 21.25km^2 remained to be addressed. The testing and training activities took place within designated live-fire ranges, which remain in active use and are located in secured military zones that are inaccessible to the public.[1] The remaining areas are located in the two far northern regions of Arica-Parinacota and Tarapacá (see Table 1).[2]

In its first Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 7 report, submitted in September 2012, Chile informed States Parties of the existence of four military training ranges covering an estimated 97km^2 of areas that were suspected to contain unexploded submunitions.[3] In 2019, Chile cancelled 32.3km^2 through non-technical survey (NTS), followed by a reduction of 33.9km^2 through TS in 2021. In 2023, Chile conducted its first clearance operations, fully releasing one of the four contaminated areas (the Punta Zenteno military range), and covering 1.4km^2 in the city of Punta Arenas, in the southernmost region of Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic.[4] In 2024, Chile further reduced 8.1km^2 at Delta-Zapiga, an air force military range in the Tarapacá region in the north of the country.[5]

The contamination is the result of cluster munitions used during military exercises. In Arica-Parinacota, MK-II LAR 160 cluster munition rockets were fired. In the Tarapacá region and in the Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic region, CB-250K cluster bombs were dropped in 2004 and 2007.[6]

In accordance with standard procedures of the Chilean Armed Forces, each use of these training areas is followed by search and clearance operations for munition remnants or unexploded ordnance (UXO), conducted by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units. As a result, Chile considers the remaining CMR contamination to be minimal.[7]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by region (at end 2024)

Region	Military training range	CHAs containing CMR	Area (m^2)
Arica-Parinacota	Pampa Chaca Este	1	17,106,753
Tarapacá	Delta-Zapiga*	1	3,235,945
Tarapacá	Barrancas	1	906,064
Totals		**3**	**21,248,762**

* The Delta-Zapiga area was reduced by 8,088,374m^2 through TS in 2024.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Chile is also impacted, although to a limited extent, by UXO other than unexploded submunitions.

Chile officially declared mine clearance completion on 13 November 2020,[8] having addressed all known mined areas and met its extended Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline (see Mine Action Review's report on Chile in *Clearing the Mines 2021* for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

On 3 February 2022, the Ministry of National Defence (MoND) established the Department for the Implementation of International Conventions on Explosive Remnants (DICOR). This followed the dissolution of the National Demining Commission (CNAD) and its Executive Secretariat after Chile's declaration of completion of mine clearance in 2020.[9]

A ministerial directive, in force since 2022, regulates activities under the CCM and outlined clearance planned for 2023–26, in line with Chile's current Article 4 deadline.[10] Several MoND Orders have been approved to implement the directive and to "plan, coordinate, manage, execute, and control activities in compliance with the CCM".[11]

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, p. 4.
2 Revised CCM 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
3 Article 7 Report (covering June 2011 to June 2012), Form F, p. 23; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.
4 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, p. 6.
5 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F, p. 5.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, pp. 4–5.
7 Ibid.
8 Statement of Chile, Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (virtual meeting), 16–20 November 2020.
9 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form J; and Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3 and 7.
10 Ministry of National Defence (MoND) Directive on the Execution of Military Activities in Compliance with the CCM, 7 November 2022. The Directive was shared with Mine Action Review on 9 May 2025, but is not yet available on the UNODA website.
11 Statement of Chile, CCM Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10–13 September 2024.

DICOR is responsible for overseeing Chile's commitments under the CCM as well as other disarmament treaties. It advises the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and plans, coordinates, and manages all clearance in cluster munition-contaminated areas as well as areas containing other UXO. DICOR is also in charge of managing and updating the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[12]

The Training Centre for Demining and Destruction of Explosives (CEDDEX), which is part of the Army School of Engineers, is responsible for training EOD staff and for quality control (QC) and certification of released areas in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). It is also responsible for planning, organising, and conducting training for the armed forces and international supervisors.[13]

In 2023, Chile allocated a modest sum of CLP$34.13 million (approximately US$31,000) for clearance, alongside logistical support provided by the navy, including explosives, fuel, vehicles, and other equipment.[14] This enabled release through manual clearance of one of the four CMR-contaminated areas. During the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM in September 2024, Chile said it had been unable to secure the resources needed to continue clearance and that it was exploring options for international support.[15] The national budget approved by Congress for both 2024 and 2025, however, did not allocate the required funding for EOD equipment, effectively bringing interventions to a halt in 2025.[16]

Chile formally requested international assistance for equipment as part of its fourth Article 4 deadline extension request, which it submitted in December 2024. The new work plan for 2026–28 expects activities to resume by the middle of 2026, but this is contingent upon securing US$2.68 million for the procurement of detectors and personal protective equipment (PPE). Chile has committed to covering the salaries of EOD personnel, as well as health-related expenses, air and land transportation, and information technology (IT) costs through the budgets of the MoND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[17] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised a donor meeting in Santiago in January 2025, inviting the European Union, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, and Spain with a view to mobilising resources.[18]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Since 2022, the Chilean Minister of National Defence has been a woman: Maya Fernández Allende, and, since March 2025, Adriana Delpiano. The Head of the International Division at the MoND is also a women – Karen Meier.[19] In recent years, the government has emphasised the importance of inclusion and non-discrimination across various sectors, including defence, and has been promoting the full integration of women in all defence roles.[20] A Gender Liaison Network and working group within the MoND, involving representatives from the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helps to promote equality and address potential discrimination. The Ministry's commitment to gender equality extends to all its agencies, including the voluntary EOD Units, and is supported by several national laws on gender, diversity, and non-discrimination.[21]

Women were involved in the national mine action programme in Chile that was in place from 2004 to 2020. Women officers played various roles, including commanders at different levels of the demining units. In 2021, women were also members of the EOD units of the army and air forces, who conducted the TS in cluster munition-contaminated areas.[22]

Chile's new extension request noted that "instructions have been issued to encourage the participation of women in cluster munition remnants clearance activities". There are no gender-based restrictions on joining EOD units, but participation is voluntary.[23] Despite the inclusive framework, no women participated in the 2023 clearance operations at Punta Zenteno or the 2024 technical survey in Delta-Zapiga.[24] In 2024, the army EOD team included three women while the air force EOD team had one woman but none was engaged in CMR-related activities. One of the officials working at DICOR was a woman (see Table 2).[25]

12 Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 3; emails from Valentín Segura Flores, Head of the Department of International Cooperation, MoND, 7 June 2023 and 17 May 2024; and telephone interview, 9 June 2023.

13 Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

14 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I, p. 8; and email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.

15 Statement of Chile, CCM Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10–13 September 2024.

16 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I, p. 7; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

17 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 1, 14 and 17.

18 Chile's presentation at the CCM Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025; and Response to the Article 4 analysis group on Chile's fourth deadline extension request, 31 March 2025, p. 9.

19 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 9 May 2025.

20 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

21 Law 16611 on legal equality between men and women at: https://bcn.cl/2fall; Law 21120 on the recognition and guarantees to the Right to Gender Identity at: https://bcn.cl/3atcv; and Law 20609 on measures against arbitrary discriminations and judicial procedures at: https://bcn.cl/2g7mr.

22 Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 21.

23 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J, p. 11; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 26.

24 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 18 June 2024; and Response to the Article 4 analysis group on Chile's fourth deadline extension request, 31 March 2025, p. 10.

25 Emails from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2, 9, and 22 May 2025.

Table 2: Composition by gender in DICOR and the Air Force EOD unit operational in 2024

	Staff employed	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
DICOR	3	0	1	0	2	0
Air Force EOD Unit	12	0	2	0	9	0

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Chile does not have an environmental management policy in mine action, though national environmental laws—particularly Law 19300, enacted in 1994, which establishes the legal framework for environmental protection—apply to clearance and destruction of explosive ordnance.[26] DICOR does not have a designated focal point for environmental management.[27]

In its successive Article 4 deadline extension requests, Chile has emphasised that clearance is conducted in accordance with Chile's protection laws and the provisions of IMAS 07.13. Chile also highlighted the minimal environmental impact of clearance activities, noting that the effects on ecosystems, soil quality, and biodiversity are negligible.[28] The areas where CMR remain are in arid and desert regions with almost no vegetation, where the terrain is sandy and with caliche soil (a mineral deposit of gravel, sand, and nitrates).[29]

Climate factors were taken into account in the scheduling of operations during favourable seasons. Clearance is said to be adapted to the contrasting environmental conditions between Chile's sub-Antarctic southern regions and its arid northern deserts.[30] Survey and clearance, such as that carried out in Punta Zenteno in 2023 and in Delta-Zapiga in 2024, included environmental mitigation measures such as waste management, restricted vehicle use, and controlled access to preserve soil and vegetation.[31]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Chile has used IMSMA as its national mine action database since 2003, transitioning to IMSMA New Generation in 2017 with the introduction of its MARS (Mine Action Reporting System). However, due to the discontinuation of the MARS Cloud (primarily for financial reasons), DICOR—which assumed responsibility for managing the database in February 2022—has reverted to using IMSMA V6. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided technical support when requested.[32] In 2024, no resources were secured to upgrade IMSMA to the latest version (Core).[33]

Chile has submitted its CCM Article 7 transparency reports each year since 2012, with accurate and timely information. In December 2024, Chile submitted a fourth Article 4 deadline extension request, seeking a new deadline of 1 December 2028. It provided additional information to the Article 4 Analysis Group in March 2025. The request, which was of good quality overall, was submitted in a timely manner.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Chile does not have a national strategic plan, but a Ministerial Directive, in force since November 2022, regulates activities under the CCM and outlines clearance operations planned for 2023–26, in line with Chile's current extension request.[34]

The 2023–26 work plan included annual clearance targets, but had to be revised due to budget constraints, linked, in particular, to competing priorities and increased public spending to address social needs in the country.[35]

26 Law 19300 is available at: https://bit.ly/4d0QyXc. Other relevant legislation includes Law 20173, which creates the position of President of the National Commission for the Environment with the rank of Minister of State. Text available at: https://bcn.cl/2iq0p.

27 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025.

28 Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6; Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 21; and email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025.

29 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025.

30 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.

31 Emails from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May and 18 June 2024 and 2 May 2025.

32 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.

33 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025.

34 MoND Directive on the Execution of Military Activities in Compliance with the CCM, 7 November 2022.

35 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 17.

The plan included clearance of Punta Zenteno in 2023, with the affected area successfully released.[36] This area was prioritised because the Navy Unit "Partida de Operaciones de Minas Terrestres" (POMTA) was based there, and the equipment and PPE had an expiry date at the end of the year.[37] However, the projections for 2024 were not met, as Chile was supposed to clear Barrancas and start operations at Pampa Chaca Este. In fact, Chile only reduced some 8km^2 at the area of Delta-Zapiga through TS, without conducting any clearance.[38]

In its new extension request, Chile updated the work plan with the following projected annual clearance targets: 7.4km^2 in 2026, including the two CHAs in the Tarapacá region; 7.7km^2 in 2027; and 6.2km^2 in 2028 to release the last remaining area in the Arica-Parinacota region (see Table 3).

Table 3: Planned clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas (June 2026 to December 2028)[39]

Region	Military Range	EOD Unit	2026	2027	2028	Months	Total CHA (m^2)
Arica-Parinacota	Pampa Chaca Este	Army	3,300,000	7,650,000	6,156,753	28	17,106,753
Tarapacá	Delta-Zapiga	Air Force	3,235,945	0	0	2	3,235,945
Tarapacá	Barrancas	Air Force	906,064	0	0	4	906,064
Totals			**7,442,009**	**7,650,000**	**6,156,753**		**21,248,762**

The implementation of this new work plan is, however, contingent on securing funding, primarily for the procurement of PPE and detectors, which Chile is officially requesting as international financial support.[40]

Chile initially indicated a required budget of $1.7 million to pay for 48 sets of PPE and four UXO detectors.[41] Following feedback from the Article 4 Analysis Group on the low number of detectors compared to the number of EOD pairs, Chile revised the figures and increased the budget to $2.68 million. The increased budget is based on purchasing 63 sets of PPE[42] and 27 UXO detectors – one for each pair of deminers.[43] Of these, 20 detectors are required to start operations in 2026: 14 for the Army EOD units at Pampa Chaca Este, and 6 for the Air Force EOD unit deployed at the Barrancas and Delta sites. As well, Chile is considering, subject to funding, deployment of an extra army EOD team currently based in Calama (in Antofagasta region), which would require seven more detectors in 2027.[44] The revised Article 4 deadline extension request received by the Implementation Support Unit in June 2025 included provision for further equipment: two hand-held and large-area detectors and 29 field data collection devices with specialised software (EVA4ALL) to analyse the findings.[45]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Chile follows the IMAS and associated standards and protocols. In addition, Chile has a "Manual on Procedures and Equipment for CMR Clearance", published by DICOR in 2023 and developed in consultation with the armed forces and CEDDEX.[46] In 2024, Chile published another manual focused on demining and clearance of UXO for use by the armed forces.[47]

For each of the three sites, Chile outlined a weekly plan that follows a sequence of activities: the organisation of work areas and security corridors, detection, clearance and removal, destruction, internal quality assurance, and certification (through external QC). CEDDEX is responsible for certifying land as cleared in accordance with IMAS.[48] Chile has said that no further TS is required in the three remaining CHAs – only clearance.[49]

36 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, p. 7.
37 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.
38 Revised 2022 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, p. 6; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F, p. 5.
39 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5–6 and 9–10.
40 Ibid., pp. 1 and 14.
41 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, submitted 13 December 2024, p. 1; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.
42 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.
43 Ibid.; and Response to the Article 4 analysis group on Chile's fourth deadline extension request, 31 March 2025, p. 8.
44 Email from Sergio Larraín Barth, International Programs and Operations Desk at the Department of International Cooperation, MoND, 22 May 2025; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
45 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 15.
46 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.
47 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.
48 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
49 Ibid., p. 2.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Survey and clearance of explosive ordnance are conducted by the EOD Units of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy, and the Air Force.[50] In 2024, the number of personnel who conducted the TS at Delta-Zapiga was as set out in Table 4.

Table 4: Operational survey capacities for 2024[51]

Region	Military range polygon	Operator	Teams	Personnel	Comments
Tarapacá	Delta-Zapiga	Air Force EOD Unit (Fuerza Aérea de Chile, FACH)	1	12	Nine EOD operators, two managers, and a medic.

Chile's fourth Article 4 deadline extension request outlined plans to deploy two teams of 15 EOD specialists each for operations in Pampa Chaca Este, comprising 28 deminers (14 pairs), 2 unit commanders, plus 3 support staff, totalling 50 military personnel. For the two other CHAs, Delta-Zapiga and Barrancas, a single team of 13 EOD specialists is planned, composed of 12 deminers (6 pairs) and a unit commander, plus 2 support staff, totalling 22 personnel. Starting in the second half of 2027, Chile indicated that a third team of 15 EOD specialists—7 pairs (14 deminers) and a unit commander—would be added, subject to the availability of equipment.[52]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No clearance occurred in 2024, only release through TS of almost 8.1km^2 as Table 5 describes.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	0	
Technical survey	8,088,374	Reduction of Delta-Zapiga Air Force range
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	0	

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, Chile reduced 8.1km^2 through TS from the 11.3km^2 hazardous area at the Delta-Zapiga Air Force shooting range, located in the Tarapacá Region, in the north of the country. As a result, 3.2km^2 remain to be cleared at the site.[53]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

Chile did not clear any cluster munition-contaminated areas and did not destroy any CMR in 2024.[54] In 2023, Chile released 1.4km^2 through manual clearance, destroying in situ 229 items: 216 PM-1 submunitions, 11 PM-1 fuzes, and two CB-250K bomb containers. This was the first—and only—clearance of CMR since Chile became a State Party to the CCM in 2011. The contamination was in one CHA in the Punta Zenteno military range, in Punta Arenas in the Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic region.[55]

50 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 17 May 2024.

51 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 2 May 2025.

52 Response to the Article 4 analysis group on Chile's fourth deadline extension request, 31 March 2025, p. 3; and Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

53 Revised 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

54 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F, p. 5.

55 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, pp. 6–7.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR CHILE: 1 JUNE 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 JUNE 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (INTERIM ONE-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2022

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (INTERIM ONE-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 JUNE 2023

↓

THIRD EXTENDED DEADLINE (THREE YEARS): 1 JUNE 2026

↓

FOURTH EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (TWO YEARS AND 6 MONTHS): 1 DECEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 4 of the CCM (and in accordance with the extension granted in 2022), Chile is required to destroy all CMR in cluster munition-contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2026. As Chile will not meet this deadline, it has requested a further extension of two years and six months (albeit written in the request as two years and five months) to 1 December 2028. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025.

Chile's original Article 4 deadline was 1 June 2021. No contaminated area was released between the CCM's entry into force in June 2011 and the start of NTS in 2019, which cancelled 32.2km^2. During this period, Chile prioritised Article 5 obligations under the APMBC, completing mine clearance in 2020. Chile was granted two one-year interim extensions to its CCM Article 4 deadline in June 2022 and June 2023, allowing for release through TS of 33.9km^2. In April 2022, Chile submitted a third extension request, pledging to complete clearance by June 2026, along with a revised version addressing concerns from the Article 4 Analysis Group regarding clearance capacity. By the end of 2024, Chile had cleared one of four CHAs (see Table 6) and reduced another by 8.1km^2, leaving 21.25km^2 to be cleared.

Chile should make every efforts to ensure that its fourth extension request is its last, and that it is able to declare itself free of CMR by the extended deadline of 1 December 2028 – more than 17 years after becoming a State Party.

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2024	0
2023	1,435,872
2022	0
2021	0
2020	0
Total	**1,435,872**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

As CMR are solely located in military training ranges, once clearance has been completed, the ranges will continue to be used for military training with other types of ordnance. Clearance will then be conducted by the EOD units of the armed forces after each training exercise.[56] Both the EOD teams and CEDDEX will continue functioning after Chile's Article 4 obligations have been fulfilled.[57]

56 Emails from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 1 June 2022 and 7 June 2023.

57 Email from Valentín Segura Flores, MoND, 14 May 2024.

GERMANY

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2030

On track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION: 3.2KM^2

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	1.21	0.87
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	327	483

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Röhll Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel)
- Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Germany cleared 1.21km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area—a 39% increase on the previous year—and exceeding its target for the year. This increase was due to continuity with personnel, increased use of machinery, better training for new staff, and improved weather conditions, although significant environmental and operational constraints may impede future progress.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Germany should expand use of machinery in clearance operations wherever feasible to enhance efficiency and reduce reliance on manual methods.**
- **Germany should ensure its new tender process does not interrupt clearance while preserving institutional knowledge.**
- **Germany should address the low representation of women in operational clearance roles.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	Germany has a good understanding of the extent of its sole cluster munition-contaminated area in a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock in the east of the country.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	There is strong national ownership and commitment to release the sole contaminated area. Roles and responsibilities for clearance are clear, coherent, and entirely funded by the federal government, albeit at high cost.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	There is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), including of cluster munition remnants (CMR), although women make up only a small proportion of the sector. At the end of 2024, 16% of all clearance personnel were female, a similar proportion to 2023.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Germany lacks a dedicated management policy or national mine action standard on the environment, but clearance is governed by strict environmental procedures due to the site's protected status under German and European Union law. Mitigation measures are in place to preserve priority habitats and restrict controlled burning.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	Germany submits timely and accurate Article 7 reports. It provides annual clearance figures as well as cumulative output (but only includes cumulative figures for the number of submunitions destroyed).
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	While Germany does not have a national mine action strategy, it has a completion plan to 2030 with annual targets for clearance. Germany also elaborates annual work plans, which it adjusts according to capacity and output.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	Germany's clearance capacity decreased in 2024 due to a labour shortage in the sector and staff moving to other companies ahead of the ending of certain contracts in 2025.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	7	6	In 2024, Germany cleared 1.21km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area, a 39% increase from the previous year. Germany has exceeded its annual clearance target for the year, and it should be able to meet its Article 7 deadline provided clearance capacity is sustained, and remaining challenges are effectively addressed.
Average Score	**7.5**	**7.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- The Wittstock site is administered and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA), with support from the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Commercial UXO clearance contractors: Röhll Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg (Havel)); and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle)
- On-site project management/clearance supervision: IB Winkelmann
- Destruction of CMR is the ultimate responsibility of the Brandenburg state EOD agency, the KMBD.

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- None

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Germany reported nearly 3.2km^2 of confirmed cluster munition-contaminated area at a former Soviet military training area at Wittstock, Brandenburg, in former East Germany.[1] This is a reduction on the 4.41km^2 reported for end 2023,[2] and is entirely the result of clearance in 2024.

Cluster munition remnants (CMR) were discovered "by chance" at Wittstock and declared at the CCM intersessional meetings in June 2011.[3] From 2011 to early 2014, suspected CMR contamination was reported to total 4km^2.[4]

In August 2014, however, Germany reported that the total suspected hazardous area (SHA) was actually 11km^2.[5] The increased estimate was ascribed to discovery of submunitions during non-technical survey (NTS) across a wider area than previously reported.[6] According to Germany, the dense vegetation cover and the special hazards posed by CMR and other explosive ordnance preclude conducting technical survey (TS) over the SHA.[7] A wide range of Soviet-era submunitions have been found at the site.[8]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

The entire Wittstock site, which extends over 120km^2, is heavily contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO) in varying spatial distribution and overlapping contamination as a result of use of the site for military training purposes in 1952–93.[9] CMR are found in the area of a mock airfield within the site, an area used by the air force for bombing practice and by the army for artillery firing exercises, as well as for general military exercises and training. A wide range of munitions were used over four decades. Only general information on historical use of cluster munitions at the site is available and the degree of contamination from unexploded submunitions and other UXO is not known for much of the hazardous area.[10]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Germany has full national ownership of its land release efforts. In 2011, ownership of Wittstock was transferred from the military to the federal government authority in charge of real estate – the Institute for Federal Real Estate (BImA). The Wittstock site is administrated and project managed by the Federal Forestry Agency as a subdivision of the BImA.[11] The Federal Forestry Agency's responsibilities include project coordination and control, risk management, and budget planning. Support is provided by the Central Office of the Federal Government for UXO Clearance and a consulting engineer.[12]

Commercial UXO clearance operators are contracted and managed by the local branch of the Federal Forestry Agency, Bundesforstbetrieb West Brandenburg.[13] The Regulatory Agency of the County of Ostprignitz-Ruppin is responsible for public security under the police law of the federal state of Brandenburg.[14]

In Germany, clearance and disposal of UXO are security tasks entrusted to the police and are the responsibility of the respective federal states. Almost all of these have set up a corresponding state agency for EOD for these tasks. In Brandenburg, this is the KMBD (an abbreviation for, in English, the Brandenburg state war material disposal service), which is part of the Brandenburg police. Under German legislation, the federal government is not allowed to maintain an agency for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[15] Contracting foreign companies for CMR clearance in Wittstock is not possible under German law.[16]

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

2 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

3 Statement of Germany, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2011; and Statement of Germany, CCM intersessional meetings, Geneva, 28 June 2011.

4 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May 2018; Statement of Germany, CCM Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2012 and 2013), Form F.

5 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 4 August 2014.

6 Statement of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

7 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 2019, p. 9.

8 Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

9 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 7 May and 12 July 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 11; Statements of Germany, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015; and CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3–5 September 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form F.

10 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

11 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 5.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid., p. 6.

15 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.

16 Ibid., p. 34.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

All CMR clearance costs are paid for by the federal BImA, and national funding to complete CMR clearance has been fully secured.[17] These costs have increased substantially from just over €9.5 million a year in 2018 to €25.06 million in 2024.[18] In its second Article 4 deadline extension request, Germany forecasted that average annual spending will rise to around €30 million, meaning that €150 million will be required in total for the period 2024–28, with expenditure in 2029 estimated to be some €20 million. This differs considerably from the estimates made for the 2019 extension request because the projected duration of the clearance operation is significantly longer; costs in general have risen significantly because of inflation and personnel costs; and there is a need to employ "more technological" interventions.[19]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Although there is equal access to employment for qualified women and men for EOD clearance in Germany, women only make up a small proportion of the sector, especially in terms of the number of qualified female EOD technicians with a licence for commercial EOD.[20] In 2024, as Table 1 illustrates, the percentage of women in operational roles was 16%, while IB Winkelmann, the on-site project management/clearance supervision company, had 30% female staff.[21] This is comparable to 2023, and according to Germany this is higher than many other EOD working sites in the country.[22]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024[23]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
Röhll	78	11 (14%)	13	1 (7%)	65	10 (15%)
Schollenberger	60	9 (15%)	11	1 (9%)	49	8 (16%)
IB Winkelmann	10	3 (30%)	2	1 (50%)	8	2 (25%)
Totals	**148**	**23 (16%)**	**26**	**3 (12%)**	**122**	**20 (16%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The clearance site lies within the Kyritz-Ruppiner-Heide, Germany's largest contiguous heather-rich habitat and part of the EU Natura 2000 network.[24] While Germany lacks a dedicated environmental management policy or national mine action standards (NMAS), environmental considerations are addressed in federal clearance guidelines. At Wittstock, coordination with conservation authorities helps ensure clearance avoids negative environmental impacts, with a focus on preserving priority habitats. Restoration aims to return areas like shifting dunes to their natural state, and when synergies with conservation are not possible, additional funding ensures legal compliance.[25]

Controlled burning of heathland is a prerequisite for clearance and is tightly regulated to protect wildlife, avoiding bird-breeding seasons and active periods for ground fauna, such as when insects and lizards are in their hibernation habitats. Burning and subsequent ploughing deplete soil nutrients, supporting Natura 2000 goals to maintain native flora adapted to dry, nutrient-poor conditions.[26] However, burning also produces carbon emissions. Conservation rules limit burning to between 2 and 3km^2 per year, confined to a few suitable days. Germany aims to burn around 2.5km^2 annually to maintain a clearance-ready reserve, weather permitting.[27] In 2024, nearly 2km^2 was successfully burned.[28]

17 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.
18 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
19 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 58.
20 Emails from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020 and 10 May 2021.
21 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
22 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 27 June 2024.
23 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
24 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 April 2013, p. 7; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2015), Form F.
25 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.
26 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.
27 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 35.
28 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

Environmental protection also extends to EOD. Only items too dangerous to transport—primarily submunitions and certain bombs—are destroyed on site. All other ordnance is disposed of by clearance operators "in a skilled and environmentally responsible manner".[29] While current energy needs are met by generators, Germany is planning to shift to solar power. A small photovoltaic system was installed in 2024 to assess its efficiency, but a full transition was postponed due to existing contracts expiring in 2025 and the need to retender clearance work. The new tender will require the use of solar power. Operators are also keen to reduce vehicle emissions to cut fuel costs.[30]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Germany uses its own information management system to record the distribution of CMR, which includes a geographic information system (GIS).[31]

Germany provides regular updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 reports and in statements at the meetings of States Parties. In its Article 7 report for 2024, Germany included annual clearance figures as well as its cumulative output from 2017, though it only included cumulative figures for the number of submunitions destroyed.

PLANNING AND TASKING

As CMR contamination is limited to Wittstock, Germany does not have a national mine action strategy for Article 4 implementation.[32] Its second Article 4 deadline extension request, submitted (and granted) in 2024, projected clearance of 0.82km^2 in 2023; 0.80–0.90km^2 annually in 2024–28; and 0.40–0.50km^2 in 2029, with final documentation due in 2030.[33] Clearance planning is conducted annually, as it depends on which areas have been successfully burnt.[34]

The contaminated area has been divided into sub-areas assigned to different clearance operators, forming a basic work plan. As the contaminated area is cleared, work sites are moving closer together. Highly variable contamination levels across short distances affect clearance speed, requiring flexible planning and real-time adjustments to maintain safety distances. A static plan would risk overlap and delays.[35] A project coordination committee meets weekly with core members and monthly with a broader group to review progress, quality, costs, and milestones.[36]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

CMR clearance is conducted in accordance with both German federal and Brandenburg state legislation, as well as occupational safety standards of the German Statutory Accident Insurance Association (Deutsche Gesetzliche Unfallversicherung, DGUV), and technical guidelines on UXO clearance of the federal government (Baufachlichen Richtlinien Kampfmittelräumung des Bundes). In case of conflict, federal and state legislation overrides international health and safety or technical standards.[37] Under state regulation of war material ("Kampfmittelverordnung"), the transport and disposal of explosive ordnance in Brandenburg state is the sole responsibility of the KMBD.[38]

The "Guidelines for the Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance on Federal Properties" are the legal basis for the clearance of UXO on federal government properties and thus apply to action on the Wittstock site. In addition, site-specific work instructions, approved by the KMBD, include detection of UXO (instruments and their use), treatment of submunitions and other UXO (on-site transport, storage, and disposal), and documentation.[39] These guidelines are updated on an ongoing basis, for instance to include new technical and safety aspects.[40]

29 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 18 July 2023.
30 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
31 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 16 April 2019.
32 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.
33 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 56.
34 Ibid.
35 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
36 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 3; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 31 July 2020.
37 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2; and CCM Article 4 Extension Request 2024, p. 16.
38 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
39 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
40 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.

Although Germany does not have NMAS in place, it referenced the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.14 on risk management in its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request and was developing a risk register based on IMAS 07.14 guidelines, which was planned to be finalised during the summer of 2025 after consultation with stakeholders.[41]

The entire cluster munition-contaminated area at Wittstock has been divided into 50 x 50 metre boxes, with clearance starting from known contamination and expanding outward.[42] CMR have been found in nearly every cleared box, so technical survey has not yet been used. Germany has, however, said that if future clearance reveals more CMR-free areas, the approach will shift to technical survey.[43] Detector sensitivity is calibrated to detect at a minimum a half-sphere of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition.[44]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In Germany, site clearance—including search, identification, recovery, and preparation for handover to state agencies for demolition—is typically carried out by commercial contractors meeting the requirements of the law on explosives. Two commercial UXO clearance contractors won the original public tender for CMR clearance at Wittstock: Röhll Munitionsbergung GmbH (Brandenburg an der Havel) and Schollenberger Kampfmittelbergung GmbH (Celle).[45]

In line with European procurement law, a new tender was issued in 2021, with the next required in 2025. The new contract, effective from 2026, will incorporate lessons learned to optimise operations.[46] In 2024, an average of 138 personnel were deployed on site, down from 174 in 2023. This reduction is primarily due to a labour shortage in the sector, and to a lesser extent, staff moving to other companies ahead of contracts expiring in 2025.[47]

Table 2: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines
Röhll	6 to 8	65	7
Schollenberger	5 to 6	49	7
Totals	**11 to 14**	**114**	**14**

CMR clearance at Wittstock begins with controlled vegetation burning, followed by sub-surface clearance to process the topsoil. In areas with high ferromagnetic contamination (now more widespread) larger munitions are first removed, followed by volume clearance using screening buckets mounted on armoured excavators, operated remotely by licensed personnel.[48] Although federal guidelines allow for mechanical clearance, this was not previously considered to be feasible at Wittstock due to the presence of large-calibre air-dropped and shaped-charge munitions, which pose risks to both personnel and equipment. Tilling is also avoided, as it could cause prohibited environmental contamination from explosive residues.[49]

Clearance is subject to internal quality control (QC) by commercial contractors and external QC by an independent engineering firm, covering 10–20% of each 50 x 50 metre box.[50]

41 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 48; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
42 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 25.
43 Germany, Extension Request Report – Answers to the Analysis Group, 8 February 2019, p. 2.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 5.
46 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.
47 Ibid.
48 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request., p. 21.
49 Ibid., pp. 20–21; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 22 June 2022.
50 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 28.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

There was only release through clearance in 2024, with output significantly up on the previous year, and exceeding the target set for 2024.

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	1.21
Technical Survey	0
NTS	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	327

SURVEY IN 2024

As in 2023, no CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS or reduced through technical survey in 2024.[51]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, 1.21km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared with 327 submunitions destroyed, a 39% increase from the 0.87km^2 cleared in 2023 although more submunitions (483) were destroyed in 2023.[52] The increase was largely attributed to a more stable personnel situation, greater use of machinery, enhanced training—particularly for new staff—and improved weather conditions, with fewer extremes of heat and frost.[53]

Table 4: CMR clearance in 2024[54]

Operator	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed
Röhll	732,000	137
Schollenberger	480,100	190
Totals	**1,212,100**	**327**

In 2024, alongside CMR clearance, other explosive remnants and materials were also removed, destroyed, or recycled as follows:

- **UXO:** 16,982 items, including grenades, rockets, and fuzes.
- **UXO fragments:** 52 tonnes, mostly small fragments under 100g each.
- **Scrap metal:** 235 tonnes, primarily small ammunition parts (e.g. non-explosive fragments, rocket tails) and vehicle debris. Due to the volume, only aggregate figures are available.[55]

Additionally, 125,000m^2 of clearance was conducted outside of the CHA – for fire protection infrastructure, staff areas, and other essential support functions.[56]

51 Article 7 Reports (covering 2024 and 2023), Form F.

52 Ibid.

53 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

54 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

55 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR GERMANY: 1 AUGUST 2010

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 AUGUST 2025

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 AUGUST 2030

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Germany is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2030.

After extensive and lengthy preliminary work for preparation of the site for clearance, including survey and a creation of a fire protection system, Germany finally began CMR clearance in March 2017. A total of 5.36km^2 of CMR contamination has been cleared in the last five years (see Table 5).

Germany exceeded its annual clearance targets for 2023 and 2024, as set out in its second Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in 2024. However, several persistent challenges—many of which contributed to Germany being unable to meet its initial Article 4 deadline—could still hinder progress and threaten completion by the next five-year extension deadline:

- High contamination density, including submunitions, other UXO, and metal debris.
- Limited access to contaminated areas, with controlled burning restricted to a few days a year and weather-dependent.
- Safety and security measures, especially in shrinking workspaces where maintaining required distances between teams is increasingly difficult.
- Environmental constraints, including conservation requirements and additional fire protection measures prompted by ongoing drought.
- Archaeological finds in 2024, which require investigation and delay clearance.
- Extreme heat in summer and frozen soil in winter, which interrupt operations.
- Staff shortages, due to a general lack of qualified EOD personnel and the remote location and limited accommodation options at Wittstock.
- Constraints on expanding teams, as site limitations make it unsafe to increase the number of personnel.
- Equipment delays, caused by long lead-times for procuring and replacing machinery and materials.[57]

Due to the limited numbers of trained clearance personnel available in Germany it is also unclear what impact the new tender will have on available resources and financial planning from 2026 on.[58] Nonetheless, if Germany can overcome these obstacles in the coming years, it will remain on track to meet its second Article 4 deadline.

Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	1.21
2023	0.87
2022	1.34
2021	0.85
2020	1.09
Total	**5.36**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Germany is not aware of any further cluster munition contamination beyond Wittstock, but if, contrary to expectations, contamination does become known in the future, the responsible authority would depend on the ownership of the area in question. For any federal property, the BImA responsible for clearance at Wittstock would be the authority to deal with such new contamination.[59]

56 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

57 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 29 April 2025.

58 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

59 Email from official on the Desk for Conventional Arms Control, Federal Foreign Office, 10 May 2022.

IRAQ

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2028

Not on track to meet deadline
(will require further extension request(s), due to extent of CMR)

CMR CONTAMINATION: 227KM^2

Heavy
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS (OFFICIAL DATA)

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	7.58	13.26
Technical Survey	4.5	5.31
Non-Technical Survey	0	0.49

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	7,424 (including 1,230 through TS and spot tasks)	8,080 (including 69 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Ministry of Defence
- Ministry of Interior/Civil Defence
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Survey identified 31km^2 of previously unrecorded cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024, more than double the total area released through survey and clearance. Operator capacity dropped as a result of donor funding cuts that forced Danish Refugee Council (DRC), one of two international non-governmental organisations tackling cluster munition remnants (CMR), to halt operations at the end of July 2024 and close DRC's programme. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) acknowledged that Iraq will not meet its 2028 Article 4 clearance deadline and will need to seek another extension.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Iraqi government should provide the DMA with the legal authority, funding, human resources, and training to strengthen its effectiveness as the national mine action authority.**
- **The government should stabilise leadership of the DMA to facilitate continuity of policy and consistency in its implementation, including in the issuance of task orders.**
- **The government should increase national financial funding for mine action to offset declining international donor support and provide greater transparency in its allocation and use of resources.**
- **The DMA should accelerate action to upgrade and update its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and the resources supporting information management.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	6	6	Iraq continued to find significant amounts of previously unrecorded CMR and with little capacity committed to survey, the programme is years away from developing an evidence-based baseline estimate of contamination.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	6	RMAC-South continued to lead Iraq's CMR programme but upheavals in leadership of the DMA caused policy disruption at the national level. Donor funding for mine action declined but the government provided no clarity on its plans for funding the sector.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	7	7	Iraq's 2023–28 mine action strategy acknowledges the importance of diversity to the sector although gender issues became politically sensitive in the last two years. Conservative societal norms keep women's employment low despite legislation to encourage it, but mine action authorities and operators continue actively to encourage recruitment of women.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	Iraq does not have a national standard on environmental management in mine action but mine action planning increasingly has to take account of climate extremes and operators continue to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) to manage the environmental impact of demining.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	6	DMA halted and then resumed plans to upgrade its database from IMSMA New Generation to Core. In a further setback, iMMAP lost donor funding for its support to the DMA's information management unit, resulting in the loss of trained human resources.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Planning and tasking for survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas has benefitted from good coordination between RMAC-South, the operators, and local authorities, but work plans have suffered from shrinking funding.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	Federal Iraq adopted the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) methodology for survey and clearance as a national standard in 2019. Eleven national mine action standards were updated in 2024 as part of a review ongoing since 2022.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	5	Release of CMR-affected areas dropped significantly for the second successive year in 2024 as donor funding cuts reduced the available operator capacity and the DMA acknowledged it would not meet its Article 4 deadline.
Average Score	**5.7**	**5.9**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Higher Council of Mine Action
- Directorate of Mine Action (DMA)
- Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Ministry of Interior (Civil Defence)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- iMMAP

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Iraq calculated total cluster munition-contaminated area at more than 227km^2 at the end of 2024,[1] making it one of the countries most heavily affected by CMR, and its estimate of contamination is still growing. Federal Iraq accounted for 226km^2 (99%) of the national total at the end of 2024 (see Table 1), 10% more than a year earlier and nearly 20% more than at the end of 2022. Of the 10 Federal Iraq governorates affected, three in the south—Basrah, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar—alone accounted for 92% of the national total.[2]

Iraq's 2023 Article 4 deadline extension request expected that operators would find another 79km^2 of CMR-contaminated area over the five years to 2028 but that increasingly looks conservative. CMR survey concentrated in southern governorates added 31km^2 of previously unrecorded contamination in 2024, on top of 24km^2 the previous year.[3] The two-year total of 55km^2 suggests Iraq is likely to find significantly more than allowed for, and even if survey capacity remained at the same level a reliable baseline of CMR contamination is still some years away.

Federal Iraq's contamination dates back to the Gulf War of 1991 and the United States (US)-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and follows the path of allied forces' advance from the south to Baghdad. Coalition aircraft also struck Iraqi army positions in the northern governorate of Kirkuk, but DMA data no longer identify any CMR contamination in the governorate.[4]

For reasons unknown, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) sharply reduced its estimate of CMR contamination in the second half of 2024. In June, it recorded close to 3km^2 of contamination, including 1.8km^2 (60%) in Erbil governorate and the rest split almost evenly between Duhok and Slemani governorates.[5] Iraq's 2025 Article 7 report, however, recorded only 1.3km^2 for the region, without explanation of what accounts for the reduction.[6]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at end 2023 and 2024)[7]

Province	Area at end 2024 (m^2)	Area at end 2023 (m^2)
Anbar	11,216,039	11,216,039
Babylon	559,339	911,758
Basrah	66,953,052	56,053,577
Karbala	141,910	141,910
Kirkuk	79,109	79,109
Missan	450,147	0
Muthanna	101,268,489	90,117,749
Najaf	3,704,571	3,704,571
Ninewa	14,727	215,758
Thi Qar	41,671,599	43,329,654
Federal Iraq sub-total	**226,058,982**	**205,770,125**
Kurdistan Region of Iraq	1,305,110	2,914,350
Totals	**227,364,092**	**208,684,475**

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The mine action programme in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA has represented Iraq internationally and oversees mine action for humanitarian purposes in Federal Iraq, covering 15 of the nation's 19 governorates. Mine action in the KRI's four governorates is overseen by the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which acts as both regulator and operator. The two bodies have functioned largely autonomously, but a memorandum of understanding (MoU) drafted in 2022 to facilitate cooperation between them was signed in May 2024.

The DMA and IKMAA collaborated in drawing up Iraq's draft National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, the first produced jointly by the two authorities.[8] The strategy sets increasing national ownership as a key objective and says this will be achieved by strengthening both authorities and "ensuring these national entities are empowered, appropriately structured and sufficiently equipped and resourced to allow them to fulfil their responsibilities."[9]

In 2023, the government earmarked 20 billion Iraqi dinars (US$17 million) over three years to support implementation of the CCM[10] but the funding was not disbursed on mine action and appears to have been used by the Ministry of Environment for other projects. The DMA provided no information on funding in 2024.

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; and email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, National Focal Point for CCM, DMA, 7 April 2025.
2 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
3 Email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, DMA, 7 April 2025; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F, p. 27.
4 Article 7 Report (covering 2020), Form F; and email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, DMA, 21 April 2021. The Article 7 report covering 2021 did not include the amount of previously unrecorded contamination found that year.
5 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 26 June 2024.
6 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
7 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 5 and Form F; and email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, DMA, 25 April 2024.
8 Interview with Ahmed Aljasem, Director of Information Management, DMA, Baghdad, 11 May 2023.
9 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–28, p. 36.
10 Interviews with Bakr Sahib Ahmed, DMA, in Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

FEDERAL IRAQ

The inter-ministerial Higher Committee of Mine Action,[11] which reports to the Prime Minister, oversees and approves mine action strategy, policies, and plans. The committee, which is chaired by the prime minister, includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil and environment as well as the National Security Council and IKMAA. The DMA "plans, coordinates, supervises, monitors and follows up all the activities of mine action". It draws up the national strategy and is responsible for setting national standards, accrediting, approving the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of demining organisations, and certifying completion of clearance tasks.[12]

The DMA's authority over mine action is weakened by its status as a directorate of the Ministry of Environment, ranking well below the powerful ministries of defence, interior, and oil that are major actors in the sector. Its policy making and implementation has also suffered from a rapid turnover of directors. The DMA has had at least 20 directors general since 2003. All but one were appointed on an acting basis, which also limited their authority.

Shawkat Tayeh Masoud, a former director of operations who had left the DMA in 2022, returned as acting director in September 2023 but retired in January 2025. His replacement, Eaktiffaa Mezher al-Hasnawi, the Deputy Minister of Environment, was reported as proactive and facilitating task order issuance, but was expected to leave the post in the second half of 2025 in order to run in parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2025.

Director General Masoud carried out sweeping DMA management changes and restructuring in 2024. The DMA previously oversaw three Regional Mine Action Centres (RMACs) for the North, the Middle Euphrates (MEU) region and the South,[13] but RMAC North and RMAC MEU were closed down in September 2023. RMAC South, located in Basra City, remained the focal point for Federal Iraq's response to CMR, overseeing mine action in four southern governorates: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. It collects and uploads results of survey and clearance to Federal Iraq's IMSMA database and is responsible for tasking operators in its area of operations.[14]

The government approved a national strategic plan for 2023–28 in June 2023[15] which acknowledges the institutional issues, citing "widespread belief" that the DMA should be strengthened to give it the authority commensurate with its mandate. The plan called for an external assessment of the DMA's legal mandate and institutional position that would provide recommendations to the Higher Council for Mine Action.[16] As at May 2025, the assessment had not been conducted.

The strategic plan calls for strengthened national ownership and more national funding, recognising dependence on external donor support as a key risk to the sustainability of the mine action programme.[17] To boost the mine action capacity, the DMA says Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) "have accepted to be involved" in mine action. The DMA reported the PMF had their own explosive ordnance disposal directorate and a significant workforce in many governorates.[18]

KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ

IKMAA functions as both the regulator and an operator in the KRI. It reports directly to the Kurdistan Regional Government's Council of Ministers and is led by a director general with ministerial rank. It coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulaymaniyah (Slemani). IKMAA had a total staff of more than 900 personnel in 2023, including 432 in operations, largely unchanged from the previous year, but a budgetary crisis in the KRI in recent years has imposed severe constraints on the mine action sector.[19]

IKMAA has received support from Slovenian Aid since 2022 when it provided a grant of €168,000 through ITF Enhancing Human Security. The funds financed the hiring of vehicles enabling IKMAA to deploy 15 demining teams and contributed to a rise in release of mined areas in 2022.[20] Additional Slovenian funding approved at the end of 2023 allowed the hiring of 48 vehicles which enabled teams to deploy in 2024.[21]

11 The Council, which is led by the Prime Minister, includes representatives of the ministries of defence, interior, oil, and environment, as well as the National Security Adviser and the head of IKMAA.

12 "Document of roles and responsibilities", undated but 2019, received by email from the DMA, 13 May 2019.

13 RMAC North covered the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din; RMAC MEU included Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wassit; while RMAC South comprised Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi Qar.

14 Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, in Geneva, 12 February 2020.

15 Email from Ahmed Aljasem, DMA, 8 August 2023.

16 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, pp. 37–38.

17 Ibid., pp. 17 and 22.

18 Interview with Bakr Sahib Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

19 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 3 May 2023.

20 Interview with Jabar Mustafa, Director of IKMAA, Erbil, 18 May 2023; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 3 May 2023.

21 Emails from Niyazi Khalid, Deputy Head of IKMAA, 15 April and 13 May 2024.

OTHER ACTORS

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in 2015 to assess the explosive ordnance threat in areas liberated from Islamic State and set three priorities: explosive hazard management to support stabilisation and recovery; delivery of risk education; and technical support to build capacity of government entities to manage, regulate, and coordinate Iraq's response to explosive ordnance contamination. Since 2021, UNMAS has focused from explosive hazard management to providing technical support to the mine action authorities and their implementing partners. The UNMAS mission in Iraq employed 100 people with 43 international staff in 2019. By the start of 2025, UNMAS had a staff of 23, of which three were internationals.[22]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

Iraq's 2023 CCM Article 4 extension request reported that government funding for mine action averaged close to US$4 million a year in 2020–22. On the basis of that experience, it projected government funding on $3.9 million a year for 2024 to 2028 "because the government's budget is not clear and has not been declared until now."[23] The government budget for 2023 earmarked a payment variously reported as US$20 million and of ID20 billion (US$17 million) over three years towards implementation of the CCM,[24] but the funds were not disbursed on CMR activities and appear to have been diverted to other projects.[25] No details were available of CMR funding in 2024 or 2025.

International donors provided most of the funding for mine action in Iraq following the 2015 defeat of Islamic State, but priorities have changed. The number of donors funding operations in Iraq through UNMAS has dropped from a peak of 21 in 2019 to 8 in 2024,[26] and the volume of donor funding channelled through UNMAS dropped from its high point of US$77 million in 2019 to around $6 million in 2024.[27] Donors also focused aid on clearing areas occupied by Islamic State in western and northern governorates, largely bypassing the south, where most of Iraq's CMR are found.

The US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) supported NPA and DRC in the south, but in July 2024 ended its funding for DRC, which halted operations as a result.[28] NPA received donor support in 2024 from PM/WRA, Canada, Norway, and Germany, and, for part of the year, France.[29]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Iraq's 2023–28 strategic plan recognises that the impact of contamination varies according to gender, age, and ethnic or religious affiliations, and requires specific activities targeting those needs, for which disaggregated data is a prerequisite.[30] Gender issues became politically sensitive in 2023 amid heated public debate over LGBTQ issues, which led the DMA to drop reference to gender mainstreaming and saw the Communications and Media Commission issue a directive in August 2023 banning use of the term "gender" in public communications.[31]

The government supported women's employment through a National Strategy for Iraqi Women 2023–30 focused on improving workplace conditions for women and a 2023 Social Security Law providing maternity benefits intended to encourage women's workforce participation, but conservative societal norms, particularly in the south, have kept female employment low.[32] UNMAS conducted workshops in Baghdad and Erbil on the role of women in mine action in 2024, which drew participation from the DMA, IKMAA, and the Ministry of Interior as well as from national and international NGOs.[33]

NPA has increased outreach and advocacy to local communities and stakeholders, and in 2024 its CMR programme increased the number of women in managerial roles from four in 2023 to six, including a non-technical survey (NTS) team leader and a senior logistics officer, and the number of women in operations rose from nine to ten. NPA has a gender focal point position to promote mainstreaming which is funded until 2025, and out of a total workforce of 493 in Iraq at the end of 2024 it employed 114 women.[34] Until it suspended operations in July 2024, DRC employed 10 women among its 56 operations staff, including six deminers split between two teams.[35]

22 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 4 May 2019, 6 April 2020, 11 May 2023, and 16 May 2025.

23 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 11 April 2023, pp. 39–40.

24 Interviews with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, Director, RMAC-S, Basra City, 8 May 2023; and Bakr Sahib Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 11 May 2023.

25 Interviews with international mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 28 April to 1 May 2024.

26 Interview with Pehr Lodhammar, Chief Mine Action Programme Iraq, UNMAS, in Geneva, 23 June 2023; and emails from Ban Yaseen, Programme Management Specialist, UNMAS, 23 June 2024; and Shinobu Mashima, Programme Team Lead, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

27 Emails from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 11 May 2023 and 16 May 2025.

28 Email from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, Basrah Manager, DRC, 23 March 2025.

29 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, Programme Manager, and Chris Ramsden, Deputy Programme Manager, South Iraq, NPA, 27 April 2025.

30 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, p. 15.

31 T. Alkuhadry, "As Iraq backslides on gender equality where are its women MPs?", *Al Jazeera*, 9 September 2023.

32 Emails from Safa Jamal, Senior Officer – Programme Management, UNMAS, 27 May 2024; and Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

33 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.

34 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

35 Email from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, Basrah Manager, DRC, 25 April 2024.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Iraq does not have a policy on environmental management in mine action. The DMA and IKMAA were reportedly in the process of preparing a national standard in 2022 but had not released it by May 2025. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Ministry of Environment conducted a workshop in 2024 to develop approaches to environmental management in mine action, which also discussed adding environmental factors as criteria in its task prioritisation matrix.[36]

IKMAA, in line with policies of the KRG cabinet's Environment Board, said it seeks to minimise any environmental harm from demining operations through training of deminers, community engagement, and rigorous monitoring and evaluation.[37]

Demining organisations mostly apply their own SOPs for managing the environment and minimising harm from operations. NPA appointed an Environmental Advisor for the Iraq programme in August 2024 to help develop the organisation's global environmental policy and in-country approaches to environmental management, including an IMAS-aligned SOP for land release. NPA's measures include on-site environmental impact assessments, which started in 2025; minimising machinery use; and restricting movement to defined areas to limit soil disturbance while enhancing waste management at operational sites.[38]

Iraq ranks among the five most vulnerable nations to effects of climate change, including drought, water scarcity, flash floods, frequent sand and dust storms, and extreme heat, all of which pose a growing operational challenge.[39] In the KRI, IKMAA reported that mine action planning increasingly had to take account of extreme weather events, including flooding, forest fires, and damage to infrastructure, and said it was developing a range of mitigation strategies including early warning systems.[40] Operators also report adapting working hours to deal with extreme heat and drawing up sandstorm contingency plans that may pause operations in conditions of reduced visibility. [41]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The DMA and IKMAA have separate databases which operate different information management systems. The DMA database is located at its Baghdad headquarters but RMAC South, headquartered in Basrah, is the focal point for cluster munitions, responsible for uploading CMR-related data.

The DMA operates an IMSMA New Generation system, and in 2022 started preparing to upgrade to IMSMA Core with support from the GICHD and iMMAP, a commercial service provider working under contract to the PM/WRA. It installed an IMSMA Core server in December 2022, started field testing reporting forms in 2023, and was due to launch the system by December 2023.[42] In March 2024, the DMA informed the GICHD it had decided to halt the upgrade and continue working with IMSMA NG, but reversed that decision later in the year.

The policy change added to concerns about an information management system which implementing partners say suffers from significant data gaps and long delays uploading operating results. This means that the database is not up to date and does not accurately reflect the results of survey or clearance. The DMA attributes delays to the need to correct reporting errors and the application of quality control (QC).[43] Implementing partners point to cumbersome procedures that require them to submit operational data in hard copy and on CD-ROMs to be uploaded manually into the database.[44] Data verification and correction can add further significant delays.[45]

The limited number and high turnover of the DMA's data processing staff has further contributed to the DMA's information management challenges. In 2023, iMMAP reduced the number of its staff working in the DMA from five to two,[46] and in August 2024 the PM/WRA stopped funding iMMAP's support.[47]

IKMAA also pursued an upgrade from IMSMA NG but opted to avoid costly IMSMA licenses and installed a system tailor-made from open-source software, including PostgreSQL and PHP, and using the open-source geographic information system, QGIS. IKMAA said the system, developed with support from iMMAP, provided robust functionality and a user-friendly interface.[48] IKMAA completed migration to the new system in February 2024.[49]

36 Email from Lisa Jean, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 1 May 2025; and Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 4 May 2025.
37 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024.
38 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.
39 Emails from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025; and Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.
40 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024.
41 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025; Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025,
42 Statement of Iraq, CCM Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2023.
43 Interview with Nibras Fakhir Matrood, RMAC South, DMA, in Basrah, 8 May 2023.
44 Interviews with mine action operators in Iraq, 7–20 May 2023.
45 NPA reported receiving a request in 2022 to verify data relating to a task completed in 2019.
46 Interviews with Clare Pritchard, Country Representative, iMMAP, in Erbil, 15 May 2023, and in Geneva, 1 May 2024.
47 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 27 April 2025. Email from Lisa Jean, MAG, 1 May 2025.
48 Email from Niyazi Khalid, IKMAA, 13 May 2024.
49 Interview with Clare Pritchard, iMMAP, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Iraq has not had a specific strategic plan for CMR, as the issue has been overshadowed by the priority given to tackling dense, improvised mine contamination in areas liberated from Islamic State. Iraq's National Mine Action Strategy 2023–28, officially approved in July 2023, sets broad goals for both the DMA and IKMAA – the first time the two authorities have cooperated in drawing up a national plan.[50] These include as a strategic priority the development of "a prioritisation system based on clear and transparent criteria" to inform all planning and tasking decisions.

Iraq's Article 4 deadline extension request, submitted in November 2022 and updated in April 2023, included a work plan for the first time based on the capacity available in 2022, but this has already been overtaken by funding shortfalls. The request set the goal of completing clearance of six governorates with total contamination estimated at almost 16.5km^2 in the first five years. These included completing clearance of four governorates with small amounts of CMR in 2024: Babylon (0.7km^2), Kerbala (1.5km^2), Missan (1.1km^2), and Ninewa (0.02km^2). None of these governorates was freed of contamination in 2024 (see Table 1). The plan also provided for completing clearance of Najaf (4.1km^2) in the third year of the extension and Anbar (9.1 km^2) in the fifth year.[51]

The DMA issues tasks requested by operators after consultation with DMA operations and RMAC staff and taking account of requests from government, local authorities, development plans and prioritisation criteria that include an NTS scoring system.[52] In much of Federal Iraq, tasking suffers from cumbersome procedures, although in the south, planning and tasking for survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas have benefitted from good coordination between RMAC-South, operators, and local authorities.[53]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Federal Iraq started working with UNMAS in 2021 on updating national mine action standards for mine and battle area clearance (BAC), NTS, and technical survey (TS). The standards were written in 2004–05, existed in Arabic only, and did not specifically address cluster munitions. The DMA reviewed, updated, and released 23 of 35 national mine action standards between 2020 and 2023.[54] It reviewed and updated eleven standards in 2024, including for NTS, TS, manual clearance, BAC, marking, clearance of buildings, mechanical clearance, and accreditation for mine action organisations.[55]

The DMA adopted the Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology as a national standard in 2019, citing the benefits it has delivered for survey, planning, and clearance.[56] In 2021, after a review of NMAS 09.11 for battle area clearance, Iraq increased the national standard for depth of CMR clearance from 20cm to 30cm, because in areas with moving sand or soft ground, some CMR, most commonly larger BLU-97 submunitions, had been found to penetrate deeper than 20cm. NPA said the new standard did not affect operations because 30cm was within the range of its existing detectors.[57] NPA data also showed that the great majority of CMR were found within 5cm of the surface.[58]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Iraq had two international operators available for cluster munitions survey and clearance at the start of 2024 but shrinking donor funding has reduced the operational capacity. DRC had one manual demining and two EOD/BAC teams with a total of 30 people, including 21 deminers, working in Basrah governorate's Zubair district and Rumaila sub-district at the start of 2024, and it had expected to add an international technical adviser to the programme.[59] DRC instead halted operations at the end of July 2024 after PM/WRA ended its funding. It closed its Basrah programme in April 2025 but maintained an office in Erbil, which continues efforts to mobilise donor support.[60]

NPA remained the main CMR survey and clearance operator in Iraq. Its Basrah-based CMR programme employed a total of 99 people, a drop of 24 staff from the previous year due to reduced funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and PM/WRA's reallocation of funding to a mechanical technical survey team working on conventional minefields. NPA's operating capacity included

50 Email from Ahmed Aljasim, DMA, 15 April 2022.

51 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex B.

52 Emails from Marie-Josée Hamel, DRC, 30 March 2022; Peter Smethers, FSD, 22 February 2022; Tim Marsella, HALO Trust, 17 March 2022; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 April 2022.

53 Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DRC, 30 March 2022.

54 Email from Safa Jamal, UNMAS, 27 May 2024.

55 Email from Shinobu Mashima, UNMAS, 16 May 2025.

56 Email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, RMAC-South, 12 August 2020.

57 Emails from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 April and 2 May 2022.

58 Interview with Chris Ramsden, NPA, 7 May 2023; and email, 12 May 2023. NPA data showed that 85% of M77 submunitions, which accounted for over half of cleared CMR, were found at a depth of 0–5cm and 70% of BLU-97 submunitions were also found within this range.

59 Email from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, DRC, 25 April 2024.

60 Emails from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, DRC, 23 March and 14 May 2025.

four NTS teams with 16 staff and five EOD/BAC teams with 32 staff. NPA, with funding from the US Defence Department's Humanitarian Demining Research and Development, has trialled the Scorpion mine and UXO detection system. This has proved particularly effective at accelerating operations in areas of high metal waste, by reducing metal signals and the need for excavations.[61]

Iraq's 2023 Article 4 deadline extension request said the government covered the costs of a total of 11 teams working on cluster munition tasks. These included five teams from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior's Civil Defence organisation conducting survey and clearance. Two of these teams focused on TS and the other three on clearance. Another six MoD EOD teams conducted submunition demolitions, a task restricted to the military.[62] Iraq's CCM Article 7 report indicated two MoD clearance teams and one Civil Defence team were operational in 2024, but gave no details of where or what they did.[63] Units of Iraq's Popular Mobilisation Forces were also reportedly working in Muthanna governorate in 2023.[64]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Iraq released a total of 12.4km^2 in 2024, according to official data, which recorded 12.1km^2 released in Federal Iraq and 0.3km^2 in the KRI.[65] This represented a 35% drop in the amount of CMR-affected land released from the previous year and 61% less than the area released two years before. The official data is substantially (20%) higher than operators' reported land release of 9.6km^2.[66]

Mine action authorities also reported destroying a total of 7,424 submunitions, down from 8,080 in 2023.[67]

Table 2: Land release outputs in 2024 (official data)[68]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Comments
Clearance	7.6	International NGOs reported clearing 7.3km^2.
Technical survey	0	NPA reported cancelling 1.2km^2 through NTS.
Non-technical survey	4.5	NPA recorded reduction of 0.6km^2, but the DMA did not show who accounted for the rest.
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	7,424	Including 1,230 items destroyed "not through clearance".

SURVEY IN 2024

Official and operator data relating to land released through survey differ significantly. The DMA did not record any area cancelled through NTS and reported the 4.5km^2 released through survey in 2024 was all area-reduced through TS (see Table 3). NPA reported cancelling 1,245,600m^2 through NTS in Thi-Qar and reduced a total of 648,336m^2, split almost evenly between Basrah and Muthanna governorates.[69] The KRI did not report any release of cluster munition-contaminated area through survey.

Table 3: Area released through TS in 2024 (official data)[70]

Governorate	Area reduced (m^2)
Basrah	1,418,618
Muthanna	1,431,941
Thi-Qar	1,658,027
Total	**4,508,586**

61 Online interview with Chris Ramsden, NPA, 17 April 2025; and emails from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.
62 Revised 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.
63 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
64 Email from Chris Ramsden, NPA, 13 May 2024.
65 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
66 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025; and Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, DRC, 14 May 2025.
67 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
68 Ibid.; and email from Haitham Fattah Lafta, DMA, 7 April 2025.
69 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.
70 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

CLEARANCE IN 2024

DMA data shows the amount of CMR-affected land released through clearance in 2024 fell sharply for the second successive year in 2024 but the limited information available prevents a clear determination of the reasons. The DMA reported clearance of a total of 7.6km^2 in 2024 (see Table 4), a 43% drop on the 13.3km^2 of clearance it reported for 2023,[71] and a further drop from the 16.6km^2 it said it cleared in 2022.[72] The DMA does not detail results by operator, obscuring where the downturn occurred.

Table 4: CMR clearance in 2024 (official data)[73]

Province	Area cleared (m²)	Items destroyed
South Provinces	7,163,459	5,838
North Provinces	63,134	9
Middle Euphrates	352,420	347
Totals	**7,579,013**	**6,194**

NPA remains the biggest operator working to clear CMR in Iraq and despite the loss of staff in 2024, it cleared 7.3km^2 (see Table 5), marginally (0.5%) less than the previous year (although the 1,610 submunitions it cleared in 2024 were only half its 2023 total).[74] DRC had focused mainly on tackling other unexploded ordnance but it worked on one CMR task in Basrah governorate before loss of donor funding halted the project at the end of July 2024.[75]

Table 5: CMR clearance by international NGOs in 2024 (INGO data)[76]

Operator	Governorate	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
DRC	Basrah	12,462	2	0
NPA	Basrah	3,917,785	410	369
	Muthanna	3,356,075	1,200	25
Totals		**7,286,322**	**1,612**	**394**

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR IRAQ: 1 NOVEMBER 2013

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 NOVEMBER 2023

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE-YEAR EXTENSION): 1 NOVEMBER 2028

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET DEADLINE

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Iraq is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2028. In 2025, the DMA has made clear the available operating capacity is insufficient to meet the extended deadline, and it will need to apply for a further extension.[77]

The DMA estimated in 2023 that its five-year strategy for completion needed 34 operational teams.[78] Its back-up strategy based on the 15 teams available in 2023 projected completion would take up to 16 years.[79] In 2024, only 10 teams were operational, half of them provided by NPA, two coming from DRC, two from the MoD, and one from Civil Defence. In reality, even that tally proved to be an over-estimate. One of the two DRC teams active at the start of 2024 was deployed on non-CMR tasks and both teams ceased operating at the end of July when their funding was suspended. The extent to which the MoD and Civil Defence teams were operational in 2024 was also unclear as clearance by NPA alone in 2025 was equivalent to 96% of the official cleared total (see Tables 4 and 5).

71 Ibid.; and Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

72 Iraq's Article 7 report covering 2022 recorded clearance of 33.6km^2 in that year but included 17.2km^2 which Mine Action Review assessed to be battle area clearance, not CMR clearance.

73 Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F. "South provinces" includes Basrah, Missan, Muthanna and Thi-Qar; Middle Euphrates includes Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, and Wassit; "North provinces" include Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah ad-Din.

74 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

75 Emails from Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, DRC, 23 March and 14 May 2025.

76 Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025; and Mohammed Qassim Abdulridha, DRC, 14 May 2025.

77 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; interview with Haitham Fattah Lafta, DMA, in Geneva, 7 April 2025.

78 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex A.

79 The extension request of 11 April 2023 cites 15.2 years (p. 10) while Annex B of the request puts the figure at 16 years.

The DMA's five-year strategy was based on the expectation that continuing survey would add around 114km^2 in cluster munition-contaminated areas and bring the total area requiring clearance to around 320km^2.[80] That calculation looks conservative after survey in the last two years added 55km^2 to the database, but a comprehensive baseline estimate is still years away. NPA estimates that with its current resources survey of the key southern governorates of Basrah, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar may be complete by the end of the current extension period.[81] That still does not consider CMR contamination in northern governorates of Federal Iraq or the KRI.

Declining levels of land release combined with rising estimates of contamination underscore Iraq's cluster munitions challenge is getting worse, compounded by unstable national management. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028 developed by the DMA and IKMAA with support from the GICHD provides a framework for progress, but implementation depends on uncertain levels of political and financial commitment of federal authorities.

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Federal Iraq (km^2)	KRI (km^2)	Totals (km^2)
2024	7.6	0.3	**7.9**
2023	13.3	0	**13.3**
2022	16.6	0	***16.6**
2021	10.2	0	**10.2**
2020	5.7	N/R	**5.7**
Totals	**53.4**	**0.3**	**53.7**

* Based on Mine Action Review calculation. N/R = Not reported

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Iraq's 2023–28 strategy commits to develop a strategy for managing residual contamination, but no action appears to have been taken yet to follow-up.[82]

80 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 11 April 2023, p. 23.

81 Email from Chimwemwe Tembo and Chris Ramsden, NPA, 27 April 2025.

82 Iraq National Mine Action Strategy 2023–2028, p. 23.

LAO PDR

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2030

Not on track to meet deadline
(will require multiple extension requests, due to extent of CMR)

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Massive but no reliable estimate of extent

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	*71.70	56.67
Technical Survey**	0	0
Non-Technical Survey**	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	71,106 (including 34,485 destroyed during spot tasks and 11,709 during TS)	58,382 (including 20,689 destroyed during spot tasks)

* Excludes commercial clearance in 2024 where few or no submunitions were found, as Mine Action Review does not deem this to be CMR clearance.
** Non-technical survey (NTS) and technical survey (TS) are conducted in Lao PDR, but are focused on finding evidence of cluster munition contamination as part of a nationwide survey. The output of the Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) being undertaken in Lao PDR is the creation of evidence-based confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58)
- UXO Lao
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Lao PDR increased clearance output as well as the extent of area identified through technical survey (TS), largely due to expanded capacity and funding. National ownership was strengthened by the chairing of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) moving to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), along with further progress on the quality of information management and the revision of national mine action standards (NMAS). However, challenges remain in improving efficiency in land release and securing long-term donor funding for a programme that remains decades from completion.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The NRA should finalise a national planning and prioritisation system to support survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR).**
- **Lao PDR should further improve processes for the issuing, amending, or renewal of memoranda of understanding (MoUs). Lao PDR should also consider permitting longer-term MoUs to help attract more investment into the sector.**

- **The NRA should finalise its review of NMAS to ensure best practices are applied.**
- **The NRA should continue efforts to ensure the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database is accurate and up to date. Historical operational data not already in the database should be available to operators engaged in survey and clearance.**
- **The NRA should work with operators to explore improvements to the process for releasing cluster munition-contaminated area through survey that maintain safety while improving efficiency.**
- **The NRA should work with relevant ministries to establish clear, streamlined procedures enabling the safe and authorised use of drones for survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to improve operational efficiency.**
- **The NRA should develop a long-term EOD response strategy, including planning for a national emergency response and residual risk management capacity, amid likely future funding constraints.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination but is undertaking a nationwide survey of populated areas. By the end of 2024, more than 2,351km^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) had been identified through survey.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	7	There is strong national ownership from the NRA. The transfer of oversight to MoFA has been positive, with operators noting improvements to the complex MoU procedures and strong cooperation and coordination with the NRA at all levels.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	7	In 2024, the NRA took significant steps to strengthen gender and diversity mainstreaming in the UXO sector, including updating policy documents, approving a new Gender and Inclusion Code of Conduct, and appointing Gender Focal Points for TWGs, with the Lao Women's Union conducting a sector gender analysis to inform planning. The proportion of women in the workforce remained roughly the same as it was in 2023.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	6	6	Lao PDR's NMAS on Environmental Management is under review. While progress has been made, including by the 2024 launch by MAG of a climate and environment forum for operators, most operators lack formal environmental policies, assessments, or focal points for their country programmes, and stronger, coordinated environmental practices are still needed across the sector.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Efforts to correct historical data in IMSMA and improve data quality and reporting are ongoing. In 2024, with support from the IM Capacity Development Project, regional authorities were trained and other preparations made for a migration to IMSMA Core. The NMAS on IM has been reviewed and updated and, at the time of writing, was awaiting final approval.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	6	6	The survey and clearance targets in the 2024 Article 4 extension request work plan for 2025 to 2030 are much more realistic than the national strategy and in line with potential capacity and output. Since 2021, there has been a shift towards increasing clearance capacity and reducing survey capacity. There is not yet a comprehensive national-level prioritisation matrix of clearance tasks, but an Annex to the NMAS on the issue is planned.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	Lao PDR's national standards have been under review and were due to be finalised by the end of 2025. NPA and UXO Lao both increased their respective operational capacities in 2024 thanks to additional funding.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	8	8	The area identified through TS under the ongoing nationwide CMRS increased in 2024, as did clearance output, largely due to increased funding. However, challenges persist, including the need to improve land release efficiency.
Average Score	**7.3**	**7.1**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Board
- National Regulatory Authority (NRA) Office

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- UXO Lao
- Humanitarian teams of the Lao People's Army (Unit 58)
- Commercial operators

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Commercial operators

OTHER ACTORS

- ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center (ARMAC)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Tetra Tech

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Lao PDR has the world's highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions as a result of the Indochina Wars of the 1960s and 1970s. The United States conducted one of the heaviest aerial bombardments in history, dropping more than two million tonnes of bombs between 1964 and 1973, including more than 270 million submunitions (known locally as bombies).[1] The failure rate is not known, but Lao PDR reports it may have been as high as 30%,[2] and an estimated 80 million submunitions are thought to have remained at the end of the war.[3]

Lao PDR does not yet have a reliable estimate of CMR contamination. According to its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, 15 of its 18 provinces are contaminated with CMR.[4] The nine provinces most heavily affected by CMR are Attapeu, Champassak, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Saravan, Savannakhet, Xekong, and Xiengkhouang.[5]

According to data provided to Mine Action Review by the NRA, as at the end of 2024, a total of more than 2,351km^2 of CHA had been identified through survey (see Table 1);[6] an increase on the almost 1,996km^2 of CMR-contaminated area as at the end of 2023.[7] The amount of CHA will continue to increase as the Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) continues to identify CHA. That said, since 2021, a shift towards clearance over survey has released a greater proportion of the CHAs already identified during the CMRS.

Lao PDR's initial estimation of 8,470km^2 of total CMR contamination was based on 70,000 individual US cluster munitions target locations[8] with each cluster munition strike producing an estimated footprint of up to 12 hectares (0.12km^2). These calculations gave a very broad understanding of the extent of contamination, but were, obviously, based on assumptions.[9]

In 2015, Lao PDR initiated systematic TS using the CMRS methodology to determine the extent of contamination in populated areas.[10] An estimate of the true extent of CMR contamination in populated areas will not be known until the nationwide CMRS is completed, which is still many years away. It is a notable achievement that, to date, the "proactive survey phase" (i.e. the systematic village-by-village CMRS of all villages assigned to clearance operators using the NRA's list of contaminated villages) has been completed in five of the most heavily contaminated provinces in the south. These five provinces are now in a "reactive" phase of survey where CMRS is only conducted in response to *ad hoc* requests when evidence of CMR is found by villagers outside of previously established CHAs.[11]

Considering the high level of CMR contamination in Lao PDR, previously unknown CMR evidence points will continue to be discovered outside of the existing CHA, even after completion of systematic CMRS of villages.[12] The completion of proactive survey in these five southern provinces is also notwithstanding the fact that survey of some villages or parts of villages were not assigned for systematic survey by operators, as they are restricted, often for reasons of national security.

In the most heavily contaminated province of Xiengkhouang, which is in the north of the country, systematic village-to-village CMRS (proactive survey phase) is still

1 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 3.

2 Ibid.

3 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 1.

4 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 4.

5 Ibid.; and National Strategic Plan for the UXO Sector in the Lao PDR 2021–2030, "Safe Path Forward III" (hereafter, Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III"), p. 4.

6 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, Head of Planning and Cooperation Unit, NRA, 17 June 2025. This differs from the data reported in Lao PDR's Article 7 report (covering 2024), which states a total of almost 1,964km^2 of CHA identified through survey as at the end of 2024. The discrepancy is due to the data being extracted from the NRA Dashboard on different dates and ongoing verification of the data. The Dashboard is regularly updated, and operator data is only finalised by the NRA once verified through completion reports.

7 Email from Chanmy Keodara, International Cooperation and Treaty Officer, NRA, 13 July 2024.

8 "US bombing records in Laos, 1964–73, Congressional Record", 14 May 1975; and 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part A, Executive Summary.

9 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part A, Executive Summary; and Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 7; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 25 May 2024.

10 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F; and email from Olivier Bauduin, UXO Program Advisor, US Embassy Vientiane, 21 July 2023.

11 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 8 and 18.

12 Emails from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 21 July 2023; and Katherine Harrison, NPA, 9 May 2023.

underway.[13] Completion of proactive CMRS in Xiengkhouang has yet to be achieved due to the extent of contamination and the frequent overlapping of cluster munition strikes, which has meant that operators often have to arbitrarily end CHAs and start new ones, due to the massive size of the CHAs being identified.[14] An alternative approach to CMRS was planned to be considered in the second half of 2025, with the testing of the LEAP (Layered Evidential Assessment and Prioritisation) tool in Xiengkhouang province. For more information on the LEAP tool, see the subsection below, "Operators and Operational Tools".[15]

CMRS is also being undertaken in five other CMR-contaminated provinces (Bolikhamxai, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane province), although not systematically, as funding for TS/CMRS has been sporadic in these provinces and undertaken according to operator budget availability, rather than targeted for the completion of CMRS of all villages.[16] Of Lao PDR's remaining seven affected provinces, four (Oudomxay, Phongsaly, Vientiane Capital, and Xaisomboun) are known to have CMR but do not have funding for systematic TS/CMRS.[17] The remaining three provinces (Bokeo, Luang Namtha, and Xayabouli) have low levels of CMR contamination and have been deprioritised.[18]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area confirmed through survey (at end 2024)[19]

Province	Villages	CHAs	Total area (km^2)
Attapeu	128	1,693	157.62
Bolikhamxai	99	62	5.82
Champassak	147	584	32.49
Houaphanh	121	515	50.76
Khammouane	126	869	191.02
Luang Prabang	61	330	30.87
Phongsaly	5	6	0.52
Saravan	369	2,692	139.43
Savannakhet	434	5,251	233.80
Vientiane	39	12	1.03
Xiengkhouang	292	2,335	1,405.49
Xekong	154	1,423	102.40
Totals	**1,975**	**15,772**	**2,351.25**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Lao PDR also has extensive contamination from other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including both air-dropped and ground-fired ordnance, though the extent of contamination is not known. An online reference manual compiled by Humanity & Inclusion (HI), documenting all types of explosive ordnance found in Lao PDR, has reported the presence of at least 214 types of munition.[20] These range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 3,000lb general-purpose bombs, as well as artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets,[21] cluster munitions, air-dropped mines (such as the BLU 42, 43, and 45), and other ordnance.[22] In steep mountainous areas, items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) can easily roll downhill during clearance and detonation. Items of explosive ordnance with cocked strikers and time-delay or anti-withdrawal fuzes present a particular hazard and cannot be moved, so must be destroyed in situ.[23]

Lao PDR is also contaminated, but to a much lesser extent, by anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines (See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Lao PDR for more information).

13 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
14 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 9.
15 Email from Olivier Bauduin, UXO Program Advisor, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.
16 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.
17 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
18 Ibid.
19 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
20 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, Technical Survey/Clearance Operations Manager, HI, 24 July 2024.
21 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 4.
22 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 13 July 2024.
23 Emails from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April and 28 June 2023; and Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 13 and 24 July 2024.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The NRA, created by government decree in 2004 and active since 2006, has an inter-ministerial board composed of representatives from government ministries. Since September 2023, the NRA has been chaired by MoFA, having previously been chaired by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoLSW).[24] The move to bring the NRA under MoFA was part of measures taken by the Lao government in 2023 to strengthen coordination systems among various agencies including government and operators.[25] In June 2024, the Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, who chairs the NRA, led a special session of the UXO Sector Working Group, demonstrating the high-level commitment of the Lao government.[26]

A 2018 decree, "On the Organisation and Operations of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO in Lao PDR" defines the position, role, duties, rights, organisational structure, and the working principles and methods of the NRA.[27] A further national decree on UXO management was endorsed by the government in 2022.[28] The NRA acts as the coordinator for national and international clearance operators and serves as the national focal point for the sector. This includes overall management and consideration of policy, planning, projects, accreditation, quality management (QM), and coordination of the implementation of the national strategy nationwide, as well as NRA planning and coordination functions at the provincial and district levels.[29]

During the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in 2016, Lao PDR launched sustainable development goal (SDG) 18, "Lives Safe from UXO", which focuses on freeing the country from UXO. The inclusion of UXO as a specific output in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) for 2021–2025, and inclusion in the forthcoming NSEDP for 2026–30 demonstrates Lao PDR's commitment to removing UXO as a barrier to development.[30]

UNDP provides programmatic and technical support to the NRA focusing on areas such as QM, policy, and support with national standards and treaty compliance. UNDP also supports UXO Lao as well as the Lao People's Army demining teams (Unit 58) with funding and capacity building support.[31]

Further capacity development in information management (IM), QM, operations support and EOD training is provided, primarily to UXO Lao, and to a lesser extent the NRA, through a US-funded contractor, Tetra Tech.[32] Additional support is provided by UNDP, funded by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), for national capacity building of the NRA and Army Unit 58, including for survey and clearance. Japan, through the Japan International Cooperation System (JICS), is also supporting survey and clearance as well the administration of training in EOD to UXO Lao.[33]

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and the NRA, funded by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), are jointly implementing the IM Capacity Development Project in 14 provinces (see section below on Information Management).[34] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), in collaboration with the NRA and the provincial Department of Foreign Affairs (DoFA), and with UK Government (FCDO) support, implemented a capacity-building project to strengthen national mine action management. Activities focused on IM, planning, and prioritisation. Quarterly coordination meetings facilitated continued exchange between MAG, UXO Lao, DoFA, and DoLSW, covering operational capacity, donor funding, and use of Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) technology.[35]

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

The move of the NRA's line ministry from the MoLSW to the MoFA has already seen positive developments. In 2024, HI, NPA, HALO, and MAG all reported strong cooperation and coordination with the NRA at both national and sub-national levels. HI highlighted smooth collaboration through regular joint planning, monitoring, and review meetings with local authorities, and consistent participation in NRA-led technical working groups.[36] NPA and HALO both noted strong support from the NRA and relevant provincial and district authorities.[37] MAG also described close coordination and

24 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J.

25 Ibid.

26 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.

27 Government Decree No. 67, dated 12 February 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 17; and Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Efforts, CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

28 Government Decree No. 210, dated 29 July 2022. Presentation by Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, NRA, minutes of the UXO Sector Working Group meeting, 16 September 2022.

29 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 14, 15, and 18.

30 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 6 July 2021.

31 Emails from Rupert Leighton, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 14 August 2023; and Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

32 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; and "US Renews Partnership with Lao PDR to Build Capacity in UXO Sector", US Embassy in Lao PDR, 31 January 2020, at: http://bit.ly/2LzmG8J.

33 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

34 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, Country Director, NPA, 23 May 2025.

35 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025.

36 Email from Reinier Carabain, Country Manager, HI, 22 May 2025.

37 Emails from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

improved support from government at all levels, including a smoother MoU process and effective problem-solving during operational challenges, such as the US government Stop Work Order in 2025 and the subsequent US funding for HALO and MAG for shorter periods of performance.[38] The NRA Director played an active role in securing the necessary authorisations for the May to October 2025 funding period, with stakeholders noting the director's direct engagement as a key factor in achieving these outcomes.[39]

In 2022, Lao PDR established a Country Coalition under the existing "UXO Sector Working Group" (SWG), chaired by the Minister or Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and co-chaired by UNDP and rotating donor countries. Meeting twice a year, the SWG aims to improve the efficiency, transparency, and funding of mine action in Lao PDR.[40] In 2024, it focused on reviewing progress, identifying challenges and opportunities, and presenting work plans.[41]

The SWG consists of five Technical Working Groups (TWGs) covering survey and clearance, victim assistance, risk education, information management, and policy coordination and funding strategy.[42] TWGs are tasked with specific issues and report regularly to the SWG, sharing challenges, good practices, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and operational concerns.[43] In 2025, the NRA improved the TWGs by ensuring that there were tangible outcomes from the meetings.[44]

Historically, MoU procedures have been lengthy, complex, and labour-intensive, posing a major challenge at all levels and causing significant delays to survey, clearance, and procurement and importation of equipment.[45] In the Safe Path Forward III strategy, the NRA says that it has made progress in simplifying the MoU procedures in the UXO sector but acknowledged that they remain slow and this that impacts operational efficiency and may impact sector funding. It said that alternative MoU modalities that simplify management, both by NRA and the operators, may increase operational efficiency and funding.[46] Indeed, with the shift of the NRA's line ministry from MoLSW to MoFA operators have noted a reduction in bureaucracy, and in 2024 and in the first half of 2025, HALO, MAG, and NPA reported a quicker and more manageable MoU process than in previous years, with no operational delays due to the practice of requesting interim approval and good support from DoFA staff to secure district approvals.[47]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lao PDR government makes in-kind contributions to mine action including the salaries of the NRA staff (at provincial and district level) and the clearance teams of Army Unit 58, administrative support, and infrastructure in collaboration with funding from KOICA and coordination by UNDP.[48] Salaries of NRA personnel in Vientiane are paid by international donors, with funding channelled through UNDP.[49] In addition, the government provides in-kind contributions such as for UXO Lao facilities, and through tax exemptions for equipment for humanitarian operators.[50] Clearance operators are, however, required to pay visa fees for expatriates and the previous tax exemption for international experts was removed from all MoUs after 2018.[51] In addition, changes to the law mean that international NGO staff have paid income tax since 2021.[52]

Lao PDR's Article 7 report said that it requires US$50 million annually for clearance and risk education,[53] and its 2024 Article 4 extension request puts the amount of international funding required at US$45 million per year. The NRA planned to produce a resource mobilisation strategy by the end of 2025, which will detail activities to maintain donor interest and explore alternative funding avenues. These include exploring diversified sources of funding, such as working to attract smaller donors.[54]

In 2024, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and several other smaller donors continued to provide support for CMR survey and clearance in Lao PDR. In 2025, the Philippines joined as a donor, while existing donors maintained their funding commitments.[55]

MAG's operations in Lao PDR in 2024 and 2025 were funded by PM/WRA, FCDO, the Norwegian government (Norad), and several foundations and private donors. A new private donor began funding a team in Khammouane in November 2024, although the funding was due to end in July 2025.[56]

38 Emails from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; and Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

39 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

40 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J; and email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

41 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

42 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form D.

43 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form J; and email from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

44 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

45 Emails from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024; William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024; and Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024.

46 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 12.

47 Emails from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

48 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.

49 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.

50 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 13; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.

51 Emails from Katherine Harrison, NPA, 9 September 2020; Cameron Imber, Programme Manager, HALO, 11 June 2021; Julien Kempeneers, HI, 16 June 2021; and Rebecca Letven, MAG, 19 June 2021.

52 Emails from Cameron Imber, HALO, 11 June 2021; and Katherine Harrison, NPA, 19 June 2021.

53 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I.

54 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 14, 24, and 25; and email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

55 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

56 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025.

In 2024 and 2025, UXO Lao received funding support from Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and the United States.[57] US support to UXO Lao was at its highest level in 2025, with 54 US-funded clearance teams, and the deployment of new vegetation cutting teams and multi-tasks teams in the course of the year.[58] The German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) has been funding HI's UXO Clearance Project from 2024 through to the end of 2025. As of now, no new donors have expressed interest in supporting UXO clearance activities beyond this.[59] In 2024 and 2025, NPA Lao received funding support from US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) and Norad.[60] In 2024 and 2025, HALO's donors were PM/WRA, the FCDO, and Ireland.[61]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The NRA has integrated gender into all core UXO documents including work plans and the national strategy, and relevant mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age. Women, men, boys, and girls are consulted in group discussions as part of survey and clearance activities, but their differing needs and vulnerabilities have yet to be fully considered in prioritisation and planning. Accident data suggest that boys and men are particularly vulnerable, underscoring the need for tailored approaches and potentially increased participation from these groups.[62] In 2024, MoFA approved a Gender and Inclusion Code of Conduct for the NRA and UXO Lao, establishing overall standards of professional behaviour with core principles such as respect, safeguarding, and gender equality. A supporting Human Resources Policy Supplement was also approved, providing practical guidance for integrating gender and inclusion into HR systems, including recruitment, team composition, and staff development.[63]

In its Safe Path Forward III strategy, the NRA states that gender mainstreaming is important for the national programme and that women must be involved in both work planning and project implementation.[64] The NRA has pledged to continuing mainstreaming gender in the national programme by increasing cooperation with concerned stakeholders to make progress towards gender equality a more visible part of the UXO Sector. In 2024, the NRA took several steps to strengthen gender and diversity mainstreaming in the UXO sector. These included a Training of Trainers Workshop on Gender Mainstreaming, the appointment of a Gender Coordination Committee for the UXO Sector by MoFA, and the appointments of Gender Focal Points for TWGs. The Focal Points, drawn from the NRA, HALO, HI, MAG, and UXO Lao, provide updates on gender mainstreaming during TWG meetings.[65] The NRA also updated its gender action plan, training materials, and HR policies. Additionally, the Lao Women's Union conducted a sector gender analysis to inform the 2024–26 Gender Action Plan.[66]

HALO, HI, MAG, and NPA all reported having gender and diversity policies in place.[67] In 2024, HI was appointed to be focal point of gender mainstreaming in Houaphanh province.[68] MAG appointed its first female national staff member as Technical Field Manager, one of its most senior operational roles. After completion of a six-week Senior EOD course as one of the top three students, she began the role on 1 December 2024.[69] The overall number of women staff increased in 2024 from the previous year in MAG, NPA, HALO and UXO Lao, although the proportion of women employed stayed largely the same, HALO has achieved gender parity in its programme (see Table 2).

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024[70]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NRA	65	19 (29%)	12	2 (17%)	28	3 (11%)
HALO	1,468	749 (51%)	133	68 (51%)	1,367	709 (52%)
HI	35	13 (37%)	6	2 (33%)	3	0 (0%)
MAG	1,276	465 (36%)	150	57 (38%)	1,126	408 (36%)

57 Email from Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, Chief of Programme Office and Public Information (PO-PI) Unit, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

58 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

59 Email from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

60 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

61 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

62 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 10 July 2025.

63 Emails from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 10 July 2025; and Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

64 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 17.

65 Email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.

66 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

67 Emails from Fiona Kilpatrick, HALO, 29 March 2019; Blossum Gilmour, MAG, 21 March 2019; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 25 March 2019; Julien Kempeneers, HI, 22 March 2019; and Saomany Manivong, Chief of Programme Office and Public Information, UXO Lao, 10 May 2019.

68 Email from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

69 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025.

70 Emails from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025; Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

Table 2 continued

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NPA*	1,016	325 (32%)	81	12 (15%)	943	301 (32%)
UXO Lao	1,540	436 (28%)	384	142 (37%)	1,156	294 (25%)
Totals	**5,400**	**2,007 (37%)**	**766**	**283 (37%)**	**4,623**	**1,715 (37%)**

* Staff from the IM Capacity Development Project are not included. Data correct as of 31 April 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Lao PDR has an NMAS on environmental management (Chapter 21), but this needs to be revised, to review both its compatibility with the second edition of International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action and with national environmental norms. As at June 2025, the NMAS was being reviewed as part of a review of all NMAS that was due to be complete by the end of the year.[71] The Safe Path Forward III strategy says that climate change is a challenge to addressing UXO and reiterates that mine action activities have to comply with national standards and environmental protection laws.[72]

The existing NMAS requires environmental screening and assessment to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance, evaluation of local environmental sensitivities, and identification of key risks and impact through systematic assessment. The NRA requires measures to prevent or at least minimise environmental harm during demining, as well as at camps and during travel. Vehicle maintenance must occur in designated areas with soak pits to prevent water pollution; oil dumping is prohibited; and waste must be properly contained. Disposal sites are selected to avoid harm to property, infrastructure, or cultural areas, must consider shocks and noise, and are to be refurbished according to community needs. Camp sites are chosen with environmental and community input to avoid disrupting economic activities or social and cultural values, and to ensure compliance with national and local regulations. To cut greenhouse-gas emissions, organisations are encouraged to review energy use, transport, procurement, and supply chains. Waste is managed according to the waste hierarchy, with efforts to avoid single-use plastics.[73]

Table 3: Environmental policies, assessments and focal points[74]

Operator	Environmental policy in place for country programme	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
HALO	No	No	Yes
HI	No – SOP	No	No
MAG	No – SOP	Yes, but limited	Yes, since September 2024
NPA	No – SOP	Yes	Yes
UXO Lao	No	No	No

In 2024, MAG launched the "UXO Climate and Environment Forum" for operators, initially involving HALO, HI, and NPA. The forum aims to facilitate knowledge sharing on environmental and climate change issues, identify best practices, and address field challenges, such as waste management and disposal of hazardous materials.

MAG also partnered with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Vientiane office to map US bombing data against protected areas and piloted a waste separation and recycling system in its Vientiane office. These efforts have since expanded to include connections with informal recycling collectors in its field offices.

71 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

72 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", pp. 12 and 17.

73 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

74 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025; Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

MAG also conducted carbon baseline assessments in 2024 and 2025 in collaboration with its Vietnam programme, using 2023 emission factors to inform future evaluations. As a result, in June 2025, MAG launched a three-month trial in Khammouane Province, equipping five MATs with electric cookers to explore alternatives to charcoal, which is the cooking fuel most used by field teams. Charcoal was identified during data collection as a major source of emissions, producing nearly half as much greenhouse gas as the combined fuel consumption of vehicles and machinery across the programme. As the trial is ongoing, its effectiveness remains uncertain, particularly given the uncertain reliability of electricity supply in the area. It is still unclear how much charcoal use can realistically be replaced and whether electric cookers will prove to be a viable long-term alternative.[75]

HALO launched a pilot project in 2024 to replace plastic sandbags with biodegradable hessian alternatives. The trial involved 100 hessian sandbags and aimed to assess their feasibility in field operations. However, the project found that the environmental benefits did not justify the significantly higher cost—ten times that of standard sandbags—and the associated logistical challenges, including the need to prevent rotting.[76]

All clearance operators plan annual survey and clearance operations with consideration of seasonal weather patterns and accessibility – prioritising flood-prone areas during the dry season.[77] According to Lao PDR's 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, movement of ordnance as a result of flooding or landslides is increasingly common due to climate change. Local coordinators at province and district levels enable the government to respond to localised challenges and humanitarian needs.[78] MAG has worked with the authorities in Khammouane to clear task sites for villages that often get flooded so they can safely move to pre-cleared safer ground or build new villages in less-flood prone areas.[79] HALO has conducted emergency clearance for villages displaced by major flooding.[80]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Lao PDR has faced long-standing information management challenges, primarily due to inaccurate and incomplete historical data, particularly from UXO Lao between 2004 and 2010. Errors included incorrect coordinates, use of wrong GPS formats or map datums, and misfiled reports. Many records were stored only as hard copies and were never fully digitised, and the migration to the IMSMA database left further data gaps.[81] These issues have led to some clearance records being inaccurate and hindered effective planning and prioritisation. The NRA has identified the need for better quality control of data in the IMSMA database.[82]

In the past few years, the NRA and operators have made considerable progress in addressing these problems. The NRA improved quality control through systematic reviews of completion reports and streamlined reporting processes. A standardised methodology and tracking system was put in place, within the framework of the IM Capacity Development Project, to correct historical data.[83] The IMSMA database has been made accessible to all operators via a dedicated virtual private network (VPN), which has enhanced data entry and verification, and operators have reported more timely and better coordinated updates.[84] The TWG on IM meets quarterly and is widely seen as having improved coordination and helped operators to align their own IM systems.[85]

The IM Capacity Development Project, funded by US PM/WRA and jointly implemented by the NRA and NPA, aims to enhance IM capabilities across all NRA levels improving data quality and reporting. A sector-wide capacity needs assessment identified priorities in project management, QM, IM, risk education, and victim assistance. In 2023, NPA led support to the NRA in a review of the NMAS on IM (Chapter 24). This Standard was reviewed through an inclusive process, with all stakeholders invited to participate in three dedicated workshops.[86] It has been updated and, at the time of writing, was awaiting final approval.[87] NPA also initially supported IM capacity development in 9 provinces and 55 districts, later expanded to 14 provinces and 89 districts. The remaining five provinces and 27 districts are supported by UNDP.[88] The project adapted to new UXO Sector leadership, with 2024 support extended to MoFA. Expansion to five additional provinces has been discussed.[89]

75 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June and 10 July 2025.

76 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

77 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024; Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 8 June 2024.

78 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 27.

79 Email from Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024.

80 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024.

81 Emails from Bouala Thongsavanh, NRA, on behalf of Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 30 April 2018; and Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 25 March 2019; NRA, draft "Lao PDR UXO Survey Procedures", 20 September 2017; interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 2 May 2018; and interview with Hugh Hosman and Marco Heuscher, Sterling International, Vientiane, 2 May 2018; and "Data errors on IMSMA", Nigel Orr, Technical Adviser, Sterling International, 26 April 2017.

82 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 4.

83 Email from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024.

84 Emails from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024; Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024; and Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024.

85 Emails from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; and Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

86 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

87 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

88 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 18 July 2025.

89 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 24 July 2024.

In June 2025, with the support of the United States, the NRA led a review workshop for all operators and other stakeholders to develop the Information Management Strategic Plan for 2026 to 2030. It builds on training sessions provided to the NRA and the provincial regional authorities (PRAs) across 14 provinces.[90]

Lao PDR provides regular updates on its progress in Article 4 implementation, both in its annual Article 7 transparency reporting and in statements at the CCM meetings of States Parties.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Strategy for the UXO Sector (2021–30), "Safe Path Forward III", was developed under the leadership of the NRA and adopted in January 2023.[91] The target, by 2030, is to have identified 2,500km^2 of CHA and cleared 1,000km^2 of land for agricultural and development purposes.[92] This was an ambitious and aspirational target for the sector, but is more than double existing clearance output. Accordingly, the predicted clearance outputs in the 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request (see below) were revised to reflect still ambitious, but more achievable clearance predictions. These amended clearance targets were presented by MoFA at the UXO SWG meeting in July 2025.[93]

WORK PLAN FOR ARTICLE 4 IMPLEMENTATION IN 2025–30

The 2024 CCM Article 4 deadline extension request includes a five-year work plan for survey and clearance (see Table 4), with progress dependent on maintaining current funding levels. Clearance is taking place simultaneously with survey to identify CHAs that contain CMR.[94] Lao PDR plans to clear a total of 325km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area between 1 August 2025 and 31 July 2030 (i.e. 65km^2 per annum), with predicted destruction of a total of 375,000 submunitions (75,000 per annum). Lao PDR also plans to conduct CMRS over a total of area of 1,000km^2. These outputs are based on a total cost of US$225 million (US$45 million per annum) from international funding, in addition to in-kind national support.[95]

Table 4: Planned survey and clearance in August 2025–August 2030 (2024 Article 4 extension request data)[96]

Year	Clearance (km^2)	Submunitions to be destroyed	Total area to be surveyed through CMRS (km^2)	NTS (no. of villages)	External funding (US$)
2025 (Aug to Dec)	27.08	31,250	83	62.5	18.75
2026	65	75,000	200	150	45
2027	65	75,000	200	150	45
2028	65	75,000	200	150	45
2029	65	75,000	200	150	45
2030 (Jan to end July)	37.92	43,750	117	87.5	26.25
Totals	**325**	**375,000**	**1,000**	**750**	**225**

Planned 2025–2030 clearance and survey output in Lao PDR's 2024 extension request is realistic and in line with current output, based on existing capacity. The Safe Path Forward III (2021–2030) strategy and the Ninth National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2021–2025, set intentionally aspirational targets for survey and clearance (which have not been met),

90 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

91 Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Measures, Second CCM Review Conference (Part 1, virtual meeting), 25–27 November 2020; email from Chomyaeng Phengthongsawat, NRA, 21 June 2021; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2; Statement of Lao PDR on victim assistance, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 2.

92 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III", p. 14.

93 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

94 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary.

95 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part A, Executive Summary; and Part B, Detailed Narrative, Annex 1.

96 Ibid.

which were revised in 2025.[97] At the time of writing, the NRA was conducting a mid-term evaluation of the Safe Path Forward III (2021–2030) strategy to assess its effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, and relevance and coherence within the current context and national planning for the next five years.[98]

Lao PDR is in the process of drafting its Tenth National Socio-Economic Development Plan (NSEDP) for 2026–2030, which was due to be adopted by the end of 2025. The key UXO/mine action priorities are to enhance prioritisation by standardising and clearly communicating the prioritisation system to local authorities; build the long-term capacity of national operators; integrate UXO/mine action across government sectors; adopt new technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence (AI); invest in research and development to improve operational efficiency; broaden and secure funding sources; and strengthen regional and international engagement through knowledge sharing and advocacy.[99]

In its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, Lao PDR expects to increase productivity in UXO clearance year on year through the application of good practice, the adjustment of national standards to respond to evidence and best practice in-country, and better use of data.[100] If achieved, this may result in increased clearance output compared to the extension request work plan.

There was a sector-wide annual work plan for Lao PDR in 2024, developed with input from all operators. In November 2024, it was discussed at the UXO Sector Working Group meeting where MoFA presented updates on progress in the programme and resource mobilisation. At the time of writing, the work plan for 2025 had not been shared with operators.[101] The NRA sets operators yearly targets and they in turn develop their own work plans that they submit to the NRA, although tasks sometimes overlap.[102] In January 2024, the NRA provided a centralised format for operators to use to prepare and submit their annual work plans.[103]

PRIORITISATION

Prioritisation of clearance is a critical step in the land release process, but Lao PDR currently lacks comprehensive national-level guidance on the prioritisation of clearance tasks. Operators use their own systems, with priorities discussed annually with provincial and district authorities.[104] The NRA, under the Safe Path Forward III strategy (2021–2030), has committed to developing a policy for determining national priorities, emphasising survey and clearance of agricultural land and other areas key to socio-economic development.[105]

Tetra Tech began supporting the NRA in 2022 to develop a nationwide prioritisation matrix, but a national process was not launched in 2023 as planned.[106] A meeting was held with operators and UNDP in 2024, and, since then, operators have been consulted on the development of the matrix and kept informed of progress updates through the TWG and SWG meetings. The prioritisation matrix will be published as an Annex to the revised NMAS.[107] In its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, Lao PDR confirmed plans for an NMAS on prioritisation to identify high-impact clearance within each individual village and for rural development projects.[108] Seasonal factors also influence priorities, with paddy fields cleared in the dry season and other areas tackled during the wet season.[109]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The "Lao PDR UXO Survey Standards" (UXO Survey Standard No. 21/NRA) which specify the minimum requirements for the survey of all CMR-contaminated areas in Lao PDR, were approved by the NRA in 2018 and are said to align with IMAS.[110] While operators confirm their relevance to the local threat and context, there is scope for improvement based

97 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

98 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

99 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

100 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 24 and 25.

101 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

102 Emails from Katherine Harrison, NPA, 9 May 2023; and Portia Stratton, MAG, 15 May 2023.

103 Emails from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024; and Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024.

104 Comments by Rupert Leighton, UNDP, minutes of the UXO Sector Working Group meeting, 16 September 2022; and Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III" (2021–2030), p. 5; and emails from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 21 July 2023; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024; and William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024.

105 Lao PDR, "Safe Path Forward III" (2021–2030), p. 5.

106 Statement of Lao PDR on clearance, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022; and email from Khammoungkhoun Southivong, NRA, 8 June 2023.

107 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

108 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 27.

109 Interviews with international and national operators, Lao, 1–12 May 2018.

110 NRA, draft "Lao PDR UXO Survey Procedures", 20 September 2017; and 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 3; emails from Olivier Bauduin, UNDP, 10 July 2018; and Nigel Orr, (then with) Janus Global Operations, 13 July 2018; interviews with international operators, Lao PDR, 1–12 May 2018; and Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 2 May 2018; and Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Efforts, CCM Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018; 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 2; and Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 9 and 17; and CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Forms B and G.

on best practice, such as clarifying target definitions and required depths in the absence of BLU-26 submunitions, strengthening the criteria for CHA creation based on survey evidence, and updating CMRS methodologies.[111]

According to its 2019 Article 4 deadline extension request, the NRA had planned to formally review the national standards at least every three years.[112] Operators were invited by the NRA to submit recommendations to update the national standards in 2021.[113] UNDP urged a fast-tracked revision in 2022, noting that the standards as drafted were out of date and were limiting operational productivity.[114] The NRA contracted a specialist to undertake a review of the standards in 2024, with support from UNDP and input from operators and stakeholders. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a one-week training course on national standards.[115] At the time of writing, the revised standards were under review by operators, with feedback due in July 2025. Following this, the NRA and MoFA will conduct a final review, with approval of the English version of the standards expected in August. The standards will then be translated into Lao for final approval and shared with operators in late 2025.[116]

Before 2014, UXO survey in Lao PDR was largely reactive and unstructured. The introduction of the CMRS methodology has resulted in clearance being directed to confirmed cluster munition strikes, across land boundaries where necessary, and away from areas with little or no CMR. The number of submunitions destroyed per hectare cleared has significantly increased since the introduction of CMRS.[117] Over the last few years, the approach has been strengthened to include greater use of historical data, comprehensive NTS, and evidence-based TS.[118] HALO, MAG, and NPA all conduct comprehensive village-wide TS, whereas UXO Lao does not "complete" CMRS of the whole village in the same way, reportedly due to capacity limitations.[119] UXO Lao is focusing its TS on its annual clearance work plan, which is based on the needs of local authorities and communities.[120] For development projects, clearance is conducted without TS having first taken place.[121]

CMRS methodology works outwards from the initial evidence point, searching each 50 by 50 metre box with a detector, with emphasis on finding a submunition. As soon as a submunition is found, the searcher moves to the adjacent boxes.[122] Operators continue to refine their CMRS methodology in a bid to accelerate operations, including using the technique of "skipping boxes" when teams finding a submunition in one survey box skip one or more of the immediate neighbouring boxes and then survey the one after. Skipping boxes is permitted under national procedures, and, where appropriate, has become standard practice for TS teams, where the focus is on identifying the boundaries of CHAs.[123]

In TS tasks in areas of extreme and overlapping contamination, typical fade-out approaches may not be possible or appropriate, as confirmed hazardous areas can extend far beyond initial evidence points, making continued TS impractical.[124]

Clearance is limited to CHAs unless special agreements, commercial clearance, or donor-funded development projects require otherwise.[125] Prime Ministerial Order No. 43 (2016) mandates survey and clearance for all development projects in UXO-affected areas.[126]

According to the national mine action standards, the minimum clearance depth in Lao PDR is 25cm, which is intended to capture all surface and shallow CMR contamination.[127] A study on ordnance depth distribution in Lao PDR, commissioned by the NRA with UNDP support and conducted by FENIX Insight, found that the current default clearance depth of 25cm captures 97% of UXO finds.[128] Discussions between the NRA and operators are ongoing on whether clearance depths should be adapted in certain contexts, in order to balance increased productivity with appropriate levels of risk.

The NRA is exploring better use of existing data, including analysis of US bomb data, to maximise clearance outputs. This is especially pertinent in Xiengkhouang province where levels of contamination have meant that identifying individual CHAs has been challenging and where massive contamination has led to the identification of "never-ending" CHAs. Close examination of data may mean that resources dedicated to CMRS could go straight to clearance, potentially hastening clearance outputs and reducing costs. The NRA, together with Tetra Tech, was considering this concept at the time of writing.[129]

111 Emails from Saomany Manivong, UXO Lao, 10 May 2019; Cameron Imber, HALO, 7 April 2020; Katherine Harrison, NPA, 6 May 2020; and Simon Rea, MAG, 17 June 2020; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 18 July 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 16 July 2025.

112 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 18.

113 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 30 March 2022; Rebecca Letven, MAG, 30 March 2022; and Cameron Imber, HALO, 31 March 2022.

114 Presentation by Catherine Phuong, UNDP, minutes of the UXO Sector Working Group meeting, 16 September 2022.

115 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

116 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

117 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, p. 2; and Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 9.

118 NRA, draft "Lao PDR UXO Survey Procedures", 20 September 2017; and emails from Cameron Imber, HALO, 11 June 2017; Rebecca Letven, MAG, 18 June 2017; and Katherine Harrison, NPA, 18 June 2017.

119 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 21 July 2023.

120 Email from Saomany Manivong, UXO Lao, 11 May 2021.

121 Email from Nouphin Phimmasy, UXO Lao, 4 June 2022.

122 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 29 July 2025.

123 Ibid., p. 17; interviews with Neil Arnold, MAG, Phonsavanh, 6 May 2018, and Robby Dehondt, Sterling International, Sepon, 11 May 2018; and email from Ulric Eriksson, NPA, 1 May 2018.

124 Interview with Neil Arnold, MAG, Phonsavanh, 6 May 2018; and email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 10 July 2025.

125 Interviews with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 2 May 2018 and 7 February 2019, Geneva.

126 Statement of Lao PDR on National Implementation Efforts, CCM Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4–5 September 2017.

127 2019 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 17.

128 FENIX Insight, "A study on ordnance depth distribution in Lao PDR", July 2023, pp. 8 and 12.

129 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 10 and 11; and meeting between the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group and the MoFA and NRA, Geneva, 30 April 2024.

HALO did not prioritise CMRS in 2024, as a province-wide CMRS project had already been completed in Savannakhet in 2022. However, 2024 marked HALO's highest annual clearance output to date, enabling the most robust assessment yet of CMRS effectiveness. Analysis of these clearance data, combined with HALO's ongoing work using complementary methods such as bombing data analysis and desk-based reviews of wartime records, indicates that while CMRS is a valuable tool, it is insufficient on its own to identify all areas of heavy contamination in Lao PDR. Based on these findings, HALO believes the NRA's current policy to only allow CHAs to be created through CMRS is a significant limitation. This approach prevents operators from prioritising clearance based on other credible evidence and potentially leaves hazardous areas unaddressed.[130]

In response to the discovery of landmines during CMRS, HI developed a "clearance while surveying" (CWS) approach, to allow for safe release of cluster munition-contaminated areas in areas where random mines are reported and there is no evidence of systematic mine-laying or the presence of minefields. CWS involves the commencement of full clearance from the evidence point.[131] While recognising the value of systematic CMRS for long-term planning and resource mobilisation, HI argues that CWS is faster and requires less paperwork, particularly where contamination is confirmed and clearance would ultimately cover the entire CHA, including a 50 metre buffer zone until green boxes are reached.[132] In remote, high-risk areas like Houaphanh, where mines and anti-handling fuzes (M83 submunitions) have been found, HI uses a CWS approach and focuses on the highest priority areas over village-wide CMRS, citing safety and efficiency as the reasons.[133]

HI raised concerns that during TS, when items are excavated and left behind, visible submunitions may pose risks to children and local populations. This issue was brought up during the TWG on the Technical Note for CMRS.[134] HALO reports destroying all items found during TS on the same day where possible, or posts staff to guard them overnight until disposal.[135] Other operators noted that items found are clearly marked and disposed of as soon as operationally possible, depending on the availability of explosives, typically within a few days.[136]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Land release operations in Lao PDR are conducted by a range of implementing partners, which includes the national operator UXO Lao; international NGOs HALO, HI, MAG, and NPA; and Army Unit 58. In addition, 24 accredited clearance companies support commercial activities, such as infrastructure development and extractive industries.

In the last couple of years, survey capacity in Lao PDR has been reduced (see Table 5), and clearance capacity increased, to address a higher proportion of the CHAs already identified. NPA's survey teams are multi-skilled teams, combining NTS and TS, and are referred to as CMRS teams.[137]

Table 5: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed in 2024[138]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel
Lao People's Army (Unit 58)	5	25	5	35
HALO*	0	0	5	55
NPA*	0	0	8	40
UXO Lao	9	36	15	105
MAG	1	5	17	136
HI	1	2	0	0
Totals	**16**	**68**	**50**	**371**

* TS personnel also conduct NTS

According to Lao PDR's 2024 extension request, the average daily clearance rate is 811m^2 per team per day, based on an average of 13 people per team (equating to roughly 62m^2 per deminer) and with an average 22 working days per month.[139]

130 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

131 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 25 March 2020; and Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 13 July 2024.

132 Email from Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024.

133 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 30 March 2022; and Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.

134 Email from Alexandra Letcher, HI, 6 April 2023.

135 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 19 July 2024.

136 Online interview with Aubrey Sutherland, Sasa Jelicic, and Nguyen Thi Dieu Linh, NPA, 10 July 2024; and email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 July 2024.

137 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

138 Emails from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

139 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Annex 2.

Table 6: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[140]

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel	Machines
Lao People's Army (Unit 58)	N/R	216	0
HALO	89	944	0
HI	1	14	0
MAG	46	368	2
NPA	42	628	1
UXO Lao	82	492	*9
Totals	**260**	**2,662**	**12**

* Two cluster munition demolition machines and seven brush-cutters that support area clearance by preparing access roads and vegetation cutting where this cannot be done by hand.

HALO's survey and clearance efforts are focused on Savannakhet province. There was no notable change in the number of CMR survey or clearance personnel it deployed in 2024. HALO has reduced personnel numbers in 2025 as the US Department of State's funding stop order in early 2025 forced a complete halt to operations in February and March and necessitated the lay-off of all national staff. Although operations resumed at the end of March, HALO has not been able to rehire approximately 400 personnel. As a result, HALO anticipates maintaining a reduced capacity for the remainder of the year.[141]

HI is conducting survey and clearance in Phongsaly province. As of 2024–25, HI was deploying multi-task teams (MTTs) capable of conducting TS and clearance and undertaking roving tasks. In 2024, HI's clearance and survey capacity dropped due to limited/insecure funding, leading to early termination of some EOD Level 1 staff contracts. For 2025, HI planned to deploy an NTS team, a TS team, a clearance team, a roving team, and a risk education team.[142]

MAG is operational in Xiengkhouang province in the north and Khammouane province in the south. There was no significant change in the number of CMR survey or clearance personnel it deployed in 2024. In 2025, MAG planned to discontinue NTS in Xiengkhouang due to limited strategic value and low yield. Resources will be reallocated to strengthen clearance and risk education, which more directly support land release and community safety. Depending on the outcome of the LEAP trial, MAG may reduce the number of TS teams and focus more on clearance. The LEAP (Layered Evidential Assessment and Prioritisation) tool is a pilot initiative led by Tetra Tech, with MAG supporting implementation by providing teams for the trial. It is designed as a predictive survey approach, correlating US bombing data with evidence-point polygons to identify the likely sites of contamination. The trial will focus on Kham district in XiengKhouang Province and aims to shift from a proactive TS methodology to a more reactive approach that enables direct clearance when appropriate. The concept was approved by MoFA in June 2025, though further approvals will be required for use by all operators, with implementation targeted for the first quarter of 2026.[143]

NPA is operational in the four southern and heavily contaminated provinces of Attapeu, Champassak, Saravan, and Xekong. In 2023–24, NPA received significantly increased funding from PM/WRA to double its clearance capacity (from 20 to 40 teams). NPA is now deploying 42 BAC teams (two funded by the NMFA and the remainder by PM/WRA) with no major change to capacity expected in 2025.[144]

UXO Lao is fully operational in six provinces (Attapeu, Houaphanh, Khammouane, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, and Xiengkhouang) with partial operations in Champassak, Saravan, and Xekong. Field operations in Houaphanh and Luang Prabang resumed in March 2024 following renewed PM/WRA funding. In 2024, UXO Lao increased its survey and clearance personnel compared to 2023, thanks to additional funding from the US, Japan, New Zealand, and Luxembourg. No changes were expected to the number of NTS, TS, or clearance personnel in 2025. However, overall staffing will increase with the establishment of seven EOD multi-task teams and 16 vegetation cutting teams in the six US-funded provinces, bringing total personnel to more than 1,600.[145] These deployments aim to boost productivity by enabling EOD teams to focus on clearance, while dedicated vegetation-cutting teams handle site preparation.[146]

The Lao armed forces' Unit 58 humanitarian demining capacity has expanded significantly since 2023, with a total of 227 personnel as at June 2025, including 18 women, operating across various mine action tasks. The capacity includes 10 clearance teams totalling 130 deminers; 5 TS teams totalling 35 deminers; and 5 risk education/NTS teams totalling 25 deminers.[147] This is directly in line with the plans set out in the 2024 extension request to expand Unit 58 to a total of 20 clearance, survey, and risk education teams.[148] The NRA considers Unit 58 a valuable asset, operating in line with

140 Emails from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025; William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024; Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; and Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

141 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

142 Email from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

143 Emails from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June and 10 July 2025.

144 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

145 Email from Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025.

146 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 4 August 2025.

147 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

148 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 22.

national and international standards, with good coordination between the army and the NRA. The army is also being trained in the use of IMSMA.

Lao Army teams (completely separate to the humanitarian "Army 58" teams) and not coordinated by the NRA, started UXO clearance in 2017 to enable construction work on the US$6 billion Lao-China high-speed railway to proceed safely.[149] According to an online media source, since 2018, specialists from the International Mine Action Center (IMAC) of the Russian Armed Forces have been clearing UXO in Lao PDR, and have surveyed 0.17km^2 and cleared 2,300 items of explosive ordnance. From November 2024 to February 2025, Lao and Russian military personnel cleared nearly 0.16km^2 of land and destroyed 285 items of UXO in Viengxay district of Houaphanh Province.[150]

Operators have consistently been refused permission to use drones in their survey, clearance, and EOD operations.[151] The lack of permission, which reportedly originates from high levels within the Government of Lao PDR, is due to a cross-ministerial process and is beyond the control of the NRA.[152] Under the Lao Civil Aviation Regulation issued by the Department of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Public Works and Transportation (MoPWT), there is a specific regulation for drones operated for recreation, leisure, or sport. In addition, the relevant party must have clearance from other relevant ministries for aerial photography, overflights of security-sensitive areas, use of radio frequencies, and other related activities, including permission from local authorities, among others. For any other purpose, such as mine action, operators must follow the approval process according to the intended use, specific requirements, and applicable laws and regulations.[153] In 2024, HALO collaborated with owners of private drones in Savannakhet province, which proved valuable for preparing complex EOD tasks. HALO is also exploring a drone pilot project in partnership with the NRA, although sufficient funding has not yet been secured.[154]

DEMINER SAFETY

On 21 February 2024, a UXO (BLU-24)-related accident occurred during a team break at one of the NPA clearance tasks, resulting in one amputation and one serious injury. A joint investigation by NPA and NRA was conducted. A follow-up internal investigation was also conducted by NPA Head of Global Operations and an NPA Global Special Advisor. The findings and recommendations by the NPA Head Office team were shared and discussed with all NPA programmes and with the donors.[155]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 7: Land release outputs in 2024 (based on NRA data)

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Comments
Clearance	*71.70	NRA data (excluding commercial clearance not deemed to be CMR clearance)
Technical survey	0	NTS and TS focus on creation of CHAs as part of CMRS.
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	71,106	NRA data. Includes 34,485 destroyed during spot tasks and 11,709 destroyed during TS.

* Excludes commercial clearance in 2024 in which few or no submunitions were found, as Mine Action Review does not deem this to be CMR clearance. For commercial clearance by LXML in 2024, Mine Action Review has estimated the size of cluster munition-contaminated area cleared by LXML based on the number of submunitions it destroyed and the average area cleared per submunition calculated based on humanitarian operator clearance data for 2024.

149 S. Vaenko, "Army deployed to clear UXO for Laos-China railway", Vientiane Times, 6 January 2017; and email from Bouala Thongsavanh, NRA, on behalf of Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 30 April 2018.

150 "Russia, Laos Clear Over 285 Unexploded Ordnance in Past Three Months", The Laotian Times, 20 February 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4np5wv8.

151 Emails from William Hunter, HALO, 30 May 2024; Yvon Le Chevanton, HI, 8 May 2024; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 18 May 2024; and Email from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

152 Email from Katherine Harrison, MAG, 8 May 2024.

153 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 8 August 2025.

154 Email from William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

155 Email from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

According to the NRA data reported to Mine Action Review, a total of more than 331km^2 of CHA containing CMR was identified in 2024 (see Table 8).[156] This is up from the 238km^2 identified in 2023.[157]

Table 8: Technical survey of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024 (based on NRA data)[158]

Operator	Area surveyed (m^2)	Area identified (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	Mines destroyed
Army Unit 58	13,365,100	4,002,000	316	22	0
HALO	5,047,500	1,335,484	324	258	0
MAG	261,014,404	260,628,515	4,241	30	0
NPA	9,969,500	2,494,501	421	19	0
UXO Lao	86,958,908	62,931,323	6,407	1,267	1
Totals	**376,355,412**	**331,391,823**	**11,709**	**1,596**	**1**

According to Lao PDR's Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency report, a total of more than 328km^2 of CHA containing CMR was identified in 2024 across 12 provinces.[159] This is an increase from 2023 when 206.68km^2 of CHA was identified in 2023 across 11 provinces.[160] According to the data reported to Mine Action Review by humanitarian clearance operators (except for Unit 58), nearly 332km^2 of CHA containing CMR was identified in 2024.[161]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

According to the data reported to Mine Action Review by the NRA, a total of more than 75.2km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2024, of which nearly 70.1km^2 was agricultural land and the remainder was cleared for other development projects (see Table 9).

However, the 75.2km^2 includes commercial clearance. Commercial clearance, unlike humanitarian clearance, tends to involve clearance of land in which no or very few submunitions are destroyed. It is not targeted clearance of CHAs, but instead clearance at the request of clients of often uncontaminated land, required for confidence building for construction and development projects. Mine Action Review does not consider this as CMR clearance. Of the almost 4km^2 of commercial clearance in 2024, 1,133,287m^2 was cleared by Milsearch during which 63 items of UXO but no submunitions were discovered, and 608,523m^2 was cleared by OUMMA during which only 2 items of UXO were discovered, one of which was a submunition. Mine Action Review does not deem the clearance conducted by Milsearch and OUMMA in 2024, to have been of cluster munition-contaminated area. The 4km^2 of commercial clearance also included 2,235,888m^2 cleared by LXML, during which 673 items of UXO were discovered, of which 292 items were submunitions. Based on the number of submunitions it destroyed and the average area cleared per submunition calculated based on humanitarian operator clearance data in 2024, Mine Action Review has estimated that 482,676m^2 of the total area cleared by LXML in 2024, was of CMR-contaminated area. This brings the annual total of clearance of all cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024 to 71,704,052m^2 (71.7km^2), which is the 2024 clearance total Mine Action Review has used.

During the year, a total of 71,106 submunitions were destroyed, of which 34,485 were destroyed during spot tasks, together with a large number of items of UXO and a small number of anti-personnel mines.[162] This is an increase from the more than 56.67km^2 cleared in 2023 with 58,382 submunitions found and destroyed.[163]

Table 9: CMR clearance by province in 2024 (NRA data, including commercial clearance)[164]

Province	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed during clearance, TS and spot tasks	UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed
Attapeu	6,894,022	5,227	207	1
Bolikhamxai	1,237,349	830	253	5
Champassak	2,407,578	3,682	1,154	3
Houaphanh	894,119	1,907	970	3

156 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
157 Email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.
158 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
159 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
160 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2023), Form A.
161 Emails from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.
162 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 1 July 2025.
163 Email from Chanmy Keodara, NRA, 13 July 2024.
164 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 1 July 2025.

Table 9 continued

Province	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed during clearance, TS and spot tasks	UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed
Khammouane	3,674,051	6,776	2,089	5
Luang Prabang	1,379,259	2,734	785	1
Oudomxay	249,667	1	1	0
Phongsaly	161,528	308	174	0
Saravan	7,799,180	7,795	1,070	2
Savannakhet	21,538,610	15,047	9,842	24
Vientiane	457,187	126	661	0
Vientiane Capital	0	0	16	0
Xaisomboun	1,094,957	273	241	0
Xekong	5,268,229	7,917	745	4
Xiengkhouang	22,143,338	18,483	7,764	9
Totals	**75,199,074**	**71,106**	**25,972**	**57**

According to Lao PDR's Article 7 report and CCW Protocol V report, in 2024 a total of more than almost 75.20km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared across 15 provinces (see Table 10). Of the total, 93% was for agricultural use and 7% for development projects. A total of 71,106 submunitions were destroyed during clearance, TS and spot tasks, along with 26,972 items of other UXO and 57 mines.[165] This is a significant increase from the 61.9km^2 of area cleared in 2023 with 58,735 submunitions found and destroyed.[166]

A total of 71.93km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was reported as cleared by operators in 2024 (except for Army Unit 58), with 43,527 submunitions found and destroyed and 24,275 destroyed during spot tasks (see Table 11).[167]

Table 10: CMR clearance by province in 2024 (Article 7 data)[168]

Province	Area cleared (m^2)
Attapeu	6,894,022
Bolikhamxai	1,237,349
Champasak	2,407,578
Houaphanh	894,119
Khammouane	3,674,051
Luang Prabang	1,379,259
Oudomxay	249,667
Phongsaly	161,528
Salavah	7,799,180
Savannakhet	21,438,013
Vientiane	457,187
Xaisomboun	1,094,957
Sekong	5,268,229
Xiengkhouang	22,075,924
Total	**75,031,063**

165 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F; CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (covering 2024), Form A; and email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 4 August 2025.

166 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F. The total of the clearance table in that Article 7 report is 62,096,837m^2, but the sum of the individual lines comes to 61,904,288m^2.

167 Emails from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

168 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

Table 11: CMR clearance reported by operator in 2024 (operator data)[169]

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed
HALO	374	16,827,278	8,871	1,820	8,257	0
HI	63	177,496	294	14	0	142
MAG	415	16,919,119	3,988	8,430	0	889
NPA	123	11,200,542	9,860	2,306	406	1
UXO Lao	950	26,809,459	20,514	11,705	2	7,104
Totals	**1,925**	**71,933,894**	**43,527**	**24,275**	**8,665**	**8,136**

Of the CMR clearance recorded for 2024, 6.6km^2—almost 10% of the total—was of land where no submunitions were found (see Table 12).

Table 12: Area cleared in 2024 in which no submunitions were found (operator data)

Operator	Area cleared (m^2)	Comments
NPA	411,972	Poor survey and/or task planning.
MAG	4,211,459	113,104m^2 was for development projects; Historically, TS was conducted very intensively before full clearance. Over the last two years, MAG has revised its methodology, introducing skip-boxing to identify CHAs more efficiently and use resources better. Much of the recent clearance without submunitions relates to TS conducted in 2019–20 before these improvements were adopted. MAG believes that the LEAP tool will further reduce the need for intensive TS.
HI	23,006	
HALO	1,956,762	As HALO typically create CHAs after TS, it sometimes includes areas where all CMR have already been found and destroyed, especially in the less contaminated western parts of Savannakhet province. In some cases, CHAs sit in the database for years before clearance, during which time land use can change. Locals may plough fields and remove items themselves, as suspected in some areas following extensive cassava planting in 2024. Development sites also often have minimal contamination.
Total	**6,603,199**	

NPA, UXO Lao, and HALO both increased clearance output from 2023 to 2024 due to increased operational capacity.[170] There was no significant difference from 2023 to 2024 for MAG, while for HI clearance output dropped due to a reduction in capacity.[171]

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LAO PDR: 1 AUGUST 2010

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2020

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 AUGUST 2025

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE (5 YEARS): 1 AUGUST 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE. LAO PDR WILL REQUIRE MULTIPLE EXTENSION REQUESTS BEFORE REACHING COMPLETION

169 Emails from Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025; Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

170 Emails from Per Håkon Breivik, NPA, 23 May 2025; Vilaivanh Thongmanivong, UXO Lao, 27 May 2025; and William Hunter, HALO, 22 June 2025.

171 Emails from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 12 June 2025; and Reinier Carabain, HI, 22 May 2025.

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lao PDR is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2030. Due to the massive extent of CMR contamination, and based on current capacity and output, Lao PDR will require multiple extensions to fulfil its Article 4 obligations.

There was a 39% increase in the amount of area identified through TS from 2023 to 2024 and a 12% increase in clearance output due to greater capacities in Army Unit 58, UXO Lao, and NPA. This was largely due to increased US funding to support the Lao government's strategic plan to clear more high-priority CHAs.[172] In Lao PDR's 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, an annual clearance target of 65km^2 has been set, which should be achievable if the upward trajectory of clearance output can be maintained (see Table 13). However, as the rate in which land is currently being confirmed as contaminated through CMRS is far quicker than the rate of clearance of the CHA identified, and the baseline will continue to increase. The NRA has said that it will take decades of clearance, based on current clearance capacity output.[173]

While the introduction of CMRS has significantly improved the efficiency of land release, challenges remain. A more flexible, evidence-based approach could help accelerate progress. For example, nearly 4.65km^2 of land was cleared in 2024 with no contamination found, raising questions about the efficiency of current land release methods. MAG has proposed revising the land release process to allow for NTS–Clearance without requiring TS intervention where there is strong evidence of cluster munition contamination. The LEAP tool, developed by Tetra Tech, could be an important step forward in supporting this approach in Lao.[174] However, while acknowledging the potential for a more flexible approach, the NRA maintains that the full NTS–TS–Clearance process is necessary to protect against liability, questioning who would be accountable if an accident occurred on land released after NTS without TS. Nonetheless, the NRA has indicated willingness to engage with UXO operators in the coming year to explore ways to make the land release process more efficient.[175]

An estimate of CMR contamination will not be known until the nationwide CMRS is completed,[176] which is still many years away and which focuses only on populated areas. In addition, much of the contamination is in remote and mountainous areas. This makes comprehensive survey efforts difficult and time-consuming, as determining the total size and location of all CMR-contaminated land in each province remains a major task.[177] It is a notable achievement that systematic CMRS of assigned villages has already been completed in five of the most heavily contaminated provinces in the south and good progress is also being made in Xiengkhouang. In addition, some CMRS is also being conducted to a varying, but far lesser, extent in five additional contaminated provinces, but in the four other contaminated provinces, no survey has yet been undertaken.

Lao PDR will need to continue strengthening its survey and clearance capacity in the coming years. However, the donor funding landscape remains unpredictable and, at times, insufficient to sustain the scale of operations required. Lao PDR's Article 4 deadline extension work plan to 2030 continues to depend heavily on external support, with an estimated US$45 million needed annually, totalling approximately US$225 million, for activities such as risk education, survey, and clearance.[178]

Table 13: Five-year summary of CMR clearance*

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	71.70
2023	56.67
2022	50.72
2021	46.68
2020	42.90
Total	**268.67**

* Excluding commercial clearance

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Lao PDR is still determining the extent of its baseline of CMR contamination and is many decades from fulfilling its Article 4 obligations. The GICHD believes the NRA would benefit from a strategic approach to preparing for transition to a more reactive phase, and ultimately for completion. The GICHD organised a regional workshop in south-east Asia in 2023 on risk management and liability in land release and the management of residual contamination.[179] In its 2024 Article 4 deadline extension request, Lao PDR said the government is committed to working with national capacities to develop long-term solutions to residual contamination, most notably deployment of the clearance capacity of Army Unit 58.[180] In 2025, the NRA reported to Mine Action Review that the government has prioritised investment in Army Unit 58 and that its capacity has expanded with UNDP providing capacity building support to ensure long-term sustainability.[181]

172 Email from Olivier Bauduin, US Embassy Vientiane, 13 July 2022.
173 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request 2024, Part B, Detailed Narrative, p. 22.
174 Email from Eli Mechanic, MAG, 17 July 2025.
175 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 8 August 2025.
176 Interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 2 May 2018.
177 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.
178 Ibid.
179 Email from Namrita Singh, GICHD, 21 May 2024.
180 2024 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Part B, Detailed Narrative, pp. 4 and 22.
181 Email from Viengdalat Somphet, NRA, 17 June 2025.

LEBANON

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension requested to 1 May 2030

CMR CONTAMINATION: 4.67KM^2

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	0.41	0.66
Technical Survey	0.01	0.06
Non-Technical Survey	0.03	0.13

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	1,607 (incl. 1,137 in spot tasks)	1,956 (incl. 508 in call-outs and mine clearance)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/ Engineering Regiment (ER)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity and Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Lebanon's clearance output continued to fall in 2024 as the conflict with Israel caused significant operational difficulties. Funding and capacity limitations remain critical obstacles alongside a shift in priorities away from clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) and towards survey of new CMR contamination and on clearance of other unexploded ordnance (UXO) to enable the safe return of displaced persons.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **All implementing agencies in Lebanon should routinely conduct technical survey (TS) in the release of CMR tasks.**
- **LMAC should submit a detailed costed work plan following the completion of survey of new CMR contamination that includes annual targets for clearance and operational capacity needs.**
- **LMAC should also elaborate a plan for completing clearance of CMR in difficult terrain, including the number and size of tasks concerned.**
- **LMAC should develop a resource mobilisation plan and strategy that advocates for longer-term, multi-year donor commitments to support strategic planning, reduce operational disruptions, and improve staff retention among clearance operators.**
- **LMAC should lead a consultative review of the national strategy for CMR clearance to ensure it reflects new challenges, updated land release methodologies, and available resources.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	8	8	The new contamination baseline at the end of 2024 cannot be explained by the amount of land released and previously unrecorded cluster munition-contaminated area added to the database. Lebanon has reported new CMR contamination, which is the result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots rather than new use. As of writing, survey of these newly contaminated areas was underway and was expected to be completed by end 2025.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	8	8	The Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) continued to show strong national ownership and commitment in 2024. Coordination with implementing partners was maintained through regular technical working group (TWG) meetings.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC is committed to the mainstreaming of gender and diversity in Lebanon. Gender and diversity considerations are included in the National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 and LMAC has a gender work plan, while the programme has a Gender, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Committee.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	LMAC does not have an environmental management policy in place but does have a national mine action standard (NMAS) on "Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment" (10.70), although this has not yet been updated to align with the revised IMAS 07.13.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	8	8	In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced to better reflect operational needs. Lebanon submitted an Article 7 report covering 2024, but there were some inconsistencies with the data.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25. A detailed work plan, including annual projections for survey and clearance, will be submitted following completion of the survey of new contamination.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	LMAC has steadily strengthened its NMAS over the last five years. While there was no significant change in overall capacity in 2024 from the previous year, most CMR clearance teams were redeployed for non-technical survey or to new areas due to the security situation.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	5	5	CMR-contaminated area clearance decreased in 2024 compared to 2023. Lebanon will not meet its 2026 deadline and has submitted a request to extend its Article 4 deadline to 2030. Despite earlier plans and some progress, clearance has been hampered by under-resourced operations, difficult terrain, economic instability, and recent conflict, leaving contamination levels far above projections.
Average Score	**7.3**	**7.3**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA)
- Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC)
- Regional Mine Action Centres (RMAC-N)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)/Engineering Regiment (ER)
- Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD)
- Social, Humanitarian, Economical Intervention for Local Development Association (SHEILD)
- Beeatona
- University of Balamand

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
- UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Lebanon had a total of 4.67km^2 of confirmed hazardous area (CHA) containing CMR (see Table 1).[1] This is an increase from the end of 2023 when there was 4.65km^2 of CMR contamination.[2] This difference cannot be explained by land release and new contamination alone.

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2024)[3]

Province	Area (m^2)
Beqaa	135,886
South Lebanon and Nabatieh	4,380,733
Mount Lebanon	156,304
Total	**4,672,923**

Lebanon is contaminated with new CMR as a result of Israeli airstrikes on weapons and munitions storage depots belonging to non-State armed groups during the conflict that began on 8 October 2023 until the ceasefire that began on 27 November 2024. These storage depots contained cluster munitions, along with other explosive ordnance, and led to submunitions being dispersed. To date, there is no evidence of cluster munitions having been used by Israel, Hezbollah, or other armed groups in Lebanon during this recent conflict.[4]

In southern Lebanon, a comprehensive and detailed survey is required to accurately identify all areas contaminated not only by CMR but by all types of explosive remnants of war (ERW).[5] Non-technical survey (NTS) is ongoing and LMAC reported that, as at June 2025, the CMR baseline had increased by approximately 650,000m^2, with survey planned to be completed by the end of 2025. It was not possible to access and survey areas suspected to contain new contamination during the conflict and NTS teams are working with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and local authorities to access these areas safely. While most accessible areas have now been assessed, survey is hampered by the ongoing occupation of areas of operation by the IDF and daily shelling, including along the entire Blue Line.[6] In addition to large amounts of contamination from other ERW, rubble removal from the many destroyed buildings slows survey.[7]

In November 2020, LMAC completed a nationwide non-technical re-survey of all remaining CMR areas to improve baseline accuracy and support CCM Article 4 planning. NTS teams revisit sites every three years, and NGO operators have the option to deploy NTS teams to re-survey each new task prior to starting clearance.[8] LMAC migrated to Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021 with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This revealed that several villages had been registered in the wrong province, affecting the distribution but not the total amount of CMR contamination.[9]

In a 2018 database review, LMAC standardised CHAs without defined boundaries to 10,000m^2.[10] While operators report this can over- or under-estimate actual task size, LMAC maintains the approach and increased the figure by 250% (to 25,000m^2) in its Article 4 planning to account for fade-out.[11] Baseline accuracy is further complicated by clearance following the 2006 cluster munition strikes which was mostly limited to rapid surface clearance. This included emergency clearance by the LAF around infrastructure, schools, and roads, and clearance contracted by the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre – south Lebanon (MACC-SL) to NGOs, commercial firms, and government bodies in coordination with the National Demining Office (now LMAC).[12]

The majority of CMR contamination in Lebanon is the result of the conflict with Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90% of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.[13] An estimated one million submunitions failed to explode.[14] Some Israeli bombing data was provided—most recently through the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—but has proved to be inaccurate.[15] In addition, some CMR still remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982,[16] and there is a small amount of CMR contamination on the north-east border with Syria, resulting from spill-over of the Syrian conflict onto Lebanese territory in 2014–17.[17] Types of submunitions found in Lebanon include Israeli, Soviet, and United States (US)-made submunitions, types AO-2.5 RT, BLU-18, BLU-26, BLU-61, BLU-63, M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118, and MZD-2.[18] Some areas contain unexploded

1 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, EORE and Media Section Head, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
2 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024; and Article 7 report (covering 2023), Form F.
3 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F.
4 Al Jazeera, 15 April 2024, Mapping Israel-Lebanon cross-border attacks, at: https://bit.ly/3VlYtWy.
5 Email from Adnan Araji, Acting Chief of Operations, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 28 April 2025.
6 Email from Sylvain Lefort, Country Director, MAG, 10 July 2025.
7 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
8 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 5 April 2019 and 19 March 2020.
9 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F; and email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
10 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019; LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 13; Article 7 Report (covering 2018), Form F; and revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 10.
11 Emails from Valerie Warmington, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 28 May 2020; and Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 2 September 2020.
12 Human Rights Watch, "Flooding South Lebanon. Israel's use of cluster munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006", 16 February 2008.
13 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006.
14 Email from Brig.-Gen. Ziad Nasr, Director, LMAC, 27 April 2018; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.
15 Interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, Head of Operations, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; presentation by Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 16 November 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F.
16 Landmine Action, "Foreseeable Harm: the use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006", 2006; interview with Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, Director, and Brig.-Gen. Fakih, LMAC, Beirut, 11 April 2016; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022) Form F.
17 Revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 2.
18 Ibid., p. 23.

submunitions resulting from both ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions, which can further complicate the picture.[19] The extent of new contamination resulting from kick-out from strikes on weapons and ammunition storage depots is not yet known but is not thought to be very extensive.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Lebanon is also contaminated by other unexploded ordnance (UXO), booby-traps, and anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Lebanon for more information). In October 2023, Amnesty International reported that the Israeli army had used white phosphorus artillery shells during an attack on the southern border town of Dhayra, a populated civilian area, claiming that this action violated international humanitarian law.[20] There are also additional online reports of the use of white phosphorus by Israel.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Lebanon's mine action programme is under the control of the military. The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA), which has overall responsibility for Lebanon's mine action programme, is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and is chaired by the Minister of Defence. In 2007, a national mine action policy outlined the structure, roles, and responsibilities within the programme, and LMAC was tasked to execute and coordinate the programme on behalf of the LMAA.[21]

LMAC, part of the LAF, is based in Beirut. Since 2009, the Regional Mine Action Centre-Nabatiyeh (RMAC-N), which is a part of LMAC, has overseen operations in south Lebanon, under LMAC supervision.[22] At the end of 2018, the RMAC-Ras Baalbek (RMAC-RB) regional centre was established in north-east Lebanon to oversee mine action operations, but it closed in 2023 after the area was declared free of mines.[23]

LMAC has a capacity that, in general, functions well, but as the staff are army officers, typically many senior managers, including in RMAC, are rotated every two years or so, which hampers continuity in the management of the three mine action centres.[24] The current director of LMAC started in April 2025.[25] A new standing operating procedure (SOP) for LMAC was approved in November 2020. The SOP specifies the roles of each section of LMAC and clarifies the responsibilities and cooperation between sections. It is hoped that it will help preserve institutional memory, assist new LMAC staff, and reduce the impact of staff rotations.[26]

There is good coordination and collaboration between LMAC/RMAC and clearance operators, with consultation before key decisions are taken.[27] International operators reported that an enabling environment exists for mine action in Lebanon, with LMAC facilitating the processing of visas for international staff and assisting with the importation of equipment, including exemption of customs fees for equipment.[28] DanChurchAid (DCA) reported that during and after the conflict, visa procedures were more closely scrutinised, with on-arrival visas no longer granted and working visas typically taking several weeks to be approved. In addition, residency cards were cancelled and multiple-entry visas issued in their place for international personnel.[29]

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel provide institutional support to LMAC, particularly in strategic planning, project management, resource mobilisation with a focus on sustainability, coordination, and reporting. In 2024, three UNDP personnel were supporting LMAC with administration and information management.[30] The International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security provided institutional support to LMAC in 2024, helping to strengthen the LMAC's administrative, logistic, and technical capacity. The GICHD supports Lebanon through technical training, compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), operational planning, gender and diversity, and enhancement of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[31]

In 2024, particularly during preparations for the post-ceasefire emergency response, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided extensive support to LMAC. This included developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and training on white phosphorus handling, and producing technical notes and training materials on rubble removal and debris management. MAG also co-led the Debris Task Force, contributed to the updated rubble removal prioritisation

19 Interview with Oussama Merhi, UNDP, in Geneva, 26 June 2015.

20 Amnesty International, 31 October 2023, *Lebanon: Evidence of Israel's unlawful use of white phosphorus in southern Lebanon as cross-border hostilities escalate*, at: https://bit.ly/3VBUxT4.

21 LMAC, "Mid-term Review to Strategy 2011–2020, Milestone 2013", August 2014, pp. 4–5.

22 LMAC, "Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020", September 2011, p. 4.

23 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 21 August 2019; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

24 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, signed June 2020, p. 4.

25 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.

26 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 28.

27 Emails from Sylvain Lefort, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 March 2021; Hala Amhaz, NPA, 15 March 2021; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; and David Ligneau, Mine Action Programme Manager, HI, 21 April 2020.

28 Emails from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, Programme Manager, NPA, 8 April 2025.

29 Email from Mohamed Chour, Head of Mine Action Lebanon, DCA, 24 April 2025.

30 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

31 Ibid.

matrix, and developed resources for handling air-dropped bombs. MAG supported the Regional School of Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon (RSHDL) in delivering two courses in battle area clearance (BAC).[32]

DCA's NTS teams are supporting LMAC by delivering NTS training and assisting with IMSMA Core implementation.[33] NPA identified several issues with LMAC's transition to IMSMA Core in 2023 and has continued working closely with LMAC's Information Management department to resolve them.[34]

A "Humanitarian Mine Action Forum" was established in Lebanon in close partnership between LMAC and Norway. The forum aims to meet twice a year, with UNDP designated as the secretariat for the Forum.[35] In 2021, the Netherlands took over from Norway as Forum co-chair.[36] In 2024, the Forum met once.[37] A technical working group (TWG) where LMAC and the RMACs meet with clearance operators was established in 2018, meeting every two to three weeks in 2024 in response to the security situation.[38] Since the start of the conflict in 2023, representatives from the LAF Engineering Regiment, UNDP, and the Social Stability Working Group have also attended the meetings.[39] In 2024, discussions focused on adjusting LMAC's operational plan due to the conflict, including increased emphasis on EORE, NTS, rubble clearance, the use of mechanical assets, and new SOPs.[40] Operators said the TWG offered a useful platform for coordination and timely discussion of emerging operational challenges.[41]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The Lebanese government contributed approximately US$7.5 million in 2024 towards the mine action programme (for both landmine- and CMR-related work), to support costs associated with the running of LMAC (facilities and staff); two LAF Engineering Regiment BAC teams and three Engineering Regiment teams to cover rapid response across Lebanon; risk education; victim assistance; training; and advocacy.[42] This is the same amount as 2023.[43] Before the economic crisis, the Lebanese government had planned to allocate around $30 million for clearance operations. However, due to ongoing political and financial instability, no government funding for this purpose was allocated in either 2023 or 2024.[44]

In Lebanon's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, it was estimated that $26.5 million would be needed to cover all land release activities through to 2030. However, this was based on a pre-war contamination estimate and at the time of writing, Lebanon was seeking to determine the exact amount of funding already secured for 2025 from both national and international sources. Once the total available funding is identified, it will be subtracted from the overall budget needed to implement the full four-year work plan. The remaining amount will represent the funding gap, and Lebanon will specify what portion of this gap it expects to cover through national resources and what it seeks from international partners.[45]

Also at the time of writing, Lebanon was developing a detailed resource mobilisation plan with a clear timeline alongside a strategy which focuses on mapping available and potential funding sources; developing partnerships and proposals to secure financial, technical, and material assistance; and enhancing communication with partners.[46] Operators provided feedback on the draft plan but, as at July 2025, the final version had not been shared.[47]

In 2024, DCA received funding for survey and clearance of CMR from the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) and, to a lesser extent, from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which focused on the Ain Al Helwe Palestinian refugee camp. In 2025, CMR survey and clearance operations were being funded by PM/WRA and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). In 2025, PM/WRA funding was suspended for a time, with operations resuming following confirmation of a waiver on 19 February 2025.[48]

HI's CMR survey and clearance operations in 2024 were funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Luxembourg and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO). Although GFFO funding prioritised ERW removal in the south, HI was permitted to use the team for BAC due to the security conditions. As at April 2025, HI had no confirmed funding for CMR operations.[49]

32 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
33 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
34 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
35 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 23.
36 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
37 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
38 Ibid.
39 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.
40 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
41 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
42 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
43 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
44 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
45 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p. 6.
46 Ibid.
47 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025.
48 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
49 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

MAG's CMR survey and clearance operations in 2024 were funded by PM/WRA, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, GFFO, Japan's Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP), and Fibertek. Japan and the Netherlands both stopped funding in 2024 and the GFFO stopped funding in 2025. For 2025, MAG continues to receive support from PM/WRA, the NMFA, Fibertek, and, for the first time, UNICEF. Canada may provide additional funding, but this was not confirmed as at April 2025.[50]

NPA was entirely funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2024. Norway continued to fund NPA's operations in 2025 and the Republic of Korea (through the ITF) also provided funding for two clearance teams for five months in 2025.[51]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The gender and diversity-related policy applied at LMAC is that of the LAF military rules. LMAC reports that all staff are familiar with the rules, including provisions on gender equality, inclusion, safeguarding, and behavioural codes.[52] Committed to mainstreaming gender and diversity across mine action in Lebanon, LMAC has implemented inclusive policies, with data disaggregation in risk education and victim assistance, appointment of a gender focal point, implementation of a gender work plan, and organisation and participation in courses at the RSHDL.[53]

In 2024, MAG in partnership with LMAC launched the Gender and Inclusive Forum, an initiative that brought together INGOs, NGOs, UNDP, and LMAC to collectively advance gender equity within the sector. MAG and LMAC also co-hosted the Gender in Mine Action Forum at the RSHDL, which led to the reestablishment of the Gender, Diversity and Inclusion (GDI) Steering Committee and encouraged partner organisations to designate gender focal points.[54]

Lebanon's National Mine Action Strategy 2020–25 includes considerations on gender and diversity.[55] Of the five objectives in the strategy, the fifth states that: "The specific needs and perspective of women, girls, men and boys from all groups of society are considered, in order to deliver an inclusive HMA [mine action] response". LMAC also acknowledges in the strategy that mine action "is a male-dominated environment and we have therefore a particular responsibility to empower women and ensure that we have a gender sensitive approach to our work".[56]

The GICHD's 2021 assessment of gender and diversity in Lebanon's mine action programme found that LMAC had implemented many of its recommendations.[57] In 2023, LMAC and the GICHD co-hosted a three-day course to strengthen gender and diversity integration among mine action stakeholders.[58] LMAC also reviewed its NMAS in 2023 to align with IMAS and integrate gender and diversity considerations.[59]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024[60]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA*	68	13 (19%)	18	5 (28%)	50	8 (16%)
LMAC	149	15 (10%)	20	2 (10%)	46	2 (4%)
MAG**	202	31 (15%)	49	6 (12%)	170	25 (14%)
NPA	77	15 (19%)	12	3 (25%)	56	11 (20%)
HI	14	3 (21%)	1	0 (0%)	11	3 (27%)
Totals	**510**	**77 (15%)**	**100**	**16 (16%)**	**333**	**49 (15%)**

* DCA – Mine action staff only (excluding programme staff)
** MAG – 198 national staff and 4 international staff

The number of staff at LMAC is determined by the LAF headquarters, so LMAC has limited control over the number of women, but it consistently requests that the percentage of women be increased.[61] However, the proportion of women at LMAC is more than double the 5% average of the Lebanese armed forces and LMAC seeks to improve this ratio further.[62] The number of women in operational positions has decreased from seven in 2023.

50 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
51 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
52 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020.
53 LMAC, "Annual Report 2018", p. 5; and email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 7 March 2019.
54 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
55 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March and 22 July 2020.
56 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 8.
57 Email from the GICHD, 6 April 2023.
58 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
59 Ibid.
60 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
61 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 19 March 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 19.
62 LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 37.

MAG, NPA, DCA, HI, and Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD) all reported having gender policies in place.[63]

MAG Lebanon advanced gender equality and inclusion in 2024 through international and national initiatives. It contributed to the "Getting Ready for Siem Reap" meeting, highlighted progress on gender policies, and integrated gender-responsive practices in recruitment and training. Women participated in technical roles, including EOD and team leader training, and MAG advocated successfully for the inclusion of women in Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) courses for LAF staff. A new training facility with separate accommodation for women is also under construction. Internally, MAG re-established its Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) Committee and delivered training on gender mainstreaming and action planning.[64]

In 2024, DCA launched a new Gender Action Guide, established a Gender Hub on the Fabo platform, and updated its online gender training.[65] HI also strengthened its gender-responsive approach by including women in mine clearance teams and providing specialised training on gender and diversity to its staff.[66]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

LMAC does not currently have an environmental management policy, although there is a vision to develop one in the future and it recognises its responsibility to ensure that demining operations are conducted responsibly and efficiently while also minimising the impact on the environment. Lebanon's NMAS on Safety and Occupational Health – Protection of the Environment (10.70), which is said to align with IMAS 07.13. Although it has not been updated to reflect the revised IMAS, LMAC specifically aims to achieve this.

LMAC and its implementing partners are required to coordinate with local authorities and landowners before operations start. All NTS reports and clearance plans include information on the climatic and weather characteristics of the region, their impact on the clearance operation, and the measures to be taken. After clearance has been completed at a worksite, operators must remove and appropriately dispose of all rubbish and large fragments of munitions, filling in any holes in the ground to stabilise the surface so that natural regeneration can take place.[67] Additionally, when planning and prioritising survey and clearance tasks, Lebanon considers climate-related and extreme weather risks.[68]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[69]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
HI	No	Yes	No
MAG	No	Yes	No (has not been assigned yet).
NPA	Yes	No	Yes

In 2024 and 2025, mine action operators introduced several new measures to reduce environmental harm and greenhouse gas emissions. Solar panels were installed at selected demining offices and camps to reduce reliance on diesel generators, with MAG's Beirut office becoming fully solar powered. Solar power was also used for the first time during HI's Body Worn Camera project to charge equipment in the field.[70] MAG Lebanon began a baseline carbon footprint assessment to inform the development of a work plan and country-level environmental policy.[71] DCA enhanced vehicle maintenance routines and improved travel planning to cut fuel use and emissions, while increased use of digital tools, such as mobile apps and cloud-based systems, has reduced paper consumption.[72]

63 Emails from Emile Ollivier, NPA, 19 March 2019; David Willey, MAG, 7 March 2019; Mahmoud Rahhal, POD, 8 March 2019; and Mohamed Chour, DCA, 30 April 2024.

64 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

65 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

66 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

67 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022 and 5 May 2023.

68 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.

69 Emails from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

70 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

71 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

72 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Since 2021, LMAC has been using IMSMA Core.[73] Key improvements in the new system include more accurate drawing of surveyed polygons using tools based on GPS and imagery base maps; reducing instances of double counting of polygons; and recording the depth at which ordnance was discovered, its condition, and whether it is safe to move.[74] In 2024, new emergency response forms were introduced to better reflect operational needs and capture the full range of survey activities. These updates aim to maintain accurate and comprehensive data collection.[75] Planned disaggregation by disability and displacement status has been delayed due to the conflict and response priorities and will be revisited in 2025 planning.[76]

Lebanon submitted a timely CCM Article 7 report covering 2024. However, the land release data provided in the report did not match the data provided to Mine Action Review. Lebanon submitted a comprehensive Article 4 deadline extension request along with additional information as requested the CCM Article 4 Analysis Group. A detailed work plan with annual targets for the extension request period is forthcoming once the NTS of new CMR contamination has been completed.

PLANNING AND TASKING

LMAC has a National Mine Action Strategy for 2020–25 with a strategic implementation plan,[77] developed with support from the UNDP project funded by the European Union (EU).[78] One objective of the strategy is to complete clearance of all known cluster munition-contaminated areas by the end of 2025,[79] but LMAC will not meet this target.

In 2023, LMAC conducted a mid-term review of the strategy and implementation plan in cooperation with programme stakeholders. The key outcomes of the review were that the strategy's impacts, outcomes, and outputs are aligned with the theory of change newly developed by a consultancy company, ITAD, and adapted to Lebanon's specific context.[80] The result is a refined implementation plan for the second term.[81] A final external review of the strategy was conducted at the beginning of 2024.[82]

A new strategy covering 2026–2030 will be developed to address current challenges, priorities, and operational needs. LMAC has routinely developed a new strategy every five years to reassess unmet objectives and integrate emerging priorities. As with previous strategies, the plan will define clear objectives, required resources, and implementation methods to ensure an effective and responsive mine action programme.[83]

Lebanon's 2020 Article 4 deadline extension request outlined predicted annual clearance output and capacity up to the end of 2025. In 2024, LMAC cleared 0.39km^2, which was only 26% of the 2024 clearance target. In 2021–24, only 3.2km^2 was cleared of the 7.2km^2 that was planned.[84]

Lebanon has work plans in place for 2024 and 2025, but adjustments were made to reflect current security conditions and operational priorities.[85] A detailed work plan will be submitted as part of Lebanon's 2025 Article 4 deadline extension request, including annual projections disaggregated by method (NTS, TS, and clearance), along with the deployment plan for survey and clearance teams once the survey of new CMR contamination is completed and the national prioritisation plan has been revised.[86]

LMAC conducted a study in 2021 of tasking leading to the creation of a new national prioritisation system, based on three strategic categories: safety, economy, and treaty compliance. Each category contains subcategories which take operational considerations and impact into account.[87] The prioritisation of actions and allocation of resources is automated in IMSMA Core.[88] LMAC reported that national prioritisation criteria were being reviewed to focus on survey and clearance of residential areas to facilitate the safe return of displaced persons.[89]

73 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 31.
74 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023.
75 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
76 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
77 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 22 July 2020 and 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Plan for the Implementation and Monitoring of the LMAP Strategy (2020–25)", p. 3.
78 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2019", p. 7.
79 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2020–25, p. 4.
80 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 13 May 2024; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 30 April 2024.
81 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, p. 27.
82 Email from Lt. Col. Charbel Njeim, LMAC, 2 July 2024.
83 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.5.
84 Revised 2020 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 25 February 2020, p. 37.
85 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
86 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 10 June 2025, p.10.
87 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 March 2021; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 35.
88 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 May 2023; and LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 32.
89 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Lebanon developed its first NMAS in 2010 and since then there have been regular revisions to ensure IMAS compliance, integrate lessons learned and case studies, and strengthen gender and diversity considerations.[90] Some notable revisions which have increased operational efficiency include formally incorporating TS into cluster munition tasks; reducing the fade out distance from a 50-metre radius to a 30-metre radius in high-density CMR tasks, and to a minimum 25-metre radius in low density tasks; and reducing the frequency of destruction of items found in cluster munition sites from daily demolitions to a single demolition day each week.[91] LMAC found that where TS for CMR tasks was applied in 2022, an average of 51% of land was reduced.[92]

HI has been developing innovative techniques to support land release for several years, including the use of advanced sensors to detect buried explosive ordnance. In collaboration with LMAC, HI has trained their teams and other operators in Lebanon on improved survey methodologies. In 2023–24, HI piloted and implemented Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) in demining operations across Lebanon. The introduction of BWCs enhanced monitoring and oversight by enabling real-time or retrospective review of field activities and improving quality assurance (QA) and compliance with SOPs. They also supported training and knowledge transfer by providing footage for post-operational debriefings and training materials. Transparency and accountability were strengthened through verifiable records of daily operations. Finally, BWCs contributed to greater operational efficiency and safety by helping identify procedural deviations and allowing for immediate corrective action.[93]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, CMR clearance was conducted by international operators DCA, HI, MAG, and NPA; and the LAF Engineering Regiment.[94] There was no significant change in overall capacity in 2024, but the security situation imposed significant operational constraints. Mechanical assets could not be used in several areas due to security risks and restricted access. The teams were restructured to focus on NTS over clearance and clearance teams were relocated from South Lebanon to Mount Lebanon. Due to operational needs, the number of NTS teams might increase in 2025. However, funding constraints are expected to lead to a reduction in the overall number of TS/clearance teams.[95]

The LAF Engineering Regiment has two BAC teams. A further three Engineering Regiment companies conduct rapid-response call-outs. The Engineering Regiment has four mine detection dog (MDD) teams for TS and for use as a secondary asset supporting clearance, but none of these is used for CMR.[96] Through the Engineering Regiment, LMAC provides mechanical assistance to operators lacking this capacity.[97] Machines are mostly used as secondary assets to support clearance teams (e.g. for ground preparation, rubble removal, or for fade-out); in areas where manual clearance is difficult; and for TS and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). Often, though the terrain is unsuitable. Due to the economic crisis, LAF activity has declined, including mechanical support. Operators now cover fuel, maintenance, and spare parts for LAF-provided machines. MAG has also introduced machines to be used as primary assets.[98]

NPA worked with LMAC and the LAF to assess the capacities of the LAF MDDs for CMR survey and clearance, as LMAC said use of MDDs in TS proved successful previously for addressing CMR. However, as of writing, there are no plans to build the capacity of the LAF MDDs for CMR survey and clearance. While the concept remains under consideration, the activity is currently not prioritised due to operational and financial constraints.[99]

90 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
91 Emails from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 15 June 2021 and 30 June 2023; Hiba Ghandour, MAG, 7 April 2022; Mouhamed Chour, DCA, 4 April 2022.
92 LMAC, "Annual Report 2022", p. 13.
93 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
94 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
98 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.
99 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

Table 4: Operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024[100]

Operator	NTS teams	Total of NTS personnel	Comments
LMAC	6	12	
DCA	2	4	
HI	1	2	
MAG	6	12	NTS teams also conduct EORE and other tasks
NPA	1	4	NTS team also conduct EORE and CPP
Totals	**16**	**34**	

Table 5: Operational CMR clearance capacities deployed in 2024[101]

Operator	Manual teams	Total clearance personnel*	Machines**
LAF/ER	2	N/K	4
MAG	4	40	0
DCA	2	40	1
NPA	6	41	0
HI	12	8	0
Totals	**26**	**129**	**5**

* Clearance personnel also work on TS tasks.
** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters. N/K = not known.

DCA's clearance capacity significantly decreased from 2023 to 2024 due to security-related restrictions on deployment. In 2025, operations were continuing to be affected as the South, particularly areas along the Blue Line, was heavily targeted during the conflict and remains the primary zone of impact. Updated information indicates that minefields along the Blue Line have been disturbed and require new NTS along with surveys of new CMR contamination.[102]

In 2024, MAG's CMR teams were relocated to work in safer areas in Mount Lebanon and later redeployed to Jezzine and West Bekaa, due to the security situation. In 2025, reductions in funding might affect the number of teams conducting CMR survey and clearance.[103]

NPA deployed its six teams at 60% (six days out of every 10) in 2024, an increase from 50% in 2023. NPA expected to maintain deployment at this level in 2025 due to funding constraints.[104]

HI maintained its capacity in 2024 and trained its BAC personnel in rapid response, NTS, and TS to better respond to the impacts of the conflict. It expected to maintain these personnel into 2025.[105]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 6: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	411,601	National authority estimate
Technical survey	6,682	National authority estimate
Non-technical survey	28,717	National authority estimate
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	1,607	Includes 1,137 during spot tasks

100 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025; Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025; Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 10 July 2025; and Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

101 Ibid.

102 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.

103 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.

104 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

105 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, 28,717m² was cancelled through NTS (see Table 7) and a further 6,682m² was reduced through TS (see Table 8).[106] This is a 78% reduction from the 129,825m² cancelled through NTS and an 89% reduction from the 62,782m² reduced through TS in 2023.[107]

In 2024, LMAC reported that 169,749m² of previously unrecorded CMR was registered in the database. In addition, fade-out correction of perimeters for known CMR sites took the total baseline increase to 296,668m².[108] DCA identified one task of 30,381m² of previously unrecorded legacy CMR contamination in Aley district, Mount Lebanon.[109] MAG identified 187,026m² of previously unrecorded CMR contamination, 8,267m² of which was new contamination and the rest legacy contamination.[110] NPA identified one task totalling 19,720m² in late December 2024 of new CMR contamination.[111]

Table 7: Cancellation through NTS in 2024[112]

Province	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Mount Lebanon	N/K	3	2,961
	N/K	5	2,827
South Lebanon	MAG	4	6,503
	NPA	3	9,632
Bekaa	N/K	3	6,794
Totals		**18**	**28,717**

Table 8: Reduction through TS in 2024[113]

Province	Operator	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
Bekaa	MAG	1	6,682
Totals		**1**	**6,682**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

Lebanon reported clearing 0.41km² of CMR-contaminated land in 2024 (see Table 9) and destroying 470 submunitions in the process.[114] This is a 38% reduction from the almost 0.66km² of CMR-contaminated land cleared in 2023.[115]

Table 9: CMR clearance by province in 2024[116]

Province	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	UXO destroyed during CMR clearance
Mount Lebanon	DCA	6	142,779	220	284
	HI	1	30,522	47	1
	NPA	N/K	22,789	89	0
South	MAG	4	82,306	15	8
Bekaa	MAG	10	121,718	76	1
N/K	LAF	N/K	11,487	23	N/K
Totals		**21**	**411,601**	**470**	**294**

N/K = Not known

In addition, LAF destroyed 1,137 submunitions during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks.[117]

106 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
107 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
108 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
109 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
110 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
111 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
112 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.; Article 7 report (covering 2024), Form F. MAG reported cancelling 5 areas of 6,508m² and NPA reported cancelling 4 areas of 9,732m² in South Lebanon, HI reported cancelling 1,075m² in Mount Lebanon.
113 Emails from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025; and Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025. Article 7 report states that 26,137m² was released in Bekaa through TS. HI reported reducing two areas (one suspended) in Mount Lebanon and NPA reported reducing 4,462m² in Mount Lebanon as part of re-survey.
114 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.
115 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 2 May 2024.
116 Article 7 report states that 203,530m² cleared in Mount Lebanon and 106,310m² in Bekaa with a total of 471 submunitions found and destroyed. In Mount Lebanon, DCA reported clearing 145,519m² and destroying 183 items of UXO, HI reported clearing 30,657m² and did not destroy any items of UXO, and NPA reported clearing 47,234m² although 11,532m² was recorded as TS as is included here rather than in the TS table as it is used to speed up clearance of fade-out areas on clearance tasks. In the south, MAG reported clearing 81,856m².
117 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025. Article 7 report states that 1,160 submunitions were destroyed during spot tasks.

DCA's survey and clearance output dropped significantly in 2024 due to the impact of the conflict, which led to lost working days and a complete suspension of operations from 23 September to 27 November. Additional delays were caused by adverse weather conditions. DCA reported that 19,655m^2 were cleared in Alay and 2,740m^2 in Metn with no submunitions found.[118]

HI only began conducting CMR clearance in late 2023 and clearance operations were suspended for the last three months of 2024 due to the conflict and instead redirected toward Rapid Response, NTS, and rubble clearance.[119]

MAG experienced a significant decrease in land release output in 2024 due to operational disruptions caused by the conflict. From 23 October 2023, MAG teams were unable to deploy in South Lebanon and West Bekaa due to security concerns. Teams were instead redeployed to safer locations which did not contain CMR. This was followed by a full operational stand-down during the escalation of hostilities between September and November. After the ceasefire, most NTS activities were limited to baseline assessments, which did not result in any area cancellations. MAG reported clearing 14,993m^2 with no submunitions found.[120]

NPA reported a reduction in both area cleared and items found compared to 2023. Operations were entirely suspended from mid-September to mid-December 2024 due to staff displacement following Israel's intensified bombing campaign and ground incursion after 17 September. Additionally, operations began later than usual in 2024, following LMAC's decision on 16 October 2023 to suspend activities in the South Litani Sector (SLS), requiring NPA to identify alternative tasks further north.[121]

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR LEBANON: 1 MAY 2011

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MAY 2021

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE (FIVE YEARS): 1 MAY 2026

↓

SECOND EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FOUR YEARS): 1 MAY 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE (EXTENSION REQUESTED)

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Lebanon is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2026. Lebanon will not meet this deadline and has requested a further four-year extension to 1 May 2030.

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–20.[122] The plan called for clearance of all CMR by 2016 and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020. Both goals were dependent on capacity, but progress fell well short of planning targets. Progress was also hindered by the historical lack of NTS and TS, which often resulted in inefficient land release and unnecessary clearance of uncontaminated land. LMAC has now rectified this through the application of TS and its incorporation into the NMAS.

Lebanon has cleared approximately 4.49km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in the last five years (see Table 10). In accordance with its first Article extension request plan targets, the remaining CMR contamination was projected to be 1.55km^2 by the end of 2024. The actual remaining contamination was more than triple this figure at 4.67km^2. Several factors have contributed to this discrepancy, including insufficient funding due to the economic downturn, political instability, and shifting donor priorities. Lebanon's severe currency depreciation and inflation have directly impacted the value of government support for clearance operations and has increased the cost of those operations. The recent conflict caused a significant decrease in survey and clearance output as operations were suspended for part of the year in 2023 and 2024. Additionally, some of the CMR contamination is in areas of difficult terrain and a joint study by LMAC and the GICHD has estimated that the additional cost to address this contamination is approximately $1 million.[123] There is the added complication of tasks located in difficult terrain that have been targeted during the conflict, such as in Tyr Harfa which has been targeted by Israeli strikes over 400 times since 7 October 2023. This site will require re-survey and verification of any previous clearance before operations can begin, or resume, in the case of Tyr Harfa, where clearance was suspended in March 2023.[124]

118 Email from Mohamed Chour, DCA, 24 April 2025.
119 Email from Adnan Araji, HI, 28 April 2025.
120 Email from Sylvain Lefort, MAG, 27 April 2025.
121 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.
122 LMAC, Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020, September 2011, p. 4.
123 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2024, p. 11-13.
124 Email from Southern Craib, NPA, 8 April 2025.

Lebanon has now submitted an Article 4 extension request for a further four years and while possible, it is unlikely that it will complete CMR clearance in this time. The urgent need to enable the safe return of displaced populations and secure residential areas has increased the focus on NTS and clearance of all UXO, not just CMR. This shift in national priorities may lead to the reallocation of resources, including teams and operational efforts, towards rapid response and emergency clearance, and away from CMR clearance. Lebanon already faces a shortage of clearance teams required for planned CMR operations. Additional resources and funding are thus urgently needed to address the new contamination while maintaining progress toward fulfilling Article 4 obligations.

Table 10: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	0.41
2023	0.65
2022	1.15
2021	1.00
2020	1.28
Total	**4.49**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

According to LMAC, a tolerable level of residual risk will remain even after all major clearance is complete as hazardous areas not previously identified as containing CMR may be found in the future. LMAC understands the need to start building a sustainable national mine action capacity to deal with residual contamination. Between 2021 and 2025, Lebanon planned to determine an end state and elaborate an exit strategy; establish a sustainable structure capable of addressing remaining contamination and any residual challenge; and obtain national funding for the structures and build their capacity, all with support from international actors.[125]

LMAC presented a draft exit strategy to all stakeholders including donors at a Mine Action Forum meeting in 2022.[126] The finalisation of the strategy has been postponed as it is dependent on a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination and the availability of sufficient financial and technical support to complete clearance. Once the NTS on new areas of contamination has been completed and updated operational requirements are available then a more targeted exit strategy for CMR contamination may be developed.[127]

125 LMAC, "Annual Report 2020", p. 31.

126 Email from Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, LMAC, 29 March 2022.

127 Email from Lt.-Col. Ali Makki, LMAC, 27 May 2025.

MAURITANIA

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 AUGUST 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Two-year extension requested to 1 August 2028

CMR CONTAMINATION: 15.17KM^2

Medium
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	102,703	0
Technical Survey	1,022,774	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	29	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD) battle area clearance teams

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Mauritania reported reducing through technical survey (TS) just over 1km^2 from two cluster munition-contaminated areas— Dalet Tigert and Dhbeiyatt—near Bir Moghrein in the far north Tiris Zemmour region. Both areas were identified as being contaminated in 2023. It also reported clearing 102,703m^2 at Dalet Tigert, destroying in the process 29 submunitions. Survey and clearance were conducted by the National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (PNDHD) using national funds. As of December 2024, Mauritania had 10 areas with cluster munition remnants (CMR), covering an estimated area of almost 15.2km^2. Due to the scale of the remaining contamination, the slow progress of clearance, and the lack of international support, Mauritania has requested a new extension (its third) to its Article 4 clearance deadline under the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). It warned that, without international financial support, clearance will continue at its current pace, potentially delaying completion to 2035.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mauritania should strengthen its resource mobilisation strategy to ensure increased national and international funding are available to complete clearance by its third extended Article 4 deadline.**
- **Mauritania should put in place a national coalition forum to support its resource mobilisation strategy and serve as a strategic avenue to engage potential donors.**
- **Mauritania should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for its mine action programme as per the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).**
- **Mauritania should revise its national standard on environmental protection ensuring alignment with IMAS 07.13.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	In 2024, no cluster munition-contaminated areas were discovered, and TS and small-scale clearance slightly reduced remaining contamination to 15.17km^2.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	6	6	The PNDHD remains the only entity conducting CMR clearance in Mauritania. National funding to the PNDHD increased by $50,000 to $180,000 in 2024, with this modest annual contribution expected to continue during the extension period requested in 2025.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	4	4	Mauritania's 2023–26 mine action plan recognised that a specific gender and diversity policy has still to be developed.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	5	5	Mauritania has a short environmental protection national standard, drafted at the end of 2024, and under review in 2025. Environmental considerations are briefly mentioned in the 2025 extension request. Mauritania noted that, due to the low population density and the desert conditions in Tiris Zemmour, the environmental impact of clearance is likely to be minimal.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	No major developments on information management were reported in 2024. In 2025, however, the PNDHD and the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) started migrating data to the new version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core). Mauritania also submitted both its new deadline extension request and Article 7 report in time – in December 2024 and early January 2025, respectively.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	4	4	Mauritania does not have a CMR strategic plan but included information on how it plans to address CMR in its successive Article 4 deadline extension requests. In the absence of international support, clearance would continue at current pace and could take up to 10 years, with the PNDHD clearance teams able to address only one area a year.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	7	7	National standards were reportedly reviewed in 2024 by the interministerial steering committee that oversees the PNDHD. Mauritania's updated 2025 extension request attached its standards on TS and battle area clearance, both dated March 2022. In 2025, several standards, including on TS and both mine and battle area clearance, were revised and shared with Mines Advisory Group.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	6	6	For 2024, the PNDHD reported CMR clearance of 102,703m^2 at Dalet Tigert area, near Bir Moghrein village, as well as 1,022,774m^2 reduced through TS. Mauritania's current deadline extension to August 2026 will not be met. It has therefore requested a third extension to 1 August 2028. Without significant international support to address CMR, Mauritania has warned that it may not be in a position to declare completion within the coming ten years.
Average Score	**5.7**	**5.7**	**Overall Programme Performance: AVERAGE**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- PNDHD battle area clearance teams
- Army Engineer Corps

OTHER ACTORS

- HAMAP-Humanitaire
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Mauritania's current baseline of CMR contamination comes from new discoveries and entries recorded by the PNDHD in 2019. These followed accidents in 2018 and a redefinition by the Mauritanian government of the areas under its jurisdiction or control, particularly in relation to mine contamination in the Nouadhibou peninsula. These findings were confirmed by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) during an assessment conducted in February to March 2021 at the request of the PNDHD, with the aim of producing a more accurate estimate of remaining contamination. NPA identified approximately 14km^2 of CMR contamination across nine hazardous areas in the northern region of Tiris Zemmour, near Bir Moghrein, along the border with Western Sahara.[1]

Between 2021 and 2023, Mauritania reported the discovery of additional cluster munition-contaminated areas, some of which have since been surveyed and cleared by the PNDHD.[2] At the end of 2024, contamination was estimated to cover 15,173,065m^2 across 10 hazardous areas (one suspected and nine confirmed). See Table 1 for details. This is a reduction on the 16,298,542m^2 across 11 hazardous areas reported in 2023.[3] The 10 hazardous areas are transit zones for nomadic populations, livestock activities, and artisanal gold-mining. In 2024, two accidents involving submunitions occurred in April and December, injuring two male gold-miners.[4]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by location (at December 2024)

Region	Location ID	Submunition Type	SHA	CHAs	Area (m^2)
Tiris Zemmour	Boudheir	BLU-63	0	1	20,556
Tiris Zemmour	Boudheir 1	BLU-63	0	1	38,667
Tiris Zemmour	Boudheir 2	BLU-63	0	1	243,147
Tiris Zemmour	Dhbeiyatt*	BLU-63	0	1	807,502
Tiris Zemmour	Dhbeiyatt 1	BLU-63	1	0	693,670
Tiris Zemmour	Guneive	BLU-63	0	1	4,683,196
Tiris Zemmour	Lemreir	BLU-63	0	1	2,587,276
Tiris Zemmour	Motlani	BLU-63	0	1	120,365
Tiris Zemmour	Oudeyat Lekhyame	MK118	0	1	5,326,856
Tiris Zemmour	Tigert 1	MK118	0	1	651,830
Totals			**1**	**9**	**15,173,065**

* This area was identified in 2023 and reduced by 779,774m^2 through TS in 2024, leaving 807,502m^2 to be cleared in 2025.
SHA = Suspected hazardous area; CHA = Confirmed hazardous area.

In 2014, Mauritania had declared fulfilment of its CCM Article 4 obligations at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, having completed CMR clearance the previous year. Nine areas covering 1.96km^2 had been cleared and 1,246 submunitions destroyed. The contamination was part of a battle zone situated in the department of Bir Moghrein in the region of Tiris Zemmour and resulted from use of MK118, BLU-63, and M42 cluster munitions during the 1975–78 conflict between Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front over Western Sahara.[5]

Mauritania has claimed that all recorded cluster munition-contaminated areas lie within its jurisdiction and control, bringing the duty to clear unequivocally within Mauritania's international legal obligations under the CCM.[6] In its 2021 assessment report, NPA indicated that hazardous areas (which contain both mines and CMR) within and around Mauritania could be classified in four categories, based on whether they are located within or outside the State's jurisdiction and control.[7] In the case of the most northerly hazardous areas located close to the border, it is possible

1 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form F; APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), p. 4; and NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021.

2 CCM Article 7 Reports (covering 2021–2024), Form F.

3 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form F; and email from Commander Sarr, Head of Operations, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.

4 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form H.

5 Mauritania Declaration of Compliance with Article 4(1)(a) of the CCM, submitted on 3 September 2014; and Article 7 Report (covering 2013), Form F.

6 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.

7 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 4. Category 1: Hazardous areas within Mauritanian jurisdiction and control (Bir Moghrein and the north western portion of Nouadhibou) ; Category 2: Hazardous areas outside Mauritania jurisdiction and within Mauritania control (Nouadhibou peninsula); Category 3: Hazardous areas within Mauritania jurisdiction but outside Mauritania control (i.e. the area where the Morocco defence line crosses into Mauritania); Category 4: Hazardous areas that are outside both Mauritania jurisdiction and control (area close to the Morocco defence line outside Mauritania boarder and in Western Sahara).

that other CMR contamination extends into the territory of Western Sahara. Clearance of any such contamination would need to be agreed upon with the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic.

NPA cautioned that the contamination is in very remote and sparsely populated areas, and that residual contamination is likely to remain after the completion of large-scale clearance.[8]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

After declaring compliance with Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 2018, Mauritania reported newly discovered mined areas in 2020, as well as mined areas redefined as falling under its jurisdiction or control.[9] Subsequent surveys have identified additional areas of mixed contamination, including anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW).[10] For more detailed information, see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* reports on Mauritania.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) is responsible for coordinating mine action operations in Mauritania.[11] Following the Mauritania's ratification of the CCM in 2012, the mandate of the PNDHD was expanded to include cluster munition contamination in addition to landmines.[12] It also provides the framework for Mauritania's national mine action strategic plan, the latest of which covers the period 2023–26. [13] But this strategic plan is focused on mines and does not address CMR.

Since 2007, the PNDHD has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation, with oversight from an interministerial steering committee composed of representatives from key ministries (defence, foreign affairs, and finance), civil society organisations, and international observers (the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP).[14] It works in close collaboration with the Military Engineering Department.[15]

The PNDHD has its headquarters in the capital, Nouakchott, with a regional mine action centre in Nouadhibou. Mauritania has for several years planned to establish a second regional centre in Zouerate, the capital of Tiris Zemmour, which is described as "essential" for CMR clearance in the area.[16] The updated extension request submitted in June 2025 included a budget for the establishment of this centre, estimated at €350,000 (of which 36% would be nationally funded), along with a list of the equipment Mauritania required.[17] The PNDHD is composed of five departments: operations (including information management and quality control); small arms and light weapons; risk education/ victim Assistance; the secretariat; and administration and finance.[18] In 2024, it employed 26 personnel, of whom 10 were women, and oversaw eight battle area clearance (BAC) teams, including four deployed in Tiris Zemmour to address cluster munition-contaminated areas. In addition, 10 non-permanent staff can be called upon as needed for operational activities.[19]

The PNDHD is funded by the Mauritanian government, which allocated approximately $180,000 in 2024, up from $130,000 a year earlier.[20] In its updated 2025 extension request, covering August 2026 to August 2028, Mauritania described plans to maintain this annual contribution at $180,000.[21] This amount covers certain operational costs, as well as salaries and per diem of the PNDHD personnel and army engineers, but does not account for additional in-kind contributions, such as infrastructure and vehicles, which are also made available.[22] The national budget is not specifically earmarked for CMR-related activities, but represents the overall mine action budget, and it remains insufficient to sustain large-scale clearance. To meet its obligations by 2028, Mauritania has requested more than US$2.4 million in external funding.[23]

Since Mauritania started addressing the newly discovered CMR contamination in 2021, it has not received any international financial support specifically dedicated to addressing CMR.[24] International mine action operators present in country in 2024, notably HAMAP-Humanitaire and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), have focused efforts on other contamination (mines and ERW) in Dakhlet Nouadhibou. In 2024, the PNDHD received capacity-building support from

8 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 3.

9 Mauritania Declaration of Compliance with Article 5 of the APMBC, submitted on 29 November 2018 at the 17MSP; and 2021 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

10 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), pp. 3 and 4.

11 Decree No. 1960/MDAT/MDN establishing the PNDHD, 14 August 2007.

12 Presentation of Mauritania, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

13 Mauritania, "Updated Article 5 Extension Request Work Plan", submitted to the APMBC 21MSP in November 2023.

14 Decree No. 001358/MDAT establishing the Steering Committee of the PNDHD, 3 September 2007.

15 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

16 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 9; presentation of Mauritania, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

17 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

18 Presentation of Mauritania, Regional Conference on Improvised AP Mines, Ghana, 13–15 February 2024.

19 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 1 September 2024.

20 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form I; and emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 24 May 2024 and 23 April 2025.

21 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13.

22 Interview with Colonel Baham, National Coordinator, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13 (footnote).

23 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.

24 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 1.

these international organisations. HAMAP-Humanitaire, with renewed funding from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2024, provided explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training to 21 deminers, along with demining equipment (six detectors and eight sets of personal protective equipment (PPE)) and an ambulance. This added to the five vehicles donated in 2023. HAMAP-Humanitaire also supplied IT equipment and furniture for the deminers' camp.[25] MAG, through UK and Norwegian grants, contributed to capacity development through training on disarmament conventions, IMAS 2.10 (Guide for the Establishment of National Mine Action Standards), and project and budget management. MAG also organised a training on non-technical survey (NTS) in July 2024 and supported the acquisition of a Land Cruiser.[26]

In its successive extension requests, Mauritania has expressed its intention to establish a national coalition that would bring together the PNDHD, specialised operators and organisations, and donors, in particular States Parties to the Convention, willing to support Mauritania's efforts.[27] Although this coalition did not materialise in 2023 or 2024, HAMAP-Humanitaire has offered its support to convene a meeting in 2025, and Mauritania's updated 2025 extension request confirmed that a fundraising roundtable with potential donors will be organised.[28] Mauritania clarified that "it is fully open to receiving funding through an international NGO, provided that it retains a leadership role and that national capacities are mobilised".[29] France provided support to the Mauritania mine action programme in 2023 and 2024 through HAMAP, and voiced support during intersessional and meetings of States Parties for the resource mobilisation efforts of several affected States, including Mauritania.[30] Mauritania regularly participates in the Intersessional and Meetings of States Parties to the Convention, where it reports on progress and challenges.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Mauritania's 2023–26 mine action plan acknowledges that the country has yet to develop a dedicated gender and diversity policy.[31] As at April 2025, no such policy had been adopted, and the 2025 extension request did not indicate plans to establish one. In the interim, the PNDHD said it adheres to the national policy promoting gender equality and encouraging women's participation in traditionally male-dominated roles.[32]

By the end of 2024, women made up 39% of the PNDHD's 26 staff, with four women in managerial or supervisory positions, including the risk education/victim assistance department director (see Table 2).[33] The programme has a gender focal point, who is tasked with promoting greater inclusion, particularly in management and risk education.[34] The 2025 extension request included a budget line for a gender advisor, intended as a per diem for the focal point, to strengthen inclusivity, especially in risk education and victim assistance.[35] In 2024, two female staff members—a nurse and a cook—were deployed as part of clearance operations led by HAMAP-Humanitaire in Nouadhibou. NTS conducted by a community liaison team supported by MAG also involved mixed teams.[36]

Table 2: Composition by gender of the PNDHD (at end 2024)[37]

	Staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
PNDHD	26	10 (39%)	8	4 (50%)	18	6 (33%)

Mauritania said it consistently highlighted inclusivity, gender sensitivity, and diversity as priorities in the design and implementation of its programmes in its extension requests.[38] However, the reality is that women are primarily involved in risk education and victim assistance and support functions, rather than in more technical or operational roles. Operators have emphasised the need to enhance gender inclusion in mine action programming, noting that prevailing stereotypes suggest that women are not able to cope with physical demands such as walking long distances or working in the heat. The PNDHD has acknowledged that achieving gender balance in survey and BAC teams is challenging also due to the composition of seconded personnel from the Corps of Engineers.[39]

25 Email from Julien Kempeneers, Head of Mine Action, HAMAP, 15 April 2025.
26 Email from Emilie Sauvanet, Regional Programme Manager, West Africa, MAG, 31 Mars 2025.
27 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 13; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
28 Email from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
29 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
30 Statement of France, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024; and CCM Implementation Support Unit (ISU), Quarterly Newsletter, Q4 2022, 9 January 2023.
31 Mauritania, "Plan d'Action Déminage 2023–2026", p. 6.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
34 Mauritania, "Plan d'Action Déminage 2023–2026", p. 6.
35 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 14 and 19; and email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
36 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
37 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
38 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18.
39 Ibid., p. 13; and 2023 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 15 and 16.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In late 2024, Mauritania developed a draft national mine action standard focused on environmental protection, which was under revision in 2025.[40] The objective of the standard is to ensure that areas targeted for clearance are not environmentally degraded and that their intended post-clearance use is preserved. It references IMAS 07.13 and outlines specific mitigation measures to reduce environmental impact during EOD and other clearance operations. These include provisions for handling hazardous and toxic substances, protecting water sources, and managing waste. The standard also requires operators to adapt their standard operating procedures (SOPs) accordingly.

The PNDHD is responsible for ensuring the standard is applied and promoted among operators, but it does not have a dedicated environmental focal point.[41] In the meantime, the head of operations is responsible for ensuring that environmental considerations are integrated into the process, including during the preparation phase (when guidance and training are provided) and through on-site monitoring.[42]

Environmental considerations are briefly mentioned in the 2025 extension request. Mauritania noted that, due to the low population density, absence of permanent settlements, and the desert conditions in the contaminated Tiris Zemmour region, it expects the environmental impact of clearance to be minimal.[43]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The PNDHD hosts and manages the national mine action database. From 2017 to 2021, it used an old version (New Generation) of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).[44] In 2022, the PNDHD created its own database.[45] Due to lack of resources to cover the hosting costs, this database is offline and not directly accessible to operators.[46] In 2025, the PNDHD and the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) started data migration to IMSMA Core.[47]

In 2024, work on harmonising data collection tools and survey and clearance data output was carried out with HAMAP-Humanitaire and MAG. MAG also provided support to information management personnel.[48]

Mauritania submits its CCM transparency report every year, submitting its Article 7 report covering 2024 already on 10 January 2025. This timely submission supported the work of the Article 4 Analysis Group in tracking progress and analysing its extension request. The initial extension request, submitted in December 2024, was of average quality, with a number of inconsistencies, typographical errors, and copy-pasted sections. Most were corrected in updated versions shared in March and June 2025. For the first time, Mauritania distinguished between areas reduced through TS and those cleared since 2021[49] — an important distinction that had not been reflected in any of its previous Article 7 reports.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mauritania does not currently have a strategic mine action plan specifically addressing CMR. However, it provided a timeframe and action plan in its successive Article 4 deadline extension requests. In December 2024 (its initial submission) and March and June 2025 (successive updated versions), Mauritania submitted a third extension request, covering August 2026 to August 2028, set out in terms largely similar to the previous extension requests. Mauritania told Mine Action Review it was in the process of reviewing its APMBC Mine Action Plan for 2023–26 to include CMR.[50]

In its 2025 request, Mauritania projected annual clearance targets of 1.5km^2 in 2025; 0.3km^2 in 2026; 7.3km^2 in 2027; and 6.1km^2 in 2028 (see Table 3). But achieving these targets depends on securing US$2,415,000 in international financial support.[51] Mauritania indicated that, in the absence of this funding, clearance could take up to 10 years, with PNDHD BAC teams able to address only one area a year.[52]

40 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
41 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
42 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
43 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and interview with Colonel Baham, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025.
44 APMBC Article 7 Reports (covering 2017), Form D; (covering 2019), p. 3; and (covering 2020), p. 9.
45 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2022), p. 5.
46 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 12 and 25 June 2024.
47 Emails from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025; and Jérémy Repond, Programme Officer, GICHD, 27 May 2025.
48 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 March 2025.
49 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Table 6, pp. 6 and 7.
50 Mauritania, "Updated Article 5 Extension Request Work Plan", Submitted to the 21MSP in November 2023; and email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 23 April 2025.
51 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3 and 13.
52 Ibid., p. 8.

Table 3: Planned clearance of CMR-contaminated areas in Tiris Zemmour (2025–28)[53]

Area	SHA	CHA	2025	2026	2027	2028	Total (m^2)	Days
Dhbeiyatt	0	1	807,502	0	0	0	807,502	70
Dhbeiyatt 1	1	0	693,670	0	0	0	693,670	52
Boudheir	0	1	0	20,556	0	0	20,556	12
Boudheir 1	0	1	0	38,667	0	0	38,667	23
Boudheir 2	0	1	0	243,147	0	0	243,147	39
Guneive	0	1	0	0	4,683,196	0	4,683,196	150
Lemreir	0	1	0	0	2,587,276	0	2,587,276	110
Motlani	0	1	0	0	0	120,365	120,365	30
Oudeyat Lekhyame	0	1	0	0	0	5,326,856	5,326,856	170
Tigert 1	0	1	0	0	0	651,830	651,830	45
Totals	**1**	**9**	**1,501,172**	**302,370**	**7,270,472**	**6,099,051**	**15,173,065**	**701**

The Article 4 Analysis Group highlighted difficulties in reconciling the work plan with annual clearance projections, the stated clearance capacity, and the corresponding budgetary requirements. The work plan—covering all of 2025 and the first half of 2026, thereby extending beyond the official two-year extension period—outlined an initial period of three months dedicated to preparatory activities. This would be followed by deployment of four BAC teams, each composed of four deminers and a team leader, operating over a total of 701 days.[54] However, under the proposed work plan (assuming four BAC teams operating at the maximum rate of 600m^2 per deminer per day) the 701 days allocated remain clearly insufficient to address the total contamination.[55]
The PNDHD clarified that, while the exact duration of field operations is hard to predict due to a variety of factors, the current estimate is based on past experience, and takes into account the army's ability to provide additional personnel as well as the potential reduction in the size of hazardous areas following TS.[56]

The 2025 extension request stated that the estimated budget for the planned activities is US$2,955,000. This includes a contribution of $540,000 from Mauritania's national budget, channelled through the PNDHD, equivalent to $180,000 per year between 2026 and 2028. The remaining US$2,415,000 will need to be raised through external fundraising to cover key components: $1,405,000 for operational costs (vehicles, clearance and field equipment, marking, and risk education), $960,000 for staffing, and $590,000 for support, running costs, and overheads.[57] If additional funding is available, Mauritania indicated it could accelerate survey and clearance by mobilising support from the Army Engineering Corps, which could provide up to ten additional teams.[58]

Mauritania included a contingency plan in case further contaminated areas are discovered during the extension period. This plan involves adding the newly identified areas to the list of recorded contaminated sites and notifying States Parties through its Article 7 reports. The PNDHD also plans to carry out NTS, marking, and risk education until clearance can be conducted.[59]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the Mauritanian national mine action standards (NMAS, known nationally as les Normes Mauritaniennes de l'Action Antimines) which are said to align with the IMAS, while being customized to suit the geographical and equipment-related conditions in the country. The NMAS, which included standards on NTS, TS, mine clearance, and quality control (QC), were developed by the PNDHD with support from the GICHD and approved by the government in 2007. They are said to undergo regular updates, incorporating insights from the field.[60]

53 Ibid., Tables 3 and 8, pp. 4, 7, and 8.

54 Ibid., pp. 11 and 12.

55 Based on the remaining area of 15,173,065m^2 and maximum daily clearance capacity of 9,600m^2 (600m^2 per deminer x 16 deminers), approximately 1,580 days would be required to complete clearance.

56 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

57 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 13–14.

58 Ibid., Table 10, pp. 9 and 10.

59 Ibid, p. 17.

60 Ibid., p. 9.

The GICHD visited Mauritania in late 2022 and subsequently drafted NMAS on clearance, marking, quality management, and accreditation.[61] According to its 2024 extension request, the national standards were reviewed in 2024 by the interministerial steering committee, which oversees the PNDHD, and were scheduled for an update in June 2025. The PNDHD indicated it was revising the NMAS and planned to share the new drafts with a partner for further refinement.[62] It later clarified that the standards under review include NTS, TS, demining, and clearance, environmental protection, accreditation, and quality assurance (QA)/QC, with MAG supporting the revision process.[63] In 2024, operators had no access to the NMAS and were not involved in any revision.[64]

Land release methodology for CMR contamination is not clearly or consistently outlined in Mauritania's 2025 extension request, a point emphasised by the Article 4 Analysis Group. Drawing on official documents and discussions with operators, Mine Action Review believes that Mauritania will need to conduct additional NTS before initiating clearance. This is challenging in the context of Tiris Zemmour, where harsh desert conditions, low population density, and the presence of nomadic communities make information gathering difficult. The 2025 extension request implied that areas are *identified* through NTS, not cancelled.[65] The land release process described in the request follows a sequence of TS and manual clearance for each CHA. Mauritania attached its March 2022 national standards on TS and BAC to its updated Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in June 2025.[66]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Since Mauritania reported newly discovered contamination in 2019, the only CMR clearance operator has been the PNDHD's BAC teams – specifically, four teams deployed in Tiris Zemmour (see Table 4).[67] Between 2021 and 2024, they released four areas (Dalet Tigert, Dhbeiyatt, Guneive 1, and Guneive 2) through TS and clearance, covering an estimated 1.7km^2. In its 2025 extension request, Mauritania indicated that the same workforce, comprising four BAC teams with 16 deminers and 4 team leaders, would continue operations, while noting that additional resources from the Corps of Engineers could be mobilised if more funding were available.[68]

Table 4: Operational capacity deployed for CMR clearance in Tiris Zemmour 2024[69]

Operators	TS and manual clearance teams	TS and manual clearance personnel	Comments
PNDHD BAC teams	4	20	16 deminers and 4 team leaders. Seven other personnel supported the demining teams: a site supervisor, an EOD expert, drivers, and nurses.

In 2024, two international operators were active in Mauritania, both operating in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region, which is not known to contain CMR. HAMAP-Humanitaire conducted mine and ERW clearance, while MAG carried out NTS and risk education activities in 46 localities.[70]

NPA operated in Mauritania from 2011 to 2015. By 2013, it had cleared all known contamination in Bir Moghrein village and other contaminated areas in the Tiris Zemmour and Adrar regions. From 2014 to 2015, NPA completed all assigned AP mine clearance tasks on the eastern side of the Nouadhibou peninsula, after which the programme concluded. In February–March 2021, NPA conducted an assessment mission to help Mauritania define its baseline contamination following the discovery of previously unrecorded hazardous areas.[71] NPA has not been present in the country since 2021.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, Mauritania released a total of almost 1.13km^2 across two CMR-contaminated areas (Dalet Tigert and Dhbeiyatt), with the destruction of 29 MK118 submunitions (see Table 5 for details).[72] As at the end of 2024, total estimated CMR contamination was 15,173,065m^2 across 10 hazardous areas.[73] This marks a reduction on the 16,298,542m^2 across 11 hazardous areas at the end of 2023.

61 Emails from Jérémy Repond, GICHD, 28 May 2024 and 27 May 2025.
62 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
63 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
64 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 Mars 2025.
65 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Table 6, pp. 6 and 7.
66 Ibid., p. 21.
67 Interview with Colonel Baham, PNDHD, Geneva, 9 April 2025.
68 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 9 and 11.
69 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.
70 Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HAMAP, 15 April 2025; and Emilie Sauvanet, MAG, 31 Mars 2025.
71 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 4.
72 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
73 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Table 8, pp. 7 and 8.

Table 5: Summary of land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	102,703	Dalet Tigert
Technical survey	1,022,774	Dalet Tigert was reduced by 243,000m^2 and Dhbeiyatt by 779,774m^2
Non-technical survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	29	MK-118 at Dalet Tigert area

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, the PNDHD conducted TS in two CMR-contaminated areas: Dhbeiyatt, which was identified in 2023 through NTS, and Dalet Tigert. TS led to the reduction of 779,774m^2 in Dhbeiyatt and 243,000m^2 in Dalet Tigert.[74]

No NTS was conducted in 2024, in contrast to 2023 when the PNDHD identified two previously unrecorded areas: Dhbeiyatt, covering 1,587,276m^2 (subsequently reduced in 2024), and Dhbeiyatt 1, covering 693,670m^2.[75]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, Mauritania cleared the remaining 102,703m^2 of the Dalet Tigert area, leading to its removal from the list of CMR-contaminated areas.[76]

The PNDHD also carried out marking campaigns in Tiris Zemmour throughout 2024, using signage that are said to comply with national and international standards. The areas marked included Lemreir, El Motlani, Boudheir, Guneive, Tigert 1, Dhbeiyatt, Dhbeiyatt 1, Boudheir 1, and Oudeyat Lekhyame.[77]

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE



Under Article 4 of the CCM (and on the basis of the two-year extension granted by States Parties in 2023), Mauritania is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2026. It will not meet this deadline and has requested a third two-year extension to 1 October 2028. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025.

Upon becoming a State Party to the CCM on 1 August 2012, Mauritania had 10.18km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated areas to address. In 2014, Mauritania declared fulfilment of its Article 4 obligations at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties, having completed CMR clearance the previous year, with the support of NPA.[78] Following discovery of previously unknown CMR contamination in 2019, Mauritania submitted two deadline extension requests, first to August 2024 and subsequently to August 2026. However, it has been unable to meet its Article 4 obligations, primarily due to lack of funding and limited international support. The PNDHD has managed to release some CMR-contaminated areas using national resources, though progress has been slow. Without the necessary international support, the PNDHD has indicated that clearance will continue, but that it could take up to 10 years for Mauritania to fulfil its Article 4 obligations.[79]

74 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

75 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form F.

76 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.

77 Email from Commander Sarr, PNDHD, 16 June 2025.

78 Mauritania Declaration of Compliance with Article 4(1)(a) of the CCM, submitted on 3 September 2014.

79 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, Table 9, p. 8.

Between 2021 and 2024, the PNDHD released four contaminated areas (Dalet Tigert, Dhbeiyatt, Guneive 1, and Guneive 2) covering an estimated 1.7km^2. Of these, three were released through clearance: 81,274m^2 at Guneive 2 in 2021, 363,948m^2 at Guneive 1 in 2022, and 102,703m^2 at Dalet Tigert in 2024 (see Table 6), amounting to just over half a square kilometre.[80]

The figures for 2021 and 2022 in Table 6 have been adjusted compared to last year's report based on details provided by Mauritania in its 2025 Article 4 extension request, where it distinguished for the first time between areas reduced through TS and those released through clearance. In 2021, Mauritania released 177,574m^2 at Guneive 2: 96,300m^2 reduced through TS and 81,274m^2 that was cleared. In 2022, it released 392,998m^2 at Guneive 1: 29,050m^2 reduced through TS and 363,948m^2 cleared.

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2024	102,703
2023	0
2022	*363,948
2021	*81,274
2020	0
Total	**547,925**

* Data adjusted, compared to last year's Mine Action Review report on Mauritania, based on subsequent provision of disaggregated data.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

As CMR are in very remote and sparsely populated areas of desert, it is possible that Mauritania will again discover previously unknown contamination after completion.[81] NPA, which operated in the Tiris Zemmour region from 2011 to 2013, noted in its 2021 assessment report that all contamination is located in very remote areas with minimal impact, making the identification of additional (residual) contamination challenging due to the scarcity of informants.[82]

The Corps of Engineers will handle future residual risks, and the PNDHD will continue to enhance the capacity of this national entity to address any further contamination that may arise after completing the current CMR tasks. If previously unidentified cluster munition-contaminated areas are identified after the proposed deadline, Mauritania has committed to take prompt action to assess the extent of contamination and destroy all CMR. Additionally, it has pledged to fulfil its obligations under Article 7 of the CCM by reporting any newly identified contaminated areas and sharing relevant information with stakeholders and States Parties through formal and informal channels.[83]

80 Article 7 Reports (covering 2021), Form F; (covering 2022), Form F; and (covering 2024), Form F.

81 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

82 NPA, Mauritania Assessment Report, 12 April 2021, p. 9.

83 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

SOMALIA

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

Not on track to meet deadline
Four-year extension requested to 1 March 2030

CMR CONTAMINATION: LESS THAN 5KM^2

Light
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- None

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Somalia submitted its first Article 4 deadline extension request in December 2024 and then updated versions in April and June 2025, requesting a four-year extension to 1 March 2030. The request was due to be considered at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in September 2025. Along with a persistent lack of funding, lack of access to cluster munition-contaminated areas due to ongoing insecurity continued to prevent survey as well as any clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in 2024, and none has taken place since limited clearance in 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Somalia should ensure timely survey and clearance of CMR in accordance with its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) obligations.**
- **Somalia should elaborate a comprehensive baseline of CMR contamination as soon as security conditions allow access to affected areas.**
- **Somalia should make known its financial and resource requirements for mine action, including estimated costs for CMR survey and clearance, even while affected areas remain inaccessible.**
- **Somalia should finalise a new national mine action strategy to replace its plan for 2018–20.**
- **Somalia should elaborate a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan for the mine action programme.**
- **Somalia should elaborate an environmental policy and implementation plan for the programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	4	3	Eleven suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have been identified, with size of hazardous areas; locations; and the types and numbers of submunitions, now clearly detailed in Somalia's 2025 Article 4 Extension Request. Due to ongoing insecurity, however, no accurate baseline of CMR contamination has been established.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	4	4	The Federal Government of Somalia has still not formally recognised the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) as a government institution or approved mine action legislation. As a consequence, SEMA cannot access State funding.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 included provisions on gender and diversity. At the time of writing, an updated strategy was under development. SEMA advocates action on gender and diversity within survey and community liaison teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	4	4	A section on environmental management is contained within the national mine action standards (NMAS). Somalia does not have an environmental policy or plan for mine action but was believed to be developing these as at April 2025.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	5	5	SEMA's upgrade to the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core system, launched in 2022, was almost complete as at April 2025. Somalia submitted a CCM Article 7 report covering 2022 in 2023. In April 2025, it pledged to submit its reports covering 2023 and 2024 together.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	5	5	Somalia's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 does not contain any specific provisions for survey or clearance of CMR, but SEMA expected to launch an updated strategy in late 2025. Due to lack of access to SHAs, no annual work plans or tasking for CMR have been issued in recent years.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	6	5	The NMAS for non-technical survey (NTS) was revised in 2024, with revision of the standard on battle area clearance (BAC) set to follow. Somalia has a limited national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. It has pledged to detail its capacity requirements for CMR survey and clearance once affected areas can be safely accessed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	2	2	No CMR survey or clearance took place in 2024 and there were no reports of submunitions being discovered or destroyed in Somalia. Somalia will not meet its 2026 Article 4 deadline and has requested a four-year extension.
Average Score	**4.1**	**3.8**	**Overall Programme Performance: POOR**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA)
- Mine Action Department, within the Somaliland Ministry of Defence (MoD)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Somali armed forces explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams
- Police EOD units of the Federal Member States
- Local non-governmental organisation (NGO) consortiums, namely Central Somalia Mine Action Consortium (CESMAC), Shabelle & Hiiraan Mine Action Consortium (SHAHMAC), Jubaland Mine Action Network (JUMAN), Somali Women Association (SWA), and Southwest Mine Action Consortium (SOWMAC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)*
- Ukroboronservice (UOS) contracted under UNMAS**
- Demineco Human Services (DHS) contracted under UNMAS**

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- UNMAS as part of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS) (previously, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM))***
- United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)
- African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which transitioned to the African Union Stabilisation Support Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) on 1 January 2025

* UNMAS-contracted survey and EOD teams ceased operations in Somalia in January 2025. ** UNMAS sub-contracted UOS teams until June 2024, then DHS from 1 July 2024 to 15 January 2025.[1] *** UNSOM, which ended on 31 October 2024, was succeeded by UNTMIS the next day.[2]

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The exact extent of CMR contamination in Somalia remains unknown.[3] While there has been no baseline survey, contamination appears to be light given the low numbers of submunitions found on the ground so far and with historical survey, clearance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) activities yielding little evidence of a more significant problem.[4] However, loss of access due to persistent insecurity in recent years has prevented detailed investigation.[5]

In an updated CCM Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in April 2025, Somalia stated it had 11 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that may contain CMR across three of Somalia's five[6] official federal member states: four in Jubaland (in southern Somalia, bordering Kenya); one in Galmudug (in central Somalia); and six in South West state (also known as Koonfur Galbeed). Somalia provides estimated sizes for the SHAs only in South West and Galmudug states and cautions that the exact size of all contaminated areas has not been determined due to insufficient survey data and lack of access.[7]

The 2025 list of SHAs has been revised from that provided in Somalia's Article 7 report covering 2022 in which six contaminated areas of 100m^2 each were identified.[8] Compared to the earlier information, the 2025 list adds three areas in Jubaland and two SHAs in South West state, but retains the same location details for the single SHA in Galmudug. In both the 2022 and 2025 information, all SHAs in South West state are in Bakool, in Rab Dhuuro (also known as Rab Dhuure). Details of submunition types and quantities expected to be found were included in both lists (see Table 1).[9]

Somalia does not anticipate finding significant additional CMR contamination.[10] No unexploded submunitions were identified during survey of areas recovered from non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in 2024, although it is not stated where this occurred or how much land was surveyed.[11] Somalia has no recorded CMR accidents impacting the population.[12] Contamination data in Somalia's national database are said to be disaggregated by weapon type.[13]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at April 2025)[14]

State and location	SHAs	Area (m^2)*	CHAs	Cluster munition type	Estimated quantity
South West, Bakool, Rab Dhuure/Rab Dhuuro	6	600	0	RBK 250-275 containers	6
Jubaland, Gedo, Garbohaarey, Shabeel	1	Unknown	0	RBK 250 container	1
Jubaland, Gedo, Dolow	1	Unknown	0	AO-15CH container	1
Jubaland, Gedo, Bardere	1	Unknown	0	BL-755 submunition	1

1 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.
2 "UNSOM", accessed 22 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Yd4RSp.
3 CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.
4 Email from Rob Syfret, Head of Region, Horn of Africa, HALO, 1 June 2023.
5 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
6 Somalia has five official federal member states, plus the Banadir Regional Administration, which includes the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu.
7 Updated 2025 CCM Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
8 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.
9 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.
10 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
11 Ibid., p. 6.
12 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7 and 11.
13 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, Director, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
14 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 2–4.

Table 1 continued

State and location	SHAs	Area (m^2)*	CHAs	Cluster munition type	Estimated quantity
Jubaland, Middle Juba, Buale	1	Unknown	0	BL-755 submunition	1
Galmudug, Galgadud, Dusamreeb, Mareer Guur	1	100	0	AO-15CH container	1
Totals	**11**	**700**	**0**		**11**

* Somalia describes the size of the contaminated areas in Jubaland as "N.A".

Somalia states that no survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas has been possible in recent years due to severely restricted access. The updated Article 4 deadline extension request submitted in April 2025 states that control of territory by Al-Shabaab prevents access to SHAs in South West state and Middle Juba, and that "ongoing conflict in multiple regions" further exacerbates the challenge of reaching contaminated areas.[15] At the time of submitting the extension request, Somalia could not say when security might improve sufficiently for affected areas to become accessible for survey, with the phased transition of security responsibility from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to Somali forces still underway, and recent reports indicating a "persistent deterioration of the security situation".[16]

The Ethiopian National Defence Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–78 Ogaden War, with the Soviet Union reportedly supplying both parties with submunitions during the conflict, and PTAB-2.5 and AO-1-Sch submunitions produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.[17] In January 2016, Somali media alleged that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) had used cluster munitions during intensive bombing in Gedo region, in response to an attack on KDF forces at an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base in El Adde. Photos appeared to show that the KDF used United Kingdom (UK)-manufactured BL755 submunitions in the area of Bu'ale (also known as Buale), and subsequently it was reported that Al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type, which it used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

In 2016, a United Nations (UN) Monitoring Group earlier investigated whether Kenyan forces had used cluster munitions but was unable to conclude whether they had or not. At the time, it noted the absence of reports of BL755 submunitions among legacy unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Somalia. Kenya denied using cluster munitions.[18]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE CONTAMINATION

Somalia has contamination from other explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines across all states and regions of the country[19] with mines concentrated along Somalia's border with Ethiopia.[20] See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Somalia, including Somaliland, for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Mine action management in Somalia is the responsibility of the Somali Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), which is under the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS).[21] There is a separate mine action department within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in the separatist state of Somaliland. SEMA maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal member states, with state offices in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and South West. Each state office has a director and a staff member.[22]

SEMA serves as the de facto mine action authority for Somalia. However, hopes for full implementation of mine action legislation in Somalia and formal recognition of SEMA as the national mine action authority remain unfulfilled. On 1 June 2024, the Mine Action Bill was finally submitted to the Office of the Prime Minister along with 14 other bills pending approval by the Federal Parliament.[23] The competing priorities of multiple bills have seen repeated delays in the passing of the mine action law, and SEMA was not optimistic

15 Ibid., pp. 2 and 4.

16 Ibid., p. 10.

17 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), 17 April 2013; and Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form F.

18 "Letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN doc. S/2016/919, 31 October 2016, pp. 171–73.

19 Action Plan for Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC) Article 5 Implementation, October 2022–October 2027, 30 April 2023, p. 16.

20 "The Federal Republic of Somalia Summary of updated Article 5 Work Plan", APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023.

21 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 5 and 10.

22 Ibid., p. 5; and interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

23 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.

that it would be passed before the end of 2025. SEMA remained hopeful that once the law has been passed, funding from the federal budget will be forthcoming for SEMA's core costs.[24] No such funding has been provided since the expiry of SEMA's government grant in 2015.[25] SEMA has, however, submitted a proposed budget to the MoIS.[26]

A chronic lack of funding has resulted in significant ongoing operational challenges for SEMA and a lack of effective capacity to plan and execute mine action activities.[27] Capacity-building efforts have, however, continued. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) trains and equips EOD teams in Somalia's armed forces, and provides technical and policy advice to the Somali government, including support to meet its international treaty obligations.[28] UNMAS also supports capacity development of SEMA through HALO, with some training, mentoring, and national mine action standards (NMAS) review activities resourced until the end of March 2025.[29]

In the final quarter of 2024, SEMA provided explosives management training for 81 participants from federal member states.[30] Also in 2024, government representatives responsible for mine action from several African nations, including Somalia, visited Cambodia to learn from the Cambodian Mine Action Centre's (CMAC) operations, with the support of the Japan International Co-operation agency (JICA). JICA plans to undertake a capacity analysis of SEMA, though no timeframe for this to occur was known at the time of writing.[31]

In June 2025, Somalia reported that a formal coordination structure had been established between SEMA and international partners—the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), HALO, iMMAP,[32] and UNMAS—seeking to prevent duplication of efforts and resources in capacity development for mine action. The objectives of this group are enhanced information management and technical and operational support, and greater quality assurance (QA) and administrative capacities.[33]

SEMA's strategic planning is guided by the 2024–29 strategic plan of the MoIS, which in turn is guided by national policies and Somalia's National Transformation Plan (NTP) for 2025–29.[34] Somalia intends to align its proposed Article 4 deadline four-year extension with the implementation period for this latest NTP, which aims to address persistent threats to national security from NSAGs as well as other key challenges (such as resource mobilisation, capacity gaps, and the need to strengthen institutional frameworks).[35] As SEMA points out, progress on these challenges would enable more effective mine action[36] and help ensure implementation of Somalia's Article 4 obligations. One of the strategic goals within the NTP is to enhance the oversight role and processes of the MoIS and its institutions, including SEMA, which is designated responsibility under the NTP to plan, coordinate, implement, and provide oversight of "all mine action programmes and treaty compliance", including Somalia's obligations under the CCM.[37]

SEMA highlights that mine action in also integrated into the Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), with operations closely coordinated with the Global Protection Cluster (GPC).[38] SEMA intends to continue to work closely with all mine action stakeholders, including operators, donors, authorities and communities, throughout its implementation of Somalia's CCM obligations.[39]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In the absence of any national funding for mine action since 2015, SEMA has relied on mine action partners and donor countries.[40] In 2024, the People's Republic of China (PRC) donated RMB 1 million (approximately US$137,000) to SEMA,[41] with some funding secured from PRC until the end of 2027 for risk education, capacity building, and non-technical survey (NTS). The funding is not, though, for CMR specifically.[42] UNMAS has funded some capacity development of SEMA through HALO, and provided additional financial support to the end of March 2025. Somalia has also received some UN Development Programme (UNDP) funding for mine action.[43]

24 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

25 Email from Mohamed Abdulkadir Ahmed, SEMA, 14 October 2016; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.

26 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

27 Ibid., pp. 4–5.

28 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", Hiiraan Online, 2 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42sGtib.

29 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.

30 "Somalia concludes explosive management training with Chinese support", Somali Observatory for Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 22 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4iu8F9k.

31 "HDP Nexus for Effective Mine Action", presentation by Eri Komuki, Office for Peacebuilding, JICA, UN National Directors Meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

32 iMMAP is an international non-profit organisation that provides information management services to humanitarian and development organisations.

33 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request (June 2025), p. 9.

34 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.

35 Ibid., p. 1.

36 Presentation by Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, CCM Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2025.

37 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10–11.

38 Ibid., p. 9. The GPC is a network of NGOs, international organisations and UN agencies engaged in protection work in humanitarian crises, mandated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). See "Global Protection Cluster", accessed 23 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4cINmzz. UNMAS explains that, in Somalia, "the Explosive Hazards/Mine Action Area of Responsibility (EH/Mine Action AoR) coordination falls under the Protection Cluster, which is led by the UNHCR at the country level, while the GPC provides coordination and guidance at the global level". Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

39 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 8.

40 Ibid., p. 1.

41 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 7.

42 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

43 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 6–7.

Somalia has not shared a resource mobilisation strategy and has stated the need for international support on this topic.[44] The Federal Government intends to approach China for continued funding after the current support ends in 2027. In parallel, SEMA is seeking direct funding for its work, including from international partners operating in-country and from new potential donors.[45] SEMA cautions that funding for all mine action in Somalia beyond 2025 is uncertain[46] and that the persistent lack of funds presents an urgent challenge to effective mine action.[47]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Somalia does not yet have a gender policy and implementation plan for mine action, although the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2018–20 included provisions on gender and diversity. As at April 2025, a new national mine action strategy was being developed with the support of the GICHD. SEMA highlights the fact that, while it has advocated for gender, diversity, and inclusion (GDI) considerations in survey and community liaison teams, challenges to achieving gender mainstreaming in Somalia remain due to the nature of its patriarchal society. Additionally, SEMA highlights that clan affiliation has significant importance and must also be considered.[48]

SEMA has a dedicated GDI Officer. It asserts that gender equality will be promoted during the proposed extension period and that significant efforts will be made, working with mine action partners, to recruit women into a variety of roles. The views of women, men, boys, and girls will be recorded during community liaison and risk education activities, to better understand the impact of CMR on affected communities and inform priority setting. Finally, Somalia pledges that the right to inclusion of persons with disabilities and those from minority clans will also be considered.[49] During 2024, the GICHD delivered training on gender and diversity and SEMA continued to collaborate with HALO on these issues.[50]

Table 2: Gender composition of SEMA and regional mine action offices (at end 2024)[51]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
SEMA	22	4* (18%)	N/R	N/R	0	0
Regional offices	10 (2 per office)	1 (10%)	N/R	N/R	1 (in Puntland state)	0

* Including one woman in a legal position, a second with a gender role, and a third assisting information management.[52]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Somalia's NMAS include a chapter on environmental health and safety that requires implementing partners to consider procedures to mitigate the impact of mine action activities on the environment.[53] As at April 2025, SEMA was working with HALO to develop an environmental policy and plan.[54]

44 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form H.
45 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 7–8.
46 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 6.
47 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 4–5; and Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
48 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
49 Ibid., p. 9.
50 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 20 June 2025.
53 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.
54 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SEMA uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to coordinate and manage its mine action activities and, with the support of the GICHD, has been undergoing a transition from IMSMA New Generation to IMSMA Core. As at April 2025, the transition was almost complete, with only a few tasks remaining, such as migration of historical data on NTS, clearance, and completion reports. Mine action operators collect data using standardised protocols and forms, which are submitted to the IMSMA database.[55] Operators report that data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.[56] SEMA states that information in the database is disaggregated by weapon type.[57] Somalia's updated 2025 extension request disaggregates land release since entry into force by method of release.[58]

Somalia last submitted a CCM Article 7 report (covering 2022) in September 2023. This contained information on the estimated size of CMR-contaminated areas, as well as on the type and locations of submunitions found.[59] In April 2025, Somalia pledged to submit its Article 7 reports covering 2023 and 2024.[60] It submitted a timely Article 4 deadline extension request in December 2024, and an updated version in April and then July 2025,[61] duly addressing requests for further information by the Analysis Group.[62] SEMA presented a statement on Somalia's extension request at the CCM Intersessional Meetings in April 2025.[63]

Somalia's updated 2025 extension request sufficiently addresses most of the points outlined in the CCM Article 4 Extension Request Guidelines,[64] in so far as this is possible, given Somalia's limited information about CMR-affected areas. However, it does not include a budget or outline financial requirements for SEMA's core costs, CMR survey and clearance, or capacity building. It says that "no stand-alone budget" is required to tackle CMR, given the relatively limited scale of contamination.[65]

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2018–2020 noted Somalia's status as a State Party to the CCM and its reporting obligations and commitment to complying with the Convention, but did not contain specific provisions on survey and clearance of CMR. The launch of an updated strategy has since been delayed, and it was reported in both 2022[66] and 2024[67] that the strategy had been developed but was pending approval from the MoIS. As at April 2025, an updated strategy was under development with support from the GICHD, and SEMA hoped it would be available by September 2025. Alongside these delays in finalising a new national strategy, according to SEMA a persistent lack of secure funding for mine action has impeded the production of annual work plans and planning for specific workstreams.[68]

Although no work plan or prioritisation criteria for CMR survey and clearance have yet been shared, SEMA says it is actively assessing the feasibility of addressing CMR-affected areas, and that these areas are incorporated into operational plans for NTS by operators,[69] albeit with no known timeline. Once safe access is possible, Somalia states that implementation of Article 4 will include "clear and measurable indicators and targets, which will be regularly monitored to assess the progress of treaty compliance". An implementation plan will include further details on the schedule of activities, as well as of data collection plans. Operators will be required to submit regular reports on activities and outputs, as well as risks, challenges, and lessons learned.[70] While it has not yet been possible to issue tasks for survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas, tasking for release of mined areas has been working well, demonstrating SEMA's capability to manage and issue tasks effectively.[71]

55 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 12.
56 Emails from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023; and Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
57 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
58 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 3–4.
59 Article 7 Report (covering 2022), Form A.
60 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
61 "13MSP", CCM, accessed 27 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ES0hCu.
62 "Statement on Somalia's Extension Request, (Agenda Item 3c, Clearance and Destruction of Cluster Munitions remnants), (delivered by NPA on behalf of Mine Action Review)", at: https://bit.ly/4jQyQYL; and "Comments on Somalia's Article 4 Extension Request, Convention on Cluster Munitions" (CMC), at: https://bit.ly/42uV7We.
63 "Statement of the Federal Republic of Somalia Presented by Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle (Director General of SEMA)", CCM Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42YL9vs.
64 CCM Article 4 Extension Request Guidelines, accessed 28 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YhXlWt.
65 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.
66 Article 7 Report (covering 2020 and 2021), Form A.
67 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, UNMAS, 20 May 2024.
68 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.
69 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 6.
70 Ibid., p. 10.
71 Email from Rob Syfret, HALO, 1 June 2023.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Somalia has NMAS that are aligned with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), which were first published in 2018. Since then, however, a lack of funding to undertake stakeholder consultation, political instability, and a lack of international technical experts to assist in the review process have all delayed "finalisation" of the NMAS.[72] Progress was made in 2024, however, with revision of the NMAS for NTS and risk education through a collaborative effort involving HALO, UNMAS, and the GICHD.[73] Revision of the information management (IM) standard was underway as at April 2025, with review of the battle area clearance (BAC) standard due to follow.[74] UNMAS notes that the 2018 NMAS are sufficient to serve as a guide for the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of implementing partners to deal with legacy contamination, subject to amends that may be made during government review.[75] SEMA says it has a quality management system and that it regularly inspects activities and assesses mine action outputs.[76]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In the updated 2025 extension request, SEMA asserts that survey and clearance capacity operating in-country is sufficient to respond to known CMR hazards. Specifically, SEMA envisages that a team of seven survey and EOD personnel, equipped with basic demining and EOD equipment, is likely to be enough, but that detailed capacity and technical requirements will be outlined once CMR-affected areas can be accessed.[77]

There are no nationally funded survey or clearance teams operating directly under SEMA. Table 3 shows the number of teams Somalia envisages will be available for survey and clearance across all national and international humanitarian operators between 2025 and 2030. It is not clear whether some of the teams will perform multiple functions as no annual totals are provided. Notably, no teams are designated for survey from 2026 onwards, highlighting the need for Somalia to secure the resources needed to adequately fund survey. Also, no teams are designated for any functions during 2030. This requires clarification, as the extension request proposes a new deadline of 1 March 2030.[78]

Table 3: NGO operator capacity for CMR survey and clearance in Somalia, 2025–30[79]

	No. of teams available					
Activity	**2025**	**2026**	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**	**2030**
Survey (NTS/TS)	1	0	0	0	0	0
Manual mine clearance	6	1	1	1	1	0
BAC	2	2	2	2	2	0
EOD/Weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD)	8	0	0	0	0	0

HALO, the only international mine action operator working in Somalia, is engaged in survey and clearance of landmines but has the technical capability to address CMR once affected areas become accessible. Other implementing partners have reportedly expressed interest in working in Somalia once funding is secured.[80]

Somalia has taken steps to develop national capacity to deal with the range of explosive threats it faces. Since 2021, UNMAS has trained and equipped 51 Somali National Army EOD teams. The Somali Police Force has also benefited from similar training programmes funded by the Government of Japan, and 21 police EOD teams, capable of responding to

72 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
73 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.
74 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 5.
75 Email from Clemence Nyamandi, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
76 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 10.
77 Ibid., p. 7.
78 Ibid., p. 1.
79 "Partner mapping in response to CCM", additional information provided with the updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request of June 2025.
80 Ibid., p. 12.

explosive threats in urban areas, have been established. UNMAS cautions, however, that despite significant progress, much more is needed to establish a sustainable, Somali-led EOD capacity.[81] Somalia also has a local NGO mine action consortium in every federal member state,[82] including (but not limited to) CESMAC and SHAHMAC, both of which have EOD capabilities, having been trained by international NGOs.[83] It is not yet clear the extent to which any of these national operators may be involved in survey and clearance of CMR in the future.

Survey and EOD of other ordnance than CMR undertaken directly by UNMAS teams, including sub-contracted teams, in Somalia ended in January 2025.[84] (Prior to that, UNMAS had contracted UOS teams until June 2024[85] and then Demineco Human Services.[86]) As at April 2025 the future mandate and funding arrangements for UNMAS in Somalia remained unclear, due to the transitional period during the phased withdrawal of ATMIS from the country.[87]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

In its updated 2025 extension request Somalia clarifies the limited land release of CMR-affected areas undertaken since entry into force of the CCM in 2016 (see Table 4).

Table 4: Land release outputs since becoming a State Party in 2016 (at April 2025)[88]

State/region, location	Area released (m^2)	Year of release	Type of land release	Type of submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed
Galmudug, Dusamareb	150	2022	Clearance	PTAB-2.5M	2
Banadir region, Bangeela	100	2020	Cancellation through NTS	N/A	N/A
South West, Dinsoor	100	2018	Clearance	PTAB-2.5M	1
Totals	**350**				**3**

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Somalia did not release any CMR-contaminated areas through survey or clearance in 2024. No new discoveries of submunitions were recorded and no new areas of CMR contamination were added to the national database in 2024.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOMALIA: 1 MARCH 2016

↓

ORIGINAL ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 MARCH 2026

↓

FIRST EXTENDED DEADLINE SOUGHT (FOUR YEARS): 1 MARCH 2030

NOT ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE (EXTENSION SOUGHT)

Under Article 4 of the CCM, Somalia is required to destroy all CMR in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Somalia is not on track to meet its Article 4 deadline and has requested a four-year extension to 1 March 2030. In the updated extension request it submitted in April 2025, Somalia reiterated the persistent challenges it has faced in Article 4 implementation during the initial 10-year period, and which may still impede progress during the proposed four-year extension period. These were: a lack of access to contaminated areas due

81 "Somalia's IED crisis escalates as nearly 600 attacks kill 1,400 and UNMAS increases support", Hiiraan Online, 2 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42sGtib.

82 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

83 APBMC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 4.

84 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

85 Email from Ghirmay Kiros, UNSOM, 20 May 2024.

86 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 1 August 2025.

87 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

88 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, pp. 2–4. The updated extension request also mentions on p. 12 that two PTAB-2.5M were destroyed by HALO in Galmudug. The only identification of submunitions reported by HALO in recent years is of the two submunitions found during BAC in 2021. Email from Daniel Redelinghuys, HALO, 29 May 2022. Hence it is unclear if the two PTAB-2.5M submunitions in Table 4 were, in fact, destroyed in 2021 or 2022.

to their control by NSAGs; a lack of safe access to some contaminated areas due to widespread insecurity across the country; consequent inability to undertake survey to further investigate reports of CMR contamination; and consistent and severe under-funding of mine action. Somalia also notes that although efforts were underway to recover areas from the control of NSAGs, no timeline for when the security situation might improve could be predicted.[89]

Despite these significant challenges, SEMA has consistently collaborated with partners in recent years to continue efforts in areas such as capacity building, NMAS revision, and information management, and should be commended for this. Efforts underway to finalise an updated national mine action strategy by the end of 2025 and to revise further key chapters of the NMAS, including for BAC, will represent important progress if achieved. However, approval of Somalia's mine action legislation by the federal parliament, a prerequisite for receipt of national funding for SEMA, remains outstanding. It is critical that this matter be resolved and that Somalia secures further funding, both national and international, in order to maintain an effective mine action programme capable of meeting its Article 4 deadline within the proposed extension period, once CMR-affected areas can be accessed.

Table 5: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2024	0
2023	0
2022	150
2021	0
2020	0
Total	**150**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Somalia has established EOD/IED-trained police teams in every federal member state, which will be available to respond to community call-outs once clearance is complete.[90]

89 Updated 2025 Article 4 deadline Extension Request, p. 2.

90 Interview with Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, SEMA, in Geneva, 8 April 2025.

SOUTH SUDAN

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2034

On track to meet deadline

CMR CONTAMINATION: 9.5KM^2

Medium
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	3.55	4.30
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0.02	0.02

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	1,552 (incl. 95 in spot tasks)	2,927 (incl. 167 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)
- The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

South Sudan reported clearance of almost 3.6km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024, a drop on the 4.3km^2 achieved the previous year, but still more than its work plan target of 2.64km^2. South Sudan has extended its own target to clear all cluster munition remnants (CMR) from June 2028 to 9 July 2030 in line with its Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request. In any event, with sufficient funding and access to contaminated areas, South Sudan should still meet its Article 4 clearance deadline of February 2034. Implementation of its mine action strategy for 2024–25 has, however, been slow as a result of competing priorities and a decrease in funding.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **South Sudan should ensure consistent financial support for the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and start to fund mine action operations directly.**
- **South Sudan and its mine action partners should continue to support the NMAA to take on greater responsibilities and increase the number of national deminers.**
- **South Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy.**
- **South Sudan should continue to work towards establishing an evidence-based baseline of cluster munition-contaminated area.**
- **South Sudan should continue efforts to mainstream gender and diversity across its mine action programme and support marginalised groups to participate in the programme.**

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE

Criterion	Score (2024)	Score (2023)	Performance Commentary
UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION (20% of overall score)	7	7	Access to some SHAs continues to be restricted by the security situation and seasonal rains and flooding. There was no progress in preparing for baseline surveys.
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (10% of overall score)	5	5	The NMAA continues to face serious financial and technical limitations, preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively, with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) still assuming that function.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY (10% of overall score)	6	6	A gender, equality and diversity policy in mine action was adopted in February 2025, though mainstreaming gender into the programme remains a work in progress. Ethnic identity is said to be reflected to a limited extent within both survey and clearance teams.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION (10% of overall score)	7	7	Environmental considerations are incorporated into mine action operations and technical guidelines. Environmental assessments are conducted for planning purposes, and UNMAS and international NGOs continue to work to improve their environmental policies and action.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Reviews of data in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and re-survey of recorded hazardous areas have significantly improved the understanding of CMR contamination. South Sudan submitted its second CCM Article 7 report in April 2025, covering 2024, after submitting voluntary Article 7 reports since 2020.
PLANNING AND TASKING (10% of overall score)	7	7	Progress with some aspects of the five-year national mine action strategy launched in April 2024 has been slow. South Sudan included plans for clearance of CMR as part of its 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request.
LAND RELEASE SYSTEM (10% of overall score)	8	8	South Sudan reviews its technical guidelines annually. A request to allow qualified community liaison teams to undertake non-technical survey (NTS) has yet not yet been agreed.
LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE (20% of overall score)	8	8	CMR clearance output dropped by 0.7km^2 to 3.6km^2 in 2024, but still exceeded the work plan target of 2.64km^2.
Average Score	**7.0**	**7.0**	**Overall Programme Performance: GOOD**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- G4S Ordnance Management (G4S)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)
- SafeLane Global (SLG)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)**

* APOPO supported G4S with eight dogs until 30 April 2024.
** UNMAS has deployed personnel from Committed to Good (CTG) since 2017 as OPS/QA officers

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, South Sudan had recorded 105 cluster munition-contaminated areas covering an estimated 9.5km^2: 105 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering just under 8.7km^2 and four suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering more than 0.8km^2.[1] Eight of South Sudan's ten states contain areas believed to contain CMR (see Table 1), with Central and Eastern Equatoria in the south by far the most heavily contaminated. Western Bahr El Ghazal state was added to the list of contaminated states in 2024.[2]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2024)[3]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHAs/SHAs	Total area (m^2)
Central Equatoria	39	3,771,232	1	475,503	40	4,246,735
Eastern Equatoria	40	3,827,817	1	93,000	41	3,920,817
Jonglei	6	326,639	1	93,000	7	419,639
Lakes*	2	0	0	0	2	0
Upper Nile	4	203,429	0	0	4	203,429
Warrap	1	93,000	0	0	1	93,000
Western Bahr El Ghazal	3	132,707	0	0	0	132,707
Western Equatoria	6	339,733	1	175,698	7	515,431
Totals	**101**	**8,694,557**	**4**	**837,201**	**105**	**9,531,758**

* UNMAS explains that the two CHAs are recorded as having 0m^2 of contamination.

At the end of 2023, South Sudan had recorded 10.2km^2 of CMR-contaminated area.[4] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) explains that, despite clearance of 3.6km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024, recorded contamination was as high as 9.5km^2 at the end of the year because 1.2km^2 was discovered and added to the database and resurvey of SHA and remaining area from land release tasks further added to the contamination.[5]

A national baseline survey has never been conducted in South Sudan due to insecurity and poor access,[6] and historically the size of cluster munition strike sites has been underestimated. Calculating the extent of contamination and timing for full clearance is complex, with several CMR strikes (and therefore overlapping footprints) often found in an area.[7] Moreover, as refugees return to South Sudan, they are likely to encounter previously unrecorded submunitions. The areas with the highest levels of contamination, especially in Central and Eastern Equatoria, are sparsely populated,[8] making information on contamination difficult to verify through non-technical survey (NTS).[9]

Various initiatives since 2017 have sought to improve the accuracy of contamination data. Following a 2017 UNMAS review of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database and targeted re-survey of SHAs, such re-survey has become part of the process of CMR clearance,[10] and contributed to an increase in recorded CMR contamination.[11] In 2023, polygons located adjacent to each other (within a 50m^2 radius from the location of the last known submunition) were merged,[12] while in 2024 all cluster munition-contaminated areas in the database recorded as less than 93,000m^2 were increased to 93,000m^2 as UNMAS claimed recorded contamination continued to underestimate the scale of the problem.[13] This has resulted in the extent of contamination recorded in the database almost doubling from earlier estimates.

Contamination figures, however, are not complete given that some areas suspected to contain CMR remain inaccessible.[14] The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 set a national baseline survey as an objective and indicated a list of prioritised "payams" (administrative divisions within counties) where baseline studies would be drawn up before

1 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer Mine/Action AoR Coordinator, UNMAS, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 8 April 2025.
2 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
3 Ibid.; and CCM Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
4 Email from Deborah Asikeit, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
5 Microsoft Teams meeting with Deborah Asikeit and UNMAS, UNMISS colleagues, 3 June 2025; and email from Deborah Asikeit, 4 June 2025.
6 Email from Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
7 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 18.
8 Email from Brendan Ramshaw, Operations Manager, DCA, 22 April 2021.
9 Email from Lisa Müller-Dormann, then Programme Officer/Co-coordinator Mine Action Sub-cluster, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 22 March 2022.
10 Email from Fran O'Grady, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.
11 Email from Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, UNMISS, 23 May 2024.
12 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
13 Ibid.; and email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
14 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

the end of 2024. However, the list was not drawn up and no other progress was made towards establishing a baseline of contaminated area in South Sudan in 2024.[15] The security situation in South Sudan deteriorated at the end of 2024 and worsened in 2025, and some areas could not be accessed because of insecurity.[16]

Cluster munitions were used during the decades-long war between Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M) that ended in 2005. Prior to South Sudan's independence, Sudanese government forces dropped many cluster bombs over the south. In early 2014, Soviet-era RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh submunitions were found near a major road in Jonglei state, 16km south of the state capital, Bor.[17] The area was not previously known to be CMR-contaminated, and it is not confirmed who was responsible for the use of the weapons. Both Uganda, which was supporting the South Sudanese government against opposition forces in early 2014, and the South Sudanese government have denied their military forces used cluster bombs during the conflict. South Sudan has, though, described the use as an "unfortunate incident" and pledged not to use cluster munitions.[18]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

South Sudan has a significant mine problem and also explosive remnants of war (ERW), resulting from large-scale use of explosive weapons during armed conflicts in 1955–72 and 1983–2005 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on South Sudan for further information on landmines).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—since renamed the South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)—was established by presidential decree in 2006 to function as the national agency for planning, coordination, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.

In 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1996 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA, and UNMAS derives its current responsibilities from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate.[19] Working together, UNMAS and the NMAA oversee mine action across the country. The NMAA and UNMAS both have offices in Juba; UNMAS has sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau; and the NMAA also has offices in Wau and Yei (although the office in Yei was not operational as at April 2025, having closed in 2021 for security reasons).[20]

The NMAA has expanded its responsibilities gradually but continues to face serious financial and technical limitations preventing it from managing mine action operations effectively and UNMAS and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) continue to support the authority.[21] According to reports from the mine action sector, NMAA staff have not received salaries for many months, and many have stopped going to work. The Authority is, though, said to play a significant role in facilitating mine action operations.[22] It chairs monthly coordination meetings with all operators, while UNMAS coordinates monthly operations meetings with its commercial contractors.[23]

There has, however, been little progress with the National Mine Action Strategy outcome on strengthening national survey and clearance capacities, including the target of having one national NGO fully funded by the government to implement land release by the end of 2025, and an "Annual increase of formalised capacity enhancement projects between national and international partners".[24] The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is, however, funding a project to support NMAA capacity building.[25] From June 2025 to 2030, funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) will be working with the NMAA to strengthen its capacity.[26]

There is no regular in-country platform for dialogue among all stakeholders (national authorities, clearance operators, and donors) to discuss progress, challenges and support for its Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) Article 4 implementation in South Sudan,[27] although the National Mine Action Strategy set the target of holding one mine action donor coordination meeting per year in 2024–28.[28] Stakeholder meetings are held as needed, most recently for the APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request workshop convened by the NMAA and the APMBC Implementation Support Unit in February 2025.[29]

15 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
16 Ibid.
17 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "South Sudan", accessed 11 April 2023, at https://bit.ly/3Kqz5cU.
18 Ibid.
19 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, at a meeting with UNMAS, Juba, 30 May 2023.
20 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
21 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
22 Remarks by Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, Juba, 30 May 2023.
23 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 8.
24 Ibid., p. 21.
25 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.
26 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025.
27 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, Acting Director General, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
28 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 16.
29 Ibid.; and email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

International NGOs reported close collaboration between different demining actors, UNMAS, and the NMAA, including in identifying and prioritising areas for CMR and anti-personnel (AP) mine clearance at monthly coordination meetings. In 2024, UNMAS and MAG were the co-coordinators of the Mine Action Sub-Cluster.

Since 2023, mine action infrastructure in South Sudan has strengthened by virtue of three key developments. In August, South Sudan acceded to the CCM, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2024. On 27 July 2023, the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) Act became law, providing a clear legal framework for the mine action programme in domestic law for the first time. In April 2024, the South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028—developed by the NMAA with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)—was launched.[30] For details see the section below, *Planning and Tasking*. In addition, according to South Sudan's Article 7 report (covering 2023) another law to prohibit the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of cluster munitions is planned.[31] In 2024, however, the NMAA said it had no plans to elaborate such a law,[32] and the subsequent Article 7 report covering 2024 indicated no further progress during the year.[33]

Together these positive developments should provide a platform for increasing national ownership of the mine action programme, but progress is slow, and UNMAS continues to take a leading role in mine action in South Sudan. The NMAA Act governs the powers, functions, and operations of the NMAA.[34] South Sudan does not have a separate mine action centre and, pursuant to the Act, the NMAA's structure was to include an interministerial board with oversight responsibilities.[35] It may be that these provisions will not be taken forward.[36]

There has generally been an enabling environment for mine action operations in South Sudan in recent years,[37] but an increase in administrative requirements and costs since the start of 2024 have negatively affected operations. These include the cost of essential work-related documentation, with fees for some permits increasing by up to 300% under new Ministry of Finance regulations. In addition, the validity period for visas issued to international mine action staff has become increasingly inconsistent. Visas were previously issued for 12 months, but by the start of 2025 were issued for three to six months, resulting in an increased administrative burden as organisations are compelled to process renewals and associated payments at more regular intervals.[38] Movement of assets and equipment is also challenging as the relevant permits, issued by the Joint Border Verification, Monitoring Mechanism and Peace Keeping Department under the Ministry of Defence, are only issued for three months at a time.[39]

Furthermore, the processing time for tax exemptions has extended significantly, affecting importation of critical demining equipment. As at late 2024, the approval process was taking up to eight weeks, causing considerable disruption to operational timelines and increasing costs. The loss of documents during inter-ministerial transfers has meant organisations have had to restart the application processes multiple times, compounding delays and undermining the efficiency of mine action across the country.[40]

In terms of capacity building, UNMAS continued to provide a range of support to the NMAA, including training on IMSMA. UNMAS provided the NMAA with on-the-job training on national standards reviews, quality management (QM) systems, and operational planning and reporting. MAG, in collaboration with UNMAS, also provided on-the-job training for an NMAA information and management system officer.[41] MAG continued to accept NMAA secondees and ring-fence places for NMAA staff on MAG training, and it supported NMAA visa and travel costs for international conferences.[42] JICA, through its South-South Initiative, supported the NMAA with an exchange programme with the Cambodia Mine Action Centre, Ethiopia Mine Action Centre, and Zambia Mine Action Centre in early 2025.[43]

The NMAA has said it will need international assistance to prepare for residual clearance, for resource mobilisation, and to finalise the legal framework for CMR clearance.[44] No progress with developing a resource mobilisation strategy for mine action has been made, although according to the National Mine Action Strategy this was due to be completed by the middle of 2025.[45] South Sudan did, however, hold an Individualised Approach Meeting on the margins of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva on 19 June 2025.

30 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
31 Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form A.
32 Email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 8 August 2024.
33 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form A.
34 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
35 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p.7.
36 Interviews with Jurkuch Barach, Chairperson, South Sudan NMAA, in Geneva, 9 and 10 April 2025.
37 Email from Lisa Müller-Dormann, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Programme Manager, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 27 March 2023.
38 Email from Eric Okoth, Country Director, MAG, 15 April 2025.
39 Email from Akena Christopher, Information Management Officer, DRC, 12 June 2025.
40 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
41 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
42 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; Leah Grace, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2024; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
43 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
44 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form G.
45 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 17; and emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, Programme Director, NMAA, 10 July 2025.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The mine action sector in South Sudan has seen a drop in funding in recent years, which has been exacerbated by the United States (US) "stop-work" order in February 2025. The Government of South Sudan has provided little financial support to the NMAA, and provides none for survey and clearance.[46] NMAA personnel and other civil servants have not yet received their salaries for 2024; similarly, in 2023, civil servants did not receive their salaries for many months.[47] JICA was reported to be in negotiations with the NMAA in April 2025 to provide capacity-building support, including through refurbishment of office structures and operational equipment.[48]

UNMISS is the largest funder of mine action in South Sudan, providing $27.3 million of the $33 million (83%) of the total costs in 2024,[49] with US$19.9 million paid via UNMAS to 21 commercial demining teams.[50] This is a drop on the $20.7 million UNMAS spent contracting 24 commercial demining teams in 2023 for explosive ordnance (EO) clearance, survey, and risk education.[51]

The international NGOs do not currently have UNMAS contracts. They have indicated that the requirements of UNMAS contracts make it difficult for them to tender,[52] and they largely rely on bilateral donor support. In 2024, the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Irish Aid, and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO) funded MAG.[53] Until July 2024, the GFFO funded two DRC multi-task teams (MTTs), but since then have only funded one team, while DANIDA funded DRC's explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team.[54]

In 2025, DANIDA and GFFO have continued to fund MAG and DRC, and the FCDO and Irish Aid also continued to fund MAG.[55] PM/WRA halted funding following the US stop-work order in February 2025, resulting in MAG having to disband two MTTs and one community liaison team.[56] DRC had indicated its GFFO funding was ending in July 2025 and its DANIDA funding was ending in December 2025; if no new funding was identified, the DRC demining programme was facing closure.[57] From June 2025, however, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced funding over five years of more than €14 million (the exact amount was not available at the time of writing) for demining in South Sudan. Most of the funding is allocated to DanChurchAid (DCA) and DRC for clearance and risk education (DRC will also undertake some livelihoods activities), with €1.7 million for NPA to strengthen the NMAA.[58] The South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025 calls for $7 million to be used for clearance of high-impact contamination and risk education for high-risk groups.[59] As noted, South Sudan does not have a resource mobilisation strategy.[60]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A National Gender Equality and Diversity Policy for Mine Action developed by the GICHD in partnership with UNMAS and NGOs was completed in 2024 and adopted by the Government in March 2025, and an associated work plan was under development as at June 2025.[61] The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 outlines how South Sudan will ensure that gender and diversity are considered throughout mine action projects.[62] The NMAA Act stipulates that, in line with national employment requirements, at least 35% of the NMAA positions will be filled by women,[63] a requirement it has reportedly achieved with regard to women in management positions (see Table 2 below).[64] UNMAS has indicated that, in theory, employment opportunities for qualified men and women in survey and clearance teams across the organisations operating in South Sudan are equal. Redressing the gender imbalance is, however, a long-term challenge.[65]

46 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
47 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2023), p. 23.
48 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
49 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 55.
50 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.
51 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
52 Interviews with Andrew Steele, Logistics Manager, MAG, 20 May 2023; Lisa Müller-Dormann, DRC, 21 May 2023; and Janardhan Rao, Country Director, DCA, 26 May 2023.
53 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
54 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 25 March 2025.
55 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
56 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
57 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
58 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva,19 June 2025; and emails from Catherine Subandrio, Grants Management Coordinator, DRC, 4 July 2025; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 11 July 2025.
59 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "South Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025", December 2024, p. 30.
60 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
61 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April and 4 June 2024, and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
62 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 10.
63 Ibid.
64 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
65 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

To this end, a workshop was held in February 2024, facilitated by the Mine Action Area of Responsibility coordinators (UNMAS and MAG) and with GICHD participation, to promote the inclusion of women in mine action. This led to the creation of a female deminers WhatsApp platform for exchange of learning ideas and peer support, which will contribute to the establishment of the Women in Mine Action Network in South Sudan, which was due to be officially launched on 30 July 2025.[66] UNMAS reviewed and strengthened its Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH) safeguarding mechanisms in 2024. While gender and diversity considerations are not integrated into the NMAA's annual operational plan, UNMAS does have a gender work plan that is integrated into the annual work plan.[67]

MAG continues to ring-fence spaces on all trainings for female staff.[68] Through strengthened data collection practices and post-clearance impact assessments, MAG found that 55% of the beneficiaries of land release in 2024 were women, while 40% of beneficiaries targeted in household surveys live in female-headed households.[69] DRC sent a female staff member to take an EOD Level 3 training course in Lebanon to prepare her for a management position.[70]

Table 2: Gender composition of the NMAA, UNMAS, and operators (at end 2024)[71]

Entity	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
NMAA	138	36 (26%)	8	3 (38%)	35	4 (11%)
UNMAS	43	14 (33%)	10	6 (60%)	14	3 (21%)
CTG	17	1 (6%)	6	1(17%)	16	0 (0)
G4S	334	57 (17%)	35	1 (3%)	267	57 (21%)
SLG	172	45 (26%)	32	2 (6%)	135	43 (32%)
TDI	122	18 (15%)	15	1 (7%)	89	14 (16%)
MAG	180	59 (33%)	22	5 (23%)	154	50 (32%)
DRC*	41	17 (41%)	5	2 (40%)	37	6 (16%)
Totals	**1,047**	**247 (24%)**	**133**	**21 (16%)**	**747**	**177 (24%)**

* The number of DRC deminers reduced by 12 in July 2024 following a drop in GFFO funding.[72]

There were limited significant changes in female representation in demining personnel in 2024, though G4S increased the number of women in operational positions from 13% to 21%, and DRC increased the proportion of female personnel from 25% to 41% between 2023 and 2024. Moreover, 40% of DRC's management/supervisory staff were women (a significant increase from the figure of 14% in 2023), although the proportion of women operational staff fell to 16% from 26% a year earlier.[73]

Ethnic identity is considered within survey and clearance teams to ensure safe access and acceptance by local communities.[74] However, UNMAS has indicated that participation of different ethnic minority groups in survey and clearance across the country continues to be limited in extent.[75] UNMAS has also acknowledged that task prioritisation largely depends on security with resources concentrated on tasks within limited geographical areas.[76]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The National Mine Action strategy 2024–2028 highlights that South Sudan ranks as the second most vulnerable country to natural hazards globally, though there is little explicit focus on the environment in the strategy itself.[77] UNMAS has incorporated environmental considerations into mine action operations in collaboration with the NMAA, integrating issues in work plans and providing guidance in the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs).[78] The NTSG on

66 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Teddy Akello, NMAA, 10 July 2025.
67 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
68 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024.
69 Email from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.
70 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
71 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025.
72 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
73 Ibid.
74 Email from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 8 July 2020.
75 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
76 Emails from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019; and Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.
77 "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p.4.
78 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

Health and Safety, Social and Environment (HSSE) is updated annually, and was due to be reviewed and brought into line with the revised IMAS 07.13 on Environmental Management in Mine Action.[79] The NMAA does not have an environmental focal point and within UNMAS, the coordination and compliance officers and support services manager act as environmental focal points.[80]

Environmental assessments are conducted for planning to determine the impact of different demining assets in line with the national environment policy.[81] South Sudan's Article 7 reports covering 2023 and 2024 describe the adverse effects of climate change on operations over the previous five years, including limiting access due to extreme flooding; displacement of ordnance; longer rainy seasons (which shorten the window for operations); and seasons becoming more irregular, posing challenges to planning.[82] There were no plans to study topsoil in demolition sites to assess the impact of cluster munitions on the soil, even though the Article 7 report for 2024 notes the potential for some leakage of explosive material into the ground, topsoil damage, wild fires, and the killing and injury of animals. Post-clearance remediation is, however, undertaken, in line with the NTSGs.[83]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[84]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DRC	Yes	Yes	No
MAG	No	Yes	Yes
UNMAS	Yes	Yes	Yes

DRC has a health, safety, and environmental management protocol which aligns with the mine action NTSG.[85] MAG has a global environmental policy (reviewed in 2024) to which the South Sudan programme adheres, and aims to develop a policy tailored to South Sudan by the end of 2025. MAG is also piloting the Green Field Tool for Mine Action.[86] As noted above, UNMAS Coordination and Compliance Officers and Support Services Manager act as environmental focal points.

Implementing partners in South Sudan establish their own standard operating procedures (SOPs) and policies based on the relevant NTSG, embedding environmental considerations in their operations. When survey and clearance are completed, an area should be restored in accordance with the wishes of the local community. At a minimum, restoration should include the removal of large items of scrap metal; the filling-in of any pits or craters due to EOD; and the fencing-off of areas where residual non-explosive hazardous materials may remain in the ground.[87] UNMAS continues to sensitise mine action operators on environmental considerations when planning demolitions as well as in post-demolition procedures, during mechanical operations, and when conducting vegetation clearance.[88]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

UNMAS continues to lead on information management for mine action in South Sudan. Since the 2017 comprehensive review of data on the IMSMA database, along with re-survey of recorded SHAs and CHAs, have resulted in significant gains in the understanding of mine and ERW contamination.

South Sudan upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2021,[89] and in 2022 the major transition of IMSMA information to Survey123 was completed.[90] UNMAS has indicated that, wherever possible, the database disaggregates mined areas, cluster munition-contaminated areas, and other ERW-contaminated areas, including spot tasks.[91] Doubts have, however, been raised about data accuracy, with inconsistencies and verification challenges connected with the database. Certain records have not been verified due to limited access or resource constraints; there are possible inaccuracies in global positioning system (GPS) coordinates; some data submissions are incomplete, and reliance on secondary sources such as community reports, are all reported to reduce accuracy. It has also been suggested that funding cuts could disrupt data collection and system maintenance.[92]

79 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

80 Emails from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

81 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

82 Article 7 Reports (covering 2023) Form B; and (covering 2024), Form B.

83 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form B.

84 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025; J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 29 May 2025; and Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025.

85 Email from Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025.

86 Email from J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.

87 APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Form B.

88 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

89 Emails from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022; and Sasha Logie, GICHD, 21 April 2022.

90 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

91 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

92 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.

South Sudan submitted four voluntary CCM Article 7 reports between 2020 and 2023. South Sudan's first CCM Article 7 as a State Party was submitted in May 2024.[93] In 2024, and seemingly in 2023, it provided land release data for January 2011 to December 2023, and did not disaggregate this for the relevant years. In its Article 7 report submitted in April 2025, however, South Sudan did provide disaggregated data for calendar year 2024.[94] It had previously reported on progress in Article 4 implementation at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM (12MSP) in September 2024.[95]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In April 2024, the South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 was formally endorsed by the Office of the President, effectively making it a formal government document.[96] Developed with the support of the GICHD, clear outcomes are listed under three headings: national ownership; land release; and risk education and victim assistance, with corresponding indicators, baselines, and targets.[97]

South Sudan has submitted a new work plan for clearance of CMR as part of its APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, which address all types of EO. The requests seeks another four years for clearance of AP mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and CMR, with a completion deadline of 9 July 2030 (South Sudan's CCM Article 4 deadline is 1 February 2034).[98] The extension request and work plan are detailed, setting out the assumptions on which the request is based and attendant risk factors. The assumptions are that there is access to contaminated areas and no resumption of fighting; funding is sustained or increased; few additional areas of contamination are discovered; most remaining hazardous areas are resurveyed and cancelled or reduced where possible; there is no global or regional shock affecting the mobility of personnel (such as COVID-19); and clearance rates can be maintained.[99]

Table 4: CMR and BAC capacity requirements for 2025–30 (NMAA work plan)[100]

Year	Teams	Area cleared		Area remaining at year end (m^2)	Tasks remaining at year end
		Manual (m^2)	Mechanical (m^2)		
2025	14 manual/2 mechanical	3,080,000	616,000	7,450,579	81
2026	8 manual/2 mechanical	1,760,000	616,000	5,074,579	55
2027	8 manual/2 mechanical	1,760,000	616,000	3,138,579	33
2028	5 manual/2 mechanical	1,100,000	616,000	1,422,579	18
2029	5 manual/1 mechanical	1,100,000	308,000	14,579	1
2030	5 manual/1 mechanical	1,100,000	308,000	0	0

The work plan highlights how South Sudan will have to significantly increase its mechanical assets if it is to clear all CMR by the 2030 deadline.[101] South Sudan puts the cost of all demining between 2024 and 2030 at $183.55 million. Of this $29.25 million is for manual BAC and $12 million is for mechanical BAC, with another $8 million needed for all survey tasks.[102]

South Sudan says it intends to be pragmatic in the sequencing of tasks for clearance, balancing security, logistical requirements, and concentration of effort in the deployment of teams. South Sudan believes that this combination will allow for the most efficient clearance plan that allows for optimal supervision and monitoring of clearance efforts.[103] Task dossiers continue to be issued in a timely and effective manner in South Sudan, according to international NGOs.[104]

South Sudan's plan to develop a regionally based coordination mechanism to address reports of hazardous items and undertake survey of newly identified hazardous areas, as elaborated in its work plan of 31 March 2024, has not been taken forward due to a lack of funding.[105]

93 CCM website, South Sudan, accessed 9 May 2024, at https://bit.ly/3JXviEk.
94 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
95 Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024.
96 "South Sudan National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 13.
97 Ibid., pp. 16–24.
98 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 58–67.
99 Ibid., pp. 8, 9–10, and 54–57.
100 Ibid., p. 74.
101 Ibid., pp. 8 and 67.
102 Ibid., p. 75.
103 Ibid., p. 74.
104 Emails from Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024, Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, then Programme Manager – Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DCA, 8 May 2024; and John Sorbo, Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Programme Manager, DRC, 30 April 2024.
105 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

South Sudan's NTSGs, which outline the technical requirements expected of all demining operators working in South Sudan, are adapted from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The NTSGs are annually reviewed and revised by UNMAS in consultation with implementing partners and the NMAA,[106] taking into account lessons learned during the year and addressing any changes in IMAS.[107] These standards and guidelines contain provisions specific to CMR survey and clearance[108] and are said to be fully adapted to the local context for survey and clearance.[109] In 2024, only minor changes were made to the NTSGs to clarify areas or standards that were unclear.[110] MAG continues to advocate for a revision of NTS requirements in South Sudan, which currently require deployment of technical staff and equipment, precluding its community liaison teams, which have received the requisite training, from conducting NTS.[111]

South Sudan reports having developed a strong methodology for clearing CMR using large-loop detectors, allowing operators to discriminate between potential submunitions and metallic clutter. Operators have further enhanced productivity by using mechanical vegetation-cutting equipment.[112]

UNMAS has noted that the NTSGs require all mine action teams to conduct regular internal quality assurance (QA), along with QC sampling of 10% of each area cleared.[113] The minimum frequency for the senior management internal QA visits to each team was set at one per month in 2021, and UNMAS/NMAA teams now also undertake monthly visits.[114] A standardised scoring matrix was introduced for the EOD written examination.[115]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Clearance teams are normally accredited for and deployed to a variety of tasks in South Sudan, including CMR, AP and AV mine clearance, and EOD. None is exclusively allocated to CMR activities.[116] All teams are accredited to conduct multiple mine action activities, including clearance (see Table 5 below).

UNMAS reported that a total of 26 teams (three commercial companies – G4S, TDI, and SLG; and two international NGOs – DRC and MAG) conducted CMR survey and clearance in 2024, a decrease from the 31 teams engaged in 2023.[117] The number of operational personal involved in technical survey (TS) and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area during 2023 was 372 by the end of 2024, down from 390 personnel at the end of 2023.[118]

DCA, which closed its demining operations in South Sudan in July 2023 due to a lack of funding, had hoped to restart in 2024, but as at February 2025, was still seeking new funding.[119] Funding from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in June 2025 (see above) will allow DCA to restart demining under its "From Hazard to Harvest" programme. DCA will deploy one mechanical clearance team (with 12 deminers) and an EOD spot task team (with four deminers), and will work with its local partner, Support for Peace and Education Development Programme (SPEDF), to undertake risk education.[120]

The decision by PM/WRA to stop funding demining in South Sudan means the number of demining personnel will reduce,[121] and MAG had already lost two demining teams in early 2025 due to the US funding cuts. DRC, however, which had faced the prospect of demobilising its demining team by 31 July 2025 when its GFFO funding ended, has now secured Dutch funding enabling it to continue.[122]

106 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

107 Ibid.

108 Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and responses to questionnaire, 30 March 2015; and email from Augustino Seja, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 11 May 2015.

109 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

110 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

111 Emails from Leah Grace, MAG, 9 April 2024; and Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025.

112 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, p. 19; and 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 71.

113 Email from Ayaka Amano, UNMAS, 2 May 2019.

114 2025 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p.23.

115 Email from Fran O'Grady, UNMAS, UNMISS, 9 March 2022.

116 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

117 Emails Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

118 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

119 Emails from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, DCA, 28 February 2025.

120 Emails from Rama Hansraj Country Director, DCA, South Sudan, 19 June 2025; and Ida Marie Højgaard Jørgensen, Consortium Manager, DCA, 19 June 2025.

121 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

122 Representative of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Individualised Approach Meeting for South Sudan, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025; and email from Catherine Subandrio, DRC, 4 July 2025.

Table 5: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024 (UNMAS data)[123]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets
G4S Emergency Response Team (ERT)	6	102	*7/2 (2 Mine Detection dog - MDD teams)	2 (Robocut vegetation cutting machines)
G4S Multi-task Team (MTT)	4	53	0	
G4S Road Clearance Capacity (RCC)	1	15	3/6	1 (Robocut vegetation cutting machine)
SLG	5	76	0	0
TDI	4	54	0	4 (1 MW 330, 2 MineWolf 240
MAG	5	**55	0	2 (2 Bozenas, for ground preparation)
DRC	1/2	***17/29	0	0
Totals	**26/27**	**372/384**	**10/8**	**9 (including 2 Bozenas)**

* Until 30 April 2024, APOPO supported G4S with 8 dogs.[124] ** Data for clearance and EOD teams.
*** The number of DRC deminers reduced by 12 in July 2024 following a reduction in GFFO funding.[125]

It has been suggested that South Sudan should make use of innovative clearance technologies, such as mechanical assets or drones, to improve efficiency in difficult terrain.[126]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND ARTICLE 4 COMPLIANCE

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, according to UNMAS, a total of more than 3.5km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was released through survey and clearance (see Table 6). Of this, less than 0.02km^2 was cancelled through NTS and just under 3.6km^2 was cleared; there was no reduction of contaminated area through TS.[127] A total of 1,552 submunitions were destroyed in 2024, including 95 in spot tasks.

Table 6: Land release outputs in 2024[128]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	3,554,151
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	19,753
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	1,552 (including 95 in spot tasks)

A total of 1,249,159m^2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination across 11 hazardous areas was added to the IMSMA database in 2024.[129]

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, UNMAS reported that a total of 19,753m^2 was cancelled through NTS in Greater Equatoria, in the south of the country (see Table 7 below). This compares with 16,063m^2 cancelled through NTS in 2023, all in Eastern Equatoria.[130]

123 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025.
124 Email from Mikael Bold, Programme Manager, APOPO Dogs, 11 April 2025.
125 Email from Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
126 Ibid.
127 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.

Table 7: Cancellation through NTS in 2024 (UNMAS data)[131]

State	Operator	SHAs	Area cancelled (m²)
Central Equatoria	G4S	*0	**10,000
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	*0	52
Western Equatoria	G4S	*0	9,701
Central Equatoria	UNMAS	11	0
Eastern Equatoria	UNMAS	14	0
Warrap	UNMAS	1	0
Western Equatoria	UNMAS	1	***0
Totals		**27**	**19,753**

* This was partial release of an SHA.
** The Article 7 report for 2024 does not include this figure due to the late submission of an operator report.[132]
*** As one SHA was merged into another, it was cancelled without releasing any area (m²).[133]

In 2024, as in 2023, no hazardous CMR area was released through TS.[134] As indicated above, almost 1.25km² of unrecorded legacy contamination was added to the database in 2024.[135]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of just under 3.6km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in seven of South Sudan's eight CMR-contaminated states (see Table 8 below) with 1,552 submunitions destroyed, of which 95 were addressed in spot tasks.[136] Most clearance took place in the southern and most highly contaminated states of Eastern Equatoria and Central Equatoria. This is a drop in area cleared and number of submunitions destroyed from 2023 (when 4.3km² was cleared and 2,760 submunitions were destroyed), with the number of areas cleared down from 46 in 2023 to 14 in 2024 (following the merging of adjacent hazardous areas).[137] UNMAS suggests that the decrease in the area cleared in 2024 was due to the revision of CMR hazardous areas, which resulted in a better estimate of CMR tasks.[138]

Table 8: CMR clearance in 2024[139]

State	Operator	CHAs/ SHAs	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed during EOD	Other UXO destroyed
Central Equatoria	G4S	*0	401,320	229	22	8
Central Equatoria	SLG	1	386,990	128	5	11
Central Equatoria	TDI	*0	0	0	20	0
Eastern Equatoria	DRC	*0	229,226	57	11	1
Eastern Equatoria	G4S	1	147,889	138	11	2
Eastern Equatoria	MAG	6	1,480,255	623	1	0
Jonglei	G4S	1	76,025	5	1	1
Jonglei	SLG	1	45,293	27	0	0
Lakes	G4S	0	196,329	12	5	0
Upper Nile	DRC	*0	112,135	20	1	0

131 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
132 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.
133 Ibid.
134 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; and Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
135 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
136 Ibid.
137 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024.
138 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
139 Ibid.

Table 8 continued

State	Operator	CHAs/ SHAs	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed during EOD	Other UXO destroyed
Upper Nile	SLG	0	91,571	77	0	0
Western Bahr El Ghazal	SLG	0	55,351	33	9	0
Western Equatoria	G4S	4	331,767	108	9	3
Totals**		**14**	**3,554,151**	**1,457**	**95**	**26**

* These were partial releases of hazardous areas.
** The Article 7 report for 2024 indicates that a total of 3,517,155m² was cleared with 73 submunitions destroyed.[140] This discrepancy is explained by Article 7 report not including a late clearance report of 36,996m².[141]

In Eastern Equatoria, DRC reported releasing four hazardous areas when clearing 229,271m² and destroying 100 submunitions (including 23 during spot tasks), in contrast to the data reported by UNMAS (as presented in Table 8).[142] The reason for the discrepancy is not known, but is likely to relate to differing ways of calculating clearance. MAG also reported data that differs from Table 8, indicating it released 18 areas when clearing 1,557,997m². The discrepancy is explained by UNMAS only counting area within the polygon whereas MAG also counts clearance of access and control points.[143]

UNMAS reported that in South Sudan, surface-only clearance for CMR-contaminated sites is not conducted as the NTSGs require sub-surface clearance for all cluster munition strikes. That said, MAG says that it conducted surface clearance only of 14,700m² but this was for spot tasks only.[144]

In 2024, seven CMR tasks were cleared, covering a total of 116,085m², but without finding any cluster munition remnants (see Table 9).[145]

Table 9: Area cleared in 2024 in which no CMR were found

Operator	Area cleared (m^2)
G4S	12,321
MAG*	98,780
SLG	4,984
Total	**116,085**

* MAG reported finding no CMR in two BAC tasks covering a total of 39,525m² in 2024. The discrepancy is likely to result from differing ways of calculating clearance.

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE AND COMPLIANCE

CCM ENTRY INTO FORCE FOR SOUTH SUDAN: 1 FEBRUARY 2024

↓

ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE: 1 FEBRUARY 2034

ON TRACK TO MEET ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE

South Sudan became a State Party on 1 February 2024 with a corresponding Article 4 clearance deadline of 1 February 2034. South Sudan should be able to complete clearance of CMR well before the expiry of this 10-year deadline, and has set its own CMR clearance deadline of 9 July 2030.[146]

That said, a range of logistical challenges remain that could delay the projected CMR clearance timeline. In 2025, South Sudan identified five risk factors to meeting its own proposed new CMR clearance deadline of 9 July 2030, and the chances of these all remaining in South Sudan's favour are slim. Of these, the greatest risk is insecurity, with the possibility that fighting could resume in areas of operation. The continued deterioration in the economy, resulting in high inflation and fuel shortages, was seen as another potential disrupter, with environmental changes leading to unexpected extreme weather, climatic changes contributing to extended periods of flooding, and further reductions in funding for demining, posing further risks to clearance.[147]

Flooding already affects access and is exacerbated by poor infrastructure. In some parts of the country access to CMR-contaminated areas remains impossible for over six months a year due to rains and flooding—some contaminated areas remain under water from severe flooding dating back to 2020—while other areas cannot be accessed throughout the year due to intercommunal violence or conflict.[148] In addition, the sector has faced competing priorities which

140 Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form F.
141 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.
142 Emails from Akena Christopher, DRC, 12 June 2025; and Victor Selestino Lado, DRC, 25 March 2025.
143 Email J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025; and from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 4 June 2025.
144 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025; Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and J. Fernando Pineda Arboleda, MAG, 29 May 2025.
145 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.
146 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 74.
147 Ibid., pp. 56–57.
148 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024; email from Mike Rashid Fulla, NMAA, 23 April 2025; and Article 7 Reports (covering 2023 and 2024), Form F.

divert demining capacities; in 2024, these included the need to release land for people displaced including by new flooding.[149] Furthermore, with no evidence-based national CMR baseline, it is likely that new hazardous areas continue be identified in the future – over the last five years, for every 3m^2 cleared, an average of 2m^2 of previously unknown contamination was discovered,[150] while the NMAA remains in need of significant capacity support. Increased political unrest at the end of 2024 and start of 2025 had the potential for conflict escalation, threatening all humanitarian access, though as at April 2025, fighting was focused in the north and west of the country, while demining has generally focused on the south.[151]

Table 10: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	3.6
2023	4.3
2022	4.3
2021	6.1
2020	2.2
Total	**20.5**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

While there is no independent national capacity for clearing residual contamination, an EOD mobile team within the national authority was trained and accredited during an eight-month project that concluded in March 2022.[152] South Sudan indicated in 2024 that it would seek funding to enable an independent entity—potentially an international NGO—to train and equip the NMAA in taking the lead in coordinating the response to new reports of hazardous items, and said it would need international assistance to prepare for residual contamination.[153] It reiterated this position in its 2025 work plan.[154]

The National Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 has a specific target regarding the development of a strategy to manage residual contamination by 2028,[155] though as of April 2025 there had been no progress with this due to lack of funding.[156]

The success of the 2025 work plan is contingent on sufficient support for the NMAA to establish themselves as the long-term response and management capacity to address residual contamination that will inevitably remain beyond release of all currently known hazardous areas.[157]

149 Email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

150 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and Statement of South Sudan, 12MSP, Geneva, 11–13 September 2024.

151 Emails from Eric Okoth, MAG, 15 April 2025; and Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

152 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS South Sudan, 23 March 2023.

153 Updated Work Plan for January 2024 to June 2026, 31 March 2024, p. 23; Article 7 Report (covering 2023), Form G.

154 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8, and 68.

155 Email from Deborah Asikeit, UNMAS, UNMISS, 26 April 2024; and "South Sudan Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028", NMAA, April 2024, p. 21.

156 Emails from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, UNMISS, 8 April 2025.

157 2025 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 76.

SIGNATORY STATE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

Signatory, not State party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Believed to be light but no national baseline estimate

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	35,971	22,469
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	17 (including 3 in spot tasks)	21

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination is believed to be light, and operators report the discovery and destruction of small number of unexploded submunitions each year during battle area clearance (BAC). In 2024, national operator AFRILAM and international operator DanChurchAid (DCA) destroyed 13 and 4 submunitions, respectively, in Tanganyika province.

The ongoing armed conflicts in DR Congo, which escalated throughout 2024, hindered progress in mine action and expanded contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW). The situation worsened in early 2025 when the M23 armed group seized control first of Goma, the capital of North Kivu, and then Bukavu. These developments forced the temporary suspension of activities by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and other mine action operators, and subsequently limited their operations to non-technical survey (NTS), marking of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and risk education. At the same time, a sharp decline in funding—most notably the end of South Korean support to UNMAS and the suspension of United States (US) funding following the change in administration— threatened to bring mine action activities in DR Congo to a standstill in 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **DR Congo should make every effort to ensure that the domestic process to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is completed in 2025 and that it submits its instrument of ratification to the CCM depositary – the UN Secretary-General.**
- **In the meantime, and in order to demonstrate its political commitment to the CCM, DR Congo should submit voluntary Article 7 reports each year. The reports should include an updated estimate of cluster munition-contaminated area based on clearance conducted, including operations in Tanganyika province in 2023 and 2024.**

- **In line with the National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32, DR Congo should conduct survey to determine the location and extent of cluster munition-contaminated areas and other ERW by the end of 2026 and update an action plan for land release.**
- **DR Congo should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction as soon as possible.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM)
- Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC)
- Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC)
- Afrique pour la Lutte Antimines (AFRILAM)
- Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- The Development Initiative (TDI)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

DR Congo has a small amount of cluster munition-contaminated area, but the precise extent is not known. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–32 indicated that "a certain degree of contamination by CMR is still reported, but the areas concerned are considered negligible".[1] Often, areas designated as mined areas by the national mine action centre are in fact battle areas, sometimes containing unexploded submunitions.

The first estimate of CMR contamination came from a national survey in 2013–14 that focused on all types of explosive ordnance. It identified five confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering 17,590m^2 that contained CMR, all of which have since been cleared. The survey had, however, underestimated cluster munition-contaminated area because of limited technical capacity. Indeed, previously unrecorded contamination was discovered during subsequent clearance or following incidents, including in areas already covered by the national survey.[2]

A voluntary CCM Article 7 report submitted at the end of May 2022, the first in eight years, acknowledged that cluster munition-contaminated area had never been systematically identified by survey. The report noted six CHAs containing an estimated 247 submunitions and containers across four provinces and affecting a total of 161,523m^2 (see Table 1), almost double the area recorded in the Article 7 report submitted in 2014. It also emphasised the need to re-survey these areas, with the extent of contamination believed to be under-reported.[3]

The main change since DR Congo's Article 7 report in 2014 was the increase in the estimated size of a single CHA in Equator province up to 120,398m^2, representing nearly three-quarters of all identified contamination.[4] DR Congo also reported releasing 57,857m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area between 2017 and 2020 in five provinces (Equateur, Maniema, South Kivu, Tanganyika, and Tshopo) destroying 572 submunitions in the process. The clearance included three areas that were only partially cleared (Lukamba, Kyomba and Boso Mombemba), and which were therefore still listed as open tasks.[5]

At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM in September 2024, DR Congo listed five provinces with territories containing open CMR tasks, but did not provide updated estimates of contaminated area.[6] The list was consistent with the information provided in the 2022 voluntary Article 7 report, except that it included Maniema, which had been reported as completed. CCLAM subsequently confirmed to Mine Action Review that Maniema still contains an open task – part of Panama, an area in Maniema province.[7]

1 "Plan Stratégique National de Lutte contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les REG en RDC 2023–2032", CCLAM, January 2022 (hereafter, "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32") p. 21.
2 "Plan de Travail Pluriannuel 2023–2032", CCLAM, March 2024 (hereafter, "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32"), p. 17.
3 Voluntary CCM Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F.
4 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013), Form F.
5 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F.
6 Statement of DR Congo, CCM Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10–13 September 2024.
7 Email from Laure Ngoie, Head of Information Management Department, and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, Coordinator, CCLAM, 19 June 2025.

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province (at end 2021)[8]

Province	Territory	Name	CHA	Area (m^2)
Ituri	Aru	Aru-1	1	315
Ituri	Aru	Aru-2	1	435
Ituri	Aru	Awupe	1	2,656
South Kivu	Shabunda	Lukamba	1	719
Tanganyika	Kalemie*	Kyomba	1	37,000
Equator	Bolomba	Boso Mombemba	1	120,398
Totals			**6**	**161,523**

* The extent of contamination in Kalemie (Kyomba zone) was likely down as at the end of 2024 compared to the information in the 2022 Article 7 report, following BAC and destruction of CMR by AFRILAM and DCA in 2023 and 2024.

The 2013–14 national survey did not cover two territories—Aru in Ituri province and Dungu in Haut Uele province—where insecurity had prevented access to survey teams. After years of delay caused by a lack of funding, the national operator Synergie pour la Lutte Antimines (SYLAM), thanks to a teaming agreement with international private operator The Development Initiative (TDI), conducted the NTS in Aru in 2024. The survey identified 15 newly contaminated areas by anti-personnel (AP) mines, nine of which were cleared during the year.[9] No CMR were found, although TDI had destroyed unexploded submunitions in the Rumu area in 2019,[10] and UNMAS reported one area in Aru territory still suspected to contain submunitions, which requires further investigation.[11] The planned survey in Dungu—scheduled for 2024 under the National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–2032[12]—had not taken place as at June 2025.[13] Until the survey is carried out, it is not known if Dungu territory contains CMR.

Cluster munition contamination dates back to the early stages of the Second Congo War (1998–2003).[14] DR Congo has stated it has never used cluster munitions and that the presence of CMR on Congolese territory is due to their use by "both allied and enemy forces" during the conflict.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

DR Congo is also contaminated by ERW other than cluster munitions in all areas that have experienced armed conflicts since the country's independence, making it widespread. To date, no systematic national survey has been conducted. The National Mine Action Strategy 2023–32 indicates that while AP mined area is relatively limited (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on DR Congo for further information on the mine problem), the country faces a significant level of ERW contamination due to the presence of UXO, abandoned munitions, CMR, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[16] Indeed, in recent years, DR Congo has been facing a new and rapid expansion of the use of IEDs. In 2024, UNMAS recorded 60 incidents involving IEDs, 50 in North Kivu and 10 in Ituri, a sharp rise from 22 incidents recorded in 2023.[17]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The national structures for DR Congo's national mine action programme were established by a 2011 law implementing the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), namely the Commission Nationale de Lutte Antimines (CNLAM) and the Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines (CCLAM).[18] CNLAM is the national authority overseeing CCLAM. It is a multi-sectoral body composed of deputies from both parliamentary chambers, officials from four ministries, and representatives of five civil society organisations involved in mine action.[19] A decree formally setting out the role and responsibilities of CNLAM has yet to be adopted.[20]

8 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F.
9 Emails from Kevin Umali, Regional Operation Manager, TDI, 13 June 2025; and Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
10 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 19 June 2025.
11 Email from Julian Bustamante, Programme Management Officer Specialist, UNMAS DRC, 4 June 2025.
12 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 18.
13 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 19 June 2025.
14 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F; and email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 19 June 2025.
15 Statement of DR Congo on Article 4, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022.
16 "National Mine Action Strategy for 2023–32", p. 21; and "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 17.
17 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025.
18 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 5.
19 Ibid., p. 6.
20 Ibid., p. 28.

Established in 2012, CCLAM is the technical coordinating body for all mine action activities in the country, with support from UNMAS.[21] CCLAM is responsible for strategy development, accreditation and tasking of operators, information management, quality control (QC), budgeting, and resource mobilisation. By the end of 2024, the size of CCLAM's workforce had grown significantly to 250 employees, up from 168 the previous year. This sharp increase is likely due to the decentralisation process initiated in 2024, under the National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32, which led to the opening of 11 provincial offices to coordinate mine action efforts and manage QC activities at local level.[22]

The Mine Action Working Group, co-chaired by CCLAM and UNMAS under the Protection Cluster, aims to facilitate regular coordination among stakeholders. In April 2024, CCLAM nominated a new focal point to resume its coordination role.[23] While the frequency and consistency of meetings varied, operators reported improve coordination with national authorities in 2024, particularly through regular engagement with CCLAM. However, coordination at provincial level remains uneven in effectiveness and participation.[24]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The government provides an annual contribution of US$600,000 to CCLAM to cover salaries, running costs, and QC activities. However, no national funding is allocated to survey or clearance operations, leaving DR Congo dependent on international support to address explosive ordnance contamination.[25]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

CCLAM recognised the significance of gender in the 2023–32 national mine action strategy and successive APMBC Article 5 deadline extension requests. All activities, especially risk education and victim assistance, are required to take account of different age groups and genders.[26] DR Congo's 2021 Article 5 deadline extension request had pledged to encourage operators to employ up to 30% women in operations teams and at least half of the risk education teams. CCLAM has had a gender focal point since 2016, which aims to increase the participation of women in mine action and implement gender-sensitive policies. CCLAM has reported an increased proportion of women in its ranks – from 27% in 2024 to nearly 50% in 2025 (see Table 2).[27] AFRILAM had six women on its teams: one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 3 deminer, three EOD Level 2 deminers, a doctor, and a finance and logistics assistant.[28]

Table 2: Gender composition of operators (at end 2024)[29]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
CCLAM	250	124 (49%)	57	20 (35%)	40	9 (23%)
AFRILAM	38	6 (16%)	2	0 (0%)	32	4 (13%)
DCA	51	6 (12%)	9	0 (0%)	24	0 (0%)
UNMAS	31	10 (32%)	6	2 (33%)	25	8 (32%)
Totals	**370**	**146 (39%)**	**74**	**22 (30%)**	**121**	**21 (17%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

DR Congo lacks national standards or policies specifically addressing environmental considerations during mine action operations. Among the Congolese Mine Action Standards issued by CCLAM in 2022 is one chapter titled: "Occupational Health and Safety and Environment Management", which reportedly outlines some measures to minimise the environmental harm of

21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Interview with Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, in Geneva, 8 April 2025; and emails, 8 May 2024 and 6 May 2025.
23 Email from UNMAS DRC, 30 April 2024.
24 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025; and Jacob Payton, Operations Manager and Head of Mine Action Operations EOD 3, DCA, 24 April 2025.
25 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
26 "National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2023–32", pp. 28 and 29.
27 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
28 Email from Germain Apanane Bawala, Project Manager, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025.
29 Ibid.; and emails from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 4 June 2025.

demining operations.[30] CCLAM initiated a process to begin revising them in 2024 and indicated that the review would ensure alignment with the newly revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 on environmental management in mine action.[31] However, official reports do not explicitly reference environmental considerations in the planning or tasking survey or clearance. CCLAM also does not have a designated focal point for environmental issues in mine action.[32] AFRILAM reported having developed a standard operating procedure (SOP-14) on environmental management, which includes the conduct of environmental assessments to support planning and operations.[33]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

CCLAM took over responsibility for information management from UNMAS in 2016 but despite capacity building by UNMAS over many years still lacks the capacity and resources, including equipment and funding, to manage the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database effectively. The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 identifies the need to build staff capacity, improve data collection, update the database on a regular basis, and provide data disaggregated by age and gender.[34]

In 2024, demining operators reported that the list of hazardous areas in the database was not up to date. It did not include the latest information from operators and still listed areas that had already been cleared. The designation of hazardous areas also needed improvement, as teams were operating in locations that clearly concerned battle areas, yet were incorrectly designated as minefields.[35]

As at early 2025, DR Congo's national information management system still relied on IMSMA New Generation, which is stored locally on a single laptop and limited to manual data entry by one user. This makes it outdated, inaccurate, and unsustainable. In March 2025, CCLAM received IMSMA Core from the Geneva International Centre of Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), with implementation support from UNMAS expected throughout 2025 and additional assistance from the GICHD in 2026. Full roll-out is projected to take about two years. Preparatory efforts began in late 2024, with UNMAS leading weekly training sessions and a November workshop focused on IMSMA Core and digitalisation of CCLAM's data collection forms.[36]

The last voluntary Article 7 report under the CCM was submitted by DR Congo in May 2022, covering the period from January 2013 to December 2021. None has been submitted since.

PLANNING AND TASKING

In March 2024, the Vice Prime Minister officially signed the National Work Plan 2023–32 ("Plan de Travail Pluriannuel 2023-2032"), which operationalised the strategic orientation in the National Mine Action Strategy completed two years earlier ("Plan Stratégique National de Lutte Contre les Mines Antipersonnel et les Restes Explosifs de Guerre en République Démocratique du Congo 2023–2032").[37] The strategy sets out general objectives for the coming decade, including completing mine clearance by 2025 and CMR clearance by 2032. It aims to ensure all mined areas are cleared, that survey of areas affected by cluster munitions and other ERW is completed rapidly, and that a decentralised EOD capacity is established to tackle residual contamination.[38] The 76-page document sets out a detailed budget for the 10 years of the plan whose total cost was estimated at US$91 million, of which US$50 million was for clearance.[39]

The National Work Plan 2023–32 indicated that survey activities would be conducted in 145 territories of DR Congo and specifically stated that a national survey, combining NTS and technical survey (TS) for ERW and CMR, would be completed by 2026.[40]

DR Congo submitted its fifth APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request on 10 June 2025, albeit with a delay, with the current extended deadline (its fourth) set to expire on 31 December 2025. The requested three-year extension aims to release 35 CHAs covering 340,202m^2 and to carry out the long-delayed survey in Dungu.[41] It remains unclear whether this extension—pushing completion to 2028—will impact the CMR survey and clearance deadlines set out in the 2023–32 National Mine Action Work Plan, which were scheduled for 2026 and 2032, respectively.

30 Emails from UNMAS DRC, 30 April 2024; and Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025.
31 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025.
34 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", pp. 21, 22, and 29.
35 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.
36 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025.
37 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 7.
38 Ibid., p. 11.
39 Ibid., p. 12.
40 Ibid., p. 18.
41 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted 10 June 2025, p. 5.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

DR Congo has 24 national standards (Normes Nationales Congolaises de la Lutte Antimines) developed with support from the GICHD and regularly updated, most recently in 2022.[42] In early 2024, further revisions were made to the NMAS and associated SOPs on survey and clearance of CMR and AP mines. Key updates included integrating risk education requirements into NTS procedures and refining task prioritisation criteria based on contamination impact and community feedback. These updates were made in consultation with both national and international clearance operators, through a series of technical working group meetings facilitated by CCLAM.[43] CCLAM planned to submit the revised standards to the GICHD for review.[44]

A persistent challenge in 2024 was the mis-designation of hazardous areas, with clearance teams often deployed to locations that are clearly battle areas requiring BAC, but which were designated as minefield tasks by CCLAM. This has impacted the efficiency of operations.[45]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, no operators were specifically tasked with addressing cluster munition-contaminated areas. However, some CMR were encountered and addressed during other clearance operations conducted by AFRILAM and DCA.

AFRILAM employed 38 staff in 2024, up from 37 in 2023, with four multitask teams (MTTs) comprising 32 personnel. Three of these MTTs, contracted by UNMAS and based in Beni, Bukavu, and Goma, were engaged in a series of tasks in support of MONUSCO operations. This included BAC, bulk demolitions, and spot tasks. The fourth MTT, based in Kalemie and funded by the Swiss foundation "Monde Sans Mines", operated in two territories. In Kalemie, the team focused on BAC in Kyomba area, while in Moba, it conducted NTS, TS, and spot task EOD as well as risk education.[46]

DCA's mine action programme, funded by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) and managed from Goma, employed 51 personnel in 2024. These included three international staff (operations manager, technical field manager, and medical coordinator) along with three clearance teams each comprising 16 members: a national supervisor, a team leader, eight deminers, and six support staff (a medic, a logistics officer, a finance officer, and three drivers). DCA cleared one battle area where a small number of submunitions were found, and several areas initially designated by CCLAM as minefields, which were later identified as battle areas. In 2025, DCA reduced its workforce after losing the PM/WRA funding.[47]

UNMAS, which began working in DR Congo in 2002, was headquartered in Goma in North Kivu. In 2024, it employed a total of 31 staff (11 international, 16 national, and 4 in-kind contributions). This compares with 42 in 2023, across offices in Kinshasa, Beni (North Kivu), Bukavu (South Kivu), and Bunia (Ituri). UNMAS is mandated to provide EOD and IED disposal in support of MONUSCO, for which it contracted national operator AFRILAM (for EOD spot tasks), G4S (for IED disposal), and TDI (for training and mentoring national operator SYLAM to conduct NTS, TS, manual mine clearance, and spot tasks and demolitions). TDI-SYLAM MTTs did not tackle CMR in 2024, though TDI still has a pending CMR task in South Kivu, which cannot be addressed due to access constraints.[48] UNMAS also contracted other national organisations to conduct NTS and risk education.

In 2024, UNMAS was funded by MONUSCO through the UN assessed budget as well as with funding from the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), which started in 2022 and ended in March 2025.[49] The funding from KOICA was not renewed in 2025.[50]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, DR Congo reported release of 35,971m^2 of battle area where CMR were found (see Table 3 below). While operators cleared several areas that were designated as minefield tasks by CCLAM, in nearly every case these were in fact battle areas containing UXO, including, in some instances, submunitions.[51]

DCA was assigned one BAC task in 2024 in the Kyomba area of Kalemie territory, Tanganyika province, where it cleared 25,588m^2 and destroyed four PM1 submunitions. In addition, DCA was assigned five mine clearance tasks that turned out to be of battle areas, despite a concerted effort with CCLAM to prioritise minefield clearance. These areas

42 Statement of DR Congo, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, 2 July 2020; and "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", p. 18.
43 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.
44 Emails from Laure Ngoie, CCLAM, 25 June 2024 and 6 May and 10 June 2025.
45 Emails from Jacob Payton, DCA, 8 August 2024 and 2 April 2025.
46 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala, AFRILAM, 28 May 2025; and Yannick Malamba, Chief of Operations, AFRILAM, 13 June 2025.
47 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 13 June 2025.
48 Email from Kevin Umali, TDI, 13 June 2025.
49 Email from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025.
50 Interview with Jean-Denis Nsoki Larsen, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.
51 Email from Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025.

did not contain submunitions. In Kasai-Central, Dibelenge territory, DCA cleared 7,920m^2 in the Didamba area with no explosive ordnance found. In Mpoyi, it reduced 1,547m^2 and cleared 4,603m^2, destroying one AP mine and one mortar. In Tanganyika, Moba territory, DCA reduced 4,444m^2 and cleared 5,306m^2 in Lukunde, where one rocket and two grenades were destroyed. The Kasenga area remained inaccessible throughout the year. Finally, in South Kivu, Fizi territory, DCA cleared 1,051m^2 in Lulimba, with no explosive ordnance found.[52]

AFRILAM, having cleared 22,469m^2 and destroyed 21 submunitions in 2023 in the same Kyomba area of Kalemie territory, continued its clearance operations in 2024. It cleared 10,383m^2 during the year, destroying 10 submunitions in the process, along with three more submunitions destroyed in spot tasks, and 19 items of UXO. AFRILAM was assigned 957 spot tasks and 14 bulk demolition tasks in 2024 in the course of which it destroyed 189,000 items of explosive ordnance and incinerated more than 4.2 million rounds of small-calibre ammunition.[53]

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2024[54]

	Release in 2024 (km^2)
Clearance	35,971
Technical survey	0
Non-technical survey	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	17 (including 3 in spot tasks)

Table 4: CMR clearance in 2024[55]

Operator	Province	Territory	Name	Area (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed
AFRILAM	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Kyomba	10,383	10
AFRILAM	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Kyomba	Spot tasks	3
DCA	Tanganyika	Kalemie	Kyomba	25,588	4
Totals				**35,971**	**17**

DEMINER SAFETY

No accidents were reported during demining or EOD operations in 2024. However, persistent insecurity, particularly in the eastern provinces, posed significant operational challenges. In early 2025, following M23's capture of Goma and Bukavu, mine action activities were temporarily suspended. Operators were later prevented from destroying ERW, removing hazardous items, TS, and area clearance, being limited to NTS, marking of ERW, and risk education. Efforts were underway to secure authorisation to resume full operations, but approvals had not been granted at the time of writing.[56]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

A signatory to the CCM since 2009, DR Congo has still to ratify the Convention. At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in 2022, it explained that the delay was due to "a technical procedural issue, not a lack of political will". At the time, DR Congo announced its decision to reintroduce the ratification law through the relevant ministry, with the aim of resubmitting it to both chambers of Parliament.[57] At the Twelfth Meeting in 2024, CCLAM stated that these efforts had led to the law being adopted by both chambers.[58] However, contradictory information exists, as CCLAM also informed Mine Action Review that the law was still under discussion in the Senate.[59] Once adopted by the Senate, the ratification law will be submitted for promulgation to the President of the Republic. It has now been over ten years since the ratification law was first expected to be adopted.[60]

DRC has not submitted a voluntary transparency report for the past three years. The last report, submitted in May 2022, covered 2013 to 2021 inclusive, and detailed clearance of areas contaminated by CMR between 2017 and 2020. During this period, a total 57,857m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released across five provinces: 1,500m^2 in Equateur; 32,820m^2 in Maniema; 5,522m^2 in South Kivu; 15,000m^2 in Tanganyika; and 3,015m^2 in Tshopo province. These operations led to the destruction of 572 submunitions, including Chilean PM-1 and US-made MK118 cluster munitions. Three areas were only partially cleared and therefore remain listed as open tasks.

52 Email from Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, Technical Field Manager, DCA, 21 August 2025.

53 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala and Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 14 May 2024 and 28 May and 13 June 2025.

54 Emails from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 4 July 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Germain Apanane Bawala and Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 28 May and 13 June 2025.

55 Emails from Germain Apanane Bawala and Yannick Malamba, AFRILAM, 13 June 2025; and Charles-Félix Manzan Kouakou, Technical Field Manager, DCA, 21 August 2025.

56 Emails from Julian Bustamante, UNMAS DRC, 2 April 2025; Jacob Payton, DCA, 24 April 2025; and Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 6 May 2025.

57 Statement of DR Congo, CCM Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 August–2 September 2022.

58 Statement of DR Congo, CCM Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 10–13 September 2024.

59 Email from Laure Ngoie and Emmanuel Lokinu Omanga, CCLAM, 19 June 2025.

60 Statement of DR Congo, CCM Intersessional Meetings of States Parties, Geneva, 7–9 April 2014.

In addition, DR Congo reported a total of 3,041 submunitions cleared and destroyed in 2013–21 during land release. The items destroyed were 2,793 PM-1 and 248 MK118 submunitions.[61] Since 2022, the extent of contamination has not been officially updated by CCLAM, but it has likely decreased due to destruction of CMR by AFRILAM and DCA in 2023 and 2024 in Kyomba.

The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 planned for surveys to determine the extent and location of CMR and other ERW contamination by the end of 2026. These surveys would then be used to draw up an action plan for land release.[62]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32 aims to strengthen national ownership by setting up a Government Humanitarian Demining Service (Service Gouvernemental de Déminage Humanitaire, SGDH) to address residual contamination. The SGDH teams will mainly consist of experts from the DR Congo armed forces, the National Police, and civilians qualified in EOD.[63]

61 Voluntary Article 7 Report (covering 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2021), Form F (written by mistake as Form B on stockpile destruction).

62 "National Mine Action Work Plan 2023–32", CCLAM, March 2024, p. 18.

63 Ibid., p. 7.

NON-SIGNATORIES

ARMENIA

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

1.6KM²

Light
(Partial estimate of battle area)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	75,186	214,192
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	10	26

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Centre for Humanitarian Demining Expertise (CHDE)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, the Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE) cleared 75,186m^2 of battle area, which included cluster munition remnants (CMR). This was partial clearance of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in Vayots Dzor province. The total area cleared in 2024 was a significant reduction on the 214,192m^2 cleared the year before. No other cluster munition-contaminated area was released during the year.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Armenia should commit to never again use cluster munitions and should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Armenia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **Armenia should submit voluntary Article 7 reports annually under the CCM.**
- **Armenia should expedite the adoption of national mine action legislation.**
- **Armenia should clarify the extent of remaining cluster munition-contaminated area.**
- **Armenia should ensure it disaggregates CMR contamination and clearance from other explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- CHDE

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

As at the end of 2024, the CHDE reported 1.6km^2 of battle area in Armenia, a small decrease on the 1.64km^2 recorded at the end of 2023. The CHDE does not distinguish CMR from other ERW.[1] Contamination is recorded in two provinces that border Azerbaijan – Syunik and Vayots Dzor. As set out in Table 1, in Syunik, a total of 685,852m^2 is recorded in two CHAs and five suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). At the end of 2024, Vayots Dzor had only one recorded CHA (covering 883,612m^2), in which the CHDE had cleared 75,186m^2 of battle area in the course of the year. No CMR were found outside these areas in 2024.[2]

Recorded battle area in Armenia is only a partial national estimate. Prior to the 2020 conflict with Azerbaijan (known as the Forty-four Day War or Second Karabakh War), there was only one cluster munition-contaminated area in Armenia – a CHA in Kornidzor, Syunik province, covering an estimated 385,000m^2, which was partially surface-cleared in 2021 (45,000m^2 of clearance).[3]

Between April and September 2022, the CHDE, supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), conducted non-technical survey (NTS) in the border provinces of Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor. Following further hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in mid-September 2022, the CHDE—again with UNDP support—conducted "refreshed" NTS in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Vayots Dzor provinces to assess new contamination.[4] In addition, a baseline survey initiated earlier in 2022 was completed in Syunik, Gegharkunik, Tavush, Ararat, and Vayots Dzor provinces.[5] In May 2024, however, the CHDE reported that further survey was needed in areas under military control but that it would only be undertaken with "appropriate security guarantees".[6]

The CHDE identified two SHAs in Syunik province and two CHAs in Vayots Dzor during NTS in 2022 with a total surface area of 1.38km^2, which were added to the database. CHDE attributes the contamination to the Azerbaijani armed forces: the two SHAs in Syunik it has recorded were reported to result from fighting during the Forty-Four Day War in 2020, while the two CHAs in Vayots Dzor were a legacy of the hostilities in September 2022.[7]

In the course of the armed conflict with Azerbaijan that broke out in September 2020, Azerbaijan as well as Armenia and/or allied Karabakh forces are reported to have used cluster munitions,[8] although Armenia declared it had not used cluster munitions.[9] The CHDE reported direct evidence of new explosive ordnance (EO) contamination from the 2020 conflict,[10] including unexploded M095 submunitions, in Gegharkunik, Syunik, and Tavush provinces bordering Azerbaijan. The conflict ended with Azerbaijan regaining control over most of its internationally recognised territories except for a part of Nagorno-Karabakh. On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour military offensive which resulted in it regaining control of the rest of the territory.[11] There were no reports of the use of cluster munitions during the 2023 conflict.

Armenia has stated that it cannot accede to the CCM due to military and security issues.[12]

Table 1: Battle area by province (at end 2024)[13]

Province	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total CHAs/SHAs	Total area (m^2)
Syunik	2	356,222	5	329,630	7	685,852
Vayots Dzor	1	883,612	0	0	1	883,612
Totals	**3**	**1,239,834**	**5**	**329,630**	**8**	**1,569,464**

1 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May 2025; and Vaghinak Sargsyan, Director, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
2 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
3 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.
4 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, Project Coordinator, UNDP, 15 March and 16 June 2023.
5 CHDE, "Non-Technical Survey", accessed 20 May 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3QRwXPs.
6 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
7 Email from Karine Shamiryan, Head of International Affairs, CHDE, 27 June 2024.
8 Amnesty International, "In the Line of Fire", 14 January 2021, at: https://bit.ly/4d09o40, pp. 7, 10–13, and 15; and Human Rights Watch, "Technical Briefing Note: Cluster Munition Use in the Karabakh Conflict", July 2021 at: https://bit.ly/4cjc3By, pp. 1–3.
9 Email from the CHDE, 13 June 2025.
10 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.
11 "Azerbaijan halts Karabakh offensive after ceasefire deal with Armenian separatists", BBC, 21 September 2023, at: https://bbc.in/3rCVK0e.
12 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 26.
13 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

In addition to other ERW, Armenia is contaminated with anti-personnel mines – see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Armenia for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The CHDE was established by the Armenian government in 2011 as a non-commercial State body responsible for conducting survey and clearance and identifying contaminated areas. In 2014, the CHDE was designated the national mine action authority (NMAA) for Armenia.[14] In 2013, in conformity with a government decree, the CHDE began developing national mine action legislation, but as at May 2024, the draft mine action law was still reported to be under development.[15] No further progress has been reported since.

Key decisions on mine action are taken centrally by the CHDE, which is the only entity now conducting land release activities in Armenia. The HALO Trust no longer has a presence in the country, and last undertook limited demining there in 2021.[16] The National Mine Action Coordination Platform, however, which was established in 2023 with UNDP support, serves as a coordination mechanism supporting mine action.[17] Separate technical working groups cover land release, risk education, and victim assistance (all led by the CHDE), as well as emergency preparedness and protection (led by the Ministry of Internal Affairs' Rescue Service).[18]

In addition, under its "green label" approach, which places mine action within socio-economic development, the CHDE collaborates with a range of organisations.[19] It has thus coordinated action with UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), local organisations, and with local self-governing authorities, to translate the results of clearance of explosive ordnance into long-term socio-economic and environmental benefits, running pilot projects since 2022.[20] An advisory group established in 2023 incorporates representatives from some of these agencies and also includes the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The GICHD advises the CHDE on mine action, including on use of the latest tools and technologies for the sector.[21]

The GICHD continues to support the CHDE to install the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core (see the section below, Information Management and Reporting).[22] The CHDE and the GICHD are also cooperating in the field of innovation, with CHDE participating in the GICHD's Innovation Hub – Mine Action Innovation Technical Group, which was initiated in 2024.[23] The GICHD and UNDP also continued to support the CHDE with a review of the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) in 2024.[24]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2023, the CHDE received funding from the State budget, which also made an allocation for survey and clearance activities (amounts not disclosed);[25] an update for 2024 was not reported.

Under Armenia's five-year mine action strategy for 2023–27, mobilising resources from national and international donors is a priority.[26] It aims to expand cooperation with other international, foreign, and national actors, viewing this as a key way of supporting the implementation of the strategy.[27] At the time of writing, however, no progress had been reported.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CHDE reports that gender and diversity have been mainstreamed in Armenia's national mine action strategy, and that the needs of women and children in communities affected by CMR are taken into account in the prioritisation, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance.[28] The strategy is not, though, explicit about precisely how gender and diversity have been

14 Emails from Ruben Arakelyan, Director, CHDE, 8 June 2015; and Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 10 August 2020.

15 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

16 Email from Fiona Kilpatrick-Cooper, Head of Region – Europe (South Caucasus), HALO, 2 September 2022.

17 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024 and 17 April 2025.

18 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 17 April 2025.

19 Interview with Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, Geneva, 28 April 2024; and CHDE website, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3REVuHX.

20 CHDE, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a component of sustainable development in the economy of the country", 21 May 2024.

21 Vaghinak Sargsyan, "Greening Mine Action in Armenia as a Component of Sustainable Development in the Economy of the Country", *James Madison University*, 21 October 2024, last updated 17 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4iXMPuU.

22 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023; Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023; and Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

23 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

24 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP 17 April 2025.

25 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

26 CHDE, National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 10.

27 Ibid., p. 26; and CHDE, "International Cooperation", accessed 20 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3V7VVwE.

28 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

mainstreamed. Although the CHDE has not confirmed whether it has a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan, it plans to establish a female demining team, with training said to be in process in May 2024.[29] No further progress was reported at the time of writing.

The CHDE says it offers equal employment opportunities to both men and women. In May 2024, 14 of 51 CHDE employees were women (27%, down from 32% in 2021), while women held 4 of 17 managerial positions and 2 of 14 operational positions.[30]

Table 2: Gender composition of the CHDE (at May 2024)[31]

Total staff employed	Women employed	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
51	14 (27%)	17	4 (24%)	14	2 (14%)

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CHDE has reported that it is developing an environmental management policy; that its NMAS on environmental management in mine action is in line with International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13; that it conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance; and that it takes measures to prevent or at least minimise environmental harm.[32] When planning and prioritising survey and clearance, the CHDE says it takes into account climate-related and extreme-weather risks.[33]

The national mine action strategy lists 14 "environment protection priorities", including the "green label" approach outlined above. The first of these stipulates that: "During mine action activities, the NMAA implements environmental protection activities, ensuring the minimal impact of mine action on the environment and the intended use of these lands after clearance, land clearance (land release) 'green label' rank that guarantees each person's right of both present and future generations to live in a dignified environment conducive to health and well-being".[34] The CHDE has previously reported using methods and tools that do not damage the environment wherever possible.[35]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[36]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
CHDE	Yes	Yes	Not known

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CHDE manages the national IMSMA database[37] and has established an information management and analytical department.[38] The CHDE says it disaggregates different types of contamination, but CMR are not disaggregated from other ERW, and CMR clearance is not disaggregated from general battle area clearance (BAC).[39] In 2023, with UNDP and GICHD support, IMSMA Core was installed on CHDE servers, and the implementation of the system and transfer of data continued in 2024.[40] The GICHD continues to provide support with information management. As at May 2025, the GICHD was supporting the CHDE in the testing phase of IMSMA Core implementation.[41] CHDE personnel have also continued to participate in GICHD training and workshops.[42]

29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
34 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 23.
35 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 11 May 2022.
36 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
37 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 19 March 2014.
38 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
39 Emails from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024; and the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
40 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 7 June 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
41 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, GICHD, 2 May 2025.
42 Ibid.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The national mine action strategy for 2023–27 and operational plans were adopted by the CHDE in June 2023.[43] Among its 15 strategic objectives are listed: implementation of Armenia's international obligations in demining; clearance of all mines and ERW; and support for environmental protection issues.[44] Urgent demining and improvements to the coordination, regulatory, and management role of the CHDE are two priorities.[45]

The strategy described EO contamination in the four provinces of Gegharkunik, Syunik, Tavush, and Vayots Dzor,[46] but the document does not clearly or consistently disaggregate CMR from other ERW. Under the strategy, the Jermuk and Kechut areas in the Vayots Dzor province and Davit Bek in Syunik province were deemed priorities for the clearance of mines and ERW in 2023–2027, but the total area to be cleared (1.35km^2) does not disaggregate mine clearance from clearance of ERW, including CMR,[47] and annual clearance targets are not provided for the different areas.

The strategy does, however, indicate that in 2023, the CHDE planned to clear 50,000m^2 of mined and ERW-contaminated area using State funding and, if funds allow, in each subsequent year to add another 25,000m^2 of clearance to the target until the end of the strategy in 2027. The CHDE confirmed that it planned to clear 75,000m^2 of battle area in 2024,[48] and reported just meeting the target, clearing 75,186m^2 during the year.[49] In addition, the strategy cites CHDE plans to reduce or cancel 30,000m^2 through survey (and releasing additional area if funding permits),[50] although no cluster munition-contaminated area or mined area was released through survey in 2024.[51]

Other targets listed in the strategy include deploying additional professional demining groups and expanding collaboration with national and international operators.[52] It is not known whether any progress was made with these targets in 2024.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

The CHDE developed the Armenian NMAS, which were approved by the government in 2014.[53] The CHDE says these have been reviewed to ensure consistency with IMAS[54] and in 2022 and 2023, UNDP supported a review of the NMAS.[55] The overall quality of the NMAS on land release were said to vary, with some chapters overly prescriptive more akin to standing operating procedures (SOPs). There are sections on "All Reasonable Effort" (ARE), evidence of criteria, liability, and residual risk. Some are taken from IMAS although the text has been adapted.[56] With support from the GICHD and UNDP, the CHDE initiated a further review of the NMAS in 2023, which continued into 2024, to ensure compliance with IMAS. The CHDE intended to develop an NMAS on accreditation.[57]

The CHDE has been developing SOPs for several years.[58] SOPs on manual mine clearance, BAC, marking of hazardous areas, and medical support were all elaborated by 2018.[59] In 2020, the CHDE prepared SOPs on information management, NTS, technical survey (TS), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and quality management (QM).[60] The CHDE reviews its SOPs regularly as necessary, updating them in 2023 and again in 2024, when additions were made to the SOPs on QM, marking, and BAC.[61]

43 Email from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 5 July 2024.
44 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 9.
45 Ibid., p. 10.
46 Ibid., pp. 11–14.
47 Ibid., p. 21.
48 Email from Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.
49 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
50 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 20.
51 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.
52 Armenia National Mine Action Strategy, 2023–2027, p. 21.
53 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 19 April 2019.
54 Emails from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 19 April 2019 and 26 April 2021.
55 Emails from Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 15 March 2023 and 5 July 2024.
56 Email from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May 2023.
57 Emails from Stanislav Damjanovic, GICHD, 25 May and 23 June 2023; Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and Karinée Khojayan, UNDP, 17 April 2025.
58 Email from Varsine Miskaryan, Operations Manager, CHDE, 8 August 2016.
59 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 8 August 2018.
60 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 26 April 2021.
61 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

The CHDE was the only operator in Armenia in 2024 (as in the previous year), deploying two NTS teams with a total of twelve staff, and two clearance teams with a total of fourteen deminers in 2023.[62] In 2024, the CHDE planned to increase its operational teams by one,[63] but it is not known whether this was achieved as no update was provided for 2024.

QM has previously been reported as being conducted in accordance with IMAS and the NMAS. Quality assurance is conducted by dedicated officers who make regular field visits to inspect cleared land.[64] Quality control is conducted once clearance has been completed but prior to handover of the land.[65]

Table 4: CHDE operational capacities deployed in 2023[66]

Activity	No. of teams	No. of personnel
NTS	2	12
Clearance	2	14
Totals	**4**	**26**

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 75,186m^2 of battle area was released, all through clearance, with the destruction of 10 submunitions and one other item of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[67]

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2024[68]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	75,186	
Technical Survey	0	
Non-Technical Survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	
Submunitions destroyed	10	One item of UXO was also destroyed.

SURVEY IN 2024

No cluster munition-contaminated area was reduced through TS or cancelled through NTS in 2024 or in 2023.[69] In both years, land release activities were conducted in accordance with the 2023–27 national mine action strategy.[70]

62 Ibid., and email from CHDE, 6 May 2024.
63 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
64 Email from Ruben Arakelyan, CHDE, 8 June 2015.
65 Email from Margaret Lazyan, CHDE, 8 August 2018.
66 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
67 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2024.
68 Ibid.
69 Emails from the CHDE, 6 May 2025; and Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.
70 Emails from CHDE, 6 May and 13 June 2025.

CLEARANCE IN 2024

The CHDE cleared 75,186m^2 of battle area in 2024, partially clearing the one remaining recorded CHA in Vayots Dzor, and destroying 10 submunitions and 1 item of UXO. Of the released, 6,978m^2 was through surface clearance only. No previously unrecorded areas of cluster munition-contaminated area were discovered in 2024.[71] This is a reduction on the battle area cleared in 2023, when 214,192m^2 was cleared, all of it both surface and sub-surface, with 26 submunitions and 8 other items of UXO destroyed.[72]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

In 2024, the CHDE said that it planned to complete clearance of CMR in five to eight years if donor support was forthcoming.[73] Further survey in military-controlled areas is still needed to determine the full extent of CMR and other EO contamination, which will affect the date that completion can be achieved, but Armenia should increase its annual clearance rate if it is to meet its CMR clearance target of between 2029 and 2034.

Table 6: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (m^2)
2024	75,186
2023	214,192
2022	111,616
2021	50,999
2020	3,850
Total	**455,843**

71 Email from the CHDE, 6 May 2025.

72 Email from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024.

73 Emails from Vaghinak Sargsyan, CHDE, 10 May 2024; and Karine Shamiryan, CHDE, 21 June 2024.

AZERBAIJAN

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION: 80KM^2

Medium
(Mine Action Review estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	(Mine Action Review estimate) *12	(Mine Action Review estimate) 8
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	2,882	1,818

* ANAMA reported clearing almost 51.8km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024. However, this figure reflects the total size of tasks in which submunitions were subsequently found, rather than clearance of area that is actually CMR-contaminated. The actual area containing CMR as a result of cluster munition strikes within the task polygons is therefore far less than the total size of the polygons reported. Given the relatively small number of submunitions found and destroyed, Mine Action Review has estimated that of the 51.8km^2 of clearance claimed by ANAMA, actual clearance of CMR contamination concerned 12km^2.

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA)
- Ministry of Defence Demining Battalion
- Ministry of Emergency Situations
- State Border Service
- Qaya Safety Solutions (partnering with SafeLane Global)
- Safe Point CJSC
- Alpha Demining
- Azerbaijan Demining Company
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)
- APOPO

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Azerbaijan adopted the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities in February 2025, but has not yet adopted its revised national standards (ANMAR) and a new national mine action strategy. Azerbaijan continues to scale up a massive clearance effort of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants (CMR). In 2024, the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) reported releasing more than 51km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area through clearance and technical survey (TS), with the destruction of 2,882 submunitions.[1] These figures, however, are based on the total size of area for task polygons in which submunitions were found during land release as ANAMA does not disaggregate cluster munition tasks from other battle area clearance (BAC) or mine clearance. In order to avoid inflating CMR clearance data, Mine Action Review has estimated that the amount of land actually containing CMR released through clearance in 2024, was 12km^2. This estimated figure is nonetheless a 50% increase on the previous year.

1 Email from Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of International Relations Department, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Azerbaijan should commit to never again use cluster munitions and should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **ANAMA should work to establish a nationwide baseline of CMR-contaminated area using evidence-based non-technical survey (NTS) and TS.**
- **ANAMA should ensure that CMR survey, clearance, and contamination data are disaggregated from data relating to other ERW and mines.**
- **Azerbaijan should adopt the revised National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) without delay and allow cancellation of areas through NTS, which is not permitted under existing standards.**
- **ANAMA should elaborate a separate methodology for clearing CMR, distinct from BAC, ensuring that the footprint of a cluster strike is identified and that clearance is conducted to an appropriate fade-out distance.**
- **ANAMA should finalise and adopt a new draft mine action strategy to replace the one that expired in 2018, reflecting the significant increase in explosive ordnance (EO) contamination now under Azerbaijan's control.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA, formerly the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- ANAMA
- Ministry of Defence Humanitarian Demining Units
- Ministry of Emergency Situations
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- The State Border Service
- Four national commercial demining companies, two of which have an international commercial sub-contractor:
  - Qaya Safety Solutions partnering with SafeLane Global
  - Safe Point CJSC
  - Alpha Demining LLC
  - Azerbaijan Demining Company LLC, partnering with Piper
- International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF, an NGO based in Azerbaijan)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Azerbaijan has not established a national baseline of areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR. Unexploded submunitions comprise only a small proportion of total EO contamination, and while the precise extent of CMR contamination in Azerbaijan is significant, it is not believed to be heavy. ANAMA does not disaggregate CMR clearance from clearance of other types of ERW or of mines in the area it reports as released through TS and clearance.

ANAMA does, however, systematically categorise the type of EO destroyed during clearance, and records the number of CMR identified and destroyed by district.[2] In 2024, ANAMA identified and destroyed 2,882 unexploded submunitions during TS and clearance of polygons totalling almost 51.8km^2.[3] However, the area cleared was based on the total size of task polygons in which submunitions were found and therefore the size of CMR contamination will have been far smaller.

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

ANAMA has in the past indicated an interest in establishing a national baseline of EO contamination through NTS, but which would not disaggregate cluster munition-contaminated areas from those containing other ERW,[4] and there are no specific plans to develop a dedicated baseline survey for CMR. Clearance continues in accordance with the national work plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, according to which all types of EO are addressed without distinction. NTS is used to confirm and further define contamination.[5] ANAMA avers that due to extensive military activity across territories formerly occupied by Armenia, the precise nature and distribution of contamination is not known with any degree of precision.[6] The former lines of contact (LOCs), which experienced prolonged fortification and military use, are considered high-risk and have been designated as confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs).[7] As at the end of 2024, ANAMA had assessed that along the former LOCs, almost 1,738km^2 was CHA as it was contaminated with some type of EO. Another 8,133km^2 was designated as suspected hazardous area (SHA).[8] According to ANAMA, the designations of CHA and SHA were made primarily as a result of NTS.[9] The extent to which the identified CHAs/SHAs contain CMR is unknown.

CMR contamination resulted first from the 1988–94 conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. Following the cease-fire in 1994, tensions flared up in April 2016 when fighting broke out briefly along the then LOC and saw renewed use of cluster munitions. There were intermittent attacks and use of heavy weaponry on the front lines until 2020, when on 27 September, a fully-fledged international armed conflict restarted.[10] Fierce fighting was ended by a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement, which came into effect on 10 November 2020. Under the agreement (the Trilateral Statement), Azerbaijan regained full control of the seven districts adjacent to the former Nagorno-Karabakh (now known in Azerbaijan as the Karabakh Economic Region) and also a substantial part of the former Nagorno-Karabakh itself.[11]

Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are believed to have used cluster munitions in the course of the six-week conflict in 2020. Human Rights Watch documented repeated use of LAR-160 cluster munition rockets and M095 dual-purpose submunitions by Azerbaijan in a civilian neighbourhood in Hadrut and Khankendi (called Stepanakert by Armenia).[12] Azerbaijan denies using cluster munitions in the conflict.[13] Another Human Rights Watch report described cluster munition use by Armenia in Barda, Goranboy, and Tartar districts, including Smerch rockets containing 9N235 submunitions.[14] Amnesty International documented four cluster munition strikes resulting in civilian casualties by Armenian forces in towns and villages in Azerbaijan in October 2020. These consisted of three strikes in Barda dispersing dozens of 9N235 submunitions and a fourth in Qarayusufli.[15]

In addition to the cluster munitions reported by the media and humanitarian organisations, the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines reported that the following types of cluster munitions were found in areas regained by Azerbaijan since the 2020 conflict: 9N-210, AO-2.5PTM, PTAB-1M, and ShOAB-05. Submunitions were found in the districts of Aghdam, Fuzuli, Tartar, and Yevlakh.[16]

On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour large-scale military offensive.[17] As a result of the military action, Azerbaijan regained full control of Nagorno-Karabakh (now referred to by Azerbaijan as the Karabakh Economic Region), adding to cluster munition contamination already under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction and control.[18] No use of cluster munitions was reported during the September 2023 offensive.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Many areas, including those formerly occupied by Armenia, are confirmed or suspected to contain ERW, both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). These include former military testing areas and a former shooting range.[19] Azerbaijan is also contaminated with anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV) landmines, the precise extent of which is unknown, but is believed to be massive (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Azerbaijan for further information).

4 Email from Samir Poladov, Deputy Chairman, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.

5 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

9 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 July 2025.

10 International Crisis Group (ICG), "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer", Last updated 16 September 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3uiOou2.

11 Ibid. On 7 July 2021, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, signed a decree increasing the number of economic regions in Azerbaijan from 11 to 14. The capital, Baku, became its own separate economic region, and two new regions were created: Karabakh (encompassing Khankendi city, as well as the regions of Aghjabadi, Aghdam, Barda, Fuzuli, Khojali, Khojavend, Shusha, and Tartar), and East Zangazur (encompassing Jabrayil, Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli, and Zangilan).

12 Human Rights Watch, "Azerbaijan: Cluster Munitions Used in Nagorno-Karabakh", 23 October 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3bT3QXE.

13 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025; and online interview with Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

14 Human Rights Watch, "Armenia: Cluster Munitions Kill Civilians in Azerbaijan", 30 October 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3wv4UIT; and "Armenia: Cluster Munitions Used in Multiple Attacks on Azerbaijan", 15 December 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3vhYQ6v.

15 Amnesty International, "In the Line of Fire", Report, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3zHXp3H, pp. 10–11.

16 Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines, "Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance Problem in The Liberated Territories of Azerbaijan", Report, November 2022, pp. 1 and 3.

17 W. Landgraf and N. Seferian "A Frozen Conflict Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications", Report, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Euroasia Program, January 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3wWwsgj.

18 ICG, "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer", Last updated 16 September 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3uiOou2; and "Azerbaijan halts Karabakh offensive after ceasefire deal with Armenian separatists", BBC, 21 September 2023, at: https://bbc.in/3rCVK0e.

19 ANAMA, "Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018", p. 17.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

ANAMA (formerly the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action) was established by presidential decree in 1998. The Agency initiated demining operations in 2000. In February 2021, again by Presidential decree, ANAMA was restructured and given the status of a public legal entity as the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[20] The rebranded ANAMA has the mandate to plan, coordinate, and oversee demining by national and international operators.[21] ANAMA has a national headquarters in Baku, two regional offices in Horadiz and Goygol, and mobile base camps operating in eight regions (Aghdam, Hadrut, Jabrayil, Khankendi, Khojavend, Lachin, Qubadli, and Zangilan) of the regained territories.[22] Goygol Regional Training Centre is the main demining training centre.[23]

In February 2025, the Law on Demining Activities was adopted, which had been in development for several years, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) involvement.[24] The Law, consisting of three sections and fourteen articles, regulates the organisation and implementation of mine clearance activities in the country. Mine clearance conducted by the Azerbaijani Armed Forces for national security and defence purposes are excluded from the Law, though ANAMA has run training for the Ministry of Defence on the scope of humanitarian demining to ensure safe and effective operations based on international standards.[25]

Prior to the 2020 conflict, ANAMA conducted demining operations with two contracted national operators: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the IEPF. In March 2020, RA's field personnel were incorporated within ANAMA while RA as an organisation continued to provide logistical support to ANAMA.[26] Since the end of the 2020 conflict, both ANAMA and clearance operations have been rapidly scaled up to address the significant mine and ERW contamination newly under Azerbaijan's control. An interministerial mine action working group, chaired by ANAMA, has overall responsibility for coordinating the mine action programme, while ANAMA coordinates the work of operators.[27] The working group continued to meet regularly in 2024 (meeting a total of 19 times) and included Azerbaijan's most significant ministries, including defence, interior, and emergency situations, as well as the State Border Service.[28]

Mine action is considered a national priority by the government of Azerbaijan.[29] It was integrated into the Azerbaijan Socio-Economic Development plan 2019–2023, has since been incorporated into the updated strategy, the "Social and Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–2026", and is considered a key contributor to meeting the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[30] Azerbaijan has adopted national SDG 18 for mine action for safe return, settlement, recovery, prosperity and peace,[31] and has proposed a dedicated global SDG as part of the Agenda 2030 process.[32]

ANAMA's priorities for international assistance focus on the search for funding. Other key areas identified for support include: technical surveys and feasibility studies, data management and technological innovations (including geo-spatial methodologies), developing female demining teams, upgrading mechanical demining capabilities, mine detection dog (MDD) training, demarcation and fencing, and risk education.[33]

In 2024, there were several new donors to the demining programme in Azerbaijan (for details see the subsection below, "Funding for CMR survey and clearance"), and additional capacity building support was provided to ANAMA. UNDP continued to provide strategic and technical capacity development to ANAMA and to support the creation of an enabling mine action environment.[34] UNDP consultants provided expert guidance on land release and MDD operations for the first four months of 2025, before UNDP ceased to operate in Azerbaijan on 2 May 2025.[35] A land release consultant, building on an initial consultancy started in 2024, reviewed release methodologies and standard operating procedures (SOPs), capacity development, and institutional strengthening of mine action practices in Azerbaijan.[36] Another UNDP consultant assessed ANAMA's MDD programme and developed a capacity enhancement plan resulting in a structured capacity-building plan focused on staff training, infrastructure upgrades, veterinary care, and long-term sustainability.[37]

20 "Azerbaijan establishes Mine Action Agency", APA news, 15 January 2021, at: https://bit.ly/35MhtEu.

21 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 7.

22 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

23 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

24 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

25 "President Ilham Aliyev approves new law on mine action activities", *Azvision.az*, 3 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HEWV7e; "Azerbaijan's Parliament adopts draft law 'On Demining Activities' in third reading", apa.az, 13 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4kAwk9J; and "ANAMA Trains Military On Humanitarian Mine Clearance", *menafn.com*, 4 March 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4kYnNx3.

26 Email from Nijat Karimov, ANAMA, 28 July 2020.

27 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

28 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; interview with Vugar Suleymanov, Chairman of the Board, ANAMA; and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.

29 ANAMA, quarterly report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 3.

30 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 10; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

31 Presentation by Huseyn Huseynov, Head of Department for Sustainable Development and Social Policy, Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Aghdam, 24 May 2023.

32 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, p. 14.

33 Ibid., pp. 15–16; and emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

34 Emails from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024 and 25 June 2024.

35 "UNDP ceases its activity in Azerbaijan", caliber.az, 2 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/4lHLH0q; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

36 Email from Qadeem Tariq, Mine Action Strategic Specialist, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.

37 Ibid.

Following the statement of intent signed by ANAMA and UNDP in May 2024, to set up an International Centre of Excellence in Training for Mine Action,[38] a comprehensive feasibility study was conducted.[39] The Centre is to provide national, regional, and international training and capacity building; and to promote research and innovation. A UNDP-engaged international expert supported the design and planning process.[40] A three phase plan was drawn up: preparatory phase to mid-2025, start up from mid-2025, with full operation from mid-2026.[41] As at June 2025, ANAMA was expecting a final report with detailed recommendations.[42]

A UNDP-ANAMA demining project, launched in February 2024 covering 20 villages, with €4.25 million of EU funding, concluded in March 2025.[43] The aims included enhancing local capacity, strengthening information management systems, and applying innovative solutions in demining operations.[44] A key achievement was the establishment of female demining teams, which have been fully integrated into a local NGO's operations.[45] Further EU support was announced on 3 May 2024, with the launch of the "Team Europe Initiative on Mine Action in Azerbaijan", with the EU and its Member States expecting to increase funding to around €13 million in 2024. Funding was to support capacity-building and institutional strengthening of ANAMA, risk education, and victim assistance.[46] No updates on this work were available as at June 2025.[47]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has provided a range of capacity building support to Azerbaijan in recent years, and continued to provide capacity building support to the IEPF until the end of February 2025. This included team leader training for 14 IEPF deminers who were all accredited by ANAMA.[48] However, MAG Azerbaijan went into a phased hibernation from the end of May until the end of summer due to administrative issues relating to its registration to work in Azerbaijan.[49] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has been providing support to ANAMA since 2022 for the installation of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, though by 2024/25 only minimal support was deemed necessary. ANAMA and the GICHD also cooperate on innovation, with ANAMA representatives participating in GICHD's Innovation Session on AI applications for Mine Action and in the work of the Innovation Hub - Mine Action Innovation Technical Group, initiated in 2024.[50]

Other ongoing partners which provided capacity building support in 2024 were the US Department of State's Bureau of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the Marshall Legacy Institute. Support included the provision of training, technical assistance, and operational strengthening through partnerships with implementing organisations, including UNDP and MAG.[51] Croatia became a new capacity-building partner in 2024, providing ANAMA with eight MDDs and an associated two-month training course.[52] In addition, the Marshall Legacy Institute provided 12 MDDs to ANAMA in 2024, and expected to provide another 10 MDDs in 2025,[53] while the ITF donated two MDDs.[54] Azerbaijan has also expressed interest in collaborating on demining with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),[55] and with the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya.[56]

Amendments to broader national regulations and national compliance could improve the potential of demining NGOs to attract international funding, and their operations, thereby contributing to an enabling environment for mine action. Examples of where improvements could be made include ensuring timely approvals for national NGOs to receive international funding and timely registration renewals and memoranda of understanding for international operators.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the national authorities contributed US$114.6 million to ANAMA for both running costs and capital expenditure. The Azerbaijani government has funded most of ANAMA's running costs in recent years, as well as survey and clearance. The national contribution to running costs was expected to increase by 1.2% in 2025, to almost US$50 million.[57] In 2024, it was reported that mine action, including survey and clearance efforts, was government-funded, except for less than 5% that came from international donors. ANAMA continues to work towards securing new funders,

38 "ANAMA, UNDP to set up Center of Excellence for combating mine threats", News.az, 30 May 2024, accessed 3 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4b1tepX; and email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

39 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

40 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

41 Presentation by ANAMA at the International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 11 April 2025.

42 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

43 Ibid.; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

44 "Azerbaijan faces huge de-mining challenge with little help from West", Azernews, 20 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4aCxs7c.

45 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

46 EU, "Launch of Team Europe Initiative on Mine Action in Azerbaijan", 3 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3R2QEUE.

47 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

48 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.

49 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025; and Jessica Hyland, Regional Director – Eastern Europe, MAG, 26 June 2025.

50 Email from Tinatin Maurer-Shengelia, Regional Focal Point, GICHD, 2 May 2025.

51 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

52 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

53 Emails from Indre Sabaliunaite, Program Director, Marshall Legacy Institute, 30 May 2024 and 19 March 2025.

54 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

55 "Azerbaijan highlights interest in OSCE cooperation on mine clearance in liberated", *trend.az*, 25 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ZYGY1M.

56 "Azerbaijan, Kenya seek enhanced cooperation on humanitarian demining", *caliber.az*, 31 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3HRPqcU.

57 "Azerbaijan increases funding for Mine Action Agency in 2025 Budget", Azernews, 27 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43FPXar; and email from Nariman Gasimov, 7 July 2025.

welcoming potential donors and organisations interested in contributing to mine action in Azerbaijan.[58] It has held various conferences to attract interest and share good practice,[59] and held its third international conference together with UNDP, in May 2024.[60]

The EU, is reported to have allocated more than €6 million to demining in Azerbaijan in recent years, with another €10 million for the International Centre of Excellence in Training for Mine Action now due to be provided in 2026.[61] Other donors in 2024 included UNDP, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[62] Additional international funding was pledged at the end of 2023 for demining: $3 million from Saudi Arabia, which has already been provided, and €1.5 million from Italy via UNDP, which was pending as at July 2025.[63] New donors in 2024 included the United Arab Emirates (providing US$5 million to support demining efforts in the Karabakh Economic Region) [64], Belgium, Croatia, and Germany.[65]

Belgium pledged €250,000 in 2024 through the Belgian NGO APOPO, to continue its work with dogs and rats in Aghdam and Tartar in collaboration with ANAMA, MAG, and IEPF. In addition, APOPO continued providing MDD teams to ANAMA operators in Aghdam and Jabrayil in 2024.[66] UNHCR and UNICEF have funded risk education to support the safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).[67]

China was identified as a new donor in 2025 and was expected to provide material and technical support in 2025.[68] In 2025, funding for mine clearance from foreign donors remained at about 4.8% of total demining funding.[69] US PM/WRA donor support, however, concluded in February 2025.[70]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Azerbaijani Labour Code denounces any type of discrimination in labour relations, including between men and women. It does, however, include so-called "protective measures" which legally prohibit women from being hired into a wide array of jobs. Traditional norms and gender stereotyping also lead to women and men not being equally included at different organisational levels. UNDP's assessment underlines the fact that concerns over women's reproductive health (for example, regarding pregnancy) are deeply rooted in cultural norms intended to protect women rather than exclude them. However, these norms, despite being well-intentioned, still create barriers to women's participation in the labour force.[71]

In the mine action sector, a Gender Policy and Strategy, developed by UNDP since 2022, was being implemented in 2024.[72] A UNDP consultant on gender issues supported ANAMA in implementing the strategy in 2024 and developed a dashboard for monitoring.[73] According to ANAMA, gender and diversity are integrated into mine action in Azerbaijan, and ANAMA is keen to increase female demining team capacity and to employ injured people and people with disabilities.[74] Azerbaijan does not, however, have a gender and diversity policy and implementation plan. UNDP Uzbekistan seconded its gender specialist to Azerbaijan to deliver gender training for UNDP staff in 2024.[75]

As at the end of 2024, the number of women in operational positions at ANAMA was reported as 134, all based in regional offices, including 8 paramedics and 126 general and technical staff (not all of whom can be considered operational staff).[76] In addition, IEPF's 150 staff include 15 women deminers and two women paramedics; MAG and IEPF also established two gender balanced/mixed teams in 2024.[77] The breakdown of female staff working for other operators was not available.[78] Nevertheless, this is a considerable improvement on the situation two years earlier when no women were trained in demining in Azerbaijan,[79]

58 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 12; ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, pp. 11 and 15; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

59 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

60 Ibid.

61 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 and 11 July 2025.

62 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

63 ANAMA, Quarterly Update, "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", October–December 2023, undated, p. 12; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

64 "UAE and Azerbaijan Ink $5 Billion Deal for Nagorno-Karabakh Demining", *Devdiscourse*, 27 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3HBzmfv.

65 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

66 Email from Mikael Bold, Program Manager, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025.

67 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

68 "China expresses readiness to support Azerbaijan in demining operations", *Azerbaycan24*, 20 December 2024, https://bit.ly/45g7p6F; "China ready to continue assisting Azerbaijan in enhancing its demining capacity", apa.az, 23 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4e0ra4h; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

69 "Farid Shafiyev: Azerbaijan is among the top five countries for landmine contamination", *Azertac*, 5 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/45msUTs; and "Shafiyev points to insufficient donor support for demining in Azerbaijan", *aze.media*, 5 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4e0ylcZ; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA 7 July 2025.

70 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

71 UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 4.

72 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023 and 20 May 2024.

73 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 9 September 2024.

74 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

75 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.

76 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.

77 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

78 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025 and 8 July 2025.

79 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 11; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

and at ANAMA, women were historically concentrated in administrative roles at its Baku headquarters. Furthermore, MAG trained the first seven female demining team leaders as part of its training of 14 new team leaders in 2024; all of them were accredited.[80]

Female demining capacity has increased in large part through the EU-UNDP funded 2023 project whereby MAG, in partnership with IEPF, supported ANAMA in deploying two fully equipped women-only multi-task teams conducting mine clearance, BAC, NTS, TS, animal detection systems (APOPO provided support with animal detection systems – technical support dogs and mine detection rats[81]), and risk education.[82] The two gender balanced/mixed teams were established by MAG and IEPF using 12-month US Department of State PM/WRA funding in 2024,[83] and APOPO developed the MDD capacity of the teams.[84] ANAMA reports that women participated for the first time in 2024 in the training for MDD handling, and it planned to deploy female MDD handlers in 2025.[85]

According to ANAMA, survey and community liaison personnel are mostly from affected communities, and there are no restrictions on the basis of ethnic groups or religious affiliation. ANAMA has highlighted that risk education teams are particularly inclusive and mixed-gender.[86] Operations data are disaggregated by sex, and disaggregation by age has been implemented in risk education reporting.[87]

Table 1: Gender composition of ANAMA (at end 2024)[88]

Total staff	Women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
2,765	184 (7%)	375	7 (2%)	2,590	*134 (5%)

* The 134 women staff include 8 paramedics and 126 general and technical staff; ANAMA did not deploy any female deminers at the end of 2024.[89]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

ANAMA says it recognises the paramount importance of environmental management in demining.[90] It has developed an environmental management policy that guides all mine action operations in accordance with both national legislation and international best practice.[91] Climate and environmental considerations are reported to have been integrated into Azerbaijan's (as yet unadopted) national mine action strategy and operational work plans. These considerations are said to be reflected in task prioritisation, planning processes, and field-level operational procedures.[92]

By 2022, Azerbaijan had revised its ANMAR, but not formally adopted them (as at June 2025, the ANMAR were reported to have been finalised and undergoing internal governmental review prior to formal adoption).[93] The ANMAR cover all demining activities, with a dedicated chapter on environmental protection.[94] According to the draft ANMAR (developed in 2022), "the national programme sought with "to ensure that the environment is not degraded by mine action work and land is returned in a state that is similar to, or where possible better than, before mine action operations commenced, and that permits its intended use." The environmental protection chapter includes information on Azerbaijan's mine action environmental management system and requirements for the identification, assessment, and mitigation of environmental aspects. These include waste disposal, water supplies, burning and removal of vegetation, animals, open burning and demolition, environmental aspects of mechanical demining, and completion and remediation.

80 Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG Azerbaijan, 24 June 2025.

81 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

82 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May and 3 July 2023; online interview with Greg Crowther, Director of Programmes, MAG, 26 July 2023; UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of Mine Action Agency of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 11; and "I have no regrets: the Azerbaijani women trained to clear mines", EU Neighbours East, 18 March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3UY0Lv8.

83 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.

84 Emails from Mikael Bold, APOPO Dogs, 30 April 2025; Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May and 3 July 2023; online interview with Greg Crowther, Director of Programmes, MAG, 26 July 2023; and UNDP, "Gender Organisational Assessment of Mine Action Agency of ANAMA", Report, February 2023, p. 11.

85 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

86 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

87 Ibid.

88 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

89 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 8 July 2025.

90 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.

91 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

92 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

93 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

94 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.

Table 2: Environmental policies and action for ANAMA[95]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
ANAMA	Yes	Yes	No

ANAMA has developed an SOP incorporating guidelines from the relevant International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13.[96] During TS and clearance, demining experts are required to work with environmental specialists to assess environmental impact operations and minimise harm.[97] This includes close cooperation with the regional branches of the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources to ensure compliance with national environmental standards and to address region-specific environmental sensitivities in mine action operations.[98]

The Government of Azerbaijan can also require the conduct of a formal environmental impact assessment (EIA) in relation to large or publicly significant mine action projects, or those that will take place in areas of known environmental vulnerability.[99] It routinely applies environmental considerations such as drainage water control and mitigation of environmental disruption during clearance.[100] It has taken additional steps to minimise environmental harm, establishing designated waste collection centres in all operational regions for the environmentally safe collection of ERW.[101]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Azerbaijan's revised, but (as indicated above) as yet unadopted, national mine action standards included establishing a single, unified, information management (IM) system, which ANAMA is implementing.[102] By January 2025, the transition to IMSMA Core had been completed, with the previous system (IMSMA Legacy) remaining accessible in parallel for reference and data verification purposes. Field staff have undergone detailed training and are now using the new platform in their daily operations. The adoption of IMSMA Core is said to have significantly enhanced the efficiency of data processing by introducing greater automation and improving the accuracy and timeliness of reporting.[103]

In 2024, measures were taken to further improve the quality of data in the mine action database. All data entries are subject to multi-tiered verification by both regional staff and headquarters personnel. With the integration of automated data processing in IMSMA Core, the system now includes built-in mapping tools and analytical features designed to detect inconsistencies or potential errors.[104] These tools, combined with ANAMA's systematic multi-step review process, significantly reduce the risk of data inaccuracies or gaps. But despite improvements being made in IM, ANAMA does not yet fully disaggregate survey, clearance, and contamination data related to CMR from other data.

PLANNING AND TASKING

ANAMA is guided by the following key documents, issued at cabinet level, which together influence clearance and EORE priorities: "The Great Return Program"; "Azerbaijan–2030: National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development"; and "The Socio-Economic Development Strategy of the Republic of Azerbaijan 2022–2026".[105] Clearance is directed by the annually approved "Plan for the Clearance of the Liberated Territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as "Other Areas Affected by War and Military Operations from Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance, Devices Containing Explosives, and Other Explosive Remnants", endorsed by the Cabinet of Ministers.[106]

95 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
96 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
97 Ibid.
98 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
99 ANMAR, Section IV Management Systems, Chapter 9: Environmental Protection.
100 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
101 Ibid.
102 Presentation by ANAMA, International Conference on Humanitarian Mine Action and the Sustainable Development Goals, Baku, 31 March–1 April 2022.
103 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
104 Ibid.
105 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
106 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

The last mine action strategy was for 2013–18. Its main aims were to continue mine and ERW clearance in support of government development projects and to provide safe conditions for the local population in affected regions.[107] In March 2023, UNDP indicated that it had developed a new mine action strategy, though it was reported at the time that ANAMA was working on a second strategy with the government.[108] At the time of writing, ANAMA had not yet launched a new national mine action strategy, but work was underway to develop a new strategic document, "The Mine Action Roadmap 2035". The timeline for finalisation and adoption was still to be determined.[109]

The draft strategy called for an increase in clearance capacity so as to eventually achieve annual clearance output of 650km^2.[110] This included all forms of EO clearance, as well as visual search of battle areas. According to ANAMA, all tasks are subject to TS during which a certain percentage is physically cleared. If no evidence of landmines is found, the remaining area of the polygon is systematically searched mainly with a quick visual search supported by magnetometers.[111] ANAMA predicted that, over the long term, this level of output would not be maintained once high-priority areas had been cleared and only low threat/priority areas remained.[112] In line with its annual work plans and the draft strategy – with its focus on residential, agricultural and ecological sites, and on roads and other infrastructure – ANAMA cleared 620km^2 of hazardous area in 2024, exceeding its target of 605km^2, and was aiming to release almost 651km^2 in 2025, in line with the plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers.[113]

ANAMA coordinates the activities of several State implementing agencies, NGOs, and commercial contractors to implement its work plans.[114] ANAMA performs NTS of each project area/polygon prior to tasking operators on TS and clearance.[115] As part of the NTS process, ANAMA collates information through interviews with locals and with the personnel of construction companies, although generally limited data can be obtained from members of newly resettled communities. ANAMA also works in close collaboration with the military and consults minefield records, survey and clearance data, and incident data when available.[116] While the results of NTS do inform decisions on clearance methodologies for each task, NTS is not typically used to prioritise the tasking of polygons for TS and clearance. Instead, polygons are mostly selected and prioritised by the Cabinet of Ministers based on rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.

According to a report by ANAMA in early 2023, in accordance with its policy of ensuring the return of IDPs, the government prioritises demining of areas of high importance such as main access roads, key infrastructure (highways, railroads, and electricity lines), agriculture, and planned residential areas.[117] Thus, highly contaminated areas are not necessarily a high priority for clearance. According to ANAMA, much of the former LOC with Armenian forces will not be cleared for years, with the exception of areas where construction of roads, railway lines, and power lines or other infrastructure are required.[118]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2021, all chapters of the ANMAR were fully revised in line with IMAS, and they were revised again in 2023.[119] While the revised ANMAR had been provided to all operators, they have not been formally adopted by the government.[120] UNDP considered that the ANMAR revised in 2023 were in line with IMAS, but that more work was needed for implementing NTS and to disaggregate data.[121]

All NMAS and SOPs must now align with the new legal framework, and the UNDP consultants engaged at the start of 2025 worked towards this.[122] As at June 2025, draft ANMAR were in the process of formal adoption, undergoing internal governmental procedures.[123] In 2023, ANAMA, UNDP, and MAG began supporting the evaluation and revision of 29 mine action SOPs for the revised national standards.[124] ANAMA reported that in December 2024, it re-developed

107 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
108 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.
109 Emails from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
110 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10.
111 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
112 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 10; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
113 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May and 24 June 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and presentation by ANAMA, 27th NDM, Geneva, 30 April 2024.
114 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 9.
115 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023; and email from Ramil Azizov, 22 July 2024.
116 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
117 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, pp. 3, 5, and 8.
118 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
119 Interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.
120 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.
121 Email from Mark Buswell, UNDP, 20 March 2023.
122 Email from Qadeem Tariq, UNDP Azerbaijan, 31 March 2025.
123 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
124 Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 16 May 2023 and 24 June 2025; and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 June 2024; and interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

29 of 30 SOPs reviewed in the earlier process as part of the technical adaptation process, and made some fundamental changes.[125] Updates to NMAS and SOPs are undertaken in close consultation with operators.[126]

There is no indication that ANAMA will start using NTS to cancel SHA in the near future. ANAMA reports that while information gathered through NTS plays an important role in understanding of contamination, cancelling areas and assessing contamination solely on the basis of NTS remains highly challenging in the Azerbaijani context. Operational experience is reported to indicate that even in areas where NTS suggests there is no contamination, AP mines and UXO are frequently discovered during subsequent clearance or other technical interventions. As a result, ANAMA does not routinely cancel areas through NTS alone but uses it to prioritise the "reduction of threat", while TS is primarily used to confirm and further define contamination.[127]

One of the challenges of conducting NTS in the regained territories is that many of the areas are unpopulated and therefore no local communities can serve as key informants on contamination.[128] According to ANAMA, all mine incidents (including those involving military personnel) are plotted in maps, which can serve as evidence points. ANAMA says, however, that the demand for clearance is so high that TS cannot be conducted each time there is an incident involving a munition.[129] All areas identified for intervention are subject to full clearance in accordance with applicable standards.[130]

ANAMA considers planned land use in its prioritisation and tasking, and all clearance is conducted to three metres depth in the plots where foundations will be laid for construction.[131] Clearance is not, however, conducted to full fade-out in case of CMR being found, so if contamination extends beyond the polygon boundary tasked to the operator, it is not addressed as part of that task.[132] This means there is a risk of losing valuable information on the exact location and footprint of cluster munition strikes as the full footprint is not cleared at the time. That said, ANAMA asserts that the coordinates of all CMR discovered are carefully recorded and plotted on a map and saved for future reference.[133]

ANAMA has started fencing off hazardous areas, primarily covering areas along the former contact lines, which are considered as CHAs.[134] Previously only hazard signs were placed at the edge of each polygon and fencing was not consistently used, even when EO contamination was known to continue beyond the edge of cleared polygons.[135] However, around 70% of injuries and fatalities have occurred in areas outside the line of contact, including in cemeteries, agricultural areas, buildings, forests, and around water sources, so preventive actions are also being considered in these areas.[136]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

CMR survey and clearance are covered in ANAMA's overall training programme and ANAMA does not have personnel dedicated to CMR operations. The number of survey and clearance personnel continued its upward trajectory in 2024, and ANAMA's organisational structure was scaled up in parallel. At the end of the year, Azerbaijan's total operational capacity for addressing all EO consisted of 2,485 personnel (up from 2,281 in 2023[137]), 182 MDDs (up from 151 in 2023), and 87 mine clearance machines (up from 70 in 2023). See Tables 3 and 4 for details. ANAMA continued to use mine detection rats, "HeroRATs", in 2024 through its collaboration with APOPO, complementing other detection technologies.[138]

NTS capacity was increased from only one IEPF team (supported by UNDP), tasked by ANAMA to conduct NTS and generate hazardous area polygons in 2022,[139] to three IEPF teams by July 2024.[140] By the end of 2024, no personnel were listed as specifically undertaking TS, but 314 staff across four organisations were listed as dedicated to NTS and TS activities (see Table 3). A further increase in total demining personnel is anticipated in 2025, in particular as operations expand into previously inaccessible or newly prioritised areas.[141]

125 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June and 7 July 2025.
126 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
127 Ibid.
128 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 6 June 2022.
129 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
130 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
131 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023; and email from Ramil Azizov, 19 July 2023.
132 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.
133 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
134 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
135 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.
136 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 20 May 2024.
137 In *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2024* report on Azerbaijan, the total number of deminers was reported as 2,281, when this was in fact the total number of all survey and clearance personnel.
138 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
139 Interview with UNDP, Baku, 24 May 2023.
140 Email from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 22 July 2024.
141 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

Table 3: Operational NTS and TS capacities deployed for all explosive ordnance in 2024[142]

Operator	NTS teams	NTS personnel	TS teams	TS personnel	Comments
ANAMA	N/A	N/A	37	242	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
IEPF	N/A	N/A	2	15	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
Alpha Demining	N/A	N/A	3	21	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
Safe Point	N/A	N/A	4	36	TS personnel also conduct NTS.
Totals	**0**	**0**	**46**	**314**	

ANAMA has not resumed the use of Remote Aerial Minefield Survey (RAMS) multispectral data analysis, last used in 2023, to identify suspected areas as part of establishing a baseline survey, collecting information on mines and ERW, and other information, such as the location of trenches and military positions.[143] However, ANAMA continues to receive proposals and to explore emerging remote sensing technologies.[144] It uses advanced equipment and technology, including high-precision mine detectors capable of identifying metal objects buried up to six metres underground.[145]

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed for all explosive ordnance (at end 2024)[146]

Operator	Operational staff	MDDs/ handlers	Machines	Comments
ANAMA	1,458	126/107	54	
Ministry of Defence	132	3/6	19	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Ministry of Emergency Situations	44	6/6	4	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
State Border Service	43	0/0	0	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Alpha Demining	46	20/12	2	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
Qaya Safety Solutions	68	8/6	3	
Safe Point	80	10/6	2	
Azerbaijan Demining Company	56	9/6	3	All personnel conduct TS, NTS, and clearance.
IEPF	83	0/12		ANAMA supported IEPF with MDDs and machines.
Totals	**2,010**	**182/161**	**87**	

ANAMA is responsible for accrediting, training and monitoring all mine action operators, including State actors involved in demining.[147] As at December 2023, there were two national commercial demining companies each working with an international commercial sub-contractor, to assist with operational planning and help build capacity. These were: Qaya Safety Solutions, partnering with SafeLane Global, and the Azerbaijan Demining Company, partnering with Piper.[148]

All data are reported and entered into ANAMA's IMSMA database. In 2024, ANAMA's quality management system continued to operate through a structured framework encompassing accreditation, internal and external monitoring, and quality control (QC) mechanisms.[149] ANAMA conducts monitoring and quality assurance (QA) for operators and issues hand-over certificates after QA.[150] It has an Operational Capability Assessment Division (two staff), a Monitoring Division (with three staff), and an External

142 Ibid.; and emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 and 9 July 2025.

143 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 17 May 2023; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025; and interview with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022.

144 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

145 "ANAMA using cutting-edge technology to detect and clear landmines, unexploded ordnance", *caliber.az*, 29 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44lTPwD.

146 Emails from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June, 7 and 9 July, and 5 August 2025.

147 ANAMA, Quarterly Report "Mine Action in Azerbaijan: Priorities and Needs", January 2023, p. 7.

148 Ibid.; and interviews with Vugar Suleymanov and Samir Poladov, ANAMA, Baku, 29 March 2022; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.

149 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

150 Email from Samir Poladov, ANAMA, 7 July 2022.

Quality Control Division (three staff). In addition, here is an External Quality Inspection team (79 personnel), and an External Monitoring team (nine personnel). In 2024, a total of 1,736 sites were formally accepted following successful quality inspections, and 1,069 monitoring missions were conducted across various operational tasks.[151]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

ANAMA reported a total of almost 51.8km^2 of hazardous area where CMR were found and land released through TS and clearance in 2024, with the destruction of 2,882 submunitions.[152] ANAMA did not provide disaggregated data for land released through technical survey and land released through clearance for 2024.[153] No cluster munition-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS in 2024, as Azerbaijan does not use NTS for land release.[154] However, as noted above, the claimed CMR-contaminated area released in 2024 corresponds to the total size of tasks (polygons) in which submunitions were found. Therefore, the size of the actual CMR contamination (i.e. the contaminated area resulting from cluster munition strikes) addressed, is far smaller.

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Comments
Clearance	12	Mine Action Review estimate
Technical Survey	0	
Non-Technical Survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	2,882	

SURVEY IN 2024

While ANAMA did conduct TS in 2024, it did not disaggregate land released through TS from land released through clearance.[155] No cluster munition-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS in 2024 or 2023 in Azerbaijan, for reasons already outlined.

CLEARANCE IN 2024

As already noted, ANAMA does not currently disaggregate cluster munition tasks from other BAC tasks and mine clearance, and reported that almost 52km^2 of polygons containing CMR were released in 2024 with the destruction of 2,882 CMRs.[156] This compares to 2023, when ANAMA reported that 1,818 submunitions were discovered during TS and clearance of polygons totalling 452.6km^2.[157]

To avoid inflating CMR data clearance, Mine Action Review estimated that the amount of land actually containing CMR that was released through TS and clearance in 2024 was 12km^2, in contrast with the Mine Action Review estimate of 8km^2 of CMR-contaminated area released in 2023. The table below summarises reported 2024 land release of CMR-contaminated area through clearance and TS combined, disaggregated by district.

A range of mechanical assets and animal detection systems were deployed in Azerbaijan in 2024. Moreover, approximately 200,000m^2 of land was surface cleared only.[158] As ANAMA did not conduct tasks specifically targeting CMR, no disaggregated data are available for tasks cleared that were suspected of containing only CMR but yielded none.[159]

151 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
152 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.
153 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
154 Ibid.
155 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 25 July 2024; and Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 July 2025.
156 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
157 Emails from Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, 24 and 25 July 2024.
158 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.
159 Ibid.

Table 6: Reported land release through clearance and TS of polygons containing CMR in 2024*[160]

District	CHAs/SHAs	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed
Aghdam	27	10,706,172	410
Fuzuli	56	21,553,979	692
Jabrayil	18	8,045,991	338
Khojaly, Khankendi city	1	115,220	1,269
Khojavend	11	3,778,589	113
Lachin	8	3,371,446	16
Qubadli	5	2,284,466	18
Shusha	2	1,160,205	5
Terter	1	754,398	21
Totals	**129**	**51,770,466**	**2,882**

* In addition, a total of 2,151 AP mines and 17,918 items of UXO were destroyed across the same districts.[161]

DEMINER SAFETY

There were no reported demining accidents in 2024 involving casualties from demining organisations. There were, however, at least two reports of ANAMA personnel being injured in accidents in April 2025, one in Jabrayil,[162] and another in Gazakh district.[163] In addition, an army engineer was injured while conducting clearance in Kalbajar district in May 2025.[164]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Azerbaijan has yet to join the CCM. It should do as a matter of priority. In May 2019, Azerbaijan had stated that it would only accede to the Convention once all of its territories are liberated from occupation by Armenia and all IDPs and refugees return to their lands.[165]

No target date has been set for the completion of CMR clearance in Azerbaijan, as the extent of CMR contamination remains unknown.[166] As indicated above, clearance operations are not conducted as separate tasks targeting CMR, as contamination in the regained territories is largely undifferentiated. The exact locations or boundaries of CMR-contamination are unknown, and there is no reliable data distinguishing CMR from other EO.[167] Overall, based on government data, international experts have estimated that it will take nearly 30 years and US$25 billion to address the country's demining challenges,[168] though CMR contamination is a small part of overall EO contamination.

Furthermore, there is currently no prioritisation of clearance tasks based on the type of contamination (e.g. prioritising CMR clearance, over clearance of other types of ERW). All clearance is conducted in accordance with the national work plan approved by the Cabinet of Ministers within the framework of the "First State Program on the Great Return to the Liberated Territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan". As such, clearance priorities are determined based on broader humanitarian and reconstruction needs—clearing land to enable the return of IDPs to the regained territories—rather than the type of contamination.[169] This has reportedly included giving priority to demining the Karabakh and East Zangazur regions.[170]

In order to plan and address CMR contamination effectively, ANAMA must first quantify the problem. Establishing an accurate baseline of CMR contamination, however, is still a long way off, and Azerbaijan has yet to commit to do this. In addition, ANAMA struggles to disaggregate CMR from other types of ERW, in both data on the extent of contamination and data on the amount of land released. This is something that ANAMA has previously said that it will seek to improve as it strengthens its IM system and reporting.[171]

ANAMA continues to make impressive progress in rapidly scaling up clearance, and the process is nationally led, drawing on international expertise, such as UNDP (until May 2025) and MAG, for capacity development. Systems to support the huge upscaling of the mine action programme

160 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

161 Ibid.; and email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 8 July 2025.

162 "ANAMA employee injured in mine explosion in Jabrayil", 6 April 2025, *Azernews*, at: https://bit.ly/3FKwrR5; and "Azerbaijan Mine Action Agency worker loses left leg after Jabrayil mine blast", Caliber, 7 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4n6pWJd.

163 "Azerbaijani deminer injured in mine explosion in Gazakh", *caliber.az*, 28 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4nd00dc.

164 "Mine blast injures Azerbaijan Army serviceman in Kalbajar district", *Azertac*, 29 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4jT7D7n.

165 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 21 May 2019.

166 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

167 Ibid.

168 Civilians Injured in Azerbaijan as Armenian Mine Threat Persists", *caspiannews.com*, 2 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ZpHtll.

169 Email from Nariman Gasimov, ANAMA, 7 June 2025.

170 "Ambassador: Mines are main obstacle for return of displaced persons to Karabakh and Eastern Zangazur", report.az, 5 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3ZW1H6o.

171 Interview with Samir Poladov and Ramil Azizov, ANAMA, Baku, 24 May 2023.

in Azerbaijan, such as the Law on Humanitarian Demining Activities, and the elaboration of revised national mine action standards (albeit yet to be formally approved), and the adoption of IMSMA Core, are being put in place. Applying efficient, evidence-based survey and clearance methodology, supported by strong national standards and a good IM and QM system, will be pivotal for the success of demining efforts in Azerbaijan.

Table 7: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	*12.00
2023	*8.00
2022	*5.00
2021	*3.00
2020	**0.10
Total	**28.10**

* Mine Action Review estimate
** Includes release through survey and clearance

CAMBODIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

681KM^2

Heavy

(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)*	Release in 2023 (km^2)**
Clearance	55.25	38.24
Technical Survey	4.44	7.74
Non-Technical Survey	9.21	0.31

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	8,678 (including 698 in spot tasks)	7,800 (including 507 in spot tasks)

* Official data

** Operator data

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- APOPO
- The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- The HALO Trust
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Cambodia released close to 70km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024, an increase of at least one third over the previous year, while identifying 26km^2 of previously unrecorded contamination. The result was a 7% drop in Cambodia's estimate of area thought to contain cluster munition remnants (CMR) as at the end of 2024, compared to a year earlier. The Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) reported starting an 18-month survey in April 2024 of all air-dropped ordnance, including cluster munitions. Cambodia adopted a national standard for mainstreaming gender and diversity during the year.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Cambodia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Cambodia should accelerate technical survey (TS) to establish a comprehensive, evidence-based baseline estimate of CMR contamination.**
- **Cambodia should review its national standard on baseline survey of CMR to ensure it aligns with the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) technical note on CMRS.**
- **Cambodia should deliver a clear strategy and institutional framework for managing residual contamination.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC)
- Cambodia Self Help Demining (CSHD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- APOPO
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Cambodia reports CMR in 21 of its 24 provinces. Although it continues to identify significant areas of previously unrecorded contamination, the 681km^2 recorded at the end of 2024 (see Table 1) was 7% less than at the end of the previous year.[1]

The contamination results mainly from intensive bombing by the United States (US) during the Vietnam War and is concentrated in provinces bordering the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) and Vietnam. Developing an evidence-based baseline assessment of contamination, however, remains a work in progress. Survey has added 52km^2 to the database in the last two years (25.6km^2 of this in 2024), but it also cancelled or reduced almost 14km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area.[2] In July 2025, during military clashes along their common border, Cambodia said Thailand used cluster munitions in two attacks carried out in the vicinity of Phnom Khmaouch in Pursat province and Techo Thammachart village in Prey Vihear province.[3]

The uneven progress has resulted from changes in survey methodology. More than three quarters (77%) of the recorded contamination in 2024 consisted of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) identified in a baseline survey of explosive ordnance conducted between 2009 and 2020. That survey used a mine survey methodology ill-suited to CMR hazards, producing inflated polygons which included large amounts of land with no CMR while missing areas that do contain unexploded submunitions. Since 2015, Cambodia has been using Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology and TS to identify confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), which accounted for roughly one quarter (23%) of the 2024 contamination, up from 21% a year earlier.[4]

Two provinces bordering Lao PDR—Prey Vihear and Stung Treng—account for more than 40% of total contamination, but it consists almost entirely of SHAs. Most CHAs are in the eight provinces bordering Vietnam though survey in 2024 added a small number of CHAs in western provinces of Battambang and Banteay Meanchey and central Kandal province and Phnom Penh municipality.[5] CMAC embarked on a country-wide survey of explosive ordnance in 2024 expected to provide additional data when completed in 2025.[6]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by province or region (at end 2024)

Province or region	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total area (m^2)
Banteay Meanchey	2	2,713	1	145,394	148,107
Battambang	2	97,679	0	0	97,679
Kampong Cham	107	19,149,118	54	11,495,869	30,644,987
Kampong Chhnang	0	0	16	2,062,617	2,062,617
Kampong Speu	0	0	85	12,366,578	12,366,578
Kampong Thom	23	4,741,550	391	77,110,289	81,851,839
Kampot	0	0	2	103,392	103,392
Kandal	7	1,194,531	58	5,494,016	6,688,547

1 Email from Hean Kimsin, Director, Social and Economic Planning Department, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 16 May 2025.

2 Ibid.

3 Niem Chheng, "CMAA condemns Thai use of cluster munitions", *Phnom Penh Post*, 25 July 2025.

4 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

5 Ibid.

6 Interview with Heng Ratana, Director, CMAC, in Phnom Penh, 27 May 2024.

Table 1 continued

Province or region	CHAs	Area (m²)	SHAs	Area (m²)	Total area (m²)
Kratie	77	22,096,493	87	33,045,142	55,141,635
Mondul Kiri	0	0	52	20,921,805	20,921,805
Oddar Meanchey	0	0	1	26,326	26,326
Phnom Penh	1	214,846	17	1,505,640	1,720,486
Preah Sihanouk	0	0	14	2,984,350	2,984,350
Preah Vihear	0	0	102	173,627,595	173,627,595
Prey Veng	81	39,402,337	37	7,167,747	46,570,084
Pursat	0	0	6	1,203,341	1,203,341
Ratanak Kiri	199	28,957,282	363	20,685,597	49,642,879
Stung Treng	18	3,642,396	107	106,069,243	109,711,639
Svay Rieng	110	22,595,600	76	17,352,002	39,947,602
Takeo	0	0	9	1,675,366	1,675,366
Tboung Khmum	88	16,005,792	136	28,075,471	44,081,263
Totals	**715**	**158,100,337**	**1,614**	**523,117,780**	**681,218,117**

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Cambodia has extensive contamination by other explosive remnants of war (ERW) and landmines. This consists mainly of anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV) mined areas provisionally estimated to cover 424km² at the end of 2024[7] and unexploded ordnance (UXO) reported in 2022 to amount to 333km² (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Cambodia for further information).[8] Deep-buried AV mines pose a particular threat to rural communities.[9]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), established by royal decree in 2000, has a mandate to regulate, monitor, and coordinate the mine action sector in Cambodia. The CMAA has Prime Minister Hun Manet as its President and a government minister, Ly Thuch, as first vice president. Its Secretary General, Ly Panharith, who was appointed in January 2023, manages CMAA's planning and operations.[10] Since 2000, CMAC has conducted humanitarian and commercial survey and clearance as well as risk education and training.[11] It remains Cambodia's largest mine action operator.[12]

Since 2004, Cambodia has had Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in mine- and CMR-affected areas. These bodies draw up work plans for the CMAA's priority areas in consultation with affected communities in order to ensure that clearance addresses their housing, agricultural, and infrastructure needs.[13] MAPUs meet regularly with all mine action operators to plan annual mine action activities.[14]

The Cambodian government established a Technical Working Group on Mine Action (TWG-MA) as a consultative mechanism facilitating coordination between the government and implementing partners.[15] The Mine Action Coordination Committee (MACC) and seven Technical Reference Groups (TRGs) have been established by the CMAA to facilitate coordination and feedback at a strategic and technical level in areas such as survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, gender, cluster munitions, and capacity development.[16] The CMAA convened a meeting of the TRG on survey and clearance in 2024 to review progress in establishing a baseline of CMR contamination.[17]

7 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025. In 2025, CMAC embarked on a survey of border areas expected to add previously unrecorded mined areas to the total.

8 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (covering 2021), Annex B.

9 Interview with Heng Ratana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 27 May 2024.

10 CMAA, "Legal framework and mandate", at: http://bit.ly/2W7r3dJ.

11 CMAC, "20 Years' Achievement in Mine Action 1998-2018 and Path Ahead", 2018.

12 Interview with Heng Rattana, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2019.

13 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 November 2024, p. 10; and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Landmines and Land Rights in Cambodia", December 2010, pp. 9 and 13.

14 Email from Zlatko Vezilic, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 5 May 2020.

15 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and email from Tong Try, National Mine Action Adviser, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 18 June 2019.

16 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 24; and emails from Tong Try, UNDP, 18 June 2019 and 27 July 2021.

17 Email from Hans Risser, Country Director, NPA, 16 May 2025.

The CMAA receives technical support from a range of international organisations. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has supported the upgrade of the CMAA's information management system, gender mainstreaming, and the development of Cambodian national mine action standards (CMAS).[18] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), with funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided financial and technical support for the CMAA database unit, including paying the salaries of seven employees, and supported the CMAA's quality management (QM) department, providing refresher training after the pandemic and funding one of the CMAA's QM teams.[19] The HALO Trust (HALO) provided financial support to quality assurance (QA) officers and training on the HSTAMIDS detector as part of capacity development of the CMAA under the UK FCDO-funded Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP) project.[20]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The government did not provide funding for CMR survey and clearance in 2024.[21] Between 2020 and 2024, international donors provided almost three quarters (73%) of funding for the mine action sector. The government provided nearly US$32 million in 2023, enabling deployment of military deminers, but was unable to follow up as planned in 2024.[22]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The CMAA is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan (GMMAP) in line with the objectives of the National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, focusing on training, inclusive participation, and gender-responsive action. In September 2024 it adopted a national mine action standard on mainstreaming of gender and diversity in mine action, the first country to do so.[23]

The CMAA established a Gender Mainstreaming Team (GMT) in 2019 to coordinate with the Technical Reference Group on Gender (TRG-G), which is composed of representatives from UNDP, the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA), the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY), MAPUs, operators, and organisations working in risk education and victim assistance.[24] The TRG-G met twice in 2024 to review the CMAS on Gender.[25]

Table 2: Gender composition of the CMAA and operators in 2024[26]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
CMAA	181	40 (22%)	76	13 (17%)	N/A	N/A
CMAC[27]	1,799	368 (20%)	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
APOPO	102	39 (38%)	7	2 (29%)	84	18 (21%)
HALO	1,190	483 (41%)	108	15 (14%)	978	443 (45%)
MAG	523	199 (38%)	28	10 (36%)	449	174 (39%)
NPA	117	56 (48%)	10	3 (30%)	111	53 (48%)
Totals	**3,912**	**1,185 (30%)**	**229**	**43 (19%)**	**1,622**	**688 (42%)**

N/A = Not applicable N/R = Not reported

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

The CMAA issued a national standard on Environmental Management in Mine Action (CMAS 20) in 2022. This requires operators to minimise the adverse impact of their operations on the environment; identify steps necessary to mitigate harm; and ensure that land is left in a suitable condition for its intended use. Operators are required to take account of erosion or soil

18 Email from the GICHD, 1 July 2020.
19 Email from Sron Samrithea, Programme Manager, NPA, 6 May 2023.
20 Email from HALO, 24 July 2025.
21 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
22 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 November 2024, p. 18.
23 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
24 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 22.
25 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
26 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Alexey Kruk, Country Director, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 November 2024, p. 15. In 2023, women reportedly held 5% of CMAC managerial or supervisory positions (2 out of 38) and made up 16% of its operational staff (204 out 1,072).

degradation; possible pollution of air, water, or soil; and damage to infrastructure, wildlife, and vegetation, while also dealing with litter, debris, and other waste as well as damage to heritage sites or objects.[28] The CMAA held a two-day workshop with demining operators in 2024 on environmental management.[29]

Table 3: Environmental policies and action

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support planning and delivery of survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
APOPO	Yes	No	No
CMAC	N/R	N/R	N/R
MAG	Yes	Yes	No
NPA	Yes	Yes	No

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The CMAA began upgrading its database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to Core in 2023, which is now used by most operators. This has helped to keep the database up to date with the progress of survey and clearance. It retains IMSMA NG as an interim platform to receive data from CMAC. International operators submit reports directly through digital platforms using Survey123.[30]

In 2023, the CMAA temporarily suspended survey in order to clear a backlog of more than 1,100 survey reports accumulated on the workbench pending quality assurance checks. In 2024, it sought to streamline the process requiring operators to inform the CMAA before surveying tasks to facilitate QA and then allowing checked results to be uploaded to the database.[31]

The CMAA database is operated by an information management unit of 15 staff with the support of Norway through NPA, which covers the salaries of seven staff. In March 2025, it assigned a technical advisor to the unit.[32]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Cambodia's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, officially launched in May 2018, set out to release 80% of 624km^2 of priority CMR hazardous areas, amounting to 499km^2.[33] By 2025, Cambodia reported release of about 43% of the prioritised area (268km^2),[34] but in the meantime previously unrecorded area identified in survey had swollen the estimate of remaining contamination to 681km^2 (see Table 1 above). The final draft of the National Mine Action Strategy 2026–2035, released in early 2025, sets a revised target of clearing all known CMR contamination by 2035.[35]

Provinces prioritised for survey and clearance include Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Mondul Kiri, Prey Veng, Ratanak Kiri, Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, and Tbong Khmum. Annual work plans continue to be drawn up by operators in consultation with MAPUs taking account of local priorities, accident data, population density, and development plans.[36]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Mine action is conducted according to Cambodian Mine Action Standards (CMAS), which are broadly consistent with the IMAS.[37] In 2017, the CMAA approved in principle the CMRS methodology, which combines non-technical survey (NTS) and TS and adopted a national mine action standard for CMRS (CMAS 16) in 2018.[38]

28 Email from Tep Kallyan, CMAA, 9 May 2023; and CMAS 20.
29 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
33 CMAA, National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, p. 9.
34 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
35 National Mine Action Strategy 2026-2035 (final draft), April 2025, p. 10.
36 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
37 Emails from Rebecca Letven, MAG, 7 April 2020; and Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 19 March 2020.
38 Emails from Ros Sophal, on behalf of Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 6 September 2020; and Portia Stratton, NPA, 4 September 2020.

The CMAA revised its standard for Baseline Survey (CMAS 14) to focus solely on landmines and released a new national standard for cluster munitions baseline survey (CMAS 24) in May 2024, setting guidelines to strengthen evidence-based survey.[39] However, the CMAS still calls for the creation of SHAs even when direct evidence of CMR contamination is identified, which does not align with the IMAS technical note 08.20/02 on CMRS.[40]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Survey and clearance of CMR in 2024 was conducted by one national operator (CMAC) and three international operators (APOPO, MAG, and NPA).

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[41]

Operator	Manual clearance teams	Total deminers	Animal detection capacity (dogs and handlers)	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
APOPO			1 TSD team with 4 dogs and 4 handlers in Rattanakiri province	0	In partnership with MAG
CMAC	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	
MAG	10 BAC teams	85	0	4 drones Scorpion detection systems	MAG also deployed 3 TS teams with 30 staff who do not release land. Drones are used for mapping.
NPA	8	32	3 teams totalling 6 dogs and 6 dog handlers		
Totals	**18**	**117**	**10 dogs**	**4 drones**	

BAC = battle area clearance

CMAC, Cambodia's biggest operator, did not provide information on capacity committed to CMR survey and clearance in 2024. CMAC's 2023 annual report said it deployed eight CMR land release teams and six TS dog teams but did not give details of the numbers of personnel they employed.[42]

MAG capacity remained at the same level as in 2023, but reported higher productivity, thanks in part to APOPO's technical survey dogs and handlers. The four dogs, working approximately 3.5 hours a day, achieved higher productivity than a 10-deminer TS team working normal hours. In a 17-month trial period, the dogs lost one month to accreditation procedures but still surveyed 5,722,500m^2 compared with 5,715,000m^2 surveyed by the TS team.[43] NPA outputs rose sharply in 2024 after expanding its multi-task teams from two to eight with two teams conducting TS.[44]

HALO survey teams funded by the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Abatement and Removal (PM/WRA) deployed to five eastern provinces (provinces (Kampong Thom, Kampong Cham, Kratie, Stung Treng, Tboung Khmum) in the fourth quarter of 2024, conducting pre-clearance assessments and spot EOD tasks. In 2025, HALO has had four CMRS-trained teams in Kampong Thom province and planned to move battle area clearance (BAC) teams onto cluster munition tasks.[45]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Cambodia reported release of a total of 68.9km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area through survey and clearance in 2024 (see Table 5).[46] This represents a 36% increase over the Mine Action Review's estimate of the CMR area released in 2023. Official data and operator figures, which previously suffered from major discrepancies as a result of delays uploading survey and clearance results, were more closely aligned in 2024. Official data, however, still appears to understate the CMR area released in 2024, which Mine Action Review estimates may have reached 70.7km^2.[47]

39 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

40 CMAS 24 states the purpose of the CM Baseline Survey is to identify, define, and report SHAs. The IMAS Technical Note on CMRS states: "The CMRS report is a combination of NTS and TS. Therefore, it is not necessary to produce separate reports for NTS and TS."

41 Emails from Mick Raine, APOPO, 8 April 2025; Alexey Kuk, MAG, 22 April 2025 and Hans Visser, NPA, 16 May 2025.

42 CMAC Annual Report 2023, p. 7.

43 Email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025.

44 Emails from Sron Samrithea, NPA, 15 May 2024; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.

45 Email from Angus Coleman, Senior Operations Officer, HALO, 31 May 2025.

46 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

CMAA data showed 8,678 submunitions destroyed in 2024, including 698 destroyed in spot tasks. Operator results for 2024 recorded a total of 8,110 submunitions destroyed in 2024, about 4% more than the previous year, and included 491 items destroyed in spot tasks.[48]

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2024 (official data)[49]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m²)	Comments
Clearance	55,246,106	Operator data points to clearance of 56.3km²
Technical Survey	4,436,132	
Non-Technical Survey	9,208,364	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	8,678	Includes 698 destroyed in spot tasks

SURVEY IN 2024

The CMAA recorded a total of 9.2km² cancelled in 2024, a sharp rise from the 0.3km² cancelled in 2023. The CMAA for the first time included The HALO Trust among operators engaged on CMR tasks (see Table 6).[50] Most of the area cancelled by NPA was in central Kampong Thom province, though NPA said it cancelled a total of 9.7km², aided by two NTS teams funded by US funding.[51]

Table 6: Area cancelled through NTS in 2024 (official data)[52]

Operator	Province	Area cancelled (m²)
HALO	Kampong Cham	81,396
NPA	Kampong Chnnang, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Preah Sihanouk, Ratanak Kiri	9,126,968
Total		**9,208,364**

Technical survey by MAG in 2024 confirmed 10.8km² of hazardous area in Ratanak Kiri province in 2024, but did not release any land through area reduction, in contrast to the previous year, when it reported reducing 5km².[53] CMAC results similarly dipped, reducing 2.2km² in 2024 compared with nearly 7km² in 2023.[54]

Table 7: Area reduced through TS in 2024 (official data)[55]

Operator	Provinces	Area reduced (m²)
CMAC	Kampong Cham, Mondul Kiri, Prey Veng, Stung Treng	2,214,499
NPA	Ratanak Kiri	2,221,633
Total		**4,436,132**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

The 55.25km² officially reported as release through clearance in 2024 (see Table 8) supposedly represents a 150% hike in output over the 19.4km² officially recorded as cleared in 2023, but the official data in that year suffered from long delays uploading operating results. Drawing on operator data, Mine Action Review estimated total clearance in 2023 at 38.2km² and while the CMAA reportedly made significant progress in cutting down the backlog of operating results in 2024, operator results still suggest a higher amount of clearance amounting to 56.3km², 47% more than the estimated 2023 result.[56]

47 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
48 Emails from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
49 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
50 Ibid.
51 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.
52 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
53 Emails from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 11 April 2024 and 22 April 2025.
54 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.
55 Ibid.
56 Emails from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025; Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025; and Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.

Operator data suggests CMAC cleared 43.46km^2 in 2024, 46% higher than in 2023.[57] MAG reported slightly higher clearance in 2024 (8.67km^2), attributing the improvement to more favourable topographical conditions in its assigned tasks,[58] but NPA, aided by the sharp, US-funded increase in its clearance capacity recorded the biggest increase, recording clearance of 4,152,496m^2, nearly four times the previous year's result.[59]

Table 8: CMR clearance in 2024 (official data)[60]

Operator	Province	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks
CMAC	Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Mondul Kiri, Prey Vihear, Prey Veng, Ratanak Kiri, Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, Tboung Khmum	41,667,854	6,833	249
MAG	Ratanak Kiri	9,425,756	599	344
NPA	Ratanak Kiri	4,152,496	548	17
Other[61]	Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Prey Vihear, Siem Reap	0	0	88
Totals		**55,246,106**	**7,980**	**698**

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Cambodia's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 gives priority to completing mine clearance but set a target of releasing 80% of known CMR contamination by 2025. The remaining 20% would be considered as "residual". At the time, it estimated CMR contamination at 645km^2 and aimed to release 499km^2 by 2025. Cambodia believed 30% could be released through cancellation or land reclamation and called for release of 44km^2 a year through TS or clearance. Land release in 2025 surpassed that annual target for the first time (see Table 9). The National Strategy for 2026–2035 does not set targets for land release.

Table 9: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	55.25
2023*	38.24
2022	30.36
2021	20.58
2020	30.99
Total	**175.42**

* Mine Action Review estimate

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Goal Seven of Cambodia's National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025 is to establish a sustainable national capacity to address residual threats after 2025. The Strategy for 2026–2035 largely repeats that objective and calls for "a review of Cambodia's established legal, institutional and operational frameworks as well as development of cost-effective systems, mechanisms and tools".[62]

57 NPA, which quality assures operations by CMAC Demining Unit 5 for the PM/WRA, reported clearing 34,035,268m^2 of CMR contamination. In provinces cleared by other CMAC demining units, CMAA data showed it cleared 9,428,906m^2, suggesting total CMR clearance of 43,464,174m^2.

58 Email from Alexey Kruk, MAG, 22 April 2025.

59 Email from Hans Risser, NPA, 16 May 2025.

60 Email from Hean Kimsin, CMAA, 16 May 2025.

61 The CMAA reported that HALO explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in six provinces (Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kratie, Prey Vihear, Siem Reap) destroyed 78 submunitions and CSHD destroyed a total of 10 submunitions in EOD tasks in Prey Vihear and Siem Reap provinces.

62 National Mine Action Strategy 2026–2035 (Draft), p. 6.

ETHIOPIA

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Not known
Thought to be light

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

This is the first time that a country profile on Ethiopia has been included in this annual report. The extent and location of CMR are not yet known due to lack of comprehensive survey. Ethiopia did not formally report any survey or clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) in 2024, and Mine Action Review is not aware of any nationally coordinated survey or clearance of CMR prior to 2024. Mine Action Review received photographs, taken in May 2025, of what appears to be a Russian-made AO-1Sch submunition. This concurs with reports published previously elsewhere of possible cluster munition attacks during the recent conflict, which took place in the Tigray region in the north of the country, in 2020–22. Both the Ethiopian and Eritrean air forces possess aircraft capable of delivering RBK-series cluster munitions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Ethiopia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Ethiopia should undertake systematic survey as soon as possible to ascertain the extent and location of CMR and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**
- **Ethiopia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **Ethiopia should ensure its national mine action centre has sufficient resources to sustain an effective mine action programme and mobilise the necessary resources to survey and clear CMR.**
- **Ethiopia should prioritise the urgent establishment of a functional Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, following efforts ongoing since early 2024.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Ministry of Defence
- Ethiopia Mine Action Office (EMAO)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- National Demining Companies (Ethiopian Armed Forces)

* These international operators are accredited in Ethiopia for survey and clearance, including battle area clearance, but none was specifically tasked with survey or clearance of CMR in 2024 (or previously).

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Church Aid (DCA)*
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)*
- The HALO Trust (HALO)*
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)*
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)*

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

There is credible evidence of CMR remaining in Ethiopia from both from the recent non-international armed conflict in Tigray region in 2020–22 and from the international armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998–2000. The extent and location of CMR are not yet known due to lack of comprehensive survey. It has, however, been suggested that there may be contamination in the Tigray,[1] Afar,[2] and Amhara[3] regions in the north of the country.

The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) states that further survey is needed to ascertain the extent and location of any CMR, though it has yet to share any plans to undertake this.[4] Ethiopia has, however, shared a two-year work plan for survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines and other explosive ordnance (EO) for 2026 and 2027. This work plan incorporates several regions of Ethiopia, including the apparently CMR-affected regions of Tigray and Afar (but not also Amhara). No explicit reference is made to survey and clearance of CMR in the plan.[5]

Photographic evidence of CMR contamination is available. Mine Action Review received photographs taken in Tigray in May 2025 by an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) mine action operator, showing remnants of what appears to be an AO-1Sch submunition.[6] Previously, in September 2024, Mine Action Review received a photograph taken on an unspecified date in 2024 in Afar, in an EO-contaminated area reportedly cleared by EMAO's explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. The operator that provided the photograph believes the condition of the submunitions suggests that the contamination is relatively recent, likely resulting from the Tigray conflict of 2020– 22, rather than the earlier Eritrea-Ethiopia war.[7] The operator states that the image taken in Afar shows a Chinese Type 81 submunition, which is similar in design to the US M42 dual-purpose (anti-armour and anti-personnel) submunition. It adds that EMAO teams have reported encountering hundreds of these submunitions. In addition to the Type 81, other submunitions identified in Ethiopia reportedly include the PFM, BLU-63, M42, and MK118 submunitions, and even some combined effects munitions (e.g. the CBU-87). There are also indications of stockpiles of BL-755 and CB-500 cluster munitions.[8]

In addition to photographic evidence, teams from one INGO mine action operator have gathered multiple testimonies of cluster munition strikes in Tigray, although these were not accompanied by direct physical evidence at the time. The operator explains that, in the absence of mine action activities in Tigray during and for some time following the end of the conflict in late 2022, at-risk communities have coped with EO threats by removing and relocating surface contamination. Larger items of EO are often piled in known locations while smaller items are hidden or buried.[9] The operator believes the testimonies they have received regarding cluster munition strikes are credible, based on their analysis and supported by admittedly limited photographic evidence. It also believes that teams will encounter cluster munition-contaminated area as operations expand into less populated and more remote districts.[10] The operator has also received information from

1 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ethiopia", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YHLRMe; and "Eritrea", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43bhTl5; and email sharing preliminary findings, requiring further national review, 8 August 2024.

2 Email sharing preliminary findings, 8 August 2024.

3 "Battlefield Ethiopia -Federal forces cluster bomb Kutaber and Mekele", video posted by the Military and Foreign Affairs Network, 26 October 2021, at: https://bit.ly/4miV5IX; and email sharing preliminary findings, 8 August 2024.

4 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, Director, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

5 2025 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 40–52.

6 Email sharing preliminary findings, 14 May 2025.

7 Email sharing preliminary findings, 30 September 2024.

8 Ibid.

9 Email sharing preliminary findings requiring further national review, 18 February 2025.

10 Ibid.

the United States (US) and French military missions, both of which are providing training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) to EMAO and Ethiopia's Ministry of Defence (MoD), confirming the presence and clearance of submunitions by EMAO and MoD teams.[11] The operator asserts that direct evidence of CMR contamination has been confirmed, not only by its own teams but also by those of other operators, but that the absence of a national information management system for recording and maintaining contamination data has exacerbated a lack of clarity on the issue.[12]

As noted previously, credible evidence exists of CMR contamination remaining from both from the 2020–22 Tigray conflict and the 1998–2000 war. The Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (the Monitor) refers to evidence that cluster bombs were used in Ethiopia's Tigray region during the first half of 2021, but states that "the responsible party and circumstances of use are not known".[13] According to the Monitor, both the Eritrean Air Force and the Ethiopian Air Force possess aircraft capable of delivering RBK-series cluster munitions.[14] Media reports and social media posts and images indicate that several types of RBK-series cluster munition may have been used in attacks on Gijet and Samre, south-west of the city of Mekelle, the regional capital of Tigray, on 20–25 February 2021; and in attacks on Guyya and Menji, near the town of Abi-Adi Tembien (also in Tigray), on 13 June 2021. The air-delivered cluster munitions reportedly used included RBK-250; PTAB-2.5M; and RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh.[15] Health organisations assisting conflict victims are said to have described injury patterns consistent with those inflicted by explosive submunitions.[16]

As well as possible CMR contamination as a result of the recent conflict, there is also the possibility of legacy CMR contamination in Ethiopia from the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, during which both sides used cluster munitions. In June 1998, Eritrean aircraft dropped cluster munitions in Mekelle, in Tigray, hitting a school.[17] It is unclear if remnants from this attack have been identified or cleared since.[18]

Ethiopia has not, to date, reported on the extent and location of CMR contamination. Ethiopia drafted the Ethiopian National Mine Action Standard (ENMAS) 09.11 on Battle Area Clearance in November 2024, which states: "In Ethiopia, while the use of cluster munitions and related widespread contamination is not a predominant phenomenon, localized contamination still poses challenges to community safety and economic recovery. BAC efforts in the country therefore focus on addressing these targeted contamination issues".[19]

In April 2025, EMAO responded to Mine Action Review's enquiry about the extent and location of CMR contamination in Ethiopia by stating that further survey is needed to ascertain this. EMAO added that they were not aware of any evidence of contamination available from operators and would be glad to review it.[20] Previously, in July 2024, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Ethiopia reported to Mine Action Review that UNMAS teams had so far encountered only one case of CMR in the country, but acknowledged that survey so far and thus available data were limited.[21]

It is possible that security risks could present a barrier to future survey and clearance in some CMR-affected areas. According to EMAO, as at April 2025, there was some ongoing insecurity in Amhara,[22] and an assessment of the security conditions for mine action operations was needed at the border with Eritrea in Tigray.[23]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Ethiopia also has areas containing anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ethiopia for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

EMAO was established in 2001 by Ethiopia's Council of Ministers, following the end of the conflict with Eritrea, as an autonomous civilian body responsible for mine clearance and risk education. It reported to the Office of the Prime Minister.[24] In 2019, after several institutional transitions, Ethiopia reported that the responsibility for the national mine action programme had been transferred back to the headquarters of the MoD.[25]

11 Information provided with request for anonymity, 8 August 2024.

12 Information provided with request for anonymity, 14 April 2025.

13 Landmine and Cluster Munition, "Ethiopia", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YHLRMe.

14 Ibid.

15 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Eritrea", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43bhTl5.

16 Email from sharing preliminary findings requiring further national review, 8 August 2024.

17 "A Guide to Cluster Munitions", Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 3rd edition, Geneva, May 2016, p. 22; Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Eritrea", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43bhTl5; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ethiopia", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YHLRMe.

18 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ethiopia", accessed 10 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YHLRMe.

19 ENMAS 09.11, First Edition, November 2024, Battle Area Clearance, p. 1.

20 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

21 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, Chief, Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, Ethiopia, 31 July 2024.

22 Conflict broke out in Amhara between forces of the non-state-armed group, the Fano, and Ethiopian armed forces in April 2023. See "Scores of Ethiopians die in long-running Amhara conflict, rights body says", *Reuters*, 24 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3EZoeIq; "Understanding the Conflict in Ethiopia's Amhara Region", Centre for International Policy Studies, 16 January 2025; at: https://bit.ly/44H620D; and "Ethiopia's Ominous New War in Amhara", Crisis Group International, 16 November 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3FdY30w.

23 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

24 Council of Ministers Regulation No. 70/2001, 5 February 2001.

25 2019 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 9.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ethiopia for further information on efforts to integrate gender and diversity considerations into the programme of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in Ethiopia.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ethiopia for further information on efforts to mainstream environmental considerations into the programme of survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines in Ethiopia.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2024, UNMAS was supporting EMAO with the development of a functioning national database.[26] Humanity and Inclusion (HI) is also extensively assisting EMAO in developing a functional national information management system (IMS); providing technical support, equipment, and capacity-building.[27] EMAO stated in April 2025 that clean-up of data and on-site verification were ongoing.[28] Strengthening and improving Ethiopia's mine action IMS by "operationalising" IMSMA Core remained one of EMAO's key objectives as at March 2025.[29] It is not clear to what extent Ethiopia plans to disaggregate contamination by weapon type, including CMR, in the developing national database.

HI reported to Mine Action Review that it continued to maintain a detailed and IMSMA Core-compliant record of all operations and findings, including findings pertinent to CMR, and is prepared to share this data with the national database as soon as it becomes functional. HI also recommends that Ethiopia should implement robust data collection systems for CMR-related incidents as well as prioritise data-sharing between hospitals, humanitarian actors, and mine action operators, to help inform effective risk education.[30]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Ethiopia has not yet revealed any plan to survey and clear CMR, and has yet to allocate any CMR survey or clearance tasks to operators. HI requested a task order and submitted its implementation plan, which does include threat assessment of CMR as a potential secondary threat, in November 2024, with a relevant task order being issued in February 2025.[31]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

EMAO issued twelve Ethiopian National Mine Action Standards (ENMAS) and two standard operating procedures in 2024, which serve as the basis for Ethiopia's quality management system.[32] However, INGO mine action operators suggested in early 2025 that the ENMAS still had gaps and that they were yet to be officially endorsed or issued as at May 2025. Operators reported that twelve draft standards were in place, mostly developed by UNMAS and INGO mine action operators, including ENMAS 09.11.[33]

26 Emails from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 7 and 26 June 2024.

27 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, Chief of Operations, Armed Violence Reduction Division, Ethiopia Mission, Humanity and Inclusion (HI), 19 May 2025.

28 Interview with Brigadier-General Tadesse Amelo, EMAO, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

29 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 40.

30 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 4 April and 19 May 2025.

31 Ibid.

32 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

33 Emails from and interviews with INGO mine action operators in March to May 2025.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Ethiopia's national capacity to survey and clear CMR is not yet clear. EMAO has an EOD team, a clearance team, and a survey desk. EMAO is also supported by "other standby forces of the MoD Main Engineering department, that could provide surge support".[34] Some operators have expressed concern that EMAO's EOD teams are not yet sufficiently trained or equipped to safely address CMR contamination, for example, lacking the necessary medical equipment and personnel to safely deploy in the field.[35]

A growing number of international survey and clearance operators have been accredited to work in Ethiopia in recent years. EMAO has stated that in November 2024 it "processed the desk accreditation for six international NGOs for field deployment", namely for: BBC Media Action,[36] DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), The HALO Trust (HALO),[37] HI, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).[38] HALO was already operational, having worked in the country since August 2022, clearing mined areas on the border with Somaliland.[39] HI aimed to have multi-tasks teams (MTTs) fully operational by the end of March 2025, having initiated non-technical survey (NTS) in Ethiopia, including limited EOD tasks (relocating safe-to-move items of EO), in November 2024.[40] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) had three NTS teams trained and ready to deploy as at November 2024. It was in the final stages of importing equipment and hoping to start NTS imminently as at March 2025.[41] Operators note that bureaucratic delays in the importation of essential equipment has proved challenging in some cases.[42] As at June 2025, DRC reported that it had resolved this to some extent, having received some survey equipment, but was still facing challenges importing equipment required for clearance, including explosives, detonators, and detonation cord. It also needed clear direction on the authority required to store and transport these items within Ethiopia.[43]

Ethiopia reported that, as at the middle of 2025 HI, DRC and MAG planned to recruit and train seven multi-task teams (MTTs) in Ethiopia, capable of EOD, survey, and clearance, including BAC.[44] According to Ethiopia's 2026–27 plan for survey and clearance of anti-personnel mines and other EO, international operators have been assigned to work in CMR-affected regions, although at the time of writing there was no indication that survey or clearance tasks specifically of CMR would be issued. Ethiopia stated that DRC would focus on survey and clearance (including BAC), and EOD, in the North Western Zone of Tigray. DCA would focus NTS and EOD efforts in Afar, with potential expansion to Amhara.[45] HI would work in various parts of Tigray, including NTS, EOD, clearance, and BAC in Tigray's South Eastern and Central zones, but is prepared to deploy to other regions if required and additional funding is secured.[46] HALO would initially concentrate its efforts in the Afar region, deploying three multi-task teams capable of EOD, NTS, and EORE, but was prepared to deploy to other regions if required, and if funding allowed. HALO planned to commence operations in Afar in July 2025.[47] MAG was to undertake survey, clearance, and EOD in Tigray and Amhara.[48]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 1: Land release outputs in 2024 (Mine Action Review data)

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	0
Technical Survey	0
Non-Technical Survey	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	0

No survey or clearance of CMR was reported by Ethiopia in 2024. Mine Action Review is not aware of any nationally coordinated survey or clearance of CMR by Ethiopia prior to 2024.

34 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 28–29.

35 Emails from INGO mine action operators, 8 August and 30 September 2024, and 28 May 2025.

36 BBC Media Action to be deployed for explosive ordnance risk education and victim assistance only. Email from Pierrick Rouat, Country Director, Ethiopia, The HALO Trust (HALO), 28 May 2025.

37 In March 2024, HALO was instructed to cease operations and to renew its Ministry of Defence accreditation. In coordination with EMAO, HALO secured its re-accreditation in October 2024. Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

38 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 7.

39 Email from Rob Syfret, Head of Region for the Horn of Africa, HALO, 2 July 2024.

40 Emails from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 18 February and 19 May 2025.

41 Email from Christian Green, HMA Operations Manager, DRC, 20 March 2025; and online interview, 26 March 2025.

42 Emails from and interviews with INGO mine action operators, March to May 2025.

43 Email from Christian Green, DRC, 12 June 2025.

44 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 10.

45 Ibid., pp. 30–31.

46 Email from Alberto Casero Gómez-Pastrana, HI, 19 May 2025.

47 Email from Pierrick Rouat, HALO, 28 May 2025.

48 2025 APBMC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 30–31.

IRAN

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Not reported

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	Not reported	Not reported
Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported
Non-Technical Survey	Not reported	Not reported

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	Not reported	Not reported

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- Not reported

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Available data on contamination and land release of cluster munition-affected areas in Iran continue to be extremely limited. There is no publicly available evidence to suggest that survey or clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas took place in 2024.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Iran should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **In the meantime, Iran should commit never to use cluster munitions and should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear cluster munition remnants (CMR) on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **Iran should report publicly on the extent and location of CMR and prepare a plan for their clearance and destruction.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

- Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- IRMAC
- Iranian Army
- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Commercial operators

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

* This is based on information from earlier years. It is not known if the information remains accurate.

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The areas of Iran most significantly affected by weapons contamination, including mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), are believed to be in the five western provinces of West Azerbaijan, Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, and Kurdistan.[1] However, the extent of contamination from CMR is not known. Safelane Global, for example, states that "while the Iranian government and its partners have made good progress, cluster munition contamination is still considered a possibility in some areas".[2]

Some contamination is believed to remain from the Iran-Iraq war in 1980–88.[3] Cluster munitions were widely used in Khuzestan and to a lesser extent in Kermanshah, when Iraqi forces used mostly French- and Russian-made submunitions in attacks on oil facilities at Abadan and Mah-Shahr, and Spanish munitions in attacks on troop positions at Dasht-e-Azadegan.[4] Iraqi forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster bombs in 1984 against Iranian troops; and a US Navy aircraft reportedly used 18 Mk-20 Rockeye bombs in attacks on Iranian Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an Iranian Navy ship on 18 April 1988.[5] Air Force explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams cleared many unexploded submunitions after attacks but, as at 2014, contamination remained around Mah-Shahr and the port of Bandar Imam Khomeini, according to a retired Iranian Air Force colonel.[6] In 2020, 18 submunitions were discovered during commercial clearance of some 7km^2 in Khuzestan province in the south-west.[7]

The extent to which Iran is undertaking or planning survey to establish a baseline of CMR contamination is not known. Nor it is known the extent to which Iran disaggregates CMR contamination and clearance output from that of other explosive ordnance.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Iran also has areas containing anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Iran for further information). It has new explosive remnants of war following the armed conflict with Israel in June 2025 although the extent is not known.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Iran Mine Action Centre (IRMAC) was established as the national mine action centre in 2005, taking the place of a mine action committee within the Ministry of Defence. In 2014, IRMAC reported that it was responsible for planning, data, managing survey, procurement, and the accreditation of demining operators. It was also tasked with setting standards, providing training for clearance operators, concluding contracts with demining operators, and ensuring quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of their operations. IRMAC also coordinated mine action with the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Interior, the Management and Planning Organisation of Iran, and other relevant ministries and organisations, while also managing international relations.[8] At the time of writing, Mine Action Review had not been able to establish if this description of IRMAC's specific responsibilities remained up to date.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supports IRMAC in the provision of victim assistance and risk education. The ICRC has facilitated access of IRMAC to medical kits; first aid training for demining teams; and personal protective equipment (PPE) to support humanitarian demining. It also supports IRMAC with peer-to-peer exchange with other mine action centres and actors internationally, including in international meetings and events.[9]

1 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Weapon Contamination", accessed 29 May 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3OTC55t.

2 "Iran", Safelane Global, accessed 12 May 2025; at: https://bit.ly/3SBglf6.

3 Statement by Gholamhossein Dehghani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 13 September 2011; and "Iran", Safelane Global, accessed 12 May 2025; at: https://bit.ly/3SBglf6.

4 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Iran Mine Action", 1 September 2014, at: https://bit.ly/3F3JYTk.

5 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Iran Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 12 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mdJQS0.

6 Interview with Air Force Colonel (ret.) Ali Alizadeh, Tehran, 8 February 2014.

7 Information provided by Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, August 2020.

8 IRMAC PowerPoint Presentation, Tehran, 9 February 2014; and IRMAC, "Presentation of IRMAC".

9 ICRC, "Weapon Contamination", accessed 12 May 2025; at: https://bit.ly/3OTC55t; and Presentation by Farhad Arabpour Weapon Contamination Coordinator, ICRC delegation in Tehran, 23rd International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisers (NDM23), 11–14 February 2020, Geneva, available at: https://bit.ly/43EjVZD.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The amount of national resources Iran contributes to support IRMAC or the survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas is not known. However, Iran is believed to have dedicated significant resources and effort to clearing areas on its territory contaminated by ERW and mines.[10]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The extent to which gender and diversity are mainstreamed into mine action in Iran is not known.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action standard on environmental management and/or a policy on environmental management. It has been reported, however, that Iran's Ministry for the Environment does regulate environmental practices in mine action to some extent.[11]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

IRMAC's database is said to be accurate and operators provide regular activity reports to IRMAC on both humanitarian and commercial mine action projects.[12] However, Mine Action Review has not been able to obtain further information from IRMAC on this issue.

In 2020, IRMAC reported having a geographic information system (GIS), web-based, integrated information management system, which integrates information on quality, safety, and the environment.[13] In 2022, IRMAC launched an application for smartphones, which is reported to contain all data from historical and current clearance operations and which is intended to provide mine action organisations with a comprehensive view of contaminated and cleared areas as identified by IRMAC. The App, which is also said to contain information about explosive incidents, is updated on a regular basis. It is available to operators and interested parties upon request.[14] At the time of writing, it had not been possible to ascertain whether it includes data on cluster munition-contaminated areas.

PLANNING AND TASKING

It is not known whether Iran has a national mine action strategy or an annual work plan for the survey and clearance of CMR or agreed and specified criteria for the prioritisation of tasks.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Iran reportedly has national mine action standards in place.[15] No information was available on quality management (QM) procedures for clearance in Iran, although it was reported in 2023 that a subsidiary of IRMAC performs QA and QC of commercial demining.[16]

10 ICRC, "Experts from over 15 nations attend round-table on humanitarian mine action", Press release, 15 March 2019, at: https://bit.ly/3N7Ca4e; and ICRC, "Weapon Contamination".

11 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

12 Email from Reza Amaninasab, Director, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023.

13 IRMAC PowerPoint presentation, available at: http://bit.ly/38ALojt; and presentation by Mr Pourbagher, Deputy Director of IRMAC, NDM23, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020.

14 Emails from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 23 March 2023; and Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April and 6 May 2023.

15 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

16 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 26 April 2023.

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

No up-to-date information was available at the time of writing on Iran's national survey and clearance capacity. It was not clear what capacity, if any, was being deployed to survey or clear cluster munition-contaminated areas.

In 2023, it was reported that the Petroleum Engineering and Development Company (PEDEC), the development arm of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), contracts and monitors commercial operators conducting clearance of Iran's oil and gas producing areas. These are concentrated in the west and south-west of the country, close to the border with Iraq.[17]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

It is not known if any cluster munition-contaminated areas were released through survey or clearance in 2024 or whether any newly discovered areas of CMR contamination were added to the national database.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

As the extent of CMR contamination in Iran remains unknown and little information is available on the overall effectiveness of Iran's national mine action programme, it is not possible to comment on the extent to which Iran is making reasonable progress towards release of CMR-affected areas.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

It is not known to what extent Iran is making provision for a sustainable capacity to address previously unknown CMR-contaminated areas following completion of clearance.

17 Email from Narges Jahanparast, Ambassadors for Development Without Borders, 6 June 2023.

LIBYA

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION: 18,092M^2

Light
(National authority partial estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	4,053	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	1,895,937	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	14	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

There was both clearance and release through survey of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024, an increase from 2023. The true extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) remains unknown. Funding and operational challenges persisted, including the seven-month suspension imposed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) on three demining organisations operating in Benghazi and Sirte and the seizure of their vehicles and demining equipment, which was only resolved in May 2024, with the operators having their equipment returned to them and donors redirecting funds away from Libya to other crises.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Libya should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Libya should conduct a baseline survey to identify the extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) and begin systematic clearance based primarily on humanitarian priorities.**
- **Libya should finalise and adopt a national mine action strategy that includes targets for CMR survey and clearance.**
- **National authorities and relevant security actors should facilitate survey and clearance by accredited operators across all areas of the country. This includes resolving visa delays, import restrictions, and arbitrary suspensions that hinder operations.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- The Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Free Fields Foundation (3F)
- The Safe Trust (Al-Thiqa al-Amena) (accredited, and supported by DCA)
- Libya Peace Organisation (accredited, and supported by DRC)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

CMR contamination in Libya is largely the consequence of use in the armed conflicts in 2011 and renewed conflict since 2014. As of April 2024, the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC) had identified 18,092m^2 of area contaminated by CMR.[1]

In 2011, armed forces used at least three types of cluster munition: MAT-120 mortar projectiles, RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs, and Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs), which were delivered by rocket.[2] In early 2015, fighting between Libya's rival armed groups saw reported new use of cluster munitions, including RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M bombs, in attacks on Bin Jawad near the port of Es-Sidr in February, and in the vicinity of Sirte in March. The Libyan Air Force, controlled by the internationally recognised government of the time, had bombed both locations, though it denied using cluster munitions.[3]

In July 2019, LibMAC reported use of RBK-250-275 cluster bombs in three areas: Al-Hira Bridge (Al-Sawani), the Bir al-Ghanam area south-west of Tripoli (Nafusa Mountains), and Aziziya (south of Tripoli).[4] The same year, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) reported three areas containing CMR on the basis of its own operations. One cluster munition-contaminated area was confirmed in 2017 through non-technical survey (NTS) in the Nafusa mountains region, near the town of Kikla, in north-west Libya. In 2018–19, HI found further cluster munition strikes in Tawargha and Al Karareem.[5]

In May 2019, the LNA, led by commander Khalifa Haftar, was accused of using cluster bombs in attacks in and around Tripoli.[6] On 15 and 16 August 2019, aircraft of forces affiliated with the LNA dropped cluster munitions on Zuwarah International Airport according to the United Nations (UN) Panel of Experts.[7] Human Rights Watch has stated that forces aligned to Haftar also used cluster munitions in an airstrike in a residential area in Tripoli on or around 2 December 2019. The organisation visited the site on 17 December 2019 and found remnants of two RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M cluster bombs. The area was not known to be contaminated by cluster munitions before the attack.[8]

The HALO Trust (HALO) reports that cluster munitions were kicked out from ammunition storage areas in Misrata and Mizdah (north). In Sirte (north centre), there is minimal evidence of presence of CMR, although HALO found 22 DPICM submunitions in 2021 and a further 28 submunitions in 2022.[9]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Libya is also contaminated by other explosive remnants of war (ERW) and by anti-personnel mines, including those of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Libya for further information on the mine problem). There is also a problem with remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[10]

1 Presentation by the Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), 27th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.
2 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Libya: Cluster Munition Ban Policy", last updated 27 July 2019.
3 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Evidence of new cluster bomb use", 15 March 2015.
4 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, Chief of Operations, on behalf of Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, 4 July 2019.
5 Email from Catherine Smith, Head of Mission, HI, 12 March 2019.
6 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Libya: Cluster Munition Ban Policy", Last updated 27 July 2019; and "Tripoli forces claim successes and accuse Haftar of using cluster bombs and internationally banned phosphorus bombs", *Libya Herald*, 20 June 2019.
7 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli", 13 February 2020, at: http://bit.ly/3gAfq9G.
8 Human Rights Watch, "Libya: Banned Cluster Munitions Used in Tripoli", 13 February 2020.
9 Emails from Zita Andrassy, Programme Officer Libya, HALO, 27 February 2022; and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2024.
10 "Lives and Limbs Shattered by Libya Mines", *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 5 April 2018, at: https://bit.ly/3URCR5q.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no national mine action legislation in Libya. Mine action exists in a fragmented and occasionally violent political context. Following years of armed conflict, a new UN-backed "unity" government, the Government of National Unity (GNU), was formally installed in Tripoli in early 2016. It has faced armed opposition from the LNA and a host of militia forces. The warring parties reached a ceasefire agreement to halt hostilities in October 2020, which culminated in the election of an interim government with a roadmap leading to national elections in December 2021. Since then, Libya's progress towards elections has stalled with national elections still not held and recent outbreaks of violence in Tripoli between the GNU and the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), a security institution affiliated with the Presidential Council.[11]

LibMAC was mandated by the Minister of Defence to coordinate mine action in 2011.[12] Operating under the UN-backed GNA, LibMAC has its headquarters in Tripoli, with sub-offices in Misrata and Benghazi.[13] ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF), which started its capacity-building project in Libya in January 2014, pays the salary of 27 LibMAC employees and covers other overhead costs.[14] Danish Refugee Council (DRC) is providing capacity development support to LibMAC through training in non-technical survey (NTS) and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), as well as by supporting the standardisation of risk education.[15] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provides capacity development support to LibMAC on information management, national mine action standards, strategic planning, gender and diversity, and risk education.[16]

In August 2023, the LNA ordered the suspension of three national and international mine action organisations operating in Benghazi and Sirte—DanChurchAid (DCA), DRC, and Free Fields Foundation (3F)—and seized vehicles and demining equipment, leading DRC and other organisations to halt all operations and close their office.[17] The suspension lasted for seven months, with operators receiving the return of their equipment only in May 2024.[18]

In 2025, ten international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in the country were subjected to scrutiny by the Libyan Internal Security Agency (ISA), which led to the suspension of DRC's activities nationwide. DRC reported that the investigation initiated by the ISA lacked transparency regarding its scope and justification and significantly affected their mine action operations.[19]

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), which is integrated into the UN Support Mission In Libya (UNSMIL), has maintained a presence in the country since October 2020. As the UNSMIL Mine Action Section, the UNMAS programme in Libya is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2755 (2024) to take action to secure and manage stockpiles; to conduct survey and clearance of ERW, EOD, and risk education at the request of Libyan institutions, and to support capacity development for mine action of Libyan institutions. In 2024, UNMAS conducted Advanced Device Scene Incident Management (DSIM), Individual First Aid Kit, and Training of Trainer DSIM courses for Forensic Police officers from across Libya. UNMAS also conducted an Operations and Quality Assurance training for LibMAC officers from all regional offices.[20] The GICHD was planning to hold a training for LibMAC on quality management in November 2025.[21]

UNMAS and LibMAC chair monthly virtual and quarterly in-person Implementing Partner (IP) meetings, attended by key mine action stakeholders.[22] Since February 2025, these meetings have been held in Tripoli, which enables wider stakeholder participation.[23] DCA highlights the quarterly meetings as an effective platform for keeping operators informed and for presenting challenges and progress to donors. They also commend LibMAC's strong coordination of tasking.[24]

HALO maintains regular contact with LibMAC's Chief of Operations and staff in Misrata. However, they suggest that coordination would be strengthened by formal operational meetings involving all operators.[25] DCA reports ongoing, constructive dialogue with LibMAC on both current and planned operations, noting that cooperation is strong with input from operators on operational priorities.[26] HALO also recommends that coordination mechanisms be expanded to include representatives from the east of Libya. Their inclusion would help ensure challenges are elevated to the appropriate authorities in Benghazi and that task prioritisation reflects operational needs across all geographic areas.[27] DRC also highlighted difficulties in coordination of mine action activities in the East.[28]

The issuance of visas is variable between operators with HALO reporting that six-month multiple-entry visas are now obtainable without major issues, while DCA highlighted that visas are still typically of a short-duration of visas (typically one-month, single-entry) which remains a key barrier to

11 "UN launches new bid to revive Libya's elections", *Africanews*, 16 December 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4k3SYpZ; and "Libyans in Benghazi relay frustrations about the political and security situation to UNSMIL, propose solutions", UNSMIL, 8 June 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3TDtNzG; and "Escalating conflict in Tripoli exposes the realities of false stability – and international neglect in Libya", Blog post, Chatham House, 16 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/45TQxDd.

12 LibMAC website, accessed 9 May 2024, at: http://bit.ly/2JqVr0S.

13 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

14 ITF, "Annual Report 2024", p. 113.

15 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, EORE-NTS Program Manager, DRC, 4 June 2025.

16 Email from Christelle Mestre, Advisor, Strategic Planning, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

17 Emails from Wajdi AlKhatib, DRC, 19 April 2024; and Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 7 June 2024.

18 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, Country Director, DCA, 20 May 2025.

19 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

20 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3G7yRJE.

21 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

22 Emails from Sharmeela Aminath, UNMAS, 16 March 2023; Samir Becirovic, UNMAS, 10 June 2022, and Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.

23 Email from Julia Eckelmann, Progamme Manager/Country Director, HALO, 23 May 2025.

24 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

25 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

26 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

27 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

28 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

maintaining staffing. DRC reported that visas for international staff are often delayed due to a combination of security concerns and bureaucratic hurdles.[29] Both HALO and DRC have had issues and delays with the importation of equipment, particularly around sensitive materials.[30] HALO also reported that logistical constraints persist, particularly in moving assets between eastern and western Libya, and financial mechanisms are a significant obstacle.[31] DRC has also faced difficulties importing equipment complicated by burdensome customs and tax regulations and sanctions on certain types of equipment. In addition, the approval process for memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with national authorities can be slow and complex, further affecting operational timelines.[32]

In its Article 7 report under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Türkiye said it provided training on mine clearance, counter IED, and EOD in 2024 to Libyan Armed Forces personnel.[33]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

HALO was funded for survey and clearance in 2024 by the United States (US) Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA). In 2025, US funding was temporarily paused for one month (in January–February) due to the Foreign Assistance Review, and future support remains uncertain. Italy was co-chairing the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) in 2025, while most European Union (EU) donors, except the Netherlands, have redirected funding elsewhere.[34] DCA received funding from the EU and PM/WRA in 2024, but EU support ceased in August 2024 when funds were reallocated to Gaza.[35] In 2025, DCA was being funded by PM/WRA and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinBuZa). DRC was funded by the Netherlands for survey and clearance in 2024. In March 2025, Dutch funding ended, but Denmark (DANIDA) provided new funding for April to June.[36] In 2024, UNMAS was funded by the UNSMIL Regular Budget and bilateral donors, including Italy and Spain.[37]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

LibMAC does not have a gender and diversity policy for mine action in place. LibMAC disaggregates mine action data by sex and age.[38]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024[39]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	23	8 (35%)	7	3 (43%)	14	0 (0%)
DRC	22	4 (18%)	3	0 (0%)	16	3 (19%)
HALO	28	2 (7%)	8	1 (13%)	20	0 (0%)
Totals	**73**	**14 (19%)**	**18**	**4 (22%)**	**50**	**3 (6%)**

In 2024, DCA continued to build the capacity of its all-female EOD and risk education teams until the project concluded in August. This initiative was set to resume in July 2025 under new funding, which will also facilitate an increase in the number of women in operational roles to 16.[40] In 2023, DRC delivered Gender and Diversity training to LibMAC and local partners. In 2024, DRC followed up on the participation mechanism proposed during the workshop to support ongoing engagement and implementation.[41]

29 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
30 Emails from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
31 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
32 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
33 Türkiye APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2024), Form I.
34 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
35 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
36 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
37 UNMAS website, Libya, last updated January 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3G7yRJE.
38 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
39 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
40 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
41 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Libya does not have a national mine action standard (NMAS) or a policy on environmental management.[42]

Table 2: Environmental policies and action[43]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
DCA	No – SOP	Yes	Yes
DRC	No – SOP	No	No
HALO	Yes	No	No

In 2024 and early 2025, DCA introduced several environmentally conscious practices, including replacing plastic and synthetic fibre sandbags with sustainable hemp alternatives and continuing the use of thermite lances to limit explosive use and prevent soil contamination. It also transitioned its field offices to solar energy. Additionally, DCA teams have been clearing land in support of the government's agro-ecology project, contributing directly to Libya's one million tree-planting carbon sequestration initiative and supporting broader climate change mitigation.[44] In 2023, HALO developed its rubble recycling capabilities and secured funding for a pilot project aimed at reducing emissions, landfill use, and resource extraction by repurposing rubble for construction. However, implementation of the pilot project in Sirte in 2024 was disrupted due to redevelopment activities by the Libyan Reconstruction Fund in the target areas.[45]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

LibMAC receives technical support in information management from the GICHD and UNMAS. In 2023, LibMAC successfully upgraded its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database from the New Generation (NG) version to IMSMA Core.[46] While the database contains extensive information, it is largely focused on major cities.

Further NTS is needed in the north, and anecdotal reports suggest additional contamination in the south. In some cases, hazard polygons exceed 10km^2, and the time elapsed since initial survey indicates a need for re-surveying.[47] To address this, DRC is re-surveying both confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) to determine which should remain in the system and which can be cancelled. Some earlier surveys also appear to have been poorly conducted or lack sufficient detail.[48]

Operators report adequate access to the database.[49] However, HALO notes a lack of access to quality management reports from LibMAC's external monitoring visits. Additionally, victim data is only accessible to the submitting organisation, with LibMAC citing confidentiality concerns.[50] DRC reported ongoing discussions between its Information Management team and LibMAC to improve data accuracy to include a more detailed ERW categories database.[51]

Field data collection via Survey123 has enabled faster data submission and improved issue visibility.[52] LibMAC has introduced measures to strengthen data reliability, including mandatory geotagging and submission through Survey123's photo capture function. Despite these steps, HALO reports limited evidence of field validation of operator reports on newly identified hazardous areas, items found or destroyed, and other key metrics. Increased visibility of quality assurance (QA) visits and reporting would contribute to data quality.[53]

42 Emails from Graeme Ogilvie, DCA, 1 April 2022; Alessandro Di Giusto, DRC, 7 March 2022; and Zita Andrassy, HALO, 27 February 2022.
43 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
44 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.
45 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
46 Email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.
47 Email from Josh Ridley, HALO, 16 May 2024.
48 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
49 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
50 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
51 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.
52 Email from Josh Ridley, HALO, 16 May 2024.
53 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.
54 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.
55 Presentation of LibMAC, 27th NDM meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024.

PLANNING AND TASKING

There is no national mine action strategy for Libya.[54] In 2024, LibMAC announced plans to develop a strategy with support from the GICHD and UNMAS.[55] The GICHD conducted a general assessment of Libya's mine action programme in the second half of 2024 and subsequently assisted LibMAC with strategic planning. A strategy stakeholder workshop was held in October 2024, followed by a consultation workshop in February 2025. Both were co-organised by LibMAC and the GICHD and included participation from operators. These workshops produced a strategic theory of change for Libya. In July 2025, the GICHD reported that LibMAC will lead the drafting of the strategy, based on the agreed theory of change, and the GICHD was awaiting further updates on next steps.[56]

ERW-contaminated areas in Libya are prioritised for clearance based on criteria set by LibMAC, in coordination with national authorities and in alignment with Ministry of Defence and donor priorities and agreements. LibMAC is responsible for issuing task orders and operators report that LibMAC reviews implementation plans and issues task orders in a timely and effective manner.[57] The prioritisation of tasking considers humanitarian impact, requests from local authorities and affected communities, socio-economic land use, and security and access conditions.[58] In 2024, following the intervention of the Libyan Reconstruction Fund/National Development Agency in redevelopment of hazardous areas in Sirte, LibMAC advised HALO to focus on ammunition storage areas as priority for clearance, as HALO has a unique mechanical clearance capability and there is high need for this in multiple locations across Libya.[59]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

National mine action standards (LibMAS), in Arabic and English, have been elaborated with the support of the GICHD and UNMAS, and were approved by the GNA in 2017. The LibMAS are available on the LibMAC website.[60] According to international clearance operators, the LibMAS are sufficient and aligned to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[61] But the national standards have not been updated since being approved in 2017. The GICHD and LibMAC conducted a workshop in June 2025 on NMAS development and review with the inclusion of operators.[62]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Mine action operations have been conducted by government entities, in particular LibMAC as a leader in mine action response, but also the National Safety Authority (NSA), which is mandated to conduct EOD in civilian areas.[63] These institutions liaise with LibMAC but are not tasked or accredited by them, nor do they provide clearance reports to the Centre.[64] Three national operators are currently active in Libya: 3F, The Safe Trust (Al-Thiqa Al-Amena), and Libya Peace Organisation.[65] Libya Peace Organisation, which partners with DRC, is accredited by LibMAC to conduct NTS, EOD, and risk education.[66]

In 2024, LibMAC opened 117 tasks, mostly for quick response and NTS activities in southern parts of Tripoli after the LNA withdrawal, as well as in Tawargha, Sirte, and Benghazi. In addition, LibMAC personnel conducted 226 QA/QC missions and 23 accreditation procedures for international and local NGOs for NTS, risk education, and EOD tasks. During 2024, LibMAC recorded 112 completed tasks.[67]

56 Email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 1 July 2025.

57 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

58 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; and Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

59 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

60 LibMAC website, accessed 20 May 2022 at: https://bit.ly/3ldhvx2. Report of the Secretary-General on UNSMIL, UN doc. S/2018/140, 12 February 2018, p. 12; and UNMAS, "Programmes: Libya", accessed 14 May 2022 at: http://bit.ly/31tU1tB.

61 Emails from Catherine Smith, HI, 12 March 2019; Nicholas Torbet, HALO, 14 April 2020, and Charles Fowle, HALO, 5 May 2023.

62 Emails from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May 2025; and Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

63 Interview with Brig. Turjoman, LibMAC, in Geneva, 10 January 2017; and email from Tess Bresnan, UNMAS, 3 May 2024.

64 Email from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021.

65 Presentation of LibMAC to the 27th NDM meeting, Geneva, 9–11 April 2024; and email from Christelle Mestre, GICHD, 17 July 2025.

66 Free Fields Foundations (3F) website, accessed on 20 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4bnui8h; and email from Wajdi Alkhatib, DRC, 10 June 2024.

67 ITF, *Annual Report 2024*, p. 113.

Table 3: Operational survey capacities deployed in 2024[68]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel
3F[69]	2	6	0	0
DRC	1	3	0	0
HALO	1	3	0	0
Libya Peace Organisation[70]	2	6	0	0
Totals	**6**	**18**	**0**	**0**

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[71]

Operator	Manual/mechanical clearance teams	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
DCA	5	46	0	All clearance personnel function as multitask teams conducting NTS, TS, BAC, and EOD as required
HALO	2	9	3	Two mechanical clearance teams
Totals	**7**	**55**	**3**	

Now in its fourteenth year of working in Libya, DCA has offices in Benghazi, Misrata, Sirte, and Tripoli, and is accredited to conduct clearance and EOD tasks.[72] DCA's capacity decreased in 2024 due to a reduction in funding. In 2025, capacity will increase by four teams, totalling approximately 48 personnel, including re-establishing the "all-female" EOD and NTS team, plus one "all-female" risk education team.[73]

DRC has been working in Libya since 2011 and has had three offices: in 2013–21 in Sabha (southern region); in 2018–23 in Benghazi (eastern region); and since 2011 in Tripoli. DRC Tripoli office has a capacity of one EOD team, one NTS team, two risk education teams, and a capacity-building project with the partner Libya Peace Organisation. DRC intended to establish a new NTS team to operate in Tripoli in 2024.[74]

HALO has been present in Libya since 2018 and has offices in Misrata and Sirte, as well as liaison presence in Benghazi. HALO's main operations focused on mechanical clearance in Sirte in the Jeeza Navy area and at a Misrata ammunition storage area where it found CMR in 2022. In March 2024, HALO recruited an additional mechanical clearance team, and cross-trained an EOD team in NTS. HALO's mechanical clearance teams continued work in Sirte until the Libyan Reconstruction Fund began redevelopment of the areas. In August 2024, teams shifted focus to a priority ammunition storage area in Misrata. One team returned to Sirte in December to respond to EOD call-outs and began conducting re-survey in March 2025. In 2024, HALO also procured mechanical ancillaries, such as a hydraulic grapple, which were expected to improve the efficiency of rubble removal and mechanical clearance in 2025.[75]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Comments
Clearance	4,053	Operator data
Technical Survey	0	Operator data
Non-Technical Survey	1,895,937	Operator data
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	14	Operator data

68 Emails from Col. Adel Elatwi, LibMAC, 22 April 2021; Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

69 This information was last updated in April 2021.

70 This information was last updated in April 2021.

71 Emails from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025; and Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

72 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 22 July 2025.

73 Email from Graeme Ogilvy, DCA, 20 May 2025.

74 Emails from Wajdi AlKhatib, DRC, 19 April and 10 June 2024.

75 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, Libya, 23 May 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 1,895,937m^2 of CMR-contaminated area was cancelled through NTS in Tripoli and no area was reduced through technical survey.[76] None of the international operators released area though survey in 2023.

Table 6: Cancellation through NTS in 2024[77]

District	Operator	Areas cancelled	Area cancelled (m²)
Tripoli (Airport Road)	DRC	4	1,345,121
Tripoli (Bab Alazizia)	DRC	2	550,816
Totals		**6**	**1,895,937**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

A total of nearly 4,053m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2024 with 14 submunitions destroyed (see Table 7).[78] In 2023, no CMR clearance was conducted.

Table 7: CMR clearance in 2024[79]

District	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Misrata	HALO	3	4,053	14	244
Totals		**3**	**4,053**	**14**	**244**

In 2024, HALO cleared three bunker areas totalling 4,053m^2 and located 14 submunitions, which were destroyed in situ using a low-order technique with T-jets. An additional 244 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were found; those assessed as safe to move were transferred to a temporary storage site and destroyed later by LibMAC.

The absence of containers and the condition of the submunitions suggest they were likely ejected during the 2020 explosion. However, the limited dispersion pattern indicates that the bunkers may have contained the blast, confining the munitions to a relatively small area. It remains possible that, for bunkers that remained intact after the explosion, some submunitions found during clearance may have originated from different storage locations. Further insight into the extent of submunition dispersion—specifically, how many were expelled versus how many remained stored—could be gained from data collected by 3F, who conducted surface clearance operations between and around the bunkers.[80]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Libya is not yet a State Party to the CCM. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.

There was a notable increase in both survey and clearance of CMR-contaminated areas in 2024, following a year of inactivity in 2023. However, the understanding of the extent and location of CMR contamination in the country is still limited and a comprehensive nationwide baseline survey is urgently needed.

Although progress towards a national mine action strategy is promising, the political and security context remains a key challenge for implementation. Strengthening the capacity of LibMAC remains a priority, particularly its ability to coordinate mine action activities across all stakeholders and geographic areas.

76 Email from Yeison Zuluaga Gomez, DRC, 4 June 2025.

77 Ibid.

78 Email from Julia Eckelmann, HALO, 23 May 2025.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

MYANMAR

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Myanmar is heavily affected by explosive ordnance as a result of decades-old conflicts between the Tatmadaw (army) and numerous non-State armed groups (NSAGs) affiliated with ethnic minorities. Since the military coup in 2021, violence has sharply escalated in geographic scope and intensity accompanied by extensive government air strikes and including reports of cluster munition use. The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) is not known but is not thought to be substantial.

Reports indicate military use of cluster munitions in at least five of Myanmar's seven states, including Chin, Karenni (Kayin), Karen (Kayah), Shan, and Rakhine states, as well as the central Sagaing and Magway regions.[1] Cluster munitions have been delivered in air strikes but also reportedly in 120mm mortar shells.[2]

Specific incidents documented by human rights and news organisations include Myanmar Air Force use of cluster munitions in attacks on Mindat township in the western Chin State in July 2022[3] and a year later in July 2023.[4] Amnesty International documented an attack on Namkham township in northern Shan state in December 2023 using bombs it said were most likely cluster munitions. Photographs of the device's remnants matched those of cluster munitions used in previous Myanmar Air Force attacks.[5]

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar said in 2024 that photographic and video evidence suggested continued use of cluster munitions in areas inhabited by civilians.[6] In May 2025, local People's Defence Forces and the opposition national unity government said the military used cluster munitions in an airstrike on the O Htein Twin village school in Sagaing region although other international reporting and comment on the attack made no reference to cluster munitions.[7]

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Myanmar does not have a structured mine action programme. Tentative steps over several years towards setting up a national mine action authority (NMAA) ended with the military coup in 2021. The State Administration Council established by the Tatmadaw to lead the government has not set up a mechanism for managing or coordinating mine action and focused on military campaigns marked by intensifying air strikes and sharply increased explosive ordnance contamination.[8]

The operating context for humanitarian demining organisations—as for humanitarian and civil society organisations in general—has become increasingly challenging. Myanmar informed the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in November 2020 that it had set up a Mine Action Working Group in May 2020 as "the first step towards formulating a National Strategy and Plan of Action for mine clearance".[9] A Department of Rehabilitation created in 2018 gradually took over responsibility for overseeing mine action and took steps towards setting up a NMAA but momentum was lost with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and government elections in November 2020.[10] No concrete results emerged by the time the Tatmadaw took over the government in February 2021. Since then, operators have followed a policy of non-engagement with the Department of Rehabilitation.[11]

1 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Cluster Munition Production & Use in Myanmar/Burma", Briefing Paper, August 2023; and "UNICEF Myanmar calls for the urgent protection of children in Rakhine State as schools reopen soon", 28 May 2019.

2 Email from an international organisation in Myanmar, 19 May 2025.

3 Amnesty International, "Deadly Cargo", 22 November 2022.

4 "Air strikes by Military Council with bombs and cluster munitions", *Burma News International*, 11 July 2023.

5 Amnesty International, "Myanmar military should be investigated for war crimes in response to 'Operation 1027'", 21 December 2023.

6 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, UN doc. A/HRC/55/65, 14 March 2024, para. 36.

7 Depayin People's Defense Force, cited in "Death Toll From Myanmar Junta Airstrike on School Rises to 24", *The Irrawaddy*, 14 May 2025; see also "Myanmar junta airstrike kills 22 at school: witnesses", *Agence France-Presse*, 13 May 2025.

8 Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN doc. A/HRC/57/56, 4 September 2024, pp. 4–5; Myanmar Protection Cluster Strategy 2024–2025, Global Protection Cluster, undated, pp. 2–3; N. Gillen, "Myanmar: at least 43 killed and 50 injured by junta air strike in Rakhine", Action on Armed Violence, 10 January 2025.

9 Statement of Myanmar, 18th Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC (18MSP), Geneva 16–20 November 2020.

10 Email from Hilde Jørgensen, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 27 May 2021.

11 Email from Matthew Walsh, Head of Humanitarian Response and Mine Action, DanChurchAid (DCA), 22 April 2021.

A national Mine Risk Working Group (MRWG) first set up in 2012 has not formally convened since February 2021. A Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) which was set up in 2022 under the Global Protection Cluster comprising UN agencies, international organisations, and NGOs has provided a platform for coordinating, and information sharing between, humanitarian demining organisations, supported by five subnational AoRs for the north west, the north east, the south west, the south east, and Rakhine State.[12]

PLANNING AND TASKING

In the absence of a national mine action authority, Myanmar has not formulated national or state level plans for any form of mine action.

The MA AoR strategic plan for 2025–26 set out general objectives, including expanding risk education, enhancing the coverage and effectiveness of mine action and ensuring access for victims to health care and support. It calls for increasing the number of local mine action organisations and providing them training. It also called for systematic surveys to map explosive ordnance contamination and establishing an information management department with a centralised database accessible to all mine action stakeholders.[13]

MINE ACTION OPERATIONS

It is not known whether any CMR were destroyed during survey or clearance operations in Myanmar in 2024. Even before the 2021 coup, demining organisations were not permitted to conduct technical survey or clearance and therefore concentrated on building up non-technical survey (NTS), risk education, and community liaison. After February 2021, an increasingly hostile political environment and escalating conflict limited the space for international NGO involvement in humanitarian demining.

12 Mine Action Area of Responsibility Strategy 2025–26, Global Protection Cluster, undated.

13 Ibid., pp. 6–9.

SERBIA

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION: 0.27KM^2

Light
(National estimate, but not including areas under military control)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance	0.34	0
Technical Survey	0	0.13
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	11	16

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Stop Mines
- IN Demining

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Serbia had planned to release all areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants (CMR) by the end of 2024 (excluding possible contamination at military sites), but did not meet this target. It has secured sufficient funding and resources to be able to achieve this by the end of 2025 and should be able to meet this goal, provided resources are used appropriately, with full clearance reserved for land that actually contains contamination.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Serbia should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Serbia should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **The Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) should conduct non-technical and technical survey, rather than full clearance where survey is the most efficient means to achieve land release.**
- **SMAC should also prioritise survey of military areas where CMR are suspected.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Sector for Emergency Management, Ministry of Interior
- Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Stop Mines
- IN Demining

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- None

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Serbia had a total of just over 0.27km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area: one confirmed hazardous area (CHA) covering almost 0.03m^2 and one suspected hazardous area (SHA) of nearly 0.25km^2 (see Table 1).[1] This is a 56% decrease compared to 2023 when Serbia had a total of just over 0.61km^2 of contaminated area – the result of clearance in 2024.[2] SMAC does not, however, hold data on contamination in any areas under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), including former military sites bombed in 1999.[3]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by municipality (at end 2024)[4]

Municipality	Village	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)
Bujanovac	Borovac	1	25,570	0	0
Užice	Bioska	0	0	1	248,767
Totals		**1**	**25,570**	**1**	**248,767**

CMR resulted from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes in 1999. According to Serbia, cluster munitions struck 16 municipalities: Brus, Bujanovac, Čačak, Gadžin Han, Knić, Kraljevo, Kuršumlija, Niš City-municipality of Crveni Krst, Niš City-municipality of Medijana, Preševo, Raška, Sjenica, Sopot, Stara Pazova, Tutin, and Vladimirci.[5] Only two municipalities are considered still to contain contamination.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Serbia is also contaminated by other explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded aircraft bombs, both on land and in its internal waterways, as well as by anti-personnel (AP) mines[6] (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Serbia for further information on the mine threat).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

According to a Government Decree on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency Management, under the Ministry of Interior, acts as the national mine action authority (NMAA).[7] The NMAA is responsible for developing standard operating procedures (SOPs), accrediting demining operators, and supervising the work of SMAC.[8]

SMAC was established on 7 March 2002, with a 2004 law making it responsible for coordinating survey and clearance; collecting and managing mine action information (including casualty data); and surveying SHAs. It also has a mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control (QC) and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, and conduct risk education.[9] Since 1 January 2014, in accordance with the Government Decree on Protection against Unexploded Ordnance, the Sector for Emergency Management has been responsible for accrediting demining operators. Previously, SMAC was responsible for doing so.[10]

1 Email from Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 4 April 2025.
2 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
3 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
4 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
5 SMAC, "Mine Situation", accessed 21 April 2023, at: http://bit.ly/1Nom1V7.
6 Ibid.
7 Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 70/13.
8 Emails from Darvin Lisica, Regional Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 6 May and 12 June 2016.
9 Law of Alterations and Supplementations of the Law of Ministries, Official Gazette, 84/04, August 2004; interview with Petar Mihajlović and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, Belgrade, 26 April 2010; and 2022 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.
10 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

The current director of SMAC was appointed by the Serbian government in July 2019.[11] As at April 2025, 17 people were employed at SMAC: the director, two assistant directors, and 14 other employees.[12]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is supporting SMAC to set up the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)—IMSMA Core—as well as with quality management.[13]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

SMAC is fully funded by Serbia, including salaries and running costs, as well as for survey, development of project tasks for the demining of contaminated areas, follow-up on implementation of project tasks, and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining. In 2024, Serbia reported that around €590,000 was allocated from the national State budget for SMAC, an increase on the €450,000 provided in 2023.[14] The UXO disposal work of the Sector for Emergency Situations of the Ministry of Interior is also State-funded.[15]

National funding for survey and clearance operations remained at €260,000 in 2024,[16] a level that was expected to be maintained in 2025. Support was matched with donor funds from the United States and the Republic of Korea through ITF Enhancing Human Security.[17] In 2024, funding was split between one AP mined area, which was a technical survey (TS) task, and two CMR clearance tasks. Serbia expected these donors to continue funding Serbia in 2025.[18]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

SMAC does not have a gender policy in place and does not disaggregate relevant mine action data by sex and age. However, it does ensure women and children are consulted during survey and community liaison. SMAC also reports ensuring that ethnic or minority groups are consulted.[19] Serbia claims that qualified women have equal access to survey and clearance positions.[20]

At SMAC, nine of the 17 employees (53%) are women, who hold two of the three managerial/supervisory level positions (67%) and one of the nine operations positions (11%). SMAC hired two new female staff in 2024.[21]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

SMAC is committed to taking environmental aspects into account in its work and to minimising environmental harm from demining. For each survey or clearance task, the contractor (i.e. the demining operator) is required to include in its execution plan an environmental protection and a fire protection plan, together with a plan for health and safety at work. Illustrative examples on environmental protection during CMR clearance include the clearance in Kopaonik National Park, which demanded a special regime to protect certain trees and plants.[22] SMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that it was planning to develop a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, a process that was not complete at the time of writing.[23]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

SMAC had its own information management system until it decided to solicit GICHD support to implement IMSMA Core.[24] In February 2024, the GICHD and SMAC began working on a first version of the new database.[25] The GICHD and SMAC collaborated on building and testing the system, focusing on data migration, data cleaning, and new data entry forms.[26]

11 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020.
12 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
13 Ibid.; SMAC, "GICHD Workshop on IMSMA Core for Mine Action Actors in the Republic of Serbia", 27 March 2023, at: https://bit.ly/42PgTC7; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
14 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025 and 7 May 2024.
15 SMAC, "Mine situation", 21 April 2023.
16 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
17 Statement of Serbia on Clearance, APMBC Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties (virtual meeting), 15–19 November 2021; 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 34; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
18 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
19 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020, 26 March 2021, and 11 April 2023.
20 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 23 April 2020 and 11 April 2023.
21 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
22 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
23 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
24 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 April 2023; and GICHD, 26 May 2023.
25 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
26 Emails from Kinda Samra, GICHD, 27 June 2024; and Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

The Government of Serbia adopts SMAC's annual work plans.[27] SMAC had annual work plans in place for 2024 and 2025.[28]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

According to SMAC, and despite problems with land release methodology, survey and clearance are conducted in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[29] SMAC, in cooperation with a consultant from NPA, developed three new NMAS in 2023 on the glossary of terms, land release, and quality management. SMAC reported to Mine Action Review in 2024 that subject to funding, further NMAS would be developed, starting with a national standard on information management, which was ongoing at the time of writing.[30]

Serbia has plans to issue a new decree on protection against ERW. The draft decree, which is being developed by SMAC and the Ministry of Interior, will include a definition of land release (not defined in the former decree), and supports the development of NMAS. As at April 2025, the decree was in the final stages of review by the government.[31]

Under new directorship in late 2015, SMAC reassessed its land release methodology in order to prioritise full clearance over TS of hazardous areas.[32] This does not correspond to international best practice and is an inefficient use of scarce clearance assets. In February 2016, SMAC reported to Mine Action Review that while SMAC supports the use of high-quality non-technical survey (NTS) to identify areas suspected of containing CMR, it will fully clear these areas rather than using technical survey (TS) to identify the boundaries of contamination more accurately.[33] While SMAC's position on land release remains the same, there is still said to be a willingness to conduct TS in a form "adjusted to the context of Serbia", in response to the stated preference of international donors for TS over clearance as and where appropriate.[34]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SMAC does not itself conduct clearance or employ clearance personnel but does survey areas suspected to contain mines, CMR, or other ERW, and performs QA and QC on clearance tasks. Clearance is conducted by commercial companies and NGOs, which are selected through public tender procedures executed by ITF and supported by international funding.[35]

The Ministry of Interior accredits mine action operators for one year at a time. In 2024, 11 companies/organisations were accredited for demining but only two were operational (see Table 2).[36]

Table 2 represents an increase in capacity from 2023 when a total of 12 TS personnel were deployed.[37] In 2025, SMAC expected survey and clearance capacity to increase as more projects were being implemented.[38] An explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) department within the Sector for Emergency Management responds to call-outs for individual items of ERW. It is also responsible for demolition of items found by SMAC survey teams and by contractors/operators during clearance.[39]

Table 2: Operational Clearance capacities deployed in 2024[40]

Operator	Clearance teams	Clearance personnel
Stop Mines	1	12
IN Demining	1	12
Totals	**2**	**24**

27 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 18 and 21.
28 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
29 SMAC, "Mine Situation", 21 April 2023; and APMBC Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Section 4.
30 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
31 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
32 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.
33 Ibid.
34 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 30; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
35 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 18; and email from Kinda Samra, GICHD, 27 June 2024.
36 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
37 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
38 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
39 Interview with Jovica Simonović, SMAC, Belgrade, 16 May 2017; APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request (2018), p. 18; and email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 3 June 2022.
40 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2024[41]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m²)
Clearance	335,800
Technical Survey	0
Non-Technical Survey	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	11

SURVEY IN 2024

No CMR-contaminated area was released through survey in 2024.[42] In 2023, no area was cancelled through NTS but a total of 131,900m^2 was reduced through TS with 16 submunitions destroyed.[43]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of 0.34km^2 was cleared across two areas with 11 submunitions destroyed.[44] This increase from 2023, when no clearance was conducted, is due to a shift in donor preferences, with more funding allocated to CMR clearance.[45]

All 11 submunitions found in 2024 were in one clearance task, with 0.18km^2 of clearance taking place in the second task with no CMR found.[46]

Table 4: Clearance in 2024[47]

Municipality	Village	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed
Užice	Bioska	Stop Mines	1	152,600	11
Užice	Bioska	IN Demining	1	183,200	0
Totals			**2**	**335,800**	**11**

SMAC did not have available data on the number or type of submunitions destroyed by the EOD Department during spot tasks in 2024.[48] SMAC also does not possess data on explosive ordnance contamination of military areas in Serbia.[49]

In addition, 57,733m^2 of clearance of other ERW was conducted, supporting infrastructure projects as well as the safe removal of a sunken German World War Two fleet of warships from the River Danube.[50]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

A total of 1.8km^2 has been cleared in the last five years (see Table 4).

In its 2022 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request Serbia included a work plan for completion of all ERW clearance by 2025, at a predicted total cost of €20 million. CMR were not disaggregated from other ERW.[51] Serbia had planned to complete clearance of all known cluster munition-contaminated areas under civilian control (i.e. excluding military areas) in 2023, and then again in 2024.[52]

SMAC's 2024 work plan included four CMR clearance tasks in Užice, totalling 0.58km^2, and one clearance task totalling 0.03km^2 in Bujanovac. However, Serbia was only able to complete clearance of two tasks, with the remaining 0.27km^2

41 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
42 Ibid.
43 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
44 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
45 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.
46 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
51 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 37–38.
52 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 11 April 2023 and 7 May 2024.

of cluster munition-contaminated area planned to be cleared in 2025.[53] Serbia should easily be able to meet this target and has secured sufficient funding and capacity to be able to do so, however, this could be done more efficiently and effectively if Serbia released land through survey rather than conducting full clearance on land that does not contain CMR.

In addition, SMAC has received a request from the MoD to clear former military compounds bombed during the NATO strikes, that are intended for civilian use, and which are not currently in SMAC's database.[54] A number of these compounds may contain CMR, which may delay Serbia's completion of CMR clearance.[55]

In its 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request Serbia stated that: "In the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, there are mined areas, as well as areas contaminated with cluster bombs remaining after the armed conflicts. Pursuant to Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council (Annex II, item 6), it is envisaged that after the withdrawal, an agreed number of the Republic of Serbia personnel will be allowed to return to perform certain functions, including marking and clearing minefields. As this provision of Annex II has not been implemented, this issue is still within the competence of UNMIK in accordance with Resolution 1244."[56]

Table 4: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	0.34
2023	0
2022	0.28
2021	0.88
2020	*0.30
Total	**1.80**

* Previously reported as 0.28km^2, but subsequently revised upwards, as the earlier figure excluded a 12,805m^2 clearance task that had been completed, but not reported.

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

SMAC expects to need both national and international capacity to deal with any residual contamination that may be discovered following completion of planned CMR clearance.[57]

53 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 4 April 2025.
54 Emails from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 25 March 2022 and 11 April 2023.
55 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024 and 4 April 2025.
56 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (2022), p. 9.
57 Email from Slađana Košutić, SMAC, 7 May 2024.

SUDAN

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION: 33,196M^2

Light
(partial estimate; national authority data)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	0	0
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	0	0

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- JASMAR Human Security Organisation (JASMAR)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of explosive weapons has been reported since the outbreak of the ongoing armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, adding new unexploded ordnance (UXO) to existing contamination. As at May 2025, there were no indications that the conflict had included new use of cluster munitions. Survey and clearance restarted in 2024 having been halted for a year by the hostilities, with the focus on clearing UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). No cluster munition remnants (CMR) have been reported as being identified or destroyed during this clearance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Sudan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Sudan should submit an annual voluntary Article 7 report to the CCM disaggregating submunitions from other UXO and reporting according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land release terminology.**
- **Sudan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **Sudan should reassess its timeline for addressing CMR and other UXO as soon as reasonably possible, and should develop a work plan on how this will be achieved.**

- **Sudan should develop a resource mobilisation strategy increasing its international advocacy to attract new and former donors as soon as reasonably possible.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
- Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- JASMAR for Human Security (JASMAR)
- National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, the Sudan National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) reported a total of 33,196m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in three states across four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and three suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).[1] All but two square metres of the total cluster munition-contaminated area is located in Blue Nile state. In that state, CMR are in three CHAs covering 27,580m^2 and one SHA of 5,614m^2. Only minimal contamination (spot tasks) is recorded in South Kordofan and West Kordofan (see Table 1 for details).

This is the first time that NMAC has been able to provide CMR contamination data since the end of 2021. Access to data in the mine action database was lost when its offices were ransacked early in the conflict that erupted in April 2023.[2] Cluster munition-contaminated area reported at the end of 2024 is a significant reduction on the 142,400m^2 reported at the end of 2021.[3] No cluster munition-contaminated area has been registered or cleared since 2022, but NMAC plans to undertake more survey after the conflict ends and expects to discover further contamination.[4]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area by state (at end 2024)[5]

State	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total SHAs/CHAs	Total area (m^2)
Blue Nile	3	27,580	1	5,614	4	33,194
South Kordofan	1	0	1	1	2	1
West Kordofan	0	0	1	1	1	1
Totals	**4**	**27,580**	**3**	**5,616**	**7**	**33,196**

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions in its armed conflict with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state.[6] In April 2017, the African Union-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) reported finding two submunitions in North Darfur (at Al Mengara village in Al Liet locality). Villagers stated that the bombs were dropped in 2008, had been identified by UNAMID at that time, and that the military had promised to dispose of the items.[7] SAF Engineers destroyed the items in February 2018 and no further CMR were reported or identified.[8]

There have been no new reports or allegations of cluster munition use in Sudan since 2015. There is no evidence that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions, although it has imported them and is believed to still possess stocks.[9]

1 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, 24 June 2025.
2 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024; and email from Robert Thompson, Head of Project Unit/Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.
3 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 23 June 2022.
4 Ibid.
5 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
6 See Cluster Munition Monitor, "Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy", updated 23 August 2014.
7 Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.
8 Email from Colin Williams, Deputy Programme Manager, Ordnance Disposal Office, UNAMID, 1 June 2018.
9 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Sudan", accessed 29 May 2024 at: https://bit.ly/4bDHWo2.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Sudan also has a significant problem with anti-personnel (AP) and anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and UXO, primarily as a result of the more than 20 years of civil war that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and South Sudan's independence in July 2011 (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Sudan for further information). Since 2011, new conflicts in the disputed area of Abyei, which straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan, and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.[10]

The widespread use of munitions in the conflict since 2023 has added considerably to the estimated 34km^2 of legacy contamination from previous conflicts.[11] Most conflict-affected areas are now heavily contaminated by explosive ordnance; as at January 2025, the greatest contamination was in the capital Khartoum and Al Jazirah, Darfur, North Kordofan, and Sennar states.[12]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

NMAC is the governmental body that has managed Sudan's mine action programme since 2005, and has functioned as the executive mechanism for the national mine action authority (NMAA) since 2011. Its key responsibilities are overseeing planning, supervision, licensing, and monitoring of all mine action responsibilities.[13] Sudan has national mine action legislation – the 2010 Mine Action Act.[14]

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was first established in Sudan in 2002, and has since had a key advisory role in building Sudan's humanitarian demining infrastructure. Working with NMAC, UNMAS mobilises funds for the programme and supports land release, risk education, victim assistance, and information management.[15]

The April 2023 conflict scattered NMAC staff around the country, and its Khartoum offices were looted. UNMAS, which had been based in the same building as NMAC in Khartoum, withdrew its international staff from Sudan in April 2023, and set up an office in Port Sudan in July.[16] All operations were suspended, though UNMAS sub-offices in Damazin in Blue Nile state and in Kadugli in South Kordofan state remained open.[17] By April 2024, NMAC, with the support of UNMAS, had re-established its head office in Port Sudan.[18] UNMAS also supported NMAC to resume its core functions, including conducting accreditation and quality assurance monitoring of mine action operators.[19] By the end of April 2025, NMAC had another six operational sub-offices – in Kassala, Madani, Khartoum, Damazine, Kadugli and El-Fasher.[20]

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database for a year, until April 2024, when access was restored (albeit with the possibility that some data had been lost – for details see the section below, "Information Management and Reporting").[21] Survey and clearance all but ceased in April 2023, except for the limited non-technical survey (NTS) conducted by Danish Refugee Council (DRC).[22] When small-scale clearance resumed in April 2024 (in the Omdurman area of Khartoum state), the focus was on clearing explosive remnants of war (ERW), but without specific survey or clearance of CMR.[23]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided capacity building support to the NMAC in the past, including training, and provided remote support with the implementation of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core in 2021.[24] IMSMA Core implementation has been on hold since then, but will resume when all the data have been retrieved.[25]

The last annual meeting of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) was held in March 2023 in Khartoum, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS); the Ambassador of Italy (the Global MASG Chair for 2023); and the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Ministry of Defence. Key stakeholders, including donors, discussed the status, risks, challenges, and opportunities of Sudan's mine action efforts,[26] but the events of 15 April 2023 overtook any potential progress made.

10 Human Rights Watch, "Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan's Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States", 6 December 2012; "Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan", *All Africa*, 10 August 2013; and UN, "UNMAS Annual Report 2012", New York, August 2013, p. 10.

11 OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, Mine Action Area of Responsibility, 31 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4deaR3M, p. 1; OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025, Executive Summary, 31 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3RWuYtk, p. 8; and email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, Chief of Mine Action, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

12 OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Update January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/42Pc0v1, p. 3.

13 Presentation by Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, "Mine Action in Sudan: Challenges and Commitments", at the UN National Directors Meeting & UN Advisers (NDM28), Geneva, 10 April 2025.

14 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), "Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Sudan", March 2012; and Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 7 Report (covering 2019), Form A.

15 UNMAS webpage on Sudan, accessed 8 May 2025, at https://bit.ly/43ShIdk.

16 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024; and Matt Williams, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

17 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

18 Interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, Director General, NMAC, in Geneva, 30 April 2024.

19 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

20 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

21 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission (UNITAMS), 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview (as UNMAS Sudan), in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024.

22 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

23 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

24 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, Country Focal Point, GICHD, 13 April, 3 June, and 10 August 2022.

25 Emails from Henrik Rydberg, GICHD, 8 August 2023; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

26 Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2024.

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, the government contributed US$1,425,000 to the national mine action programme through NMAC,[27] an increase on the $500,000 provided in 2021 and 2022 (when the value of Sudan's allocation had fallen from $2million in 2019 and 2020 with the devaluation of the local currency).[28] However, the budget remains small given the level of need, with the Sudanese government facing a failing economy and competing urgent humanitarian needs.[29]

The Sudan Humanitarian Fund (SHF), which is administered by Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), funded survey and clearance in Khartoum state in 2024, and the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) funded a risk education project. In 2024, UNMAS's operations were funded by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), the Government of Japan, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), the FCDO, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), and, as in-kind support, by the Government of Switzerland. The MPTF and the CERF were new donors for UNMAS, while funding from AICS and USAID ended on 31 December 2024.[30] Funding from Japan also came to an end on 31 March 2025.[31]

At DRC, NTS and risk education were funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs;[32] and its UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) risk education project was funded by the UN MPTF, the FCDO, AICS, the Government of Japan, and USAID. UNOPS also funded an NTS land release project while the SHF funded a battle area clearance (BAC) project, and the US Department of State's Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs funded risk education as part of a larger multi-sector humanitarian response project.[33]

The US foreign aid cuts at the beginning of 2025 left the UNMAS programme facing a fiscal cliff edge on 31 March 2025. However, the Government of Canada, FCDO, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), and CERF have since confirmed allocations for 2025, which will even allow UNMAS to expand its programme, including for survey and clearance.[34]

While Sudan does not currently have a resource mobilisation strategy, NMAC has organised side-events during meetings and conferences to attract donors, though many are reluctant to provide support to the NMAA due to its status as a government entity, and some funders ceased to fund mine action following the outbreak of conflict.[35] Sudan had calculated it required $32.6 million for all land release (not just for CMR) in 2022–27[36] but all plans and costings will have to be revisited as a result of the conflict.

NMAC is developing plans to diversify its funding sources as part of its strategic framework, which was expected to be finalised by the end of 2025, and has considered the possibility of seeking funding from private donors.[37] UNMAS Sudan continues to mobilise resources, with a key focus on donor diversification.[38]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

A new gender and diversity policy was developed and endorsed in 2021, and gender was mainstreamed in the national mine action strategic plan for 2019–23. The policy is said to be in the course of being implemented.[39] Gender and diversity considerations are also incorporated in the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) for survey, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[40] All survey and community liaison teams are supposed to be gender balanced and women and children were consulted systematically during survey and community liaison activities. Gender was also to be considered in prioritising, planning, and tasking of survey and clearance, in line with the NMAS and new standardised IMSMA forms.[41]

27 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
28 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 4.
29 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
30 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
31 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
32 Email from Katherine Santi Nelson, Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding Manager, DRC, 9 July 2025.
33 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, Operations Manager, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.
34 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
35 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
36 APMBC 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 8 and 30.
37 Online interview with Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 12 March 2025; and email, 30 April 2025.
38 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
39 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
40 Email from Aimal Safi, Senior Operations and QM Advisor, UNMAS, 27 March 2022.
41 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

NMAC has previously reported that mine action data are disaggregated by sex and age,[42] and that it had created a dedicated Gender Focal Point (GFP),[43] though as at July 2025 it was not known whether anyone was in post. NMAC says it always encourages women to apply for employment in the national programme, whether at the office level or in the field. A group of 28 women from different states and ethnic groups completed basic demining training in 2021 and have since been integrated into various teams in their localities, many of them in mine action activities.[44]

In response to the 2023 conflict, UNMAS launched a gender-responsive emergency risk education initiative in 2024, using gender- and age-sensitive materials that target risky behaviours. UNMAS is also planning a training workshop on the gender guidelines for mine action programmes in collaboration with the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) co-coordinator, and a female-headed national NGO.[45]

Table 2: Gender composition of the NMAC and operators (at end 2024)[46]

NMAC/ Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial and supervisory staff	Total women managerial and supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
NMAC	54	17 (31%)	20	5 (25%)	12	4 (33%)
UNMAS	14	5 (36%)	4	0 (0%)	8	2 (25%)
DRC	18	6 (33%)	6	3 (50%)	14	3 (21%)
JASMAR	87	19 (22%)	8	2 (25%)	79	14(18%)
NUMAD	120	23 (19%)	10	3 (30%)	86	19 (22%)
Totals	**293**	**70 (24%)**	**48**	**13 (27%)**	**199**	**42 (21%)**

Before the 2023 conflict, NMAC reported that ethnic minority groups in affected communities were consulted during survey and considered during the planning of mine action activities. Survey teams were structured to address all affected groups within a community, including ethnic minorities.[47] In 2021, 21 former fighters from a Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction completed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 1 training, and were integrated into mine action operations in their home areas of Bau/Ulu and the Ingasana mountains.[48]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

In 2022, Sudan reported having a policy on environmental management, which included information on how mine action operators should minimise potential harm from demining.[49] There is a dedicated NMAS on environmental management, and environmental impact assessments are integral to Sudan's NMAS, but in practice the assessments may not always have been conducted to support the planning and conduct of survey and clearance.[50] However, NMAC plans to reactivate the environmental policy, which will be reviewed at least annually.[51] It has indicated that it already takes account of the environment and climate-related risks when setting priorities and determining the timing of operations.[52]

UNMAS is working with NMAC to introduce enhanced environmental protocols as projects move to more field-related activity for land release. There is a focus on minimising the impact of demolitions on the environment; clearance of waste at sites; and measures to mitigate contamination from spills and any waste. UNMAS, with UNOPS management support, encourages implementing partners to adopt environmentally responsible practices and includes environmental requirements in its requests for proposals.[53] UNMAS does not have a dedicated environmental focal point, but key UNOPS operational and support management personnel act as organisational focal points, ensuring the appropriate application and monitoring

42 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.
43 Email from the GICHD, 29 June 2021.
44 Emails from Aimal Safi, UNMAS, 27 March 2022; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
45 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.
46 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.
47 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.
48 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 22.
49 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.
50 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.
51 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.
52 Ibid.
53 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Abigail Stevens, Associate Programme Officer, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.

of environmental standards by UNMAS and contracted organisations.[54] UNOPS support personnel are designated as formal focal points for the Environmental Inventory, for collecting and reporting relevant non-operational environmental data from the office, in line with organisational policies to achieve climate-related goals.[55]

UNMAS says that, in the future, environmental assessments relating to survey and clearance will be incorporated into external QA and health and safety, social and environment reporting. Certain operational management and support personnel within UNMAS act as organisational focal points.

Table 3: Environmental policies and action[56]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
DRC	No*	No	No
NMAC	Yes	No	No
UNMAS	Yes	No	Yes

* DRC has a global SOP on environmental management but not one specific to Sudan.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Neither NMAC nor UNMAS had access to the mine action database following the ransacking of their offices (co-located in Khartoum) between April 2023 and April 2024. NMAC, the GICHD (which hosts NMAC's data), and UNMAS have worked together to retrieve the data,[57] and NMAC has confirmed that its IMSMA department has recovered all data except for 2023, and that efforts continue to retrieve these missing data.[58] A specific plan was set to be agreed for the rebuilding and upgrading of IMSMA, with implementation due to start in 2025.[59] Moreover, migration of data to IMSMA Core, which was ongoing before the outbreak of the conflict, will resume when the missing data are recovered, but staff training on IMSMA Core has already started. NMAC has held training workshops for field partners, focusing on report quality.[60]

Upon re-activating the MA AoR and its coordination platform, UNMAS resumed requesting streamlined reporting of activities and outputs using the format provided by OCHA. UNMAS also drafted new reporting templates for land release operations and data workflows to improve data validation. When implemented, these processes will strengthen data flow and enhance quality.[61]

PLANNING AND TASKING

A new mine action strategy was under development in 2025 with support from the GICHD, taking into account the impact of the conflict, and NMAC expected to finalise it before the year's end.[62] The previous national mine action strategic plan, for 2019–23, had been awaiting approval since March 2022,[63] and was to be issued in February 2023.[64] This was never formally approved as a result of conflict,[65] although a final version of the strategy was shared with stakeholders.[66]

Sudan had been working towards a two-phase work plan prior to the conflict, providing annual land release targets for all explosive ordnance to 2027,[67] but this was blown off course by the 2023 conflict. As at April 2025, NMAC and its partners were working on an emergency work plan that prioritises clearing institutions and service facilities in war-affected areas, particularly those with a high rate of voluntary return.[68] Frequent shelling, however, is a significant challenge to the planning and execution of clearance in conflict hot spots, along with administrative barriers to access, including delayed visa issuance for international staff and authorisation to travel to conflict-affected areas.[69]

54 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

55 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

56 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

57 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 5 and 18 May 2023; and interview in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 14 May 2024; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

58 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

59 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

60 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

61 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

62 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

63 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

64 2022 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 19.

65 Email from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024.

66 Email from UNMAS Headquarters, 24 July 2023.

67 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 48–58.

68 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

69 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025; and Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 August 2025.

In 2021, a systematic prioritisation system was introduced as part of the new NMAS, linked with IMSMA, with each SHA and CHA classified as high, medium, or low impact and prioritised accordingly.[70] All previously identified hazardous areas were to be resurveyed through NTS, then released through TS and clearance as required.[71] The prioritisation methodology is to be reviewed to ensure that it aligns with evolving threats and challenges.[72]

In the meantime, NMAC resumed clearance of ERW in April 2024, using government-funded NUMAD rapid-response teams in Omdurman.[73] In addition, NMAC, supported by UNMAS, set up a hotline in order to offer a response to reports of UXO.[74] In late 2024, UNMAS also supported resumption of survey and clearance of ERW by DRC and JASMAR in accessible areas of Khartoum state, with plans to scale up in 2025.[75] UNMAS deployed a Mine Action Advisory Team (MAAT) to provide technical advice on explosive hazards to the humanitarian community; reactivated the Mine Action AoR coordination forum; and distributed EO contamination maps and monthly analyses to support the wider humanitarian response.[76]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, an amendment was made to the NMAS section on team composition to introduce "risk education+" and "NTS+" teams. The aim is to enhance operational flexibility by allowing teams to perform dual functions (risk education and NTS or NTS and EOD, respectively) based on the operational context and nature of contamination.[77] A comprehensive programme-level review of national standards has been discussed by NMAC and UNMAS, with provisional plans to implement this in 2025. The review will focus on aligning standards with the evolving operational context and ensuring compliance with IMAS.[78] In May 2025, Chapter 05.05 on Building Clearance was added to the NMAS as a response to the urban nature of recent EO contamination.[79]

NMAC made two changes to their standard operating procedures (SOPs) in 2024 and early 2025, incorporating medical support into each chapter of the mine action standards to ensure these are not missed when chapters are consulted independently, and adjusting team composition due to a lack of EOD Level 3 qualified personnel. The latter involved merging two multi-task teams each with an EOD Level 2 team leader under the supervision of a single EOD Level 3 team supervisor. This will increase the number of deminers on the ground, but will also reduce operational flexibility by allocating a large number of deminers in one area, thereby weakening the ability to react quickly to priority tasks.[80]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, there was an increase in NMAC's survey staff, with trained personnel from different organisations displaced by the conflict able to return to work.[81] NMAC expected to further increase its staff in 2025 as more personnel returned to work, and is training 23 young men and women to conduct risk education and survey.[82] UNMAS also expects a steady increase in personnel.[83] DRC had anticipated that a budget freeze and termination of US government funding and the shrinking of donor overseas aid budgets could lead to a reduction in survey and clearance personnel in 2025,[84] although by April 2025, the Sudan mine action programme had attracted further funding, as outlined above.[85] DRC was considering whether to initiate CMR and AP mine clearance operations, based on Sudan's humanitarian priorities, "in the near future".[86]

70 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

71 Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, August 2022, pp. 34 and 36; and draft APMBC Article 7 report (covering 2022), Form F, pp. 16–17, received by email from Badreldin Elguaifri, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

72 Presentation by Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, "Mine Action in Emergency Humanitarian Relief, Peacebuilding and Recovery efforts: Global Lessons from Sudan and Other Emergency Contexts", APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25 November 2024.

73 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

74 Emails from Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 10 June 2024; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

75 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, 30 May 2025.

76 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

77 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Matt Williams, UNMAS Sudan, 28 May 2025.

78 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

79 Email from Abigail Stevens, UNMAS Sudan, 14 July 2025.

80 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

81 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023 and 30 April 2025.

82 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

83 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

84 Email from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

85 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

86 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 9 July 2025.

Table 4: NTS survey capacities deployed in 2024[87]

Operator	State	NTS teams	NTS personnel	Comments
DRC	South Kordofan	1	3	January–July and August–October 2024.
JASMAR	Khartoum (Karari)	4	12	1 December 2024–6 February 2025, working with DRC.
Totals		**5**	**15**	

Table 5: Operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024[88]

Operator	State	Manual teams	Total deminers	Dogs and dog handlers	Mechanical assets	Comments
NUMAD	Khartoum (Omdurman)	1	*16/12	*0/5	3	Deminers also conducted survey.
JASMAR	Khartoum (Omdurman)	4	16	0	0	1 December 2024–6 February 2025.
Totals		**5**	**32**	**0/5**	**3**	

* NUMAD had 12 deminers, which increased to 16 in April 2024 when it began BAC in Omdurman; five dog handlers but no dogs; and three mechanical assets which were not deployed in 2024.[89] NUMAD deployed five rapid-response teams for BAC in Omdurman, but they operated as one team working on one task.[90]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

In 2024, no CMR survey or clearance took place, as was similarly the case in 2023.[91]

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, as in 2023, no hazardous area was reported as released through NTS or TS.[92]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

No clearance of CMR was reported for 2024 or 2023,[93] although some BAC was conducted.[94]

DEMINER SAFETY

No demining staff were killed or injured in demining operations in 2024, and there were no attacks on UNMAS personnel resulting in casualties, abductions, or loss of equipment.[95]

87 Emails from Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

88 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025; and Katherine Santi Nelson, DRC, 29 May 2025.

89 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 13 June 2023.

90 Email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 24 June 2025.

91 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025; and Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

92 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024; and email from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April 2025.

93 Interviews with Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, in Geneva, 29 April 2024; and Robert Thompson, UNMAS, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

94 Emails from Khalid Hamdan Adam, NMAC, 30 April and 24 June 2025.

95 Emails from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025; and Ra'ed Salameh, DRC, 27 March 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Sudan is not a State Party to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. In March 2022, the NMAC stated that there had been no developments with regard to Sudan's accession to the CCM,[96] and the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 will likely have delayed progress towards becoming a State Party.

The conflict has also delayed completion of CMR clearance as it has resulted in a change in the focus of humanitarian demining activities. UXO and AXO now pose the greatest explosive hazard in highly populated areas, and risk education and ERW clearance have been prioritised accordingly. In addition, practical and technical limitations continue to obstruct survey and clearance of legacy hazards, including restricted access, challenges to obtaining serviceable explosives, and a lack of resources. UNMAS, for example, has only had limited access outside Port Sudan since November 2024,[97] and recent attacks on Port Sudan and any escalation in fighting could further restrict access for operators.[98]

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Sudan has previously had a plan in place to deal with residual risk and liability post-completion.[99] It was planned that ultimately Sudan would establish a national capacity within the military or police.[100]

96 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 31 March 2022.

97 Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS Sudan Programme, 17 April 2025.

98 "Sudan paramilitary attacks leave key city without power", BBC News, 6 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4kae9qK.

99 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 9 April 2020.

100 Email from Hatim Khamis Rahama, NMAC, 19 May 2021.

SYRIA

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but extensive

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Release in 2023 (km²)
Clearance	2.12	1.96
Technical Survey	0	0.10
Non-Technical Survey	0	0.25

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	1,103 (including 522 in spot tasks)	705 (including 483 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

Conducting survey and clearance in areas then controlled by the Assad regime:

- Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service's (UNMAS) implementing partner Safety Solutions

Operating in the north-west:

- Syria Civil Defence (SCD) (also called the White Helmets)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)

Operating in the north-east:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has enabled a shift to a country-wide approach to mine action coordination, with operators reporting improved access and cooperation. Clearance output increased in 2024, and operators have been expanding survey and clearance capacity in 2025 to reach new areas, but major challenges remain, including a surge in casualties, persistent funding shortfalls, the absence of a national contamination baseline, only nascent managerial capacity in the transitional government, and ongoing security risks.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Syria should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Syria should urgently establish a baseline of cluster munition-contaminated area to enable effective prioritisation and planning, with particular focus on agricultural land due to its importance for food security and economic recovery, and the high number of victims.**

- **Syria should continue to strengthen coordination mechanisms and information management by promoting consistent, timely data sharing among all mine action operators and integrating the Northeast Syria Mine Action Centre (NESMAC) into a unified national system.**
- **Syria should develop national mine action standards (NMAS) in consultation with operators and ensure their application across all survey and clearance activities.**
- **Syria should systematically assess and address informal clearance practices by untrained civilians, which pose severe risks to life.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC)
- Syria Civil Defence (SCD) (also called the White Helmets)
- Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The precise extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants (CMR) in Syria is unknown but it is certainly widespread due to the repeated use of cluster munitions during 14 years of conflict. No comprehensive countrywide survey of contamination has been conducted. Prior to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, such a survey was not feasible. UNMAS is now leading efforts to coordinate with all mine action implementing partners to prioritise a baseline non-technical survey (NTS) across accessible areas in north-west and central Syria to understand the scope and extent of weapon contamination more fully.[1]

Estimates indicate that more than 65% of all Syrians—15.4 million of the 23.6 million population—are at risk from explosive ordnance, with extensive impact on communities, farmland, and infrastructure.[2] Contamination is particularly high in Deir ez-Zor in the north east where roughly a quarter of all accidents since December have taken place. Contributing factors include former frontlines being dismantled and redistributed as arable land, restricted humanitarian access on both sides of the Euphrates river, and limited access to essential services, forcing people to travel long distances.[3] The 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview estimated that the highest percentages of explosive contamination were in Quneitra, As-Sweida, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Idleb, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, and Dar'a governorates and Damascus governorate neighbourhoods.[4] The Syria Civil Defence (SCD), also known as the White Helmets, published a map of hazardous areas of northern Syria, showing the highest intensity of explosive ordnance contamination in the sub-districts of Saraqeb (Idlib governorate) and Al-Atareb (Aleppo governorate), followed by Jisr Al-shighur, Nabul (Idlib), Al-Bab, and Tadaf (Aleppo).[5]

1 Emails from Adesh Singh, Technical Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 6 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
2 UNMAS, Syria, data as of June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lFMXkn.
3 Mine Action AoR Syria, Situation Update No.3, covering the period 1-30 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4eBpEWT.
4 Syria 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview, February 2024, OCHA, at: https://bit.ly/4erk3St.
5 The White Helmets website, (Arabic), accessed on 4 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fks3Wl.

Since December 2024, Syria has witnessed a surge in casualties from explosive ordnance. More than 1,000 victims, one third of whom are children, were reported in December 2024 to May 2025. The 414 people killed and 592 injured compares to the 912 casualties reported for the whole of 2024.[6] In June 2025, the Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management stated that the Ministry records victims of mines and explosive ordnance on daily basis.[7] The recent rise in casualties in Syria is linked to multiple factors. Abandoned military vehicles and weapons stockpiles have increased civilian exposure, while military strikes on ammunition depots have scattered explosive ordnance more widely. Since December, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to areas with contamination, often unaware of the risks. Economic hardship has also pushed people to collect scrap metal, which includes explosive ordnance. Without a comprehensive mine action programme, civilians are increasingly attempting to clear or dismantle explosives themselves, often at great personal risk.[8]

Thirteen of Syria's fourteen governorates (all except Tartus) have experienced cluster munition use since 2012.[9] The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) recorded at least 496 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and January 2023 attributing them to Syrian government forces or Russian forces (or the alliance of the two).[10] Cluster munition attacks are said to have resulted in the deaths of 1,053 civilians, including 394 children and 219 women. In addition, at least 382 civilians, including 124 children and 31 women, were killed due to the detonation of submunitions left after earlier attacks.[11] A range of Russian-made cluster munitions were used in the conflict.[12]

Sub-regional surveys and impact assessments have confirmed that CMR contamination in Syria is widespread and persistent. HALO's 2018–20 community impact assessment in Aleppo and Idlib governates found contamination in more than 400 communities, with unexploded submunitions the most frequent ordnance type and which were responsible for 36% of recorded contamination and 42% of casualties.[13] The SCD conducted NTS in Aleppo, Hama, and Idlib and recorded explosive contamination in between 22% and 38% of communities surveyed between 2021 and 2022, with submunitions comprising more than 40% of identified items. These were predominantly Russian-made with cluster munitions including SHOAB-0.5, AO-2.5RT, 9N235, AO1-SCH, M77-HEAT, SPBE-HEAT, and PTAB-1M and 2.5M types.[14] A joint Syrian Arab Red Crescent Society (SARC) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) assessment across nine governorates (Al-Hassakeh, Aleppo, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, and Sweida) reported explosive ordnance in 92% of surveyed communities, of which 46% reported the presence of CMR.[15]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

The continued use of cluster munitions adds to the existing CMR problem in addition to dense contamination from other explosive ordnance, in particular landmines, including those of an improvised nature (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Syria for further information).

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

There is no functioning national mine action authority or national mine action centre in Syria. In March 2025, the Syrian transitional government appointed Raed al-Saleh, former head of the White Helmets, as Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country. However, due to the ministry's nascent status and limited operational capacity, UNMAS has assumed a coordination role and will provide support to the ministry to establish a national mine action authority and national mine action centre.[16]

On 20 June 2025, the Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management stated that the Ministry intends to establish a national mine action centre "soon", in collaboration with national and international partners. He added that the Ministry also plans on establishing a national emergency response system[17] and designate zones that are safe for return, construction, and agriculture, within three years.[18]

6 Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6, as of 27 May 2025, OCHA, at: https://bit.ly/3TmDkey; and ICRC, International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria, 3 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3IdKMGy.

7 "The Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management to Al-Ikhbariah: The Ministry's mission is to plan and prepare before disasters strike", (Arabic), *Al-Ikhbariah*, (in Arabic), 20 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/46FjmDz.

8 ICRC, International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria, 3 April 2025.

9 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Syria Cluster Munition Ban Policy, last updated end 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3KOdtbb.

10 SNHR, "Cluster Munitions Remnants are an Open-Ended Threat to the Lives of Syria's Future Generations", Report, 30 January 2023, at: https://bit.ly/40NicQ0, p. 10.

11 SNHR, "Cluster Munitions Remnants are an Open-Ended Threat to the Lives of Syria's Future Generations", Report, 30 January 2023.

12 Ibid., pp. 11–20.

13 HALO, "Syria, A Hidden Emergency", Report, at: https://bit.ly/3fD4w4x, pp. 3, 7, and 11.

14 Emails from Michael Edwards, SCD, 11 May 2021 and 15 June 2022.

15 ICRC and SARC, Mine Risk Needs Assessment and Education, PowerPoint presentation to the 24th National Director's Meeting, Geneva, 25 May 2021.

16 UNMAS, UNMAS Syria and the Syrian Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management Discuss Future Cooperation on Mine Action, 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/44AAfwz; and email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

17 "The Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management to Al-Ikhbariah: The Ministry's mission is to plan and prepare before disasters strike", (Arabic), *Al-Ikhbariah*, (Arabic), 20 June 2025; and "The Minister of Emergency

18 "The Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management launches a plan for safe zones and a mine action centre", (Arabic), *Ultra Syria*, 21 June 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mlali6.

In north-east Syria, mine action is coordinated by the Northeast Syria Mine Action Centre (NESMAC), which was established by local authorities in 2021. In 2024, MAG continued to strengthen NESMAC's capacity, particularly in information management (IM), delivering four training courses in IM, EOD Level 2, quality management, and gender equity, diversity, and inclusion (GEDI), for 11 NESMAC staff. MAG's IM unit also supported NESMAC in collecting and analysing data from mine action actors to develop an ongoing portal-dashboard project.[19] DCA provided limited in-kind support to sustain NESMAC's operations in 2024, providing equipment such as solar panels, batteries, and electronics to improve office capabilities.[20] In November 2024, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) trained 16 NESMAC staff (7 women and 9 men) in disability, gender, and age (DGA) issues as part of its victim assistance activities.[21] HI also reported, however, that coordination with NESMAC remains a challenge.

Since iMMAP Inc. ended its capacity support in July 2024, NESMAC has faced significant operational constraints, limiting its ability to provide consistent technical oversight, coordination, tasking, and information management. Limited institutional capacity and lack of formal recognition also hinder robust quality assurance (QA) and standardised procedures. As a result, mine action actors in north-east Syria must rely on external coordination and technical support, highlighting the need for continued capacity-building and resources to strengthen NESMAC's role. Meanwhile, no formal relationship exists between NESMAC and UNMAS, which cites "political sensitivities" and unclear dynamics between Damascus and Hassakeh as barriers. NESMAC remains a de facto coordination body for mine action in north-east Syria but is not officially recognised by international frameworks or the UN system.[22]

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, mine action coordination in Syria was divided into three separate regions: government-controlled areas, the north-west, and the north-east, with coordination mechanisms operating separately in each and with no effective integration between them. Since the fall of the regime, a country-wide approach has become the central framework for mine action coordination.[23]

The Syria Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR), part of the Syria Protection Cluster, with UNMAS as the cluster lead agency and with a co-coordinator hosted by HI. That said, as at June 2025, UNMAS was facing delays in staff recruitment and did not yet have an MA AoR Coordinator or full-time IM officer in place.[24] The Syria MA AoR unifies all previously existing coordination structures and hosts technical working groups (TWGs) in: risk education, victim assistance, IM, survey and clearance, and advocacy. The Syria MA AoR coordinates the activities of 38 partners nationwide implementing a range of mine action programmes.[25] MA AoR partners must be engaged in at least two pillars of mine action, one of which must include survey and clearance.[26] Coordination meetings are held twice monthly, beginning on 6 February 2025, while TWGs meet monthly, except for the Advocacy TWG which meets twice a month. NESMAC is not invited to participate.[27] According to operators, cooperation and information sharing among national and international mine action actors has seen a significant improvement.[28]

Operators have generally reported a more enabling environment for their work since December 2024, but numerous challenges remain. HI reported facing significant constraints from new requirements as of January 2025 for international NGOs to operate under the umbrella of Syria Trust for Development (STD) or SARC, limiting independence and impartiality, and a provision that calls for INGOs to hand over all assets to the government prior to closing operations.[29] Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) reported that access permission processes are lengthy taking up to six weeks, although these now cover larger areas at the governorate level for three-month, extendable periods, and visitor visas are easier and cheaper to obtain than before.[30] In north-east Syria, DanChurchAid (DCA) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) operate in a relatively enabling environment with good international staff access via the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) border, cooperative local authorities, and streamlined MoU processes. Both operators reported facing delays and restrictions on importing mine action equipment, though, with a ban in place on the importation of explosives and equipment such as detectors, GPS, and Push to Talk radios.[31] In north-west Syria, HALO reported improved international staff access via Jordan since December 2024 and strong relations with local authorities enabling wide operational freedom, but persistent challenges in importing large equipment, leading to reliance on local procurement.[32]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

The mine action sector remained underfunded throughout 2024, with only 13% of the required US$51 million received.[33] In 2024, DCA's survey and clearance operations were funded by the European Union - Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI) until June, with internal gap funding covering the remainder of the year. DCA secured UK Foreign, Commonwealth

19 Email from Najat El Hamri, Regional Director, MAG, 3 June 2025.
20 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
21 Email from Lejla Susic, AVR Specialist, HI, 2 June 2025.
22 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
23 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
24 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
25 Mine Action AoR, Situation Update No. 3 (covering April 2025).
26 Online meeting with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Co-coordinator, Syria Mine Action AoR, 7 August 2025.
27 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and online meeting with Aida Burnett-Cargill, Syria Mine Action AoR, 7 August 2025.
28 Email from Chris Tierney, Country Director, NPA, 24 June 2025.
29 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
30 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
31 Emails from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
32 Email from Simon Jackson, Programme Manager, HALO, 4 June 2025.
33 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

and Development Office (FCDO) for survey and clearance operations in 2025.[34] HALO's survey and clearance operations in 2024 and 2025 were funded by France, Ireland, and Norway, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF). In addition, the Gould Foundation provided funding for a single project in 2024, and new donors Germany and Canada began funding in 2025. Ireland, Norway, and France were, though, ending their support by December 2025.[35] MAG's survey and clearance operations were funded by US Department of State Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) and Norway NMFA-Norad in 2024, with the Netherlands joining in 2025. US funding faced a temporary suspension until a waiver was issued to continue operations although, as at June 2025, no official outcome has been received.[36] HI's 2024 survey and clearance donors were the US Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), OCHA SCHF, and the German Federal Foreign Office (GFFO). In 2025, BHA stopped funding while the rest of the donors have remained.[37]

UNMAS's 2024 donors included UN OCHA Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF), Belgium, Finland, Estonia, and the Republic of Korea, which joined as a new donor. For 2025, donors included OCHA SHF, Belgium, UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), UN-Habitat, Italy, and Finland, with Canada in the pipeline.[38] NPA was funded in 2024 by the Norwegian MFA, Japan, and SHF. This continued into 2025 with Norwegian funding responsibility moving to Norad and plans for OCHA CERF to also support.[39]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

There is no national gender and diversity policy for the mine action programme. However, several operators have their own frameworks in place.[40] DCA has both a global and a country-specific gender and diversity policy with an implementation plan. MAG and NPA each have institutional gender and diversity policies and implementation plans.[41] UNMAS has an institutional gender and diversity strategy.[42] SCD has a gender strategy and a diversity strategy, along with policies to prevent discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or sex.[43]

HI has reported working to integrate gender and diversity considerations into its humanitarian and development programs in Syria, in alignment with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Equality Strategy for Syria 2024–26,[44] which aims to advance gender justice and women's empowerment by increasing their participation in decision-making, improving access to resources and services, and engaging men as allies.[45]

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024[46]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women in managerial or supervisory positions	Total operational staff	Women in operational positions
UNMAS	12	6 (50%)	4	2 (50%)	2	1 (50%)
NPA	70	31 (44%)	27	10 (37%)	54	23 (43%)
HALO	58	19 (33%)	14	5 (36%)	48	14 (29%)
MAG	222	43 (19%)	39	7 (18%)	153	34 (22%)
DCA	35	7 (20%)	4	1 (25%)	31	6 (19%)
HI	254	73 (20%)	29	7 (24%)	6	4 (67%)
SCD*	3,246	419 (13%)	630	88 (14%)	2,616	331 (13%)
Totals	**3,897**	**598 (15%)**	**747**	**120 (16%)**	**2,910**	**413 (14%)**

* Data is from 2023

34 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
35 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
36 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
37 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
38 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
39 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
40 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.
41 Emails from MAG, 24 May 2021; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024.
42 Email from Francesca Chiaudani, UNMAS, 31 March 2022.
43 Emails from Michael Edwards, SCD, 5 March and 15 June 2022.
44 UNDP, Gender Equality Strategy 2024 – 2026, at: http://bit.ly/44pJL5D.
45 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
46 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June and 29 July 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

In 2024, all HALO Syria staff received safeguarding training on gender and power dynamics, with improved reporting mechanisms to help all staff, especially women and vulnerable groups, feel safe speaking up about abuses.[47] MAG's senior management held workshops and awareness sessions to strengthen staff and NESMAC understanding of gender, diversity, and practical integration in fieldwork.[48] HI deployed an Inclusion Technical Specialist based in Amman to support projects across Syria, ensuring interventions are responsive to disability, gender, and age through inclusive case management and technical assistance for local service providers in health, education, livelihoods, and protection. The specialist also advances HI's "BeHinclusive" action plan, highlighting its commitment to inclusive humanitarian action.[49]

In 2025, NPA delivered training to 20 students, half of whom were women, and over the past year has promoted more women than men to team leader positions based on performance. Four NPA staff were trained in Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) data collection, with plans to conduct regular or ad-hoc surveys in operational areas, sharing results with the PSEA coordinator at the OCHA Protection Sector.[50]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

UNMAS's partnerships with implementing partners follow guidelines that include environmental requirements. UNMAS applies the IMAS 10.70 on environmental management, and the "do no harm" principle. It also considers the environmental impacts of assessing and removing explosive ordnance, such as the necessary removal of vegetation for operations.[51]

Table 2: Environmental policies, assessments and focal points[52]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country programme level
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
HALO	No - SOP	No	No
DCA	No - SOP	Yes	No
HI	No – SOP	Yes	Yes
MAG	No – SOP	Yes	Yes
SCD	No – in development	No	N/R

N/R = Not Reported

In 2024, two female staff from NPA were trained on the Green Field Tool and have translated the accompanying Survey123 form for use in Syria. Training sessions on the tool with programme staff were planned to be held in July and August 2025, with implementation of the tool on all projects scheduled thereafter. NPA also signed an MoU with a national NGO, the Athar Organization, to recycle NPA's empty 10-litre plastic water bottles with Athar.[53] DCA began using an environmental assessment tool in its clearance operations in 2024 and planned to adopt the Green Field Tool via Survey123 in 2025.[54] HI assessed MUNIREM technology in 2024, a chemical neutralisation agent for EOD, as a more environmentally friendly option for disposal but found it impractical in Syria due to the need for specialised equipment and high water consumption. Instead, HI adopted Dragon Fire, a thermite-based system, which leaves minimal residue, reduces the logistical burden in the field, and meets IMAS and environmental protection principles.[55]

Operators report considering climate and extreme weather risks during operational planning.[56] In 2024, DCA delivered risk education sessions in the informal settlement camps of Hweijet Zehra and Al-Khalil, targeting communities displaced by flooding. DCA also accounts for risks such as vegetation fires during dry periods, heat-related health hazards in summer, and reduced accessibility during the rainy season when planning and prioritising survey and clearance.[57]

47 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
48 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
49 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
50 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
51 Email from Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
52 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.
53 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
54 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
55 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
56 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
57 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

In 2025, UNMAS assumed responsibility for coordinating information management across all of Syria. This includes managing existing and incoming data related to survey and clearance.[58] Until the fall of the Assad regime, IM remained fragmented between the north-west, the north-east, and government-controlled areas, with no data sharing between them. UNMAS is now leading efforts to consolidate all data from mine action partners into a centralised Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, to which, as at June 2025, most operators had submitted data on NTS and explosive ordnance incidents.[59] To streamline data flow and ensure timely, standardised reporting, UNMAS has asked each operator to formally designate a dedicated user who will be granted access to submit data directly to the IMSMA server via structured forms or automated scripts (depending on their technical capacity).[60] This consolidated approach will enable accurate, timely updates to the Mine Action AoR service-mapping dashboard and support evidence-based analysis for prioritising clearance and integrating mine action within broader humanitarian coordination efforts.[61]

The IM TWG meets regularly, both monthly and on an ad-hoc basis, with participation from personnel representing all mine action implementing partners. Co-chaired by UNMAS and NPA, the TWG seeks to ensure that information is collected, stored, and analysed in a uniform and coordinated manner.[62]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Syria does not have a national mine action strategy in place. Operators use their own prioritisation frameworks for clearance.

NPA reported that before December 2024, prioritisation was mainly determined by access permissions and since then, NPA has established its own prioritisation system with priority agricultural areas to support the return of IDPs, strengthen food security, and enable livelihoods activities.[63] DCA prioritises clearance based on humanitarian impact and urgency of need, focusing first on areas where civilians live amid known or suspected contamination, followed by areas likely to see the return of IDPs, while also considering access to critical infrastructure, livelihoods, and services.[64] As at June 2025, HALO was finalising its clearance prioritisation matrix in coordination with UNMAS and local authorities, using indicators such as type of threat, proximity to residential areas, number of accidents, direct beneficiaries, intended land use, and frequency of EOD call-outs.[65] MAG prioritises clearance based on threats to local populations and land needed for agriculture.[66] HI's prioritisation framework aligns with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) principle of "All Reasonable Effort", and considers humanitarian impact, community engagement, and technical assessments. It works closely with local communities to identify priority areas, such as agricultural lands, schools, and healthcare facilities, in an inclusive manner.[67]

UNMAS uses a structured, needs-driven approach aligned with IMAS, national priorities, and humanitarian principles, coordinating closely with implementing partners. Its criteria include humanitarian impact, severity and type of contamination, support for humanitarian and development access, requests from authorities or communities, and operational feasibility and security. UNMAS also employs evidence-based tools like IMSMA to inform and guide prioritisation decisions.[68]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

There are no formal national mine action standards (NMAS) in Syria. As a result, most of the operators work to their own standard operating procedures (SOPs). HALO has highlighted that the absence of national standards and the lack of requirements for all actors, including local volunteer and military organisations, to follow them results in partially cleared areas that must be treated as uncleared, wasting time and resources.[69] DCA has also stressed the urgent need to assess and address widespread informal clearance by untrained civilians, which poses a severe risk to life.[70]

58 Ibid.
59 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
60 Ibid.
61 Emails from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
62 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025
63 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
64 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
65 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
66 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.
67 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
68 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
69 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
70 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

HALO updated its NTS SOP in 2024 to address the anticipated scale of contamination following increased access after the Assad regime's collapse. Aligned with IMAS 08.10, the revised SOP includes a more detailed survey form and expanded data analysis procedures to improve clearance planning and reporting. HALO also slightly amended its mechanical clearance SOP to maintain safety as it expands its mechanical fleet.[71] DCA began reviewing its manual and mechanical clearance SOPs in 2025 to align with evolving operational contexts, updated technical standards, and best practices, with planned improvements in safety protocols, task planning, equipment use, and environmental integration.[72] HI updated its risk education and NTS SOPs in April/May 2025, introducing more concise steps to improve operational clarity, IMAS compliance, and field-level efficiency and consistency.[73] NPA revised its SOPs on NTS, environmental considerations, and quality in line with updated IMAS and to better reflect procedures adapted to the specific context in Syria.[74]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, SARC, the ICRC, NPA, and UNMAS implementing partner, Safety Solutions, were conducting survey and clearance in Assad-regime controlled areas; Syria Civil Defence (SCD) and HALO were operating in the north-west; and DCA, HI, ITF, MAG, and Roj Mine Control Organization (RMCO), were operating in the north-east.

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, in areas under the government's control, most survey and clearance had been conducted by Russian and Syrian military engineers and civil defence organisations.[75] In 2024, the Syrian army conducted clearance in regime-controlled areas, on a limited scale, which included clearance of CMR and other ordnance.[76]

UNMAS signed an MoU with the Syrian government in 2018. The following year, UNMAS reported the government had agreed to the involvement of international demining organisations which would be registered by the government and coordinated by UNMAS.[77] In 2024, prior to the fall of the Assad regime, four organisations were accredited for mine action in government-controlled areas: DRC, NPA, Safety Solutions, and SHIELD.[78] UNMAS reported no change in capacity from 2023 to 2024 and but expected an increase in capacity during 2025. The planned increase includes deployment of additional NTS teams and Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) which will conduct TS and clearance and provide risk education.[79]

Following the signature of an MoU with the Syrian government in December 2021,[80] NPA received accreditation and completed its inception phase in 2022. The inception phase included the recruitment of national staff and the setting up of NPA's office in Damascus.[81] NPA reported no change in capacity from 2023 to 2024. A planned training course for searchers was postponed from December 2024 to January 2025. The newly trained searchers will allow staff to be reassigned to form dedicated EORE teams. NPA also plans to increase its capacity in 2025, contingent on funding, and was beginning operations in Homs governorate in July 2025.[82]

The ICRC works in partnership with SARC and has trained and supported SARC risk education and NTS teams with SARC teams conducting NTS in Aleppo, Damascus, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, and Lattakia governorates. ICRC has its own clearance teams, and in 2024 it also initiated explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[83]

HALO has operated in Syria since 2016. In 2024, given the scale of the programme and the prevailing security situation, HALO cleared a single AP mined area in Idlib governorate. There was no significant change in HALO's survey and clearance capacity in 2024 compared to 2023. As at June 2025, HALO had increased the number of NTS teams from one to three and mechanical clearance teams from two to six. It planned to add a further five NTS teams during the year. In addition, the number of EOD teams has grown from two to five, with a further seven expected to be deployed by the end of 2025. HALO was restarting operations in Daraa and beginning operations in Deir ez-Zor in July 2025. Subject to funding, it also plans to expand into Rural Damascus and Latakia.[84]

SCD has been operational in Syria since 2013. In June 2025, the SCD announced that it will become fully integrated into the Syria government with its emergency response capacity transferred to the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management.[85] In 2024, SCD was operational in 33 sub-districts of Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama governorates providing NTS and single-item disposal via remote-controlled open burning.[86] The SCD intended to increase its survey and clearance capacity from six to eleven teams in 2025.[87]

71 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
72 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.
73 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.
74 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
75 "Russian military boosts qualified Syrian sappers to demine war-ravaged country", *Tass*, 9 January 2018.
76 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024.
77 Statement by Agnes Marcaillou, Director, UNMAS, to the UN Security Council, 24 October 2019.
78 Email from Hassana Mardam Bey, UNMAS, 19 June 2024.
79 Email from Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.
80 NPA, New Humanitarian Mine Action in Syria, at: https://bit.ly/3MHNXTF.
81 Email from Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 April 2023.
82 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.
83 ICRC, *ICRC in Syria, A Year in Review: 2024*, at: https://bit.ly/401D9Jl, p. 8.
84 Email from Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025.
85 SCD, Statement on the Integration of the Syria Civil Defence (The White Helmets) into the Syrian Government, 2 June 2025, at: http://bit.ly/3J8fSQd.
86 Email from Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.
87 The White Helmets website, (Arabic), accessed on 4 August 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4fks3Wl.

Table 3: NTS and TS capacities deployed in 2024[88]

Operator	NTS teams	Total NTS personnel	TS teams	Total TS personnel	Comments
RMCO	10	20	0	0	Until the end of January 2024.
DCA	2	6	0	0	
HALO	2	9	0	0	
MAG	10	27	N/A	N/A	NTS and community liaison teams. Clearance teams conduct TS.
HI	28	72	0	0	Of this 11 teams totalling 25 personnel were operational until end of January 2024 and 8 teams totalling 19 personnel until end of August 2024.
Safety Solutions	2	6	0	0	
NPA	4	12	N/A	N/A	Clearance teams conduct TS.
SCD*	6	30	0	0	
Totals	**64**	**182**	**0**	**0**	

* Data is from 2023. N/A = Not applicable

Table 4: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[89]

Operator	Clearance teams	Total deminers*	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
Safety Solutions	1	4	0	
NPA	4	30	0	
HALO	2	10	2	Two five-strong mechanical clearance teams deployed on AP mined area.
SCD*	6	54	0	
MAG	9	83	10	
DCA	4	27	11	
HI	6	56	0	Of this 3 teams totalling 30 personnel were operational until the end of August 2024
Totals	**32**	**264**	**23**	

* Data is from 2023

DCA has been operational in north-east Syria since 2015. In 2024, it prioritised survey and clearance operations across multiple locations in Ar-Raqqa governorate. In early 2024, it conducted survey and clearance on three public infrastructure sites. Following clearance, the sites were rehabilitated by DCA's Shelter team and handed over to local authorities and communities for use. After a reduction in clearance teams from 2023 to 2024 following the conclusion of a major grant, an increase in the number of NTS and clearance personnel was expected in 2025. This planned scale-up supports DCA's strategy to expand mine action operations into new areas, including Rural Damascus, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor.

88 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

89 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 29 July 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and Sami Mohammad, SCD, 24 May 2024.

Under the Syria Mine Action and Livelihood Outcome-Based Pilot Project funded by the FCDO, a Nexus approach will be implemented in 2025. This will integrate mine action, shelter rehabilitation, and livelihood components in targeted areas. In the countryside, clearance will enable safe access to agricultural land. The livelihood component will include agro-ecology training, distribution of agricultural inputs and irrigation kits, and the construction of greenhouses, designed to promote food security and enhance resilience among rural communities affected by explosive contamination. In urban settings, contaminated public infrastructure, particularly schools, will be cleared of explosive ordnance, with rubble safely removed and managed. Following clearance, the shelter team will rehabilitate the schools, while the livelihood team will provide on-the-job apprenticeship training to community members (of mixed gender) in masonry, carpentry, plumbing, painting, and electrical work. In preparation for this expansion, DCA has initiated the registration process with the Syrian MoFA and has established an office in Damascus. As of June 2025, DCA was working to set up a mine action base and recruit survey and clearance personnel, with an initial focus on clearance in Rural Damascus and the surrounding areas.[90]

A local organisation, RMCO, established in 2016, was conducting clearance in the north-east but sustained heavy casualties among its deminers attempting to clear improvised devices.[91] In 2023, RMCO partnered with DCA for NTS in hard-to-reach areas and this project concluded at the end of January 2024.[92]

HI has been present in Syria since 2012. In 2024, it conducted survey, clearance, and EOD in Raqqa, including clearance of the riverbed of the Euphrates, which enabled the reopening of the Al-Rashid Bridge, improving connectivity between Raqqa and the surrounding regions. HI increased its survey and clearance capacity by 12 personnel in 2024. Plans to expand the programme further in 2025 depended on securing adequate funding. In 2025, HI began clearance at three schools in Deir ez-Zor. In north-west Syria, HI is delivering risk education in Idlib and Aleppo governorates and training its staff and those from SCD in NTS.[93]

MAG has been operational in north-east Syria since 2016. In 2024, MAG conducted survey and clearance operations in Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Kisreh, Al Ajil, Hasakah-Markada, Shadaddi, Tal Tamr, and Elwet Eldisheisha. There was no change in operational capacity compared to 2023. In 2025, newly liberated areas with heavy contamination, including locations in southern Ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor governorate, and western Syria, will require expanded operations. MAG has secured new grants to support activities in these areas and expected to receive additional funding. As a result, the number of personnel is expected to increase across the country.[94]

ITF has operated in north-east Syria since 2020. From January 2023 to January 2024, ITF deployed 10 NTS teams as part of a consortium with 3iSolution, DCA, and HI to conduct survey of all accessible explosive ordnance-contaminated areas in north-east Syria. From August 2023 to October 2024, under the "Clear then Grow Phase III" project supported by the French and Slovenian Ministries of Foreign and European Affairs, ITF surveyed and cleared former agricultural land and infrastructure contaminated with explosive ordnance in IS-liberated areas, also providing risk education. ITF also provided capacity building support to its local partner, Reachout, conducting training on IMAS, international donor expectations and project management; developed SOPs and organisational policies; and provided guidance on best practices, including financial management.[95]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Table 5: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	2.12	Operator data
Technical Survey	0	Operator data
Non-Technical Survey	0	Operator data
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	
Submunitions destroyed	1,103 (including 522 in spot tasks)	Operator data

90 Email from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

91 S. Kajjo, "Landmine removal crucial in post-IS Syria", *Voice of America*, 3 April 2019; and interview with operators, Erbil, Iraq, May 2019.

92 Emails from Kevin Straker, DCA, 15 March and 28 June 2023; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025.

93 Email from Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025.

94 Email from Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025.

95 ITF, 2024 Annual Report, at: https://bit.ly/4m0FJbd, pp. 105–10.

SURVEY IN 2024

Operators did not release any cluster munition-contaminated area through survey in 2024. This is a decrease from 2023 when 0.35km^2 was released through survey (nearly 0.10km^2 reduced through TS and almost 0.25km^2 cancelled through NTS).[96]

In 2024, a total of 25.42km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was identified through NTS, of which DCA identified almost 13.49km^2 in Ar-Raqqa governorate; HALO identified nearly 11.16km^2; and NPA identified 0.77km^2.[97]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, a total of almost 2.12km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared, with 581 submunitions destroyed.[98] This is an increase from the 1.96km^2 cleared in 2023, with 222 submunitions found and destroyed.[99]

Table 6: CMR clearance in 2024[100]

Governorate	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
Raqqa	DCA	3	1,043,669	98	136
Raqqa	MAG	129	197,436	113	15
Raqqa	HI	2	359,007	54	4
Rural Damascus	UNMAS	25	29,355	292	0
Rural Damascus	NPA	10	490,253	24	81
Totals		**169**	**2,119,720**	**581**	**236**

A further 522 submunitions were discovered by operators during spot tasks in 2024: 155 by UNMAS in Rural Damascus and Aleppo; 2 by NPA in Rural Damascus; 315 by SCD in the north-west; and 43 by MAG, and 7 by DCA in Raqqa.[101]

In 2024, as part of its clearance of agricultural land, ITF released 1,550,386m^2 through TS and clearance with 3 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 4 anti-vehicle mines, 7 electric detonators, and 4 items of UXO destroyed. It is not clear if any were CMR.[102] ICRC clearance teams surveyed 1,815,000m^2 in Aleppo and Rural Damascus, clearing 737,746m^2 and destroying 559 explosive devices, although it is not clear if any were CMR.[103]

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Syria is not yet a State Party to the CCM, nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible. NPA reported conducting quarterly advocacy meetings with the national mine action committee of the former Assad regime to encourage Syria to join both the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the CCM. NPA has continued this advocacy with the interim government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Finance. These efforts have been framed as a means to reintegrate Syria into the international community, enable funding from other States Parties, and demonstrate that the interim government prioritises the well-being of the Syrian people. On 22 June 2025, during a meeting on the national disaster plan, the Minister of Emergency Services and Disaster Management announced that the Syrian government is considering acceding to the APMBC, with a decision expected in the coming months.[104]

In 2024, until the fall of the Assad regime in December, survey and clearance in Syria remained divided across three main regions as described above. Overall land release output fell from 2023 to 2024 due to the lack of survey, although clearance output increased. An overall rise in survey and clearance capacity was expected in 2025, with operators planning to deploy additional teams. However, this expected increase in survey and clearance output will not be sufficient to meet the expanding demand in newly accessible areas following the change of regime, with a dramatic rise in the number of incidents from explosive ordnance especially in agricultural and grazing lands. Population movements into newly accessible areas combined with high-risk civilian behaviours, such as informal clearance for cash, further compound the challenge.

96 Emails from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024

97 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Simon Jackson, HALO, 4 June 2025; and Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

98 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

99 Emails from Chris Tierney, NPA, 17 June 2024; Riaan Boshoff, MAG, 21 May 2024; and Adesh Singh, DCA, 16 May 2024.

100 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Lejla Susic, HI, 2 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; and Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025.

101 Emails from Adesh Singh, DCA, 6 June 2025; Najat El Hamri, MAG, 3 June 2025; Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025; Joseph McCartan, UNMAS, 25 June 2025; and SCD, Annual Report 2024, p. 47, at: https://bit.ly/44u8Pbz.

102 ITF, "Annual Report 2024", p. 106.

103 ICRC, International Mine Awareness Day: Addressing the threat of explosive ordnance in Syria, 3 April 2025.

104 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

Funding remains a critical constraint with HALO reporting a lack of long-term, sustainable funding and the absence of multi-year contracts, while NPA notes that mine action continues to receive low funding priority despite the manifest humanitarian need. In 2025, UNMAS was prioritising a baseline survey of accessible areas across Syria to improve understanding of contamination, including from CMR, which will support the development of a nationwide prioritisation process. However, coordination challenges remain with HALO reporting the absence of shared data from other mine action and non-mine action actors while HI highlights the lack of formal recognition and limited capacity of NESMAC with no direct relationship with UNMAS due to political sensitivities. HALO has also raised concerns about the absence of enforced national standards, leading to inconsistent clearance quality and the need to re-clear partially cleared areas.

The interim government of Syria is still building its institutional capacity and does not yet have a recognised national mine action authority or mine action centre to manage mine action. UNMAS has taken on an interim coordinating role and is providing capacity support to the Minister of Emergency Services and Disaster Management. Nevertheless, NPA reports significant regulatory and administrative challenges, including centralised and understaffed registration and licensing processes in Damascus; frequently changing visa policies; sanctions that restrict direct or indirect support to the interim government; and retrospective customs reviews of previously imported goods.

The security situation in Syria remains fractured and volatile with Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) maintaining control over the north-east; foreign militaries, notably Turkish troops still holding parts of the north-west; regular Israeli strikes on Syrian military positions; and sporadic attacks from Islamic State.[105] In 2024, NPA reported the loss of equipment, including a large-loop detector on loan to the national mine action committee that was stolen during the looting of its building; a 20-foot shipping container used as a temporary ammunition store stolen from Yarmouk; and team uniforms stolen while awaiting clearance at the Lebanese border with Syria.[106] In 2025, three SCD volunteers were killed by a remotely detonated device during EOD operations in eastern Hama. Initial observations raise serious concerns that the team may have been deliberately targeted by individuals monitoring the site.[107]

105 Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, Conflict in Syria, accessed 5 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3Gv2Knk.

106 Email from Chris Tierney, NPA, 24 June 2025.

107 SCD, Statement by the Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets) on the killing of three volunteers from the UXO removal team in Hama Countryside, 22 May 2025, at: http://bit.ly/407TBI6.

TAJIKISTAN

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

4.92KM²

Light
(National authority estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	393,867	572,426
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	178 (including 16 in spot tasks)	511 (including 5 in spot tasks)

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan
- Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC)
- Ministry of Defence
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Tajikistan continued with relatively limited clearance of cluster munition remnants (CMR) during battle area clearance (BAC) and mine clearance in 2024. Clearance output fell in 2024 compared to 2023 due to high levels of metal fragmentation, which slowed the pace of BAC, and also due to NPA's focus on mined areas. As was the case in the three years previously, no cluster munition-contaminated areas were released through survey in Tajikistan during the year, but previously unrecorded areas were identified. At the time of writing, Tajikistan was still planning to complete all necessary survey for a baseline of CMR contamination by the end of 2025 and set time-bound plans for land release.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Tajikistan should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Tajikistan should comply with its obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR on territory under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible.**
- **The Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) should continue to seek to confirm the extent of CMR and ensure timely release of the contaminated areas.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL)
- Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST)
- Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC), Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Border Guard Forces of Tajikistan

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan has a CMR problem that TNMAC states exists across 19 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering an estimated total of 4.92km^2 (see Table 1), an increase on the 3.74km^2 estimated at the end of 2023.[1] The more recent estimate is not, though, considered comprehensive. Tajikistan reports no suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) that may contain CMR.

Tajikistan's CMR contamination is largely concentrated in central areas of the country,[2] spread across two of Tajikistan's four regions. The largest concentrations (almost 26% and 54%, respectively) are in Rasht in the Districts of Republican Subordination (DRS) region and in the mountainous district of Darvoz in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous (GBAO) region (also referred to as the VKMB). The remainder (almost 20%) is in Vahdat in the DRS region. Tajikistan planned to finish surveying all explosive ordnance (EO) contamination by the end of 2025 in the districts of Darvoz, Rasht, and Vahdat where cluster munition-contaminated areas have continued to be identified.[3] A total of 1.53km^2 of previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database in 2024.[4]

Contamination data are disaggregated by weapon type in the national database, with CMR disaggregated from other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[5]

Tajikistan traces its CMR contamination back to the civil war of 1992–97 but has not clarified who was responsible for using cluster munitions.[6] Most submunitions cleared are the Soviet-era type AO 2.5RT/RTM,[7] but ShOAB-0.5 submunitions have also been found.[8]

Tajikistan faces several challenges in determining an accurate baseline of CMR contamination. Owing to a lack of nationwide survey, Tajikistan has no recorded SHAs and continues to discover areas of contamination for which no previous information exists.[9] Added to this, cluster munitions were used without documentation so non-technical survey (NTS) teams must invest effort into finding informants, including former military personnel, who were involved in the civil war. Information about previously unknown areas of contamination also comes from explosive accidents, most recently involving two civilians and the explosion of a ShOAB-0.5 submunition in the Romit Gorge in Vahdat district in 2021.[10]

Tajikistan's terrain also presents a challenge to determining an accurate baseline of contamination. Mudslides, landslides, avalanches, and rockfalls can cause submunitions to move or become more deeply buried.[11] NPA believes that significant cluster munition-contaminated area is likely still unrecorded and argues for a comprehensive, nationwide survey that would better map the exact locations of contamination.[12] FSD, the Fondation suisse de déminage, agrees that it is highly likely that further contamination will be discovered.[13]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (at end 2024) (National Authority estimate)[14]

Region	District	CHAs	Area (m^2)
GBAO	Darvoz	9	2,656,245
DRS	Rasht	5	1,291,650
DRS	Vahdat (Romit)	5	975,220
Totals		**19**	**4,923,115**

1 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 15 April and 23 July 2024; and 2 July 2025.
2 "Tajikistan's Mine Action Programme: Overview of Remaining Challenges and Needs", Presentation at Individualised Approach Meeting, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC), Geneva, 21 November 2023.
3 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024 and 2 July 2025.
4 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
5 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.
6 Statement of Tajikistan, APMBC Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.
7 Email from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 29 April 2020.
8 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, Director, Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST), 14 April 2023.
9 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023.
10 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023.
11 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022; and email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023.
12 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, Senior Operations Officer/Acting Country Director, NPA, 20 March 2025.
13 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, Country Director for Tajikistan and Programme Manager for Central Asia, FSD, 13 May 2025.
14 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 April 2025.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Tajikistan is also contaminated with anti-personnel mines. See Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* reports on Tajikistan for further information.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL), which is chaired by the First Deputy Prime Minister and comprises senior representatives from relevant line ministries, acts as Tajikistan's national mine action authority. The CIIHL is also responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government's socio-economic development policies.[15] TNMAC is the executive arm of the CIIHL and serves as the coordinating body for mine action, responsible for accreditation, risk management, the issuing of task orders, information management, quality assurance (QA), and quality control (QC).[16] Tajikistan's Parliament adopted a Law on Humanitarian Mine Action in 2016.[17] The Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a significant role in the mine actor sector through the Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC), the biggest national operator.[18]

The Government of Tajikistan and TNMAC are enabling and highly supportive of mine action. This includes the granting of visas, concluding memoranda of understanding with operators, facilitating imports, granting access to border-detached areas that require special permissions, and involving operators in decisions as needed.[19]

TNMAC regularly receives support on topics such as information management from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[20] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also continued to provide support to the national programme in 2024, including training of Ministry of Defence explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel through the OSCE-funded Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre (REHTC).[21] Military medical specialists from Tajikistan also received medical training in support of EOD in Kazakhstan, co-organised by the OSCE.[22]

Monthly technical coordination meetings between TNMAC and operators continued in 2024. Topics discussed included the need to further assess the size of CHAs containing CMR.[23]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

As Tajikistan has not yet adhered to the CCM, no separate funding is allocated specifically for survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas.[24] National funding for humanitarian demining has remained modest, but consistent. In 2024, the Government allocated US$66,020 to support humanitarian mine action, as well as US$500,000 designated for "technical and non-technical assistance" and to facilitate the implementation of Tajikistan's obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APBMC). CMR survey and clearance tasks are allocated during the course of mine tasking.[25] HDC is funded by the United States (US)[26] and the OSCE.[27] Following the US review of funding to mine action globally in early 2025, continued US funding of TNMAC and of OSCE's implementation of the REHTC was approved.[28]

A summary of information provided by international humanitarian operators on their funding for survey and clearance in 2024 and forecast for 2025 is provided in Table 2. Both FSD and NPA were significantly impacted by the suspension of funding by the US Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) in January 2025. NPA's funding was withdrawn in February 2025, forcing it to reduce capacity and begin operations later in the year than planned.[29] As at May 2025, FSD's US funding remained suspended, hindering clearance at the Afghan border.[30]

15 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 20.

16 Ibid., pp. 20–21; and "Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025", p. 9.

17 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, pp. 20–21.

18 Ibid., p. 23.

19 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Country Director, NPA, 6 May 2024; Saodat Asadova, National Programme Officer, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Nickhwah Din Mohammed, Country Director, FSD, 24 March 2023.

20 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

21 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and OSCE, "The first-ever Tajik-led explosive ordnance disposal course kicks off at OSCE-supported Regional Explosive Hazards Training Centre", 16 September 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4hnV9Uj.

22 OSCE, "OSCE-led regional medical training course for specialists from Central Asia concludes in Kazakhstan", 28 August 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4g5BtDS.

23 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

24 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

25 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023, 15 April 2024, and 2 July 2025.

26 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 23.

27 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 10 June 2024.

28 Interview with Saodat Asadova, OSCE, Geneva, 9 April 2025.

29 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

30 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Tajikistan (2024–25)[31]

Donor	2024	2025
Norway (Norad[32]/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA))	NPA	NPA
PATRIP Foundation	FSD	FSD
Private donors (unspecified)	FSD	FSD
UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)	FSD	FSD
US PM/WRA	NPA, FSD	Funding withdrawn from NPA and FSD in January 2025.

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Gender and diversity considerations were integrated into Tajikistan's national mine action strategy for 2021 to 2030, with annual plans also addressing these issues.[33] Tajikistan states that gender is mainstreamed in all aspects of their mine action programme,[34] which is underpinned by national legislation on gender equality, the national development strategy to 2030, and other programme and strategy documents.[35] TNMAC states that as information is being collected to establish an accurate baseline of contamination, which was due to be completed by the end of 2025, various segments of the at-risk population are being consulted in the course of survey and risk education.[36]

Table 3: Gender composition of operators in 2024[37]

Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Total women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Total women operational staff
TNMAC	25	7 (28%)	8	3 (38%)	4	0 (0%)
NPA	64	14 (22%)	6	2 (33%)	50	10 (20%)
FSD	59	18 (31%)	16	8 (50%)	49	15 (31%)
UST	54	0 (0%)	5	0 (0%)	54	0 (0%)
MoD HDC	117	0 (0%)	15	0 (0%)	84	0 (0%)
Totals	**319**	**39 (12%)**	**50**	**13 (26%)**	**241**	**25 (10%)**

The Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (TMAP) Gender and Diversity Working Group (GDWG) reconvened with renewed focus in the second quarter of 2024,[38] having previously not met since 2022.[39] Participants included TNMAC, the MoD, operators, and the OSCE. Key items discussed in 2024 included gender and diversity analysis and assessments and monitoring and evaluation of efforts by the GDWG members.[40] In support of the GDWG, the OSCE held a training workshop on mainstreaming of gender and diversity issues into mine action, as well as key topics such as how to develop gender-sensitive indicators in monitoring and evaluation.[41] The basic demining course in Tajikistan includes content on gender and human rights.[42]

31 Emails from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

32 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See www.norad.no.

33 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

34 APMBC Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

35 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

36 Ibid.

37 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

38 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

39 Email Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, 31 March 2023.

40 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

41 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March and 18 June 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

42 Email from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 18 June 2025.

TNMAC asserts that men and women with relevant work experience and qualifications in demining have equal access to employment in the sector in Tajikistan.[43] It acknowledges, however, that in view of the predominance of men in the military, where service is compulsory for men and voluntary for women, it is challenging to achieve gender balance.[44] As in previous years, no women were employed by MoD's HDC in 2024.[45]

NPA, FSD, and national operator UST all report having a gender and diversity policy.[46] FSD and NPA deploy gender-mixed teams.[47] Although UST supports equal access to employment in theory, it had not yet employed any women as at July 2025.[48] NPA saw a notable drop in the proportion of managerial or supervisory positions occupied by women, from 50% in 2023 to 33% in 2024. This was due to a 50% drop in all management and supervisory staff, leaving only six staff, including two women, in these positions.[49] It did, however, continue collaborating with local women's associations to actively recruit and train female deminers in 2024, with all candidates for the basic demining course successfully gaining employment with NPA.[50]

In 2024, FSD launched a socio-economic baseline assessment (SEBA) to map gender disparities and identify the specific needs of women and men in surveyed areas along the Kyrgyz border. This is intended to inform future interventions, such as expanding employment and vocational training, and improving gender-sensitive mine action.[51] FSD also employed a gender officer to oversee SEBA, risk education, and community engagement.[52]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Table 4: Environmental policies and action[53]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
FSD	Yes	Yes	Unclear
NPA	Yes	Yes (from June 2025)	Yes
UST*	Yes	Not known	Not known
HDC MoD	No	No	No

* Updated information requested in March 2025 but not provided at the time of writing.

Tajikistan has a national mine action standard (NMAS) on environmental management in mine action, though, as at July 2025, this had not yet been updated to be in line with the revised 2024 edition of IMAS 07.13.[54] The NMAS covers issues such as safeguarding of the environment during the establishment and removal of worksites and accommodation, waste disposal, air quality, and water supply.[55] Based on the Standard, TNMAC monitors the demining activities of all operators to assess environmental implications and environmental protection requirements.[56] Tajikistan does not have an environmental management policy for mine action but a 2011 law on environmental protection and other regulatory documents define the legal basis for all State policy on the environment.[57]

A multi-stakeholder working group on climate change and the environment and mine action has been established and conducted its first meeting in June 2024, with participation from TNMAC, operators, the OSCE, and the REHTC. Further meetings were planned for 2025, though no specific dates for these were given as at July.[58]

43 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

44 2019 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information received 3 August 2019.

45 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 June 2022; Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023 and 23 July 2024; Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

46 Emails from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD,15 April 2024; Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

47 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, pp. 18-19, at: https://bit.ly/4384LOE.

48 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

49 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

50 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

51 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, at: https://bit.ly/4384LOE, pp. 18–19.

52 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

53 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; online interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025; email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 19.

54 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

55 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 3 and 9 June 2022; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022; and NMAS Chapter 20: "Environment, Health and Safety".

56 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

57 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024 and 2 July 2025.

58 Emails from Saodat Asadova, OSCE, 24 March 2025; and Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

FSD, NPA and UST all have an environmental standard operating procedure (SOP).[59] FSD has an environmental policy at its headquarters and was undergoing the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 14001 accreditation process, with a draft of the FSD Environmental Management System complete as at May 2024.[60] FSD also conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance tasks.[61] NPA Tajikistan has an annual environmental annual action plan linked to its environmental policy[62] and, from June 2025, was implementing NPA's global Green Field Tool, in order to conduct environmental screening of the areas where it works and analyse its environmental impact.[63] FSD undertakes refresher training on the environmental SOP and FSD's commitments to sound environmental practices each year with all management and operational staff, following the winter stand-down period.[64]

Operators undertook various specific measures to prevent or minimise environmental harm in 2024. NPA replaced two vehicles with electric cars and improved travel planning to reduce emissions. It also introduced use of solar panels in the field, including in some remote locations.[65] UST reports that, after leaving field camps or completing operations, UST buries waste, excluding metal and plastic materials.[66] In 2024, operators and TNMAC also continued collective tree-planting efforts, planting over 1,000 trees in total.[67] Going forward, NPA plans to extend recycling from its offices to its field bases, though it highlights that government recycling facilities in the districts outside Dushanbe are variable and limit the extent to which recycling is possible.[68] Alongside its demining, FSD is continuing a project to remediate polluted soil in areas contaminated by toxic Soviet-era pesticides (persistent organic pollutants, or POPs),[69] focusing in 2024 on phytoremediation (the use of plants to remove pollutants), including large-scale tree planting.[70]

Environmental concerns and climate resilience are becoming increasingly pertinent for mine action in Tajikistan, as changes to weather patterns, including both extreme heat and early snow, and heavy rainfall, continue to negatively impact the nine-month window for demining operations.[71]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

TNMAC uses the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA Core) for its national mine action database.[72] Data are disaggregated by weapon type and method of land release in the national database.[73] Data collection forms are reported to enable efficient collection of the requisite data[74] and both the database and information management by TNMAC generally are said to be functioning well, with progress and other reports from the field received daily and cross-checking of the data by TNMAC.[75]

Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan sets out clear guidelines for operators on the required content and timelines for all types of operational reports to be sent to TNMAC on a daily, weekly, monthly and as-needed basis.[76] TNMAC regularly receives support on information management through online consultations with the GICHD. Staff training on IMSMA was due to take place for all relevant staff in Tajikistan in 2025, following an in-person assessment by the GICHD in 2024 on the use of IMSMA in all mine action organisations in the country.[77]

NPA took steps in 2024 to strengthen its data communication with TNMAC, including regular coordination meetings to align reporting formats and timelines; the introduction of improved internal data validation procedures prior to submission; and more consistent sharing of operational updates and clearance statistics.[78]

59 Emails from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
60 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 29 May 2024.
61 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.
62 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022.
63 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.
64 Email from Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.
65 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.
66 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.
67 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
68 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 2 April 2025; and online interview, 3 April 2025.
69 "Tajikistan", FSD website, accessed 25 March 2024 at: https://bit.ly/3Ozn7hh.
70 FSD, "Activity Report 2024", p. 19.
71 Interview with Faiz Mohammad Paktian, Tajikistan, NPA, Geneva, 21 November 2023.
72 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 28 May 2020; and APMBC Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.
73 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 16 June 2023.
74 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May 2022 and 29 March 2023.
75 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.
76 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 4–5.
77 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
78 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

PLANNING AND TASKING

TNMAC's activities are guided by the National Strategy of the Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2021–2030.[79] As Tajikistan has not yet adhered to the CCM, however, the problem of cluster munitions is not integrated into this strategy. TNMAC does not have an annual work plan specifically for survey and clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area, but does include instructions regarding CMR when tasking demining operators with survey and clearance.[80] Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan for 2023 to 2025 outlined the list of remaining confirmed battle areas, including those containing CMR.[81] TNMAC states that, once planned surveys are completed by the end of 2025, a plan will be put in place for the phased clearance of CMR with specific deadlines for land release set.[82]

Land release, including of cluster munition-contaminated areas, is prioritised by TNMAC through application of Tajikistan's SOP 1.2 (Planning and Tasking of Mine Action Operations), taking into consideration the following criteria:

- Government and local authority requests
- Donor requirements
- The area's status in relation to the district-by-district approach
- Distance of the task site from populated areas
- The need to complete any previously suspended areas
- Altitude of the task site
- The local security situation (permission from the Border Forces).[83]

Operators report that task dossiers are issued in a timely manner by TNMAC.[84] NPA highlights that seasonal access constraints present a major ongoing challenge to planning and tasking, particularly in remote areas, which are often impacted by harsh weather. NPA has, however, made significant progress to improve logistical coordination and deploy teams as effectively as possible when conditions are optimal.[85] FSD has highlighted that the "limitations" placed upon it when "denoting" areas for clearance can present a challenge to effective planning, though it was not clear what these involved.[86]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Tajikistan's NMAS are reviewed annually, and SOPs are reviewed in accordance with the designated accreditation period, all in consultation with clearance operators.[87] No updates were made to Tajikistan's NMAS in 2024, though a number were made to the protocol documentation for marking and safety procedures. This was done through a technical working group and in consultation with operators.[88] Operators report that Tajikistan's NMAS are appropriately adapted to the local threat and enable effective, efficient, and safe survey and clearance work.[89]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

All teams deployed for CMR in Tajikistan are multi-task teams (MTTs), capable of survey and clearance (including BAC) (see Table 5).[90] NPA undertakes CMR clearance in conjunction with mine clearance.[91] It continues to cooperate with Tajikistan's Border Guard Forces, with ten officers seconded into NPA's teams in 2024. This collaboration serves to build capacity, with secondees typically trained in both demining and BAC.[92]

NPA reduced its capacity from five to four MTTs in 2024 due to an overall drop in funding, and reduced it further to three teams at the start of 2025, due to the withdrawal of US funding, which was formally terminated in February.[93] NPA also experienced a two-month delay in the start of 2025 demining operations, starting in June instead of April, due to this reduced funding and capacity.[94]

79 Statement of Tajikistan on Political Commitment, APBMC Fifth Review Conference, Siam Reap, 25-29 November 2024, p. 2.

80 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024 and 2 July 2025.

81 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and "Tajikistan's General Land Release Operations Plan for October 2023 to December 2025", p. 5.

82 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024 and 2 July 2025.

83 Tajikistan Mine Action Programme General Land Release Operational Plan for October 2023 to December 2025, pp. 6–7; and email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023.

84 Emails from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024; Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 15 April 2024; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 7 May 2024.

85 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

86 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025. Clarification on what the terms "limitations" and "denoting" refer to specifically was requested from FSD but had not been provided as at the time of writing.

87 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022 and 2 July 2025; and APMBC Committee on the Implementation of Article 5, Preliminary Observations on Tajikistan, Intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20–22 June 2022.

88 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

89 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 29 March 2023; and Dr Nickhwah Din Mohammed, FSD, 24 March 2023.

90 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

91 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 21 May and 23 June 2022.

92 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

93 Emails from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March and 26 June 2025.

94 Zoom interview with Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 3 April 2025.

FSD expanded from one to four teams in 2024[95] but had to stand down one team in early 2025 due to a suspension of US funding, which remained suspended as at May 2025.[96] MoD HDC, however, was able to maintain its US funding and increase capacity, adding a further 26 deminers in 2024. TNMAC expected no further change to the number of HDC MoD demining personnel in 2025.[97] UST was still in the process of obtaining a licence for the use of explosive materials and devices from the relevant authorities as at May 2025,[98] an issue that has been ongoing for several years.[99] As such, all submunitions discovered by UST are destroyed by other operators.[100] UST teams report directly to TNMAC, which funds UST's survey and clearance operations.[101]

HDC MoD has a Mini-MineWolf, which is also available for use also by NPA. However, this was not deployed for CMR clearance in 2024 or in recent years.[102]

Table 5: Operational clearance capacities deployed in Tajikistan 2024[103]

Operator	MTTs	Total deminers	Mechanical assets/machines	Comments
FSD	3	23	0	EOD quick response team in place within MTTs.
UST	2	18	0	
NPA	4	36	0	
HDC MoD	8	89	0	A Mini-MineWolf machine is available but is not used for CMR survey or clearance
Totals	**17**	**166**	**0**	

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

A total of 393,867m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released in Tajikistan in 2024, all through full clearance. A total of 178 submunitions were destroyed in 2024, of which 16 were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.[104] A total of 1.53km^2 of previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database in 2024.[105]

Table 6: Land release outputs in 2024 (national authority data)[106]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)
Clearance	393,867
Technical Survey	0
Non-Technical Survey	0
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**
Submunitions destroyed	178 (including 16 in spot tasks)

95 "Activity Report 2024", FSD, p. 18.

96 Email from Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025.

97 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

98 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

99 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023; and Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 14 April 2023 and 7 May 2024.

100 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

101 Email from Saynurridin Kalandarov, UST, 16 May 2023 and 7 May 2024.

102 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023 and 2 July 2025; Melissa Andersson, NPA, 23 May 2023; Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 29 May 2024; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

103 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.

104 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025. TNMAC notes that, of the 178 submunitions destroyed, 67 identified during clearance by UST were "destroyed in EOD spot tasks by NPA". However, as they were identified during clearance they have not been included in those referred to as destroyed in spot tasks in Table 6.

105 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

106 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

No CMR-contaminated areas were released through survey in 2024[107] as was similarly the case in Tajikistan in the three years previously.[108] As noted, 1.53km^2 of previously unrecorded contamination was added to the database in 2024[109] (see Table 7) – a decrease on the 2.21km^2 added in 2023.[110]

Table 7: Previously unrecorded CMR contamination added to the database in 2024[111]

Operator	Region/District	CHAs recorded	Area recorded (m²)
N/R	GBAO/Darvoz	4	1,300,000
N/R	DRS/Vahdat	1	230,000
Totals		**5**	**1,530,000**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

A total of 393,867m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2024, of which 195,490m^2 was cleared by HDC MoD, 116,001m^2 by UST, and 82,376m^2 by NPA[112] (see Table 7). Of this 393,867m^2 cleared in 2024, 10,007m^2 was surface clearance only, which was undertaken by NPA.[113] A total of 162 submunitions were destroyed during clearance in 2024.[114] A further 16 submunitions were destroyed by HDC MoD and NPA in spot tasks[115] (see Table 9) bringing the total of all submunitions destroyed in Tajikistan in 2024 to 178.

Clearance in 2024 represents a 30% drop compared to the previous year, a reduction that TNMAC ascribes to high levels of metal fragmentation in the soil, which slowed BAC.[116] NPA also saw a significant decrease compared to the 279,608m^2 it cleared in 2023,[117] as it focused on addressing mine clearance in 2024.[118]

Table 8: CMR clearance by international operators in 2024[119]

Operator	Region/ District	Areas released	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other items of UXO destroyed
HDC MoD	DRS/Rasht	1	195,490	55	0
Sub-totals		**1**	**195,490**	**55**	**0**
NPA	GBAO/Darvoz	0	*48,218	4	**1
NPA	DRS/Vahdat	0	*34,158	36	0
Sub-totals		**0**	***82,376**	**40**	**1**
UST	DRS/Vahdat	1	116,001	***67	***20
Sub-totals		**1**	**116,001**	***67**	***20**
Totals		**2**	**393,867**	**162**	**21**

* BAC tasks, both suspended as at end of 2024. **This item was an improvised explosive device (IED).
*** Identified by UST during clearance but destroyed by NPA during EOD spot tasks.

Table 9: Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks in 2024[120]

Operator	Region/District	Submunitions destroyed
HDC MoD	DRS/Rasht	4
NPA	GBAO/Darvoz	12
Total		**16**

107 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
108 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023 and 15 April 2024.
109 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
110 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024; and Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.
111 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
112 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
113 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
114 Emails from; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
115 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
116 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.
117 Email from Faiz Mohammad Paktian, NPA, 6 May 2024.
118 Email from Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
119 Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025; Yoshiyuki Shiomi, FSD, 13 May 2025; and Azim Ibrohimov, NPA, 20 March 2025.
120 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

TNMAC states that, with contaminated areas still being found, Tajikistan does not have a target date for the completion of CMR clearance. To date, TNMAC has tasked operators with CMR clearance where possible as part of Tajikistan's annual General Land Release Plan, which includes details of known battle areas contaminated with CMR. However, Tajikistan plans to complete all necessary survey by the end of 2025, and then set time bound plans for phased clearance of CMR-affected areas.[121] Previously unknown areas of contamination have continued to be added to the national database in recent years: 2km^2 in 2020, 2.85km^2 in 2021,[122] 2.67km^2 in 2022,[123] 0.22km^2 in 2023,[124] and 1.53km^2 in 2024.[125]

Tajikistan has a well-functioning mine action programme with strong national ownership and effective collaboration between stakeholders.[126] But the authorities detail ongoing challenges for mine action that include difficult terrain, harsh weather, and natural disasters, such as rockfalls, avalanches, and landslides.[127] The rate of progress towards completion will be heavily determined, not only by the outcomes of survey completed by the end of 2025, but how Tajikistan directs its finite resources towards both clearance of CMR and also resourcing its commitment to clear landmines as a State Party to the APMBC.

Table 10: Five-year summary of CMR clearance (national authority data)

Year	Area released (km^2)
2024	0.39
2023	0.57
2022	0.61
2021	1.87
2020	0.08
Total	**3.52**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Tajikistan produced a technical manual on the management of residual contamination in 2023,[128] though, as at June 2025, these guidelines had not been formalised. TNMAC is developing the operational capacity of UST and plans that UST will deal with residual risk of unexploded submunitions upon completion of area clearance.[129]

121 Ibid.

122 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 June 2022.

123 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 31 March 2023.

124 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

125 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 2 July 2025.

126 "To Walk the Earth in Safety, 23rd Edition, Fiscal Year 2023, Documenting the U.S. Commitment to Conventional Weapons Destruction", US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, at: https://bit.ly/3wVINkT, p. 52.

127 Presentation by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, APMBC Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 22 June 2022.

128 Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 15 April 2024.

129 Ibid.

UKRAINE

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Heavy, but no reliable estimate

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	**11km²** (clearance of areas suspected or confirmed to contain CMR; official IMSMA data)	**9km²** (official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 87,066m² based only on NGO data)
Technical Survey	**4.5km²** (National authority data of all EO-contaminated area)	**1,414m²** (NGO data)
Non-Technical Survey	**7.01km²** (National authority data of all EO-contaminated area)	**0m²** (NGO data)
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**2023**
Submunitions destroyed	**25,893** (National authority data)	**Unknown**

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

Security and Defence Forces of Ukraine include:

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- The Armed Forces of Ukraine
- The National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

National humanitarian operators include:

- Humanitarian Security LLC. (Mine Action Review requested data on CMR survey and clearance in 2024 from other national operators but only Humanitarian Security responded.)

International NGOs:

- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Commercial operators:

- Multiple

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Extensive use of cluster munitions by Russian forces continued in 2024 and into 2025, along with continued use by Ukraine, with the United States (US) announcing a seventh transfer of cluster munitions to Ukraine in October 2024. Clearance and technical survey (TS) increased significantly, due to expanded capacity. Very limited cancellation through non-technical survey (NTS) by one international operator took place for the first time in six years. Several national operators also cancelled areas. Ukraine's national authorities also reported significant increases in survey and clearance across all types of operators, national and international, made possible by "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)".[1] While disaggregated data are collected and submitted to the Information System for Mine Action (IMSMA), Ukraine generally states the extent of its explosive ordnance (EO) challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with the majority of hazardous areas presenting a mixed threat. Ukraine has institutionalised in its National Implementation Plan for 2024–26, its intention to survey all accessible areas for all types of contamination, including cluster munition remnants (CMR), by the end of 2026.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Mine Action Review recognises the extremely challenging circumstances Ukraine faces following the war of aggression launched by Russia in February 2022. Nevertheless, Mine Action Review supports universal adherence to and full compliance with the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and calls on both Russia and Ukraine to immediately halt all use of cluster munitions and accede to the CCM as a matter of priority.**
- **If it has not already done so by the time this report goes to print, Ukraine should expedite its processes for permission to operators to use explosives in clearance and destruction operations as well as subsequent accreditation to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).**
- **Ukraine should review its instructions to operators and processes for the issuance of cancellation certificates, which currently limit cancellation to battle area clearance (BAC) tasks with no history of evidence of CMR.**
- **Ukraine should formalise a gender and diversity policy in mine action and continue its work to develop an implementation plan for this through its Gender in Mine Action Initiative group.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Sectoral Working Group on Humanitarian Demining (SWG, under the Ministry of Economy)
- Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD, under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers)
- National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), interministerial auxiliary collegial body, the secretariat of which sits under the Ministry of Defence (MoD))
- Mine Action Centre (MAC, under the SSTS and then the MoD, at Chernihiv)
- Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre (under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast) (Established during 2024)
- Social-Humanitarian Response Centre (under the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- Centre of Excellence for Humanitarian Demining (under the MoD) (Launched in 2024)

CERTIFICATION AND QUALITY CONTROL CENTRES

In total, 13 institutions can train and issue certificates of deminers, including:

- Interregional Centre for Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) (at Merefa**)
- Demining Center of Military Unit A2641 (at Kaminiets Podilsky)
- Military Engineering School

STATE SERVICES ENGAGED IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- Armed Forces of Ukraine
- National Police
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)
- State Border Service
- National Guard

STATE OPERATORS:

- State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU)
- State Special Transport Service (SSTS)

1 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, Head, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) Secretariat, Ministry of Defence (MoD), 9 May 2025.

NATIONAL OPERATORS*

- Arkhipelag LLC
- BIG UA
- Demining Solutions
- EOD & RC
- Global Clearance Solutions (GCS)
- Humanitarian Security LLC
- International Demining Group (IDG)
- Mellom Pro LLC
- Nibulon
- Patron Demining
- Safe Ground Solutions LLC
- Safe Land
- Sheriff LLC
- Transimpex Demining
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA)
- Ukrainian Demining Services (UDS)
- Ukroboronservice (UOS)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS*

- APOPO
- DanChurchAid (DCA)
- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD)
- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI) – scheduled to begin NTS in August 2025
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- SafeLane Global
- Safe Path Group

OTHER ACTORS*

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Lithuanian Demining Coalition
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- Tetra Tech
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change
- Mine Action Sub-cluster (MA AoR) chaired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO)
- UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
- UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
- UN World Food Programme (WFP)
- UNICEF
- UN Women
- The UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- Chemonics
- East Europe Foundation
- Enhancing Human Security (ITF)
- NATO
- Ukrainian Red Cross Society
- MAT Kosovo

* Information based on data available at July 2025. Due to the rapidly expanding mine action programme in Ukraine, there may be actors not included in this table. An up-to-date list of certified mine action operators is available online on Ukraine's National Mine Action Platform, Demine Ukraine, which reports 108 certified mine action operators as at 17 July 2025, with more than 50 others undergoing accreditation.[2]
** The team at Merefa relocated to Kyiv during 2024 due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area, and remained in Kyiv at the time of writing in June 2025.[3]

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

Taking into account that both active conflict and primary NTS are ongoing, there is no reliable estimate for the extent of cluster munition-contaminated area in Ukraine, but the level of contamination is expected to be heavy due to the very widespread use of cluster munitions in the course of the Russian assault on Ukraine and subsequent use by the Ukrainian armed forces. As at the end of 2024, areas within the control of Ukraine and scheduled for NTS, which potentially contain CMR or anti-personnel (AP) mines, anti-vehicle (AV) mines, and other EO as a result of the presence of troops/hostilities, totalled 105,877km^2 and were present in nine of Ukraine's twenty-four oblasts (administrative regions)[4], as set out in Table 1.

It is believed that not all of the 105,877km^2 has yet undergone survey to establish suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) (or discredit the claimed presence of contamination). Therefore, not all of this area will contain EO, and less still will have CMR, despite widespread cluster munition use in Ukraine. A combined total of 70% of all potential hazardous areas are in the Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Sumy oblasts (regions).[5] It should also be noted that, where disaggregated data on hazardous areas have been collected, data are submitted to IMSMA with a list of the types of EO present and the area's designation as suspected or confirmed hazardous area. However, Ukraine generally states the extent of its EO challenge without disaggregation by weapon type, with most hazardous areas having a mixed threat.[6]

2 See "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine at: https://bit.ly/45vLlVT.

3 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Technical Adviser on Mine Action, Economic and Environmental, Organisation for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), 11 June 2025; and telephone interview with Paul Heslop, Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine, UN Resident Coordinator's office (UNRCO), 16 June 2025.

4 Ukraine has twenty-four oblasts, plus the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and two cities Special Status – Kyiv and Sevastopol. It is further divided into "hromadas" (municipalities).

5 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

6 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

Table 1: Area scheduled for primary NTS which may contain CMR, AP mines, or other contamination by oblast (at end 2024) (National authority estimate)[7]

Oblast/District	Areas that may contain CMR and require NTS	Area (km^2)
Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvorizhsky	24	1,255
Dnipropetrovsk/Nikopolskyi	5	1,472
Donetsk/Kramatorskyi	83	4,464
Kyiv/Brovarskyi	52	2,767
Kyiv/Buchanskyi	82	2,554
Kyiv/Vyshhorodskyi	128	4,314
Kyiv/Fastivskyi	68	1,406
Zhytomyr/Korostenskyi	13	3,948
Mykolaiv/Bashtanskyi	347	4,466
Mykolayiv/Mykolayivskyi	335	5,493
Sumy/Konotopskyi	7	5,188
Sumy/Okhtyrskyi	8	3,195
Sumy/Romenskyi	1	2,395
Sumy/Sumskyi	19	5,961
Sumy/Shostkinskyi	50	2,694
Kharkiv/Bohodukhivskyi	3	2,128
Kharkiv/Izyumskyi	1,030	5,912
Kharkiv/Kupyanskyi	467	2,222
Kharkiv/Lozivskyi	3	2,805
Kharkiv/Kharkivskyi	131	1,606
Kharkiv/Chuhuyivskyi	118	4,015
Kherson/Beryslavskyi	400	4,750
Kherson/Khersonskyi	62	2,085
Chernihiv/Koryukivskyi	4	4,604
Chernihiv/Nizhynskyi	20	7,205
Chernihiv/Novhorod-Siverskyi	2	4,634
Chernihiv/Chernihivskyi	137	10,130
Chernihiv/Prylutskyi	3	2,209
Totals	**3,602**	**105,877**

The nature of EO contamination in Ukraine has been described as "unique" for three reasons. Firstly, there is a "scale, complexity and overlapping nature of different threats" not seen since the Second World War. Secondly, EO-contaminated areas are very heavily contaminated, unlike anything seen since the World Wars. Finally, many areas suspected to be contaminated—for example, because they were briefly occupied—have proven to contain little or no contamination.[8]

Access by non-governmental operators to perform survey or clearance within 20km of the front lines of conflict and State borders was prohibited in 2023 and remained so at the time of writing.[9] The front line is approximately 1,000km long and 5km deep. Inside this area is where the vast majority of EO contamination is believed to be situated.[10] Outside this buffer zone international operators recorded areas of CMR contamination in 2024.[11] Even in areas that are accessible, however, barriers to accurate survey still exist. Some operators caution that resurvey will be necessary in many areas, either due to recontamination or due to the displacement of people, which left few or no witnesses to new contamination. As such, some polygons will require further refinement once more data become available.[12]

According to the Monitor, "both parties to the conflict continued to use cluster munitions during 2023 and the first half of 2024, but it was not possible to systematically document and attribute the continued use of these weapons, given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities."[13] The Monitor also states that, as of July 2024, "at least 13 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions had been used in Ukraine since February 2022. These types of cluster munitions are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and mortar projectiles, except for the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft".[14] Subsequently, in May 2025, the first use of the OAB-2.5RT submunition was reported in Ukraine, which was deployed by Russian forces. Several unexploded submunitions of this type were found in the Donetsk region, along with the tail fin of an RBK-500 dispenser bomb. The OAB-2.5RT is a spin-armed, aerially-delivered, high explosive fragmentation (HE-FRAG) anti-personnel submunition.[15]

From the outset of its attack against Ukraine that began in late February 2022, Russia's armed forces have used cluster munitions extensively against Ukrainian military objectives, as well as, in violation of international law, against the civilian population and civilian objects. The exact number of cluster munition attacks is unknown, but as at May 2024, hundreds had been documented or reported[16] in at least

7 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

8 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", The United Nations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peace Operations (DPO), and UNMAS, January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3R6uvEl.

9 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konovalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

10 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

11 Emails from Michael Edwards, Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Operations Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, Head of Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding, Ukraine, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, Country Director, Fondation suisse de déminage (FSD) Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, Deputy Head of Operations (Support), The HALO Trust (HALO), 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, Programme Manager, Ukraine, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, Programme Manager, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), 12 May 2025.

12 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Julie Bouvier, Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) Specialist, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 16 May 2024.

13 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025, at: https://bit.ly/40CrdNo.

14 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 20 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/40CrdNo. A table listing all types of cluster munitions used in Ukraine in 2022–24 is available there.

15 "First use of OAB-2.5RT submunition in Ukraine", Fenix Insight Bulletin, 27 May 2025.

16 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3V7hU6T; and Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine 2023", at: https://bit.ly/3wwcJUF.

ten oblasts, including: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.[17] Further cluster munition attacks on civilian objects have been documented. On 7 March 2025, several munitions struck a residential area in Dobropillia, Donetsk region, including a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which evidence indicated likely dispersed cluster munitions.[18] On 4 April 2025, Russian forces struck a residential area in Kryvyi Rih in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, reportedly using an Iskander-M ballistic missile with a cluster warhead, which exploded mid-air over a "densely populated neighbourhood, directly hitting a children's playground", and killing twenty people, nine of whom were children. It was further reported that on 13 April, two ballistic missiles with cluster munitions were launched at central Sumy, killing 35 people and injuring a further 120. On 18 April, Russian forces reportedly launched three Iskander missiles, one of which had a cluster warhead that exploded near a residential building and struck a civilian company in Kharkiv, injuring almost 100 people.[19] It should be noted that, while these examples of cluster munition use by Russian Forces are provided based on available information, there may be other unrecorded cases that cannot be documented until NTS is undertaken.

Ukraine's forces have also used cluster munitions in the current conflict, including in 2024. According to the Monitor, Ukraine used US-supplied M39A1 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles, equipped with a cluster munition warhead in an April 2024 attack on a military airfield at Dzhankoi, in occupied Crimea. The Monitor also refers to unconfirmed reports that Ukraine has used cluster munitions delivered by ATACMS to attack targets in Russia, but has not been able to verify these claims.[20] On 16 October 2024, the US Department of Defense announced a further US transfer of cluster munitions of unspecified type to Ukraine; the seventh transfer since the first one in July 2023.[21] Prior to July 2023, Ukrainian forces appear to have used cluster munitions at least three times in its fight against the Russian forces on Ukrainian territories.[22]

Further supply of cluster munitions to Ukraine from other States than the US was also reported in 2024, notably from Poland.[23] Media sources reported that Turkey began sending cluster munitions to Ukraine, notably DPICMs, in late 2022,[24] though Türkiye and Ukraine have denied the transfer.[25] However, photos circulated on social media in August 2023 purported to show Turkish-made 155mm M483A1 cluster munition projectiles being used in Ukraine by Ukrainian forces.[26] Several media outlets reported that Ukraine requested cluster munitions from Estonia and the US in 2022.[27] According to limited and unverified sources, Israeli-made (or copied) M971 120mm cluster munition mortar projectiles were photographed in the possession of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 2022. Each projectile delivers 24 M87 DPICM submunitions. It is not known how or from whom Ukraine may have acquired it.[28]

Use of a German-manufactured SMArt 155 artillery shell by Ukraine against two Russian tanks has also been documented, with these munitions reportedly first sent to Ukraine by Germany in March 2023. This weapon uses a pair of 'smart' anti-armour mines in a howitzer shell that flies submunitions to a target.[29] It is believed to fall within the limited exception for sensor-fuzed weapons excluded from the prohibitions in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) under its Article 2(2)(c).[30] A March 2023 Russian press article reported that the remains of a SMArt 155 (DM702 A1) submunition had been found at the position of a Russian battalion near the city of Kremennaya in Luhansk. The possibility was noted, however, that this submunition could have reached Ukraine via a State other than Germany.[31]

In July 2023, Human Rights Watch reported that Ukrainian cluster munition rocket attacks on Russian-controlled areas in and around the city of Izium in eastern Ukraine during 2022 had caused many casualties among Ukrainian civilians.[32] Ukraine is not a State Party to the CCM and is not therefore bound by its provisions, although use of cluster munitions are subject to the applicable rules of international humanitarian law. It has stated that it will record the location of any cluster

17 Human Rights Watch, "Growing Civilian Toll from Russian Cluster Munition Attacks", 25 August 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3mEdO7C; and *Cluster Munition Monitor 2022*, p. 14.

18 "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2024-31 May 2025", United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), p. 8.

19 "Cluster Iskander missiles rocking peaceful cities: Tactics and threat to civilians", *RBC Ukraine*, 18 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43XlWmN. The 4 April and 13 April 2025 attacks (among other attacks by Russian forces on civilian areas, involving various weapons) are also documented by the OHCHR, though there is no specific mention of use of cluster munitions. See: "Sustained large-scale attacks by Russian armed forces kill and injure civilians across Ukraine in April", OHCHR, 24 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4lb7yNe. The following report notes that Kyiv said the attack "involved the usage of a cluster munition": "Zelenskyy Calls Out 'Weak' US Response To Russian Playground Strike That Killed 9 Children", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 4 April 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4kVrHaB.

20 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

21 "Seventh U.S. Transfer of Banned Cluster Munitions Condemned", Cluster Munition Coalition, 17 October 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3FhwFii.

22 "To Push Back Russians, Ukrainians Hit a Village With Cluster Munitions", *The New York Times*, 18 April 2022, at: https://bit.ly/41NMZgv; Human Rights Watch, "End Cluster Munition Attacks in Ukraine", 11 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3lx3cTX; and OHCHR, "Situation of human rights in Ukraine in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation", Report, 29 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3AkenqJ, p. 12.

23 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

24 "Turkey Is Sending Cold War-Era Cluster Bombs to Ukraine", *Foreign Policy*, 10 January 2023, at: http://bit.ly/3KwekwG.

25 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine 2023".

26 Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine Cluster Munition Ban Policy", accessed 28 January 2025.

27 "Ukraine seeks US cluster bombs to adapt for drone use – lawmakers", Reuters, 7 March 2023, at: http://bit.ly/3GuBL8e; "Estonia weighing giving Ukraine cluster munitions", *Estonian Public Broadcasting*, 26 January 2023, at: http://bit.ly/3GrCpTW; and "Exclusive: Biden administration weighs Ukrainian requests for access to US stockpile of controversial cluster munitions", CCN, 8 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Ghwiv2.

28 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, "Ukraine 2023".

29 "Cluster Munitions for Ukraine: Everything You Need to Know About Washington's Green Light Decision", *Kyiv Post*, 7 July 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3www4VL.

30 "A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics: (i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions; (ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms; (iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object; (iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism; (v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature".

31 "The remains of a German guided anti-tank submunition from a SMArt 155 projectile were found near Kremennaya", Top War, 5 March 2023, at: https://bit.ly/4bFWNyo.

32 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

munition use by its own forces, as well as adhering to certain other principles. Following the US announcement on 7 July 2023 that it would supply DPICMs to Ukraine, Ukraine's Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov presented five principles that he said the armed forces would respect upon receiving the cluster munitions:

- use them only in Ukraine;
- not use them in "urban areas (cities)" but only "in the fields where there is a concentration of Russian military";
- keep a strict record of where the munitions were used;
- conduct clearance activities after the de-occupation of the areas where the munitions were used; and
- report to partners on the use of the munitions and their efficiency.[33]

Wherever possible, State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) personnel have cleared the contamination resulting from the use of EO, including CMR, immediately after use.[34] Ukraine asserts that it is continuing to clear CMR following de-occupation of areas[35] as well as undertaking rapid response to clear EO contamination in the buffer zone along the line of conflict.[36] Ukraine also has CMR contamination that predates the current conflict with Russia. Before 2022, Ukraine said that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,[37] with the most intensive use of cluster munitions said to have occurred in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk region.[38]

A total of 69.8km^2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination, all of which has occurred since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, was recorded by international operators in 2024, across 374 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 69 SHAs.[39] This is a more than ninefold increase on the 7.5km^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area recorded by international operators in 2023.[40] National operator Humanitarian Security also recorded 66.86km^2 of new contamination across 199 CHAs and five SHAs,[41] which, added to that recorded by international operators, brings the total to 136.7km^2 (see Table 16). Official IMSMA data provided to Mine Action Review in July 2025 recorded a lower figure of 125.06km^2 for previously unrecorded CMR contamination entered into the national database in 2024[42] (see Table 15).

Ukraine's national mine action strategy includes a target to complete "initial non-technical survey (NTS) in 100 per cent of the territories controlled by Ukraine, where it is possible to carry out humanitarian demining", including survey of CMR, by the end of 2026.[43] As at May 2025, however, it was not known whether Ukraine was on track to achieve this.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Ukraine is also contaminated by huge quantities of other ERW as well as by AP and anti-vehicle mines used during the different conflicts (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Ukraine for further information on the mine problem). It is also affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from the First and Second World Wars[44] and remnants of Soviet military training and abandoned stockpiles.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Humanitarian demining in Ukraine is coordinated by the First Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) of Ukraine, also the Minister of Economy as at July 2025.[45] The Ministry of Economy (MoE), ensures interaction of central executive bodies on humanitarian demining matters[46] and has overall responsibility for strategic planning and system coordination.[47] Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy, which covers the period 2024–33, was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 28 June 2024.[48]

33 Ibid.

34 "See how Kharkiv's bomb squad neutralizes cluster bombs in Ukraine", *National Public Radio (NPR)*, 24 April 2022, at: https://n.pr/3NqnQ47; and SESU Facebook page, 8 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3G04DDJ.

35 Human Rights Watch, "Ukraine: Civilian Deaths from Cluster Munitions", 6 July 2023.

36 Interview with Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA, MoD, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

37 SESU, "Humanitarian demining in Ukraine: current issues and challenges", Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties (14MSP), Side event, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

38 Interview with Lt.-Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Mine Action Department, MoD, in Geneva, 20 May 2016.

39 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

40 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

41 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

42 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

43 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine order dated 28 June 2024, Order No. 616-p on approval of the National Mine Action Strategy for the period up to 2033 and approval of the operational action plan for its implementation in 2024–2026", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals", at: https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

44 See, e.g., "During a Year in Kerch and Sevastopol neutralized 33,000 munitions", *Forum*, 4 December 2009.

45 Yulia Svyrydenko, at the time of writing, July 2025.

46 "Soul of Soil", UN Development Programme (UNDP), accessed 19 February 2024, at: https://www.soulofsoil.com.ua/uk.

47 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

48 "Government approves National Mine Action Strategy and Operational Plan for its implementation for the first 3 years", Government of Ukraine, 28 June 2024, at: https://bit.ly/46iT1cj; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the primary body responsible for developing and approving mid-term and long-term national plans for mine action, alongside operative plans.[49] It is an inter-ministerial body, with 17 Ministries represented as at April 2025.[50] The NMAA secretariat has responsibility for coordinating the work of the Mine Action Centre (MAC). The MAC and the Interregional Center For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU share the remits of information management (IM), quality assurance (QA), monitoring, planning, and certification of the operators.[51] The NMAA also coordinates the ministries, central and local State bodies, local government, and other organisations (including mine action operators). While the MoE is the main policy-making body, the NMAA approves and ensures State mine action policy; monitors and reports on State progress in fulfilling its obligations in mine action under international treaties; and coordinates the development and execution of mine action strategy, the national mine action programme, and action plans.[52] While the NMAA sits at ministerial level, it is serviced by a secretariat with "some" managerial functions.[53]

The Sectoral Working Group (SWG), introduced in 2023, is an advisory body at the MoE, which "functions as a unified platform for coordinating and aligning cooperation efforts in the field of humanitarian demining between Ukrainian governmental authorities and development partners." It is co-chaired by the DPM, the UN Resident Co-ordinator (UN RC), and the Ambassador of Japan. As at May 2025 the SWG had held three meetings since its establishment; two in 2023, and one in May 2024.[54] The Working Group includes representatives from several ministries and other key national entities.[55]

The Centre of Humanitarian Demining (CHD) was established in April 2023 as a State institution under the Economic and Financial Department of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers.[56] The CHD was established with the aim of improving coordination and mobilising resources. It is now the driving force behind Ukraine's State-funded land release compensation programme and is engaged in building up Ukraine's QA capacity, as well as working in many other areas of mine action.[57]

There are nominally four national supervisory and management bodies in Ukraine: the MAC, located in Chernihiv, which is under the SSTS and, in turn, under the MoD (for operational matters, including co-ordination and tasking); the Interregional Center For Humanitarian Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU, located in Merefa (hereafter, "the centre at Merefa");[58] the inter-ministerial NMAA, serviced by a secretariat; and, at the top of the hierarchy, an inter-ministerial committee on humanitarian demining. A regional centre, the Kharkiv Mine Action Coordination Centre, was established in 2024 under the Governor of Kharkiv oblast.[59]

Three bodies are responsible for certification of operators and processes:[60] the centre at Merefa; the Demining Centre of Military Unit A2641, located in Kaminiets Podilsky; and the MAC in Chernihiv. These three bodies are also responsible for quality management (QM) tasks. Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy acknowledges that the ability of these institutions to carry out QM responsibilities "does not meet the needs of today" and that quality control (QC) and external monitoring require attention as part of systems improvement. It also cites the need for a "unified procedure" for certification of operators and processes.[61] Progress on both these matters is being made. As previously noted, the CHD is engaged in efforts to build QA capacity. In February 2024 Ukraine's Cabinet introduced a certification procedure for mine action operators, which unifies the separate lists of required documentation and separate lead times previously required by the three above-mentioned certification bodies.[62] In November 2024, the government adopted a further resolution that provided for the launch of a digital "Diia" accreditation portal, intended to further simplify and automate certification. The portal, which is being set up by the MoE and Ministry of Digital Transformation,[63] was due to go live by the end of 2025.[64] Details of the required process for certification as a mine action operator in Ukraine are publicly available on the Government's Demine Ukraine website.[65]

In March 2024, the Cabinet adopted Decree 284, approving the Procedure for Compensation of Costs for Humanitarian Demining of Agricultural Land, allowing land owners to reclaim from the Government 80% of the costs of demining

49 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3JY8fce.

50 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

51 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 13 February 2020; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

52 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and DRC Special Legal Alert – "NMAA Framework 2022", Issue 73, January 2022.

53 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; and email from the GICHD, 17 June 2022.

54 "The Sectoral Working Group", Demining Ukraine, 2 July 2024, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3zUWlhA.

55 Email from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), 23 July 2024.

56 "Center for Humanitarian Demining established in Ukraine", *Interfax Ukraine*, 7 April 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3LDzj1g; and "Cabinet adopts changes to the Humanitarian Mine Action Architecture in Ukraine", Special issue of DRC Legal Alert, Issue 98, October 2023.

57 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

58 As previously noted, staff were relocated away from Merefa to Kyiv part way through 2024, due to the intensity of aerial attacks in the area. However, to avoid confusion, the term "the centre at Merefa" has been maintained throughout this report.

59 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

60 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024, No. 616-", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems", at: https://bit.ly/4cKpA5j.

61 Ibid. The document states that a fourth body is also responsible for QM, naming the Humanitarian Demining Centre. However, it is not known if this is intentional, as the centre at Merefa is also listed.

62 Decree №123 was adopted 2 February 2024. "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 102, 1 February–31 March 2024", at: legal-alert-issue-102.pdf, pp. 2–3.

63 "The Ukrainian government has adopted a resolution that provides for the launch of the certification process for mine action operators on the Diia portal", International Demining Group, 27 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3FocPlC.

64 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

65 "How to Become a Mine Acton Operator", Demine Ukraine, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4jjZFnA.

of each plot. In August 2024 this was amended to 100% of the cost of such services.[66] The objective of this programme is to restore economic activity in EO-affected areas. Farmers apply through the State Agrarian Register (SAR). As at June 2025, 482 applications had been received; 69 contracts had been signed; and the cycle of land release had been completed under 26 contracts, covering a total area of about 25km^2.[67]

A national mine action law was adopted by Ukraine's parliament in 2018,[68] although the government did not proceed with its implementation on the grounds it was inconsistent with a number of other legal acts.[69] Amended legislation was passed in December 2020. The amended law created the two National Mine Action Centres (NMACs) at Cherniv and Merefa.[70] The MAC is said to play a pivotal role in planning and organisation of mine action, and, in the context of the current conflict, is the main coordination body for operations.[71] Reporting by mine action operators and their interaction with the NMAA is managed through the MAC and the NMAA Secretariat.[72]

The MoE continued to lead on coordination of the mine action sector more broadly in 2024. Operators report being consulted and involved in key decision making by the national authorities to a certain extent, for example, through these coordination meetings as well as national mine action standards (NMAS) drafting workshops. However, some operators also note that the complex nature of Ukraine's mine action oversight and regulation framework; the variety of institutions and government and military bodies involved; and their complex relations to one another, mean that key decision-making processes are not always completely transparent or inclusive. Operators also acknowledge that the ongoing war and state of martial law does preclude the national authorities from including operators fully in decision-making processes.[73]

In addition to the MoE, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Mine Action Area of Responsibility (MA AoR) also remained a key coordination mechanism[74] and continued meeting in 2024.[75] However, a formal transition is in progress from the Mine Action AoR to an MoE-led coordination structure. Presently, UNDP coordinates the MA AoR as part of the Protection Cluster, supporting the broader UN response and providing coordination in partnership with State institutions, national and international operators, other UN agencies, and the private sector. In line with Ukraine's National Mine Action Strategy (2024–33) and Operational Plan (2024–26), the Government of Ukraine, through the MoE, is leading efforts to enhance coordination and governance in the sector. UNDP will support the planned transition of the MA AoR from UNDP to full national ownership by 2030.[76] Additionally, the Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN at the UN Resident Co-ordinator Office in Ukraine (UNRCO) convenes meetings approximately every other month of the key eight to twelve partners providing technical advice and support; there are two local Mine Action Support Group (MASG) meetings per year in advance of the global MASG meetings in Geneva and New York; and the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group meets approximately five times per year.[77] A Mine Action Donor Coordination Workshop also took place in Kyiv in April 2024[78] and the Ukraine Mine Action Conference (UMAC) took place in Lausanne on October 2024,[79] with a further UMAC planned for autumn 2025, in Tokyo.[80] A multi-stakeholder coordination workshop took place in Geneva in April 2025 as well as a multi-stakeholder workshop in Kyiv in May 2025, to review the interim results of the national mine action strategy implementation.[81] Participants proposed multiple changes to the operational plan including expanding the programme of State compensation for demining to forests; adding new mechanisms to attract innovation; and improving the formats of mine action support for veterans, women, and victims of EO.[82]

Overall, operators have reported a positive environment for mine action and facilitation of the operators' work by the Ukrainian government. The HALO Trust (HALO), the largest international operator working in Ukraine, reports having a close working relationship with national and local

66 "DRC's Legal Alert: Issue 108, 1–30 September 2024", at: https://bit.ly/3EeHn8l, p. 8.

67 "Ukraine Mine Action Today and Tomorrow", Presentation from Roman Konokalov, Mine Action Department of the MoD, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025. Mine Action Review did not request information on how much of this area, if any, was contaminated with CMR as this would provide only partial understanding of the CMR problem.

68 OSCE, "Ukrainian parliament adopts legal framework for mine action, with OSCE advice provided", 10 December 2018, at: http://bit.ly/2QdTaqo; and interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 7 February 2019; and email, 13 June 2019.

69 DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020.

70 The Law of Ukraine on Mine Action, No. 2642-VIII, Chap. III, Art. 23; DRC-DDG Legal Alert Special, "Mine Action Law Amendment", Issue 56, September 2020; and interview with Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 13 February 2020.

71 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024; and interview with Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Administrator, Information Management System for Mine Action, Ministry of Defence, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

72 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, submitted to the Chair of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.

73 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

74 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

75 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) by Paul Heslop, Senior Mine Action Adviser to the UN Resident Coordinator Ukraine, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 6.

76 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025.

77 Telephone interview with Paul Heslop, UNRCO, 16 June 2025.

78 "Ukraine Identifies Strategic Mine Action Goals to Strengthen National Recovery – Two-Day Donor Workshop Ends", Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 19 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43LfSgR.

79 "GICHD Update", Presentation to the MASG, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 3.

80 "Japan ready to host Ukraine Mine Action Conference – Economy Ministry", *Ukrinform*, 19 June 2024, at: http://bit.ly/4f2QOGi.

81 Emails from Government of Ukraine, 18 July and 1 August 2025.

82 "Progress in the implementation of the National Mine Action Strategy: a two-day workshop was held in Kyiv", Demine Ukraine, 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4l8LRwX.

authorities, but also continues to advocate for greater involvement in strategic planning.[83] Ukrainian authorities are reportedly proactive when it comes to signing memoranda of understanding (MoUs) and facilitating cooperation with partners.[84] But importation legislation has proven restrictive, as many types of mine action equipment (e.g. machines, detectors) are considered "military", which involves additional constraints. Further importation rules and documentation apply to international NGOs,[85] though FSD notes that being registered as a "charitable fund" has removed these challenges with importing equipment, allowing it to, in effect, be treated as a national NGO.[86] Operators also note that visa restrictions can sometimes make it difficult for international staff from some countries to enter Ukraine.[87]

Conscription of male staff was highlighted as major challenge for mine action operators in 2024. Operators held several meetings on this issue with the national mine action authorities and the MoE, during 2024, which were generally supportive. As at May 2025, a procedure was in place to allow international operators to obtain up to 100% exemption from conscription for their staff,[88] including half of field staff.[89] As would be expected, the security situation in 2024 limited humanitarian demining operations at times, for example, UAV flights were grounded during active air alerts or at the order of local military authorities on occasion, and temporary stop work orders were instituted for parts of Sumy and Kherson Oblasts at different points during the year, requiring HALO, for example, to redeploy teams to other areas. HALO were able to redeploy flexibly, resulting in no loss in overall productivity.[90] Due to the active conflict, not all hromadas[91] or all parts of hromadas assigned to operators are accessible.[92]

The requirements for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) certification remained the same in 2024, with the main challenge still the approval process for transport and storage of explosives.[93] There are two separate processes involving different stakeholders. The process for acquiring permission to use, transport, and store explosives is the same whether an organisation wishes to undertake demining or another relevant activity such as quarrying, and involves the Ministries of Labour and of the Economy. EOD accreditation, on the other hand, is implemented by the mine action centres. It is reportedly the permissions process for explosives that has caused difficulties rather than the EOD accreditation process. Ukraine requires that the destruction of any ordnance identified by international operators that do not have EOD certification is carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service (SSTS), or SESU.[94] In some cases, this can delay further work at a site until the hazard is cleared. Operators do report good cooperation with SESU and Ukrainian Armed Forces in the process of demolition of items found during clearance.[95]

HALO eventually gained EOD accreditation in December 2023, after a ten-month process, and FSD in August 2025, also after a 10-month process. However, as HALO and FSD highlight, even once certified challenges remain with the efficient management, storage, and transportation of explosives.[96] Additionally, the current permission and simplified accreditation are only valid under martial law. Once martial law is lifted, all EOD operators will be required to meet the full list of accreditation requirements, which HALO states previously made it almost impossible to conduct EOD.[97] As at April 2025, Danish Refugee Council (DRC) was working through the required steps to gain permission to use explosives.[98] As mentioned, FSD received certification to conduct demolitions in August 2025 and plans to use low-order techniques (for example, methods such as deflagration, used to neutralise UXO by burning the explosive material within the casing, rather than detonating it) as a way around the challenge of storage and transportation of explosives.[99] Humanitarian Security received EOD accreditation in April 2025.[100] Further information on the required process for obtaining permits for the acquisition, transportation, destruction, and storage of explosive materials by mine action operators can be accessed on the Government's Demine Ukraine website.[101]

83 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.
84 Email from Dino Šujak, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) Ukraine, 16 May 2024.
85 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, Country Director, Ukraine, MAG, 26 April 2024; and Julie Bouvier, HI, 16 May 2024.
86 Email from Tony Connel, FSD, 25 June 2024.
87 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; Julie Bouvier, HI, 16 May 2024; and Tony Connel, FSD, 25 June 2024.
88 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.
89 Email from Eleanor Porrit, FSD, 28 July 2025.
90 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
91 A hromada is the basic unit of administrative division in Ukraine, similar to a municipality.
92 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
93 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.
94 The Work Plan for Humanitarian Demining of De-occupied Territories of Ukraine for 2024, 30 April 2024, Annex 1.
95 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024.
96 Emails from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 28 July 2025.
97 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.
98 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.
99 FSD highlights that low-order EOD techniques can significantly reduce noise, shockwaves, and physical damage, compared to traditional high-order detonation methods, and can be a more environmentally friendly and cost-effective option for UXO disposal. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 5 June 2025.
100 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 1 June 2025.
101 "Permits for Activities with Explosives", Demine Ukraine, 1 July 2024, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mo84cp.

Ukraine continued to collaborate with implementing partners and operators on capacity building in its national programme during 2024. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) support focused on the development of Ukraine's first national mine action strategy and implementation plan; NMAS, including land release, mechanical operations and detection systems involving animals (ADS); and Ukraine's mine action information management system.[102] As at April 2025, GICHD was planning a programme of needs assessment and organisational development support for national mine action organisations, as well as preparing a report on gender and diversity in mine action in Ukraine.[103]

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) continues to be engaged in mine action systems building, including on the environment and mine action[104] and the development of a unified EOD training curriculum, piloted in 2024 with participants from SSTS, SESU, and National Police EOD personnel.[105] UNDP's five-year mine action project in Ukraine continued to provide equipment and technical, expert, and strategic support. UNDP's project also involves innovative technologies for mine action such as satellite imagery, remote mine detection, artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning.[106] The UN World Food Programme (WFP) continued to work with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Government of Ukraine, and FSD during 2024 to survey small-scale agricultural land for the presence of mines and other ERW; to clear land where necessary; and support safe release for food production. As at February 2025 the project was underway in Kharkiv.[107]

The national authorities and operators also continued to receive capacity development and training from international operators in 2024, including from HALO in the areas of NTS, manual demining, and gender mainstreaming.[108] HALO, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) also supported with delivery of QM training for the NMAA, coordinated by the GICHD.[109] DRC delivered EOD training to NMAA, SESU, and MAC personnel.[110]

SESU also received training and capacity development support. NPA continued efforts to establish a sustainable mine detection dog (MDD) capability within SESU, training and providing six MDDs and providing staff training.[111] FSD provided technical expertise and capacity development to SESU in mechanical ground preparation.[112] Several international operators including DRC and HALO, donated equipment to the MAC and SESU, including vehicles; metal detectors; EOD kits, personal protective equipment (PPE); first aid kits; and office and IT equipment.[113]

It has been suggested that there is the need for a more joined-up approach to capacity development support to the national authorities in Ukraine, and that an independent training needs analysis could be useful. International organisations and private companies in Ukraine are reportedly overlapping or duplicating support in some cases, both in terms of equipment provision and training.[114] As at March 2025, Ukraine stated that international assistance remained "of crucial need" for equipping MoD Ukraine demining teams with demining machines, vehicles for EO transportation, and International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)-compliant EOD training of all levels abroad – "due to safety in Ukraine".[115]

To support innovation the MoE announced the launch of the Humanitarian Demining Innovation Platform in February 2025, intended as a coordination platform, which can test and improve new technologies; attract investment and resources from international partners and companies; and facilitate innovation scaling and establishing technology production in-country.[116]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

It is not possible to capture the full extent of all funding for survey and clearance of CMR (along with other EO) made available in Ukraine in 2024. A summary of information provided by international humanitarian operators on their funding for survey and clearance in 2024, and forecast for 2025, is provided in Table 2. Due to the extensive and mixed nature of the EO threat, no distinct national resources are dedicated to survey and clearance of CMR, or any other particular type of EO, by the Government of Ukraine – all EO survey and clearance are funded as a whole.[117] The 2024 budget allocated by the government for all demining was UAH3 billion (approximately US$76 million).[118]

102 "GICHD Update", presentation to the MASG, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 2.

103 Interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025.

104 "Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine", OSCE, accessed 15 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dHLoze.

105 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

106 "Mine Action Project in Ukraine", UNDP, accessed 19 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43KwS5V.

107 "Ukraine", World Food Progamme, accessed 18 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mxy2u1.

108 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

109 Ibid.; and emails from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

110 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

111 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

112 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

113 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

114 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

115 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

116 "The Ministry of Economy launches a coordination platform for innovations in humanitarian demining", Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 17 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4mtijvT.

117 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

118 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head, Mine Action Office, Ministry of Economy, "Ukraine: Meeting Food Security Needs Through Integrated Mine Action", Side event, NDM, Geneva, 1 May 2024.

As at January 2025, it was claimed that more than US$1 billion had been pledged to mine action from international donors in the preceding two years. There is some concern that the future financial burden of mine action on Ukraine could be considerable if donor support decreases.[119]

Non-traditional or innovative funding is also being explored extensively for Ukraine's mine action sector, for example, through a UNDP study on potential innovative finance models in 2024,[120] and through a collaboration between the GICHD, the Mine Action Finance Initiative (MAFI), and Ukraine's MoE to develop and pilot innovative finance mechanisms for the Ukraine context, with the aim of scaling the mechanisms for the entire mine action sector.[121]

Various international operators in Ukraine were significantly impacted by the suspension of US funding in January 2025. FSD experienced a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in Ukraine as the expected new contract for US funding was not signed.[122] HALO's funding in Ukraine from the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) was suspended. As at June 2025, HALO remained optimistic that PM/WRA funding would continue.[123] NPA received a stop-work order from PM/WRA on 24 January 2025, pending a project review. This was partially lifted in February before being fully lifted on 12 March 2025. The project is scheduled to end on 30 November 2025.[124]

Table 2: Funding for survey and clearance by international operators in Ukraine (2024–25)[125]

Donor	2024	2025
Canada (Peace and Stabilisation Operations Programme (PSOP))	HALO, MAG	HALO (as at March 2025), MAG
Czech Republic (Ministry of the Interior)	HALO	HALO (as at March 2025)
Denmark (Danish International Development Agency (Danida), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA))	DCA, DRC	DCA (to end Q2 2025), DRC
EU European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)	DCA, DRC	DCA, DRC
European Commission, Foreign Policy Instruments (EU-FPI)	HALO, MAG	HALO (as at March 2025), MAG
Festival Medical (UK charity)	MAG	MAG
France (Crisis & Support Centre (CDCS))[126]	HALO	HALO (as at March 2025)
The Freeman Foundation	MAG	MAG
Germany (German Federal Foreign office (GFFO))	DCA, DRC, HALO, MAG, NPA	DCA, HALO (as at March 2025), MAG, NPA (until end June 2025)
Howard G. Buffett Foundation (HGBF)	DRC, FSD, HALO	DRC, FSD (to end October 2025), HALO (as at March 2025), MAG
The If! Foundation	MAG	MAG
Italy (Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS))[127]	MAG	MAG, DCA
Japan (Association for Aid and Relief)	HALO	HALO (as at March 2025)
KfW[128]	NPA (from Dec. 2024)	NPA
Latvia (MFA)	None	HALO
Luxembourg (MFA)	HALO	HALO (as at March 2025)

119 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

120 "Innovative Finance in Mine Action Progress to Date & New Initiatives. Progress since 4th Review Conference", Camille Wallen, Co-Founder & Director of Symbio Impact & MAFI, APBMC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 25–29 November 2024, pp. 11–12.

121 "MASG Intervention: Innovative Finance for Mine Action", GICHD, 29 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4k7av1n.

122 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

123 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025.

124 Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA Ukraine, 6 June 2025.

125 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 31 July 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 28 July 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

126 The Crisis and Support Centre (Centre de Crise et de Soutien) is part of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. See "France Diplomacy", Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, accessed 14 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/43f00A0.

127 L'Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo (AICS) is the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation. See www.aics.gov.it.

128 KfW is a German bank. In December 2024, NPA implemented a project with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) under NRC's donor KfW. Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Table 2 continued

Donor	2024	2025
Netherlands (MFA)	DRC, HALO, MAG	DRC, HALO (as at March 2025), MAG
The Netherlands Refugee Foundation (Stichting Vluchteling)	MAG	None
Norway (Norad[129]/MFA)	HALO, NPA	HALO (as at March 2025), NPA
Novo Nordisk Foundation[130]	DRC	DRC
The Sisley Foundation	MAG	MAG
Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA))	DRC	DRC
Swiss Solidarity	FSD	FSD
Switzerland (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation)	FSD, MAG	DRC, FSD, MAG
UNDP	HALO,[131] MAG, NPA	MAG, NPA
United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)	HALO, MAG	HALO (as at March 2025), MAG
Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF)[132]	DRC	None
US PM/WRA	DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG	DRC, FSD (to end January 2025 only),[133] MAG, NPA
Viterra[134]	HALO	HALO (as at March 2025)
WFP & FAO	FSD, NPA (in-kind support from WFP)	FSD, MAG (in-kind support from WFP), NPA in-kind support from WFP)
Other small donors (unspecified)	FSD, HALO	FSD, HALO (as at March 2025)

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Ukraine is taking steps to prioritise mainstreaming of gender and diversity concerns into all aspects of mine action. The National Mine Action Strategy incorporates nine measures intended to ensure equality and inclusion, including supporting veterans, mine-affected individuals, and persons with disabilities, as well as addressing gender inequality.[135] A national initiative group—the Gender Aspects in Mine Action Initiative— is up and running, and an assessment on gender and diversity in mine action was conducted in 2024. In February 2025, a multi-stakeholder workshop on gender and inclusivity took place, organised by the MoE and the GICHD. Recommendations called for tools to strengthen the capacities of different social groups and initiatives to improve political and legal frameworks.[136] As at April 2025, the MoE was working on an implementation and monitoring and evaluation plan for tracking gender and diversity in the sector,[137] while the GICHD was updating a report on gender and diversity in the sector.[138] It has also been suggested that national-level reporting could improve gender-specific details.[139]

129 Norad is the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, under Norway's MFA. See www.norad.no.

130 Novo Nordisk Foundation is an independent, Danish enterprise foundation. See www.novonordiskfonden.dk.

131 Although HALO's UNDP-funded land release project ended in 2024, HALO continues to cooperate with UNDP in other areas of mine action. Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

132 The Ukraine Humanitarian Fund is a country-based pooled fund led by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). See "Ukraine Humanitarian Fund", OCHA, accessed 15 May 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4j2JquT.

133 Ended as scheduled on 31 January 2025. As at 4 July 2025, the anticipated new contract was not signed due to freeze of US funding. Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March and 4 July 2025.

134 Viterra is a Dutch agriculture company. See www.viterra.com.

135 "Social Inclusion and Gender Equality in Mine Action: Outcomes of the Two-Day Workshop", Demine Ukraine, 21 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/3YRHf6j.

136 Ibid.

137 Interview with OSCE Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025; and email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

138 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025.

139 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

One of the tasks identified in the National Mine Action Strategy implementation plan for 2024–2026 is to increase the percentage of marginalised groups who are "engaged in mine action".[140] Operator policies related to gender are reportedly given consideration before operators are accredited. The same considerations and recommendations for equality of opportunity are applied by the national authorities to groups with disabilities, and steps are taken to promote equal access to employment in mine action for these groups.[141] All mine action operators, as with all businesses and organisations in Ukraine, are required to employ a certain percentage of persons with disabilities.[142]

With regard to increasing the numbers of female operational personnel, Ukraine has stated that, as it expands mine action operational capacity in the MoD up to an estimated 5,000 personnel, it expects female specialists to form up to 30% of the units, although no time frame for this has been given.[143] The NMAA states that, due to the ongoing Russian invasion against Ukraine, information regarding the composition of the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, which form all of Ukraine's Government demining units, is considered to be sensitive data, which cannot be shared. Thus, Table 3 highlights the total numbers of staff (male and female) employed across government demining units and the centres involved in humanitarian demining operations (the MAC at Cherniv and the Centre at Merefa); and certified mine action operators. The numbers for women staff included in Table 3 cover only those employed by certified mine action operators.[144]

Table 3: Gender composition of supervisory bodies and government demining units (at end 2024)[145]

Total staff*	Total women staff (GUs excluded)	Total managerial or supervisory staff*	Total women managerial or supervisory staff (GUs excluded)	Total operational staff*	Total women operational staff (GUs excluded)
4,395	179	879	20	3,516	159

* Includes the MAC at Chernihiv; the Centre at Merefa; the demining units of the armed forces, SESU, and SSTS; and national police EOD units.

Operators are required to provide gender and age-disaggregated beneficiary data.[146] All international survey and clearance operators implement their global gender, diversity, and inclusion policies at the country-level in Ukraine,[147] while HALO and MAG have developed country-specific gender and diversity strategies for their respective organisations in Ukraine.[148] According to some agencies, about 15% of those employed in mine action in Ukraine were women as at January 2025,[149] although Ukraine's MoD says the proportion of women engaged in mine action "exceeds 35%".[150]

A project underway with UN Women aims to bring 200 to 500 more women into the sector over the following 18 months, and ultimately increase the proportion to 40% to 50%, with women employed across all types of leadership, operational, and supporting positions.[151] DRC reports that the most commonly reported barriers to accessing the mine action sector identified by women, according to its 2023 perception survey, were: traditional gender stereotypes (26%); the perceived need for necessary previous military training (22%); and the need to work in remote locations (20%).[152] DRC's March 2024 report calls for recruitment processes to be strengthened so as to help overcome stereotypes about the mine action sector (particularly that military experience is required); reviewing working conditions, benefits, and pay packages; introducing shared parental/caretaker leave for both women and men; implementing capacity development plans to ensure career progression paths for women; and collecting and maintaining good, gender-disaggregated data for informed decision-making.[153] Further research on women's perceptions of employment in mine action and key barriers, published by FSD and NGO Girls in the first quarter of 2025, made recommendations on: strengthening of information and awareness-raising activities to dispel fears and stereotypes; clearly communicating that newcomers to the sector receive proper training to help ensure their safety; clear emphasis of the principles of gender equality and openness to the employment of women; and transparent and decent working conditions and pay.[154]

140 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

141 Interview with Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, MoD, in Geneva, 1 May 2024.

142 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025. This is a legal requirement according to Law of Ukraine No. 2682-IX of 18 October 2022 "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Protection of Social, Labor and Other Rights of Individuals, Including During Martial Law, and Simplifying the Registration of Jobs for Persons with Disabilities".

143 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

144 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

145 Ibid.

146 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

147 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 1 April 2023; Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February and 13 June 2022; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Denys Holovetskyi, HALO, 29 May 2023; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

148 Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

149 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

150 "Over one-third of mine action personnel in Ukraine are women", MoD of Ukraine, 21 February 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4dzVcfg.

151 "Mine Action in Ukraine: Interview with Paul Heslop", OROLSI, DPO, and UNMAS, January 2025.

152 "Ukraine: Gendered Perceptions and Participation in the Mine Action Sector", DRC, March 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3ST5w8p, p. 15.

153 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

154 "Women's Perceptions of Employment in Humanitarian Mine Action: Key Barriers" FSD and NGO Girls, February-March 2025, pp. 6-7, at: https://bit.ly/45ayEPo.

International operators are engaged in efforts to increase female employment in survey and clearance. Building on its gender perception survey findings of 2023, DRC launched a mass media campaign in June 2025.[155] DCA was, able, through a recruitment campaign featuring existing female staff as role models, to recruit, train, and deploy several female staff in 2024, including some as team leaders.[156] NPA was able to increase the proportion of all staff who are women by 10% between 2023 and 2024.[157] National NGO operator, Humanitarian Security, had no female deminers at the time of writing but planned to train six by July 2025.[158] National operator UDA has 40% female staff.[159]

Table 4: Gender composition of humanitarian mine action operators in 2024*[160]

Operator	Total staff	Total women staff	Managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Operational staff	Women operational staff
DCA	170	60 (35%)	45	17 (38%)	86	19 (22%)
DRC	330	96 (29%)	21	5 (24%)	309	84 (27%)
FSD	622	157 (25%)	111	70 (63%)	511	87 (17%)
HALO	1,546	441 (29%)	360	97 (27%)	1,308	322 (25%)
Hum. Security	65	7 (11%)	6	2 (33%)	59	5 (8%)
MAG	303	131 (43%)	70	21 (30%)	246	97 (39%)
NPA	342	126 (37%)	103	27 (26%)	285	94 (33%)
Totals	**3,378**	**1,018 (30%)**	**716**	**239 (33%)**	**2,804**	**708 (25%)**

* Includes data on all international survey and clearance operators and on national ones, where available. Mine Action Review was not able to source data on this matter from other national operators.

Initiatives to retain women, and parents, employed in survey and clearance in 2024 included the continuation of HALO's childcare stipend programme for mothers and single fathers, as well its parental leave programme. In 2024, HALO introduced additional support measures for working parents, including its "baby box" and "first grade kit" initiatives.[161] HALO, in partnership with Trimble, also launched the "Women in GIS for Demining" initiative, which trains and mentors female Geographic Information Systems (GIS) specialists from disadvantaged backgrounds. This project empowers women through technical skills development in geospatial technologies, allowing them to contribute to mine action and post-war recovery, while enhancing their long-term career prospects.[162] HALO also provides uniforms and PPE tailored for female employees.[163] In 2025, MAG planned to conduct an evaluation, exploring the impact of equitable employment practices, how these are mainstreamed throughout the programme, and if they are having an impact on retention of female staff.[164]

Efforts were also made to increase employment of war veterans in mine action. Various national and international operators, including Global Clearance Solutions (GCS), FSD, and HALO, worked alongside UNDP on a scheme, co-organised by the MoE and with the participation of other ministries, to enhance employment opportunities for military veterans.[165] In FSD, for example, the first cohort of 12 gained skills in operating drones, ground preparation machines, and detectors in 2024, and FSD planned to intensify its efforts in 2025.[166] HALO has mentorship programmes in place for war veterans.[167]

Measures were taken to increase recruitment of persons with disabilities and other under-represented groups into mine action. In 2024, MAG surpassed the minimum legal requirement that 4% of its workforce in Ukraine should comprise persons with disabilities, increasing from one staff member to 14 by the end of the year (more than 5% of its total workforce).[168] HALO conducts workplace accessibility assessments and took steps to enhance workplace

155 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025.

156 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

157 Emails from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024

158 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

159 "Birthday of the Ukrainian Deminers Association", 15 November 2024, at: https://bit.ly/43gCpCb.

160 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

161 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

162 Ibid.; and "She maps. She protects. Women in GIS for Safer Lands', Presentation from Luan Jaupi, Head of Information Management & ICT, HALO, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

163 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

164 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

165 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

166 "Training veterans in humanitarian demining", FSD, 24 December 2024, at: https://bit.ly/40zT0hF; and email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

167 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

168 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

accessibility in 2024. HALO also supported the MoE with a project to provide remote sensing imagery analysis training for a cohort of mine victims and employed many of the successful course participants. HALO is also collaborating with national NGOs and the State Employment Service of Ukraine to implement inclusive hiring practices, remove employment barriers, and provide tailored support to candidates from under-represented groups. Efforts include adjusting recruitment processes, improving workplace accessibility, and offering flexible work arrangements to accommodate employees with diverse needs.[169]

FSD, HALO, and MAG also highlight their efforts to employ community-facing personnel fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.[170] MAG provides enhanced and country-specific conflict sensitivity training for staff.[171] FSD provides cultural sensitivity training to staff, particularly for engagement with displaced populations and vulnerable groups.[172] Key written communications, such as risk education materials and warning signs are commonly provided in both Ukrainian and Russian.[173]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

It has been reported that there is good cooperation between the Ministries of the Economy, the Environment, and Defence, on mine action and the environment,[174] which extends to an environmental working group, with effective ministerial representation. The Department of Environment and Mine Action in the MoD coordinates all work on mine action and the environment, including research. The Conflict and Environment Observatory (CEOBS) highlights that Ukraine's environmental legislation and mine action legislation are not yet sufficiently aligned.[175]

Ukraine has a major strategic focus on demining agricultural land and, in turn, on soil specifically. In their January 2025 report on environmental degradation from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine, CEOBS and NPA recommend post-clearance soil sampling to help enhance understanding of the dispersal of metals and energetic materials from the use of explosive weapons.[176] The Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has set up a working group to establish a protocol for soil sampling, with the FAO leading on this and related research. QA and QC teams of the MoD are implementing soil sampling on operational demining sites, and these personnel undertook environmental auditor qualifications in 2024 to prepare for this;[177] an initiative supported by OSCE.[178] Strategies suggested to mitigate the environmental impact of mine action on agricultural land in particular include: avoiding use of explosives where possible; restoring farmland for production of non-food crops; and using cleared agricultural land to generate other non-crop sources of revenue, such as from solar panels and wind turbines.[179] It is understood that mechanical demining techniques widely applied to agricultural areas would not be suitable for clearance of EO-contaminated environmentally protected areas and forests.[180]

Ukraine's NMAS include a chapter (11.2.9) on "Environmental regulations", and a section (12.6) on "Environment, occupational health and safety".[181] Certain other standards further cover environmental aspects of demining, though not yet fully.[182] Operators report that Ukraine's NMAS on environmental management requires work to fully align it with the revised International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 07.13 (Second Edition, 3 July 2024). Key gaps include climate change adaptation and mitigation; environmental risk assessments; environmental impact assessments; and compliance with international standards such as ISO 14001.[183] The updated IMAS 7.13 has been translated into Ukrainian[184] and the technical committee on standardisation plans to develop an updated NMAS, though a target date for this had not yet been determined at the time of writing.[185]

The NMAA states that environmental assessments are conducted to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance of CMR and that environmentally friendly survey and clearance methods are applied where possible.[186] The OSCE is helping build the operational capacities of the national mine action centres to systematically conduct "environmentally safe" demining.[187]

169 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

170 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

171 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

172 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

173 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

174 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić and Iryna Maksymuk, OSCE, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

175 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, CEOBS, 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 15 June 2025.

176 "Assessing environmental degradation from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine", CEOBS and NPA, 16 January 2025, p. 12.

177 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, Researcher, CEOBS, 28 April 2025.

178 Interview with Miljenko Vahtarić and Iryna Maksymuk, OSCE, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.

179 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 15.

180 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, CEOBS, 28 April 2025; and email from Anna McKean, CEOBS, 15 June 2025.

181 Emails from Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022; and Imogen Churchill, HALO, 23 March 2022.

182 These include Ukraine's NMAS: 8820-2023 ("Mine action. Management processes. Basic Provisions") and parts four and five of this which address, respectively, mechanised demining (8820-4) and land release (8820-5). Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025; and "National Mine Action Standards", Communication Platform for Technical Regulation in Ukraine, accessed 20 July 2025, at: https://bit.ly/4m3vYZt.

183 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

184 Zoom interview with Anna McKean, CEOBS, 28 April 2025.

185 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

186 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

187 "Support to Environmental Rehabilitation with Focus on Building National Humanitarian Mine Action Capacities of Ukraine", OSCE, accessed 14 May 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4dHLoze.

The National Mine Action Strategy, approved in June 2024, does acknowledge the need for systemic consideration of the environment in mine action and outlines tasks related to the environment under each of the strategy's three strategic goals. These tasks include reducing pollution caused by EO; consideration of the environment during task prioritisation; and application of "environmentally friendly demining methods", especially in protected and conservation areas.[188]

International operators report varying approaches to the integration of environmental considerations into mine action in Ukraine. NPA applies its Green Office tool in Ukraine and, from May 2025, also began implementing the Green Field Tool. NPA Ukraine has conducted an environmental survey among staff and was developing an action plan based on findings at the time of writing.[189] DRC has an environmental management system in place[190] and all international operators have SOPs on environmental management.[191] MAG follows the direction of the NMAA with regards to environmental measures on task sites and includes environmental considerations in the planning and delivery of survey and clearance activities.[192] MAG also conducts post-clearance environmental assessments in line with its global standards.[193] FSD and DCA report to follow a "do-no-harm" approach, for example, ensuring field activities cause minimal disruption to the environment.[194] FSD also emphasises responsible use of mechanical assets to limit soil disturbance and limits the detonation of explosive ordnance where possible.[195]

Some international operators are also engaged in efforts to reduce emissions. In 2024, HALO continued to develop and apply its framework to calculate and reduce greenhouse gases across its demining operations and administration, using the Humanitarian Carbon Calculator Plus (HCC+) online software.[196] HALO and FSD also highlight the importance of deploying teams as close as possible to work sites reduce vehicle emissions.[197] Humanitarian Security uses solar energy in field camps.[198]

HALO Ukraine has formed a partnership with World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) Ukraine to restore the shelterbelts (vegetation barriers)[199] that HALO has demined in the Mykolaiv region. This project aims to have a positive impact on agriculture, help mitigate the impact of climate change, and contribute to the post-war recovery of affected communities.[200]

Table 5: International operator environmental policies and action[201]

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
DCA	Yes	Yes	No
DRC	Yes	No	No
FSD	Yes	Yes	No
HALO	Yes	In development (June 2025)[202]	Yes
NPA	Yes (country-specific)	Yes (from May 2025)	Yes
MAG	Yes	No	No

188 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Strategic goals, objectives and expected results aimed at achieving the defined goals".

189 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

190 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

191 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

192 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

193 Email from Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023.

194 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; and Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

195 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

196 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

197 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

198 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

199 A shelterbelt is a vegetation barrier, grown to protect crops and livestock from strong winds and to help prevent erosion, and topsoil depletion.

200 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

201 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April and 11 June 2025.

202 As at June 2025, HALO was testing the NPA/CEOBS Green Field Tool, which was in the final stage of development. Emails from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March and 19 June 2025.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Ukraine is using IMSMA Core.[203] Operators report that the system functions effectively, and all operators have been trained in its use.[204] It is said to meet information requirements for the programme, and that it has been structured to support and adapt to the specific data needs of mine action operators. Furthermore, the established connection between operators and the national database enables its use for geographic information systems (GIS) purposes, allowing operators to leverage spatial data for mapping.[205] Operators also report that the national database is up to date in so far as is possible in the context of the ongoing conflict.[206]

Survey and clearance data entered into IMSMA are validated by the MAC.[207] All accredited operators are required to regularly submit reports, including on NTS, TS, and clearance.[208] Data collection forms are regularly discussed and agreed with operators.[209] The IMSMA database receives new information daily from operators that is shared across key partners.[210] Ukraine states that access to its IMSMA Core portal is open to all certified operators "within the defined limits that do not contradict the privacy policy of sensitive data", as well as to government authorities involved in mine action, local authorities, international organisations, and the public at large.[211]

HALO developed an EOD reporting form in Survey123 in 2024, which is available for other operators to use once certified to conduct EOD operations. This has led to improved communication and co-ordination in this area between HALO and the MAC.[212] The MAC provides detailed, live information on a public website on progress in releasing EO-contaminated land, including the amount of land surveyed and cleared and the number of items destroyed (not disaggregated by weapon type), both by government units and humanitarian operators.[213]

Though large amounts of territory remain subject to primary NTS, so have not yet been excluded from being potentially contaminated, and not yet designated as SHAs or CHAs, Ukraine is collecting and recording disaggregated data in its IMSMA database in areas where it has access and where it has so far been able to conduct comprehensive NTS.[214]

PLANNING AND TASKING

The National Mine Action Strategy for 2024–33 focuses on three strategic goals: "land release, protection of the people, and system improvement". Ukraine plans to update the implementation plan every three years.[215] An operational plan for 2024–26 is attached to the strategy. The strategy does not specifically address CMR, but rather refers throughout to "explosive ordnance".[216]

Ukraine prioritises clearance of critical infrastructure facilities and population centres.[217] The National Mine Action Strategy identifies the need for better planning and tasking as part of systems improvement, citing "the formation of a system of prioritisation of tasks for mine action and the centralised distribution of relevant tasks by the authorised body" as prerequisites to effective, centralised task distribution in the country.[218] In October 2024, the Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine advocated for "clear and appropriate task dossiers, linked to prioritisation & outcomes", rather than output-focused demining.[219] A pilot project to improve prioritisation, in partnership between digital technology company Palantir and the MoE, was underway in Kharkiv in April 2025.[220] In March 2025, the national authorities published the "Methodological Guidelines for Prioritizing Areas Contaminated by Explosive Ordnance for Humanitarian Demining".[221] As at July 2025, this new methodology for prioritisation was being piloted, with assessment at the hromada, oblast, and national levels.[222]

203 Email from the GICHD, 26 May 2023.

204 Email from Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

205 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

206 Emails from Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

207 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

208 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; and Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024.

209 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

210 GICHD, "Ukraine faces massive explosive contamination one year into conflict", 24 February 2023.

211 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

212 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

213 Ukraine National Mine Action Center, MoD and SSTS, accessed 22 May 2025, at: https://ua-nmac.org/en/statistics/.

214 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

215 Presentation by Oleg Stoiev, Head of Mine Action Office, MoE, NDM, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

216 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p".

217 2023 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 3.

218 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".

219 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 28.

220 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025. See also "Palantir and Ministry of Economy of Ukraine Sign Demining Partnership", Palantir, 3 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/44LV5sq.

221 "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9. At the time of writing, in July 2025, this document was available in Ukrainian, but it was not known if it was also available in English.

222 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

Some changes to tasking procedures were made during 2024 and early 2025. A new procedure was introduced in 2024 requiring that humanitarian operators first request all tasks through the relevant oblast administration before an official task order is submitted to MAC. When the MAC and the oblast administration have differing priorities or inconsistent data availability, this has often led to significant delays. Improving coordination and data sharing between the MAC and the oblast administrations could help streamline this process.[223]

In early 2025, the MAC made changes to the task allocation process for hazardous areas requiring TS or clearance, such that operators now seek approval from the MAC, demonstrating they have capacity to begin work on a task within ten days of receiving approval. Unlike previously, requested tasks no longer need to be located in the hromadas originally designated to the operator for NTS or risk education. This allows greater flexibility for operators to apply for permission to conduct TS and clearance on high-priority hazardous areas.[224] The change could have been better communicated to all stakeholders, as initially there were delays in the issuing and renewal of task orders. By April 2025, however, the process was said to be working more effectively even though it has introduced an additional layer of bureaucracy.[225]

While there have been improvements, operators do highlight some continued challenges with tasking. For example, the annual assignment of areas for NTS can prove inefficient, as the NTS capacities of operators can change over the course of the year, leaving some operators constrained from conducting NTS where they have capacity and others unable to cover assigned areas adequately. Building more flexibility into the system of annual NTS area assignments would help ensure that operators with available resources are not constrained from conducting NTS in affected areas.[226]

Tasking for clearance sites can be lengthy and complicated, with approvals from several layers of administration required – and these bodies not always aligned on priorities.[227] HALO, at times, has encountered delays in obtaining allocation of new areas for survey from the MAC.[228] MAG also experienced challenges in tasking in early 2025, with other demining actors being issued task orders for clearance sites already issued to MAG. It seems that MAG was tasked for these sites within the IMSMA system, whereas others had been tasked by the MoE through the cadastral plot priority list, resulting in the overlap. The affected task sites were suspended while the issue of who has primacy to conduct clearance is resolved. This was ongoing as at April 2025.[229]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

NMAS were finalised by the MoD in 2018.[230] At the time, the GICHD considered that these were in line with IMAS whereas other stakeholders felt they needed further refinement, for example, by tailoring the criteria for direct and indirect evidence to the new operational context[231] and clarifying responsibilities for control and enforcement of marking systems.[232] In April 2023, Ukraine issued "improved" national standards covering NTS, TS, manual demining, clearance, mechanical demining, EO destruction, and EORE.[233] Certain revised NMAS were due to come into effect on 1 June 2024[234] and IM standards and QM standards were approved in 2024.[235] New land release and mechanical land release standards entered into force on 1 April and 1 May 2025, respectively, with the former meaning that humanitarian operators are finally able to cancel land through NTS (though only under certain criteria).[236] At the time of writing, MDD standards were expected to be released in 2025.[237] A new technical committee on the "Standardisation of Mine Action Processes" was established by the national authorities in March 2025.[238]

The changes to the NMAS in 2024 and early 2025 involved consultation with operators.[239] Though generally well received, challenges remain over how they are understood and implemented.[240] With regard to cancellation, according to the instructions issued by the MAC in August 2024, only areas with evidence of contamination from UXO, not areas with evidence of contamination from CMR or mines, may be resurveyed and cancelled.[241] Some operators suggest this is overly restrictive. HALO, for example, continues to advocate for revisions to

223 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

224 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

225 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

226 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

227 Ibid.

228 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

229 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

230 Emails from Gianluca Maspoli, GICHD, 25 September 2018; and Miljenko Vahtarić, OSCE, 25 September 2018; and interview, 7 February 2019.

231 Emails from the GICHD, 19 April 2023 and 19 June 2025.

232 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

233 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 7.

234 Presentation by Col. Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA, MoD, at NDM, Geneva, 29 April 2024.

235 Email from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.

236 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; interview with the GICHD, Geneva, 10 April 2025; and "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9.

237 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

238 "Mine Action in Focus, Issue 1", Demine Ukraine, MoE, June 2025, p. 9. This newsletter contains a link to a document in Ukrainian regarding this committee. At the time of writing (July 2025), it was not known if the document was also available in English.

239 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

240 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

241 This instruction was issued in the MAC's supplementary note No. 244, dated 21 August 2024. Email from the Government of Ukraine, 1 August 2025.

the instructions that enable operators to cancel areas that do not require further intervention, as very few tasks are eligible for cancellation under the current system.[242] This has been highlighted as particularly problematic, given that large areas of land are suspected of being contaminated by EO (primarily as a result of having been occupied by Russian forces), but without any evidence of contamination. The Senior Technical Advisor on Mine Action to the UN in Ukraine has advocated the adoption of a risk management approach "until land is confirmed as being contaminated or no evidence of mines is accepted"[243] and also suggests greater delegation of decision-making on cancellation, e.g. to the oblast level or further down.[244] These challenges and potential solutions apply equally to mine and CMR contamination. As already noted, under present instructions from the MAC, cancellation is not permitted in areas with a history of contamination of either weapon-type.

HALO points out that increased use of mechanical clearance techniques in Ukraine have the potential to dramatically increase the speed, efficiency, and safety of clearance, once context-specific methodologies have been refined and adapted to the terrain and threats in the country. HALO experienced some challenges with the process of accreditation of crewed mechanical assets during 2024, with delays to testing by the national authorities,[245] which require that at least one type of every asset is tested before approval and deployment.[246] The technical notes accompanying the NMAS on mechanical assets are also said to be not consistently understood or implemented across the sector.[247]

The Government states that Ukraine's QM system is an area for further improvement, as capacity remains challenging.[248] In October 2024 a "lack of scale of capacity to meet the needs of the sector, particularly for QM, QC and tasking" in Ukraine was highlighted to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), with a recommendation for further investment in QA and QM.[249] HALO reports that limited external QC capacity among the national authorities caused delays during 2024, preventing HALO from handing over completed tasks to local communities in a timely manner.[250] The MoD and SESU both have QA teams. However, respective roles and responsibilities for QA reportedly require clarification, and the national authorities were looking into this as at April 2025.[251]

In 2024, DRC and DCA each cleared one area recorded as containing CMR but with no CMR found.[252] HALO cleared four hazardous areas covering a total of 261,039m^2 that were recorded as containing CMR, but which proved to contain none (see Table 6).[253] When reflecting on this data, it should be noted again that most contaminated areas in Ukraine contain a mixed explosive threat.

Table 6: Areas cleared in 2024, which proved to contain no CMR (operator data)[254]

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)
DCA	1	271,907
DRC	1	14,567
HALO	4	261,039
Totals	**6**	**547,513**

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

As at July 2025, Ukraine had 108 certified mine action operators, including NGOs and government units, with more than 50 others undergoing accreditation.[255] The number of mine action operators in Ukraine has grown significantly since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, increasing from 29 in 2023[256] to 45 by July 2024,[257] and then doubling to 90 by April 2025. As at June 2024, total demining capacity in Ukraine reportedly exceeded 3,000 but was changing regularly.[258]

The NMAA calculated the combined total of all government unit survey, clearance, and EOD personnel stood at 4,395 in 2024, along with 221 mechanical demining assets (see Table 7).[259] This had increased to 278 by July 2025.[260] For 2023, Ukraine reported that clearance of all types of EO by government units in Ukraine involved 384 teams comprising 1,503 personnel in total.[261] This was approximately in line with Ukraine's plan to expand from 200 demining teams of more than 1,000 personnel in December 2022, to 400 teams

242 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
243 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 7.
244 Ibid, p. 28.
245 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
246 Interview with Government of Ukraine, 17 July 2025, online.
247 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.
248 Interview with Government of Ukraine, in Geneva, 11 April 2025.
249 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, pp. 25 and 28.
250 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
251 Interview with the GICHD, 10 April 2025.
252 Emails from and Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; and Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025.
253 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.
254 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; 8 April 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.
255 These numbers were correct as at 17 July 2025. See "List of Operators", Demine Ukraine at: https://bit.ly/45vLlVT.
256 "Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order dated 28 June 2024 No. 616-p", section entitled "Analysis of the current state of affairs, trends and justifications for the need to solve the identified problems".
257 "List of Mine Certified Mine Action Operators", ArcGIS Web Application, accessed 23 July 2024, at: https://bit.ly/3y9J58e.
258 Email from Paul Heslop, (then) UNDP, 7 June 2024.
259 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.
260 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.
261 FAO and WFP Presentation, NDM, 2024.

of 2,000 personnel in 2023[262] – nearly four times the capacity available in 2020.[263] Ukraine expected a further increase in capacity during 2025[264] and intends to set mine action operational capacity in the MoD at around 5,000 personnel. It was approaching this by the end of 2024 (see Table 7). It is not specified what level of this increased capacity will be available for the survey and clearance of CMR. However, Ukraine's plan for capacity growth refers throughout to "mines and explosive remnants of war".[265]

The MoD and several other ministries continue to deploy units that undertake rapid demining and EOD spot task destruction of mines and ERW. This includes the engineering units of the armed forces; SESU; national police EOD units; and the SSTS, which is responsible for demining national infrastructure.[266] The Armed Forces of Ukraine and police EOD teams are reportedly at the forefront of emergency response in disposing of ERW in newly accessible areas.[267]

Table 7: Government unit capacities deployed for CMR survey, clearance, and destruction in 2024[268]

Type of unit	NTS personnel	TS and clearance personnel	Emergency EOD personnel	Total personnel	Mechanical demining assets deployed*
All government demining & EOD units including in the armed forces; SESU; SSTS; and national police EOD units*	572	2,149	1,674	4,395	221**
Totals	**572**	**2,149**	**1,674**	**4,395**	**221****

* The NMAA states that, due to ongoing conflict, disaggregated information with regard to the composition of the separate demining entities within the Defence and Security Forces of Ukraine, is considered militarily sensitive and hence has not been provided to Mine Action Review.
** Mechanical demining assets as of 2 May 2025.

The SSTS reports to be the "largest formation in demining in Ukraine" and states that it conducted 54% of all demining in 2024, including 43% of all EOD and 65% of all survey, though it is not clear if this refers to demining in the area within 20km of the front lines of conflict, open only to government units, or to demining activity outside of this restricted area. As at April 2025, SSTS had four demining battalions and one underwater demining company, with 3,000 deminers trained and 250 more in training. For 2025–26, SSTS planned to establish a further underwater demining company and bring its total demining personnel to more than 5,000.[269]

Ukraine continued to build the capacity of its national demining units through international cooperation in 2024. Within the framework of NATO's international Demining Capability Coalition[270] over 1,000 humanitarian deminers of Ukraine's MoD received IMAS EOD1/EOD2 training. Humanitarian demining units of the MoD also received "demining machines, individual EOD kits, pick-up vehicles for EO transportation, mine detectors, armoured vests and visors".[271] Training of personnel in the Security and Defence Forces in 2024 covered NTS, TS, demining, mine and improvised explosive device (IED) rapid clearance and spot tasks."[272]

Table 8: NGO operational NTS capacities deployed in 2024[273]

Operator	Teams	Total personnel
DCA	6	24
DRC	12	23
FSD	19	57
HALO	70	151
Humanitarian Security	1	3
MAG	12	24
NPA	17	34
Totals	**137**	**316**

262 US Department of State, "Demining Ukraine: A Pre-requisite for Recovery: Michael Tirre Remarks before the U.S. Helsinki Commission", 8 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3KFdXzJ.

263 APMBC Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2020.

264 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

265 Answers to additional questions of the APMBC Committee on Article 5 Implementation on Ukraine's deadline extension request, 1 September 2023, p. 2.

266 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 25 July 2025.

267 "Ukraine: Strengthening national mine action capabilities", DRC, 9 February 2024.

268 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

269 "Partnerships in Action: How Collaboration and Innovation Drive Impact", Presentation from Mikhailo Konopelniuk, Colonel, Demining, SSTS, at the NDM, Geneva, 9–11 April 2025.

270 This coalition has 22 member States: Lithuania, Iceland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Moldova, Japan, and Ukraine. The MoD of Ukraine, along with Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania, initiated the Demining Capability Coalition (DMC) in February 2024. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

271 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2024), Form E.

272 Ibid., Form A.

273 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Multiple international demining organisations operational in Ukraine include APOPO,[274] DCA, DRC, FSD, HALO, MAG, and NPA (see Tables 8 and 9).[275] Humanity & Inclusion (HI), currently active in risk education, planned to begin NTS in August 2025.[276] Humanitarian Security is a national operator based in the Kharkiv region, where it planned to survey 90km^2 of hazardous area by the end of 2025. Humanitarian Security highlights that several new operators, including Falcon Demine LLC, and the Charity Fund Relief Coordinating Centre, also began conducting significant NTS in Kharkiv and the wider Kharkiv region in 2025. It also cites Ukroboronservice (UOS) and International Demining Group (IDG) as also actively conducting NTS and clearance in Ukraine. Humanitarian Security also highlights that, until early 2024, mainly international operators (along with government units) conducted survey, while the number of national humanitarian operators conducting survey was minimal.[277] While Mine Action Review made every effort to contact both international and national operators, due to the rapidly expanding nature of the mine action programme in 2024, it was not feasible to source and include information on all national operators who may have surveyed and cleared EO in 2024.

Table 9: NGO operational TS and clearance capacities deployed in 2024*[278]

Operator	Manual teams	Mechanical teams	MTTs	Total deminers**	Dogs and handlers	Machines***
DCA	5	0	0	45	0	Manual teams and total deminers includes 1 x TS team of 5 deminers.
DRC	0	0	20	180	0	0
FSD	23	6	0	260	0	MV10 x2 MV4 x1 GCS 200 x1 Robocut x4 Rollers x3 Bobcat x1
HALO	75	25	0	430 (380 manual, 50 mechanical)	0	Traxx x 3 T800 Robocut x 30 S300 Robocut x 13 Amtrac x 2 Hitachi 210-LC7 remotely operated excavators x 5
Humanitarian Security	10	N/K	0	40	0	3 x MR31 demining and QC
MAG	13	Mechanical team trained and certified but not operational in 2024.	0	94	0	0
NPA	31	15 mechanical demining personnel trained and certified in Q4 2024 but not operational.	0	167	8	7 ground preparation machines.
Totals	**157**	**31**	**20**	**1,216**	**8**	**75**

* Information based on data available at time of writing. Full information not available on the capacity of national operators.
** Excluding team leaders, medics, and drivers unless otherwise stated.
*** Excluding vegetation cutters and sifters.

274 APOPO did not undertake any survey or clearance operations in CMR-affected areas during 2024. Email from Nick Guest, Programme Manager, Ukraine, APOPO, 3 March 2025.

275 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; Dino Šujak, ITF Ukraine, 16 May 2024; Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024; and FSD, "Ukraine", accessed 10 April 2024, at: https://bit.ly/4bIMYPH.

276 Emails from Fenella Henderson-Howat, Technical Head of Programme, HI, Ukraine, 4 April and 30 July 2025.

277 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 11 June 2025.

278 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

HALO and FSD both saw a significant increase in survey and clearance personnel deployed in 2024, compared to 2023.[279] HALO was able to double its number of NTS teams from 35 to 70, and began deploying its own dedicated EOD teams for the first time in 2024.[280] MAG was also able to increase community liaison and demining capacity due to more donor funding.[281] DCA reduced its NTS capacity from seven teams to six in 2024 but increased its TS and clearance capacity. It planned to continue this trend in 2025, while attempting to retain and retrain staff in line with its operational plan to increase focus on TS and clearance.[282] NPA had doubled the number of its manual teams[283] by the end of 2024, compared to the year before. NPA also obtained certification for mechanical assets in April 2024, with 13 deployed by the end of the year, and signed a partnership agreement with WFP. Under this agreement, WFP is providing mechanical assets and support with MDD capacity for demining on agricultural land during 2025. NPA reciprocates by sharing real-time data on cleared areas in Kherson and Mykolaiv regions, to enable targeted livelihood assistance. NPA also began training four additional MDDs in Q4 2024. It expected these to be certified and operational in March–April 2025.[284]

MAG imported two MineWolf 240 machines in April 2024, and gained mechanical certification in November 2024, following capability testing of the machines at the National Research Centre at the request of the national authorities, which caused some delay to certification. A mechanical team was trained and certified but not operational during the year.[285] MAG anticipates EOD accreditation to be completed towards the end of 2025. The process is ongoing but has been affected by the US review of foreign assistance.[286]

Following expansion in 2024, FSD saw a 25% reduction in survey and clearance capacity in early 2025, due to the unexpected cessation of US funding. FSD expected certification and deployment of dogs for TS in June 2025.[287] HALO expected an increase in survey and clearance capacity during 2025, but not to the extent achieved in 2024.[288] NPA expected to increase manual capacity in 2025.[289] MAG expected the number of teams to remain steady in 2025, though this depended on the outcome of the US decision following the stop work order and on other funding proposals in progress as at June 2025.[290] National operator Humanitarian Security planned to add one NTS team, two mechanical teams, and one manual team during 2025. It also planned to dedicate 12 personnel to EOD spot tasks only from April 2025 while increasing mechanical assets, with 11 Ukrainian-produced machines due for delivery in Q1–Q2 2025.[291]

In terms of use of new and developing technologies in 2024, HALO trained NTS and remote sensing (RS) personnel in UAV use and imagery analysis. It equipped teams with a mixture of small, medium, and large UAVs, including some with advanced sensors for use in different contexts. By June 2024, high-resolution UAV survey was being used in planning every suitable clearance task. HALO also introduced the Scorpion, a dual-sensor BAC detector consisting of an active metal detector and a magnetometer. It collects data referenced by differential global positioning system (DGPS) and HALO believes will prove valuable for subsurface clearance.[292]

With the continued flow of equipment donations into Ukraine's mine action programme, one of Ukraine's challenges has been highlighted as a lack of "logistics capacity to support equipment donations and keep them operational".[293]

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Land release data provided to Mine Action Review by Ukraine's NMAA pertain to release of land contaminated with various types of EO, including CMR, AP and AV mines, and other items of UXO. According to the NMAA, a total of 11.51km^2 of all contamination types was released through survey in Ukraine in 2024, of which 7.01km^2 was cancelled through NTS and 4.5km^2 was reduced through technical survey.[294] In addition, 17.1km^2 was cleared in Ukraine in 2024.[295] The NMAA reports that 25,893 submunitions were destroyed during TS, clearance, and EOD, together with 14,142 AP mines, 11,119 AV mines, and 164,248 other items of UXO.[296] However, as noted above, the areas released, as reported by the NMAA are of all EO contamination. Therefore, the size of the actual cluster munition contamination (i.e. the contaminated area resulting from cluster munition strikes) addressed, is far smaller.

279 Emails from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

280 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

281 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

282 Email from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025.

283 NPA previously used the term "multi-task team" to refer to its teams capable of manual TS, clearance and BAC. However, from 2025, NPA is not using this term and refers instead to "manual teams".

284 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

285 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025.

286 Ibid.

287 Email from Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025.

288 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

289 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

290 Email from Niamh McNamara, MAG, 11 June 2025.

291 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

292 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

293 "Mine Action in Ukraine", presentation to the MASG by Paul Heslop, UNRCO, New York, 24 October 2024, p. 25.

294 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

295 Ibid.

296 Ibid. Disaggregated information regarding submunitions destroyed and TS and clearance, and those destroyed in EOD spot tasks, was requested but not provided.

Official IMSMA data provided in July 2025 states that 11km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2024,[297] which is the CMR clearance total Mine Action Review has used. While the 11km² was clearance of SHAs/CHAs suspected or confirmed to contain CMR, not all these areas were ultimately found to contain CMR during clearance.

Of 2,389 hazardous areas surveyed, 817 were found to contain CMR.[298] This represents 34% of all hazardous areas surveyed. Some 125.06km² of CMR-contaminated area was recorded across 817 hazardous areas: 29.31km² in 195 SHAs and 95.75km² in 622 CHAs[299] (see Table 16).

Table 10: Land release outputs for all EO-contaminated areas in 2024 (National authority data)[300]

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	11	Official IMSMA data provided on clearance of SHAs/CHAs suspected or confirmed to contain CMRs. Not all these areas were ultimately found to contain CMRs.
Technical Survey	4.5	Includes reduction of all EO-contaminated area.
Non-Technical Survey	7.01	Includes cancellation of all EO-contaminated area.
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	
Submunitions destroyed	25,893 (Includes CMR destroyed during spot tasks)	Data provided by the NMAA combined the number of submunitions destroyed during clearance with those destroyed in spot tasks. Operators that provided data to Mine Action Review reported destroying 65 submunitions during spot tasks (DCA 6, NPA 48, and Humanitarian Security 11).[301]

International humanitarian operators released 267,257m² through survey, of which 121,143m² was cancelled by NPA and the remaining 146,014m² was reduced by DCA and HALO.[302] Several national operators also released areas through survey in 2024.[303] Mine Action Review made written inquiries to many national operators but was not able to source information from all of these.

International demining operators cleared 1.9km², destroying 91 submunitions.[304] A further 54 submunitions were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by international operators.[305] Humanitarian Security reported clearing a further 2.56km², destroying 175 submunitions. It destroyed a further 11 submunitions during EOD spot tasks in 2024.[306] These figures bring the total number of submunitions destroyed by humanitarian operators who reported data to Mine Action Review to 331 during TS, clearance, and spot tasks.

SURVEY IN 2024

According to the NMAA, a total of 11.51km² across 379 hazardous areas contaminated with EO, including CMR, other items of UXO, and AP and AV mines was released through survey by all operators in 2024. Of the total, 7.01km² across 300 SHAs was cancelled through NTS and 4.5km² across 79 areas was reduced through TS (see Tables 11 and 13).[307]

International operators released 267,257m² across seven hazardous areas through survey in 2024 (see Tables 12 and 14).[308] As previously noted, cancellation by NGOs is possible, but only under specific instructions from the MAC. Several national operators cancelled areas in 2024,[309] although Mine Action Review was not able to source information from all of these.[310] NPA was the only international operator to report to

297 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

298 Ibid.

299 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

300 Emails from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025; and Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

301 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

302 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

303 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

304 Items found by DCA, DRC, FSD, MAG, and NPA were transferred to SESU for disposal. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 6 June 2025.

305 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025, Zhanna Hulia, GIS Assistant, FSD Ukraine, 19 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

306 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

307 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

308 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; and Amela Balic, Programme Manager, NPA, 12 May 2025.

309 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

310 National operator, Humanitarian Security, reported cancelling 12.98km² across 24 hazardous areas. Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025. However, the Government of Ukraine reported to Mine Action Review that this operator had not cancelled any area according to the IMSMA database and explained that it is possible that the areas were not designated SHAs that were cancelled but areas that required survey to be freed from suspicion of possible contamination. Interview with Government of Ukraine, 17 July 2025; and email, 18 July 2025.

Mine Action Review that it released any area through NTS, cancelling one SHA with an area of 121,143m^2 (see Table 12). The remaining 146,014m^2 released by survey by international operators was reduced through TS: 117,835m^2 by DCA and 28,179m^2 by HALO (see Table 14).[311] National operator Humanitarian Security also reduced 173,845m^2 through TS in one hazardous area (see Table 14).[312] Mine Action Review was not able to source data from other national operators that reduced areas in 2024.

By comparison in 2023, just one international operator, HALO, reduced 1,414m^2 through TS,[313] the first time in five years where there had been reduction of CMR hazardous areas in Ukraine. HALO's reduction of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2024 was an almost twenty-fold increase on that achieved in 2023. This was due to increased capacity and more use of machines.[314] No international operators released any cluster munition-contaminated area through NTS in 2023, then the fifth year in a row without cancellation.[315] No information was available on release of cluster munition-contaminated area by Ukrainian national bodies through survey in 2023. Ukraine reported only on survey of contamination broadly since the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022, with data not disaggregated by weapon type or by type of hazardous area (i.e. SHA or CHA), and not provided for survey undertaken in 2023 specifically.[316]

According to official IMSMA data, during 2024, of 2,389 hazardous areas surveyed, 817 were found to present a CMR hazard.[317] This represents 34% of hazardous areas surveyed. Some 125.06km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was recorded across 817 hazardous areas: 29.31km^2 in 195 SHAs and 95.75km^2 in 622 CHAs[318] (see Table 16). International humanitarian operators recorded 69.8km^2 of previously unrecorded CMR contamination in 2024, with 10.6km^2 in 69 SHAs and 59.16km^2 in 374 CHAs.[319] In addition, national operator Humanitarian Security identified almost as much again; 66.86km^2 (see Table 17).[320] It explains that, in the Balakliya-Barvinkove area of Kharkiv where its 2024 survey operations were focused, the front line had remained motionless for almost six months in 2022, with both sides to the conflict using mainly multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) against each other. This resulted in the primary contamination in the area being from unexploded submunitions, hence the operator recorded significant new areas of contamination from CMR in the national database[321] (see Table 16). These figures bring the total of previously unrecorded CMR contamination identified by humanitarian operators (national and international) to 136.67km^2, according to data supplied to Mine Action Review by operators, who state that all these areas were entered into the national database.[322] NPA highlights that in 48 of the 102 CHAs newly recorded by NPA (see Table 16), the primary contamination was from mines, though the areas also contained CMR. The remaining 54 CHAs are battle areas containing direct or indirect evidence of CMR contamination.[323] The 69.8km^2 of new contamination added by international operators is an increase on the 51.2km^2 added to the national database by international operators in 2023.[324]

Table 11: Cancellation through NTS of all EO-contaminated area in 2024 (National authority data)*[325]

Operators	SHAs cancelled	Area cancelled (km²)
All government units, and national and international demining operators.	300	7.01
Totals	**300**	**7.01**

* Information on cancellation through NTS, disaggregated by weapon type, was requested but not provided.

311 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; and Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

312 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

313 Email from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

314 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

315 Emails from Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 1 April 2023; Nick Guest, MAG, 23 March 2023; Alberto Rinaldo Serra, NPA, 15 March 2023, Tony Connell, FSD, 24 March 2023 and 24 March 2021; Almedina Musić, DRC, 7 February 2022 and 20 April 2021; Imogen Churchill, HALO, 23 March 2022; Ronan Shenhav, HALO, 20 April 2021; Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 May 2024; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024; Jon Cunliffe, MAG, 26 April 2024; and Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May 2024.

316 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (covering 2023), Forms B and E. Form B stated that 331,638 hectares had been surveyed "since the beginning of the large-scale military invasion of the Russian federation on the territory of Ukraine". Form E stated that, since 24 February 2022: "non-governmental organizations have conducted non-technical survey of 2,250 areas with a total area of 29,674 hectares and technical survey of 182 areas with a total area of 2555 hectares, cleared 234 hectares of territories, identified 7,103 items of unexploded ordnance, during NTS of 18,000km^2 indicated as out of suspicion.

317 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

318 Ibid.

319 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

320 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

321 Emails from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security LLC, 21 March and 11 June 2025.

322 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

323 Email from Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

324 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 21 April 2024 and Amela Balic NPA, 5 June 2024; Sophie Breinholdt Nielsen, DRC, 10 and 29 May 2024; Michael Edwards, DCA, 3 May and 10 June 2024; Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May and 6 June 2024; and Tony Connell, FSD, 25 June 2024.

325 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

Table 12: Cancellation of battle areas, including with CMR in 2024 (international operator data)[326]

Operator	Oblast	District	Sub-district	Cancellation of areas suspected to contain CMR	Area cancelled through NTS (m²)
NPA	Mykolaiv	Shevchenkivska	Liubomyrivka	1*	121,243*
Totals				**1***	**121,243***

* The MAC accepted cancellation as the farmer had ploughed the area and the initial evidence of CMR was indirect.

Table 13: Release of EO-contaminated area through TS in 2024 (National authority data)*[327]

Operators	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
All government units, and national and international humanitarian operators.	79	4,499,971
Totals	**79**	**4,499,971**

* Information on reduction through TS, disaggregated by weapon type, was requested but not provided.

Table 14: Reduction of cluster munition-contaminated area through TS in 2024 (operator data)[328]

Operator	Oblast	District, sub-district, locality	Areas reduced	Area reduced (m²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mishkovo-Pohorilivska Mishkovo-Pohorilove	1	117,835
Sub-totals			**1**	**117,835**
HALO	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Ivanivska, Budy	1	14,230
HALO	Kyiv	Brovarskyi, Kalytianska, Kalyta	2	12,009
HALO	Kharkiv	Chuhuivskyi, Novopokrovska, Svitanok	1	1,139
HALO	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Kulykivska, Hrabivka	1	801
Sub-totals			**5**	**28,179**
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Balakliya	1	173,845
Sub-totals			**1**	**173,845**
Totals			**7**	**319,859**

Table 15: Areas contaminated with CMR, newly recorded in 2024 (official IMSMA data)[329]

Oblast	Hazardous areas (CHAs and SHAs)	Size of hazardous areas (km²)	SHAs	Size of SHAs (km²)	CHAs	Size of CHAs (km²)
Dnipropetrovsk	0	0	0	0	0	0
Donetsk	45	4.78	0	0	45	4.78
Kyiv	44	10.33	15	2.65	29	7.68
Zhytomyr	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mykolayiv	221	31.94	44	5.03	177	26.91
Sumy	8	0.36	1	0*	7	0.36
Kharkiv	369	62.84	114	19.52	255	43.32

326 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 6 June 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May and 29 July 2025. Data from IMSMA provided to Mine Action Review by the Government of Ukraine on 18 July states that, in 2024, NPA cancelled 2,568,391m² and HALO cancelled 40,233m² (whereas HALO informed Mine Action Review that it did not release any land by cancellation). As at the time of writing Mine Action Review had not yet been able to resolve this data discrepancy regarding any cancellation by HALO. However, NPA clarified that the size of areas reported to Mine Action Review by the Government as cancelled by NPA, refers to the total of all areas cancelled (i.e. including areas with other types of contamination), whereas the area cancelled by NPA with previous evidence of CMR contamination was 121,243m², as per Table 12. On the matter of ploughed land, CEOBS reports that SESU has a standard stipulating that land may be considered safe from explosive hazards if it has been tilled at least three times. "Assessing environmental degradation from explosive weapons in southern Ukraine", CEOBS and NPA, 16 January 2025, p. 18.

327 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

328 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

329 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

Table 15 continued

Oblast	Hazardous areas (CHAs and SHAs)	Size of hazardous areas (km²)	SHAs	Size of SHAs (km²)	CHAs	Size of CHAs (km²)
Kherson	119	14.47	20	2.10	99	12.37
Chernihiv	11	0.34	1	0.01	10	0.33
Totals:	**817**	**125.06**	**195**	**29.31**	**622**	**95.75**

* This is data as provided. Size of this SHA likely rounded to zero due to small size.

Table 16: Cluster munition-contaminated area newly recorded in 2024 (operator data)[330]

Operator	Oblast	District/ Sub-district/locality	SHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mishkovo-Pohorilivska	0	0	3	34,351
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivska	2	31,301	10	502,701
DCA	Mykolaiv	Tiahynska	0	0	1	5,929
DCA	Mykolaiv	Voskresenska	1	381,065	2	260,651
Sub-totals			**3**	**412,366**	**16**	**803,632**
DRC	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi	1	193,582	6	1,221,498
DRC	Kharkiv	Kharkivskyi	1	201,032	21	1,575,337
DRC	Kherson	Khersonskyi	0	0	3	109,892
DRC	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi	2	162,531	6	891,624
DRC	Kyiv	Vyshhorodsky	0	0	1	6,315
Sub-totals			**4**	**557,145**	**37**	**3,804,666**
FSD	Chernihiv		1	12,423	8	302,988
FSD	Donetsk		0	0	22	2,094,698
FSD	Sumy		1	3,012	0	0
FSD	Kharkiv		52	8,845,998	171	32,926,860
Sub-totals			**54**	**8,861,433**	**201**	**35,324,546**
HALO	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Tupychivska, Burivka	0	0	1	18,600
HALO	Donetsk	Kramatorskyi, Novodonetska, Spasko-Mykhailivka	0	0	4	217,115
HALO	Donetsk	Kramatorskyi, Oleksandrivska, Oleksandrivka	0	0	1	10,775
HALO	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Balakliiska, Bairak	0	0	1	36,887
HALO	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Velykooleksandrivska, Davydiv Brid	0	0	1	39,626
HALO	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Velykooleksandrivska, Ishchenka	0	0	1	53,107
HALO	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Velykooleksandrivska, Karierne	0	0	2	187,728
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Bashtanska, Chervonyi Stav	0	0	1	10,703
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Bashtanska, Yavkyne	0	0	1	11,099
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Snihurivska, Snihurivka	0	0	1	16,690
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Snihurivska, Vasylky	0	0	2	72,968

330 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Table 16 continued

Operator	Oblast	District/ Sub-district/locality	SHAs	Area (m²)	CHAs	Area (m²)
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Snihurivska, Yasna Poliana	0	0	1	9,344
Sub-totals			**0**	**0**	**17**	**684,642**
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Balakliya	1	800	72	22,976,567
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Barvinkove	0	0	127	43,843,808
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Savynska	3	26,983	0	0
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Donetske	1	15,615	0	0
Sub-totals			**5**	**43,398**	**199**	**66,820,375**
MAG	Kherson	Chornobaivska, Posad-Pokrovske	0	0	1	3,451
Sub-totals			**0**	**0**	**1**	**3,451**
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Bopozenska, Borozenske	0	0	1	89,925
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Bopozenska, Charivne	2	20,379	3	251,213
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Bopozenska, Piatykhatky	2	610,582	9	1,318,785
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Arkhanhelske	1	21,762	7	1,002,720
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Blakytne	0	0	1	209,141
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Kostyrka	1	106,892	0	0
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Novopetrivka	0	0	4	1,285,782
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Novovoznesenske	0	0	3	772,654
NPA	Kherson	Beryslavskyi, Vysokopilska, Veremiivka	2	59,429	3	898,516
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi, Halytsynivska, Prybuzke,	0	0	1	149,889
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Halytsynivska, Stepova Dolyna	0	0	3	390,942
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Pervomaiska, Blahodatne	0	0	6	1,460,096
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Pervomaiska, Kyselivka	0	0	3	236,220
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Pervomaiska, Maksymivka	0	0	9	1,715,423
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Pervomaiska, Partyzanske	0	0	6	2,130,700
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Bohorodytske	0	0	2	50,534
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Liubomyrivka	0	0	3	854,536
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Myrne	0	0	13	2,843,469
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Novohryhorivka	0	0	13	1,738,048
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Ternovi Pody	0	0	11	700,025
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi Shevchenkivska, Vavylove	0	0	1	439,749
Sub-totals			**8**	**819,044**	**102**	**18,538,367**
Totals			**74**	**10,693,386**	**573**	**125,979,679**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

According to the NMAA, a total of 17.1km² of land contaminated with EO, including CMR, other items of UXO, and AP mines was cleared by all operators in Ukraine in 2024.[331] The NMAA also reports that 25,893 submunitions were destroyed during TS, clearance, and spot tasks,[332] along with 14,142 AP mines, 11,119 AV mines, and 164,248 other items of UXO (see Table 17). The NMAA explains that CMR clearance was typically conducted in combination with clearance of other types of EO, including AP mines.[333] Ukraine saw a twelve-fold increase in clearance of EO in 2024 compared to 2023, which was made possible thanks to an unprecedented increase in the number of demining teams and certified mine action operators, as well as "massive use of demining machines and surface scanning UAVs". [334] However, as noted above, the areas released, as reported by the NMAA are of all EO contamination. Therefore, the size of the actual cluster munition contamination (i.e. the contaminated area resulting from cluster munition strikes) addressed, is almost certainly far smaller. According to official IMSMA data, 11km² of CMR-contaminated area was cleared in 2024,[335] which is the total Mine Action Review has used for annual reporting. While the 11km² was clearance of SHAs/CHAs suspected or confirmed to contain CMR, not all these areas were ultimately found to contain CMR during clearance.

International operators cleared 1.9km², destroying 91 submunitions,[336] 127 AP mines, and 38 other items of UXO (see Table 18). A further 54 submunitions were destroyed in EOD spot tasks by international humanitarian operators (see Table 19).[337] Humanitarian Security reported to have cleared a further 2.56km², destroying 175 submunitions, along with 17 AP mines and 418 other items of UXO (see Table 18). Humanitarian Security also destroyed 11 submunitions during spot tasks in 2024 (see Table 19).[338] These figures bring the total number of submunitions destroyed by humanitarian operators during TS, clearance, and EOD spot tasks to 331.

By comparison, HALO was the only international operator to release any cluster munition-contaminated area through clearance in 2023, releasing one area measuring 87,066m². Two submunitions were identified and marked by HALO for disposal by the national authorities, as HALO did not have EOD teams at that time.[339] HALO saw almost a six-fold increase in clearance of CMR in 2024 compared to 2023, due to increased capacity and greater use of mechanical methods.[340]

Table 17: Clearance of EO-contaminated area in 2024 (National authority data)[341]

Operators	CMR areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed
All government units, and national and international operators	302	17,095,009	25,893	164,248	14,142	11,119
Totals	**302**	**17,095,009**	**25,893**	**164,248**	**14,142**	**11,119**

Table 18: CMR clearance in 2024 (operator data)[342]

International operator	Oblast	District, sub-district, locality	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mishkovo-Pohorilivska	2	297,487	21*	2*	0
Sub-totals			**2**	**297,487**	**21***	**2***	**0**
DRC	Mykolaiv	Not stated	1	40,634	23*	0	0
DRC	Kharkiv	Not stated	1	14,794	0	1*	0
DRC	Mykolaiv	Not stated	0	101,082	1*	2*	0
DRC	Kharkiv	Not stated	0	14,232	0	0	0
Sub-totals			**2**	**170,742**	**24***	**3***	**0**

331 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

332 Disaggregated information regarding submunitions destroyed in TS and clearance and those destroyed in EOD spot tasks were requested but not provided.

333 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

334 Ibid.

335 Email from Government of Ukraine, 18 July 2025.

336 Items found by DCA, DRC, FSD, MAG, and NPA were transferred to SESU for disposal. Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 6 June 2025.

337 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025, Zhanna Hulia, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Assistant, FSD, 19 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

338 Email from Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

339 Emails from Michael Brown, HALO, 29 May and 6 June 2024.

340 Email from Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025.

341 Email from Colonel Ruslan Berehulia, NMAA Secretariat, 9 May 2025.

342 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April and 22 June 2025; Roxana-Cristina Bobolicu, DRC, 5 April and 10 June 2025; Eleanor Porritt, FSD Ukraine, 17 March 2025, Zhanna Hulia, FSD, 19 March 2025; Steve Wallis OBE, HALO, 19 March 2025; Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025; Niamh McNamara, MAG, 30 April 2025; Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 6 June 2025; and Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025.

Table 18 continued

International operator	Oblast	District, sub-district, locality	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed	AP mines destroyed
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Donetska, Pryshyb	1	10,081	0***	0	1*
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Iziumska, Fedorivka	2	181,815	0***	0	0
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Iziumska, Kamianka	2	13,027	0***	0	0
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Barvinkivska, Ridne	2	93,415	11*	0	0
FSD	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Ivanivska, Lukashivka	1	30,690	3*	0	0
FSD	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Ivanivska/Yahidne	4	221,841	0***	0	3*
FSD	Donetsk	Kramatorskyi, Lymanska, Lozove	1	77,403	0***	0	0
FSD	Donetsk	Kramatorskyi, Lymanska, Oleksandrivka	1	11,316	0***	0	0
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Oskilska, Yaremivka, Dovhenke	2	2,729	20*	0	0
FSD	Kharkiv	Iziumskyi, Oskilska, Topolske	3	3,588	0***	0	123*
Sub-totals			**19**	**645,905**	**34***	**0**	**127***
HALO	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Ivanivska, Budy	1	121,034	1	10	
HALO	Chernihiv	Chernihivskyi, Kulykivska, Hrabivka	1	2,355	1	0	0
HALO	Kharkiv	Chuhuivskyi, Novopokrovska, Svitanok	1	92,097	1	0	0
HALO	Kyiv	Brovarskyi, Kalytianska, Kalyta	2	86,462	4	0	0
HALO	Mykolaiv	Bashtanskyi, Snihurivska, Snihurivka	1	202,420	1	14	0
Sub-totals			**6**	**504,368**	**8**	**24**	**0**
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Barvinkove	8	1,711,610	157	345	12
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Izyum, Balakliya	2	851,363	18	73	5
Sub-totals			**10**	**2,562,973**	**175**	**418**	**17**
MAG	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivski, Halytsynivska, Halytsynove	0	46,170	2*	4*	0
MAG	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivski, Halytsynivska, Halytsynove	0	121,679	1*	5*	0
Sub-totals			**0**	**167,849**	**3***	**9***	**0**
NPA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivskyi, Shevchenkivska, Novohryhorivka	1**	106,513**	1*	0	0
Sub-totals			**1****	**106,513****	**1***	**0**	**0**
Totals			**40**	**4,455,837**	**266**	**456**	**144**

* Items found by operator but transferred to authorised government operators for disposal.
** Mine clearance of 106,513m² during which one submunition was found and destroyed.
*** Tasks not completed as at end of 2024.

Table 19: Submunitions destroyed in EOD spot tasks in 2024 (operator data)[343]

International operator	Oblast	District, sub-district, locality	Submunitions destroyed
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mishkovo-Pohorilivska	1
DCA	Mykolaiv	Voskresenska	1
DCA	Mykolaiv	Mykolaivska	2
DCA	Mykolaiv	Radsadivska	2
Sub-total			**6**
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Kharkivska, Izyum, Barvinkove	7
Humanitarian Security	Kharkiv	Kharkivska, Izyum, Balakliya	4
Sub-total			**11**
NPA	Mykolaiv	Not specified	41
NPA	Kherson	Not specified	7
Sub-total			**48**
Total			**65**

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

No target date has been set for completion of CMR clearance in Ukraine, nor is it realistic to expect one for the foreseeable future given the ongoing hostilities. The present phase of conflict, ongoing since February 2022, has certainly resulted in heavy new contamination, with both sides using cluster munitions. Any estimate of a date of completion remains speculation until Ukraine is in a position to conduct a national survey to assess the scale and nature of its contamination.

Both Ukraine and Russia have obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of their duties to protect the right to life of every person under their jurisdiction or effective control. The reported increase in clearance and TS of CMR-affected areas in 2024 and 2023, compared to previous years, reflects the rapid upscaling of capacity needed to address the heavy extent of contamination in Ukraine resulting from the war with Russia (see Table 20). Land release efforts have of course been hugely impeded by the Russian aggression. In addressing the significant contamination that it now faces, Ukraine will need to ensure that all operators are applying evidence based survey and efficient land release methodologies to identify and release contaminated land. It is therefore a welcome development that cluster munition-contaminated area was released through NTS and TS in 2024, with no release having taken place through survey in earlier years. That said, large-scale cancellation of CMR-affected areas will not be possible while the currently restrictive instructions relating to cancellation remain in place.

Against the incredibly challenging circumstances of war, Ukraine has been able to continue to scale up operational capacity and technological innovation considerably and further improve national ownership and programme management. Key steps taken in 2024, including the launch of the National Mine Action Strategy and implementation plan and the adoption of several critical NMAS, including standards for land release, will help ensure Ukraine can make progress towards completion when circumstances allow.

Table 20: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area released (km^2)
2024	11.00 (official IMSMA data)
2023	*9.00 (official IMSMA data provided in 2025)
2022	**0.02 (official IMSMA data provided in 2025)
2021	0.57 (NGO data)
2020	0.02 (NGO data)
Total	**20.61**

* Official IMSMA data for 2023, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.09km^2 in last year's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Ukraine, based on operator data only. ** Official IMSMA data for 2022, provided in 2025. Previously reported as 0.33km^2 in last year's *Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants* report on Ukraine, based on operator data only.

343 Emails from Michael Edwards, DCA, 8 April 2025; Amela Balic, NPA, 12 May 2025; and Maksym Slipchenko, Humanitarian Security, 21 March 2025.

VIETNAM

MINE ACTION REVIEW

CLEARING CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS 2025

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but massive

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km^2)	Release in 2023 (km^2)
Clearance*	60.13	55.26
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	10,857 (including 1,250 in TS and 1,379 in spot tasks)	11,675 (including 1,822 in TS and 1,228 in spot tasks)

* Results of clearance by international humanitarian demining organisations only.

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, NGOs increased the amount of clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area for the third successive year, although the total number of submunitions destroyed was down on the figure for 2023. The Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project (KVPVP) started the second phase of its mine action programme in May 2024 with Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) teams working in three central provinces under the US$25 million initiative. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an assessment to prepare for the upgrade of VNMAC's national database from Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation to IMSMA Core.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Vietnam should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **Vietnam should issue as quickly as possible the mine action ordinance and national mine action standards (TCVNs).**
- **Vietnam should develop a TCVN for managing the environmental impact of mine action.**
- **VNMAC should develop a national strategy and annual work plans for cluster munition remnants (CMR), with clear priorities and targets for survey and clearance.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Ministry of Defence
- Vietnam National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC)
- Provincial mine action centres and authorities (e.g. the Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC) and Quang Binh Database and Coordination Unit (DBCU))

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- VNMAC

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN)

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
- Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West)
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDERSTANDING OF CONTAMINATION

Vietnam is massively contaminated by CMR but still has no estimate of the extent, even to the nearest hundred square kilometres. An explosive remnants of war (ERW) impact survey, which was started in 2004 and completed in 2014, but only published in 2018, said that 61,308km^2 or 19% of Vietnam's land surface area was affected by ERW. It did not specify the area affected by CMR but found they affected 32 of Vietnam's 63 provinces and cities.[1] According to VNMAC, the total area still contaminated with bombs, mines, and explosive ordnance in Vietnam was 56,000km^2, which accounts for approximately 17% of Vietnam's land surface. Contamination is mainly concentrated in central provinces including Quang Tri, Quang Binh, Ha Tinh, Nghe An, and Quang Ngai.[2]

A clearer picture of CMR contamination is emerging in central Vietnamese provinces underscoring the scale of the challenge. Survey by Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in Quang Binh province, had identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering almost 181km^2 by April 2025 but had completed technical survey (TS) in only 22 of 145 communes and thus the total figure will certainly rise.[3]

In Quang Tri province, NPA completed survey in 690 of 800 villages, and of the 620km^2 of CMR identified, 177km^2 had been cleared, leaving around 443km^2. There remained 110 villages to survey which desk assessments suggest have roughly 59km^2 of contamination, pointing to a remaining challenge of more than 500km^2. The People's Committee, an important local governmental body in Vietnam, aimed to complete survey of the province in 2026 or 2027 and generate a comprehensive map of CHAs.[4] As of January 2025, provincial authorities had lifted access restrictions on all but eight villages.[5] Survey in Thua Thien Hue has identified 112 CHAs totalling 30.71km^2 but has so far covered only 31 communes, less than one-third of the total, meaning substantial additional contamination remains to be identified.[6]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Vietnam has huge contamination from unexploded ordnance (UXO) and an unquantified mine problem (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Vietnam for further information). The ERW impact survey identified the most heavily contaminated regions as the central coastal provinces, the Central Highlands, the Mekong River delta, and the Red River delta.[7] The experience of international operators in central Vietnam points to wide variations in contamination types from district to district. International operators report encountering mainly projectiles, mortars, grenades, and some aircraft bombs.[8]

1 VNMAC, "Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam, Based on the Explosive Remnants of War Contamination Survey and Mapping – Phase 1", provided by VNMAC 19 April 2018, p. 38.

2 Email from VNMAC, 14 July 2023.

3 Emails from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; and Sarah Goring, Country Director, MAG, 17 July 2025.

4 Ibid.

5 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.

6 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

7 VNMAC, "Report on Explosive Remnants of War Contamination in Vietnam", Hanoi, 2018, pp. 33–36.

8 Interviews with Resad Junuzagic, Jan Eric Stoa, and Magnus Johansson, NPA, Hanoi, 17 April 2018; and with Simon Rea and Michael Raine, MAG, Quang Tri, 19 April 2018; and emails from Clinton Smith, DDG, 23 March 2017 and 19 April 2018.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

VNMAC was established in 2014 by Prime Ministerial decree to strengthen the direction of mine action and provide a focal point for mine action operations.[9] A Decree on the Management and Implementation of Mine Action Activities (Decree No. 18), which entered into force in 2019, confirmed the Ministry of Defence (MoD) as the lead authority for the national mine action programme, acting in coordination with other relevant ministries and sectors.[10] Under the direction of the Prime Minister and management of the MoD, VNMAC will "monitor, coordinate and implement mine action tasks".[11] The government's Circular 195, which came into effect in 2020,[12] details how the decree is to be implemented.

Decree 18, currently the highest-level legal instrument governing mine action activities in Vietnam, applies to all domestic and foreign organisations operating in mine action.[13] It established the legal basis for revising and updating National Technical Regulations (QCVNs) and standards (TCVNs) and for regulating information management. In 2022, the Prime Minister ordered an Ordinance for mine action to be drafted and then issued by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. This ordinance will supersede Decree 18 in importance.[14] As of April 2025, a draft was still under review by government ministries.[15]

VNMAC is nationally funded, but the National Mine Action Programme (Program 504) is funded by both the State and international donors.[16] A Prime Ministerial Decision (16/2024/QĐ-TTg) taking effect from the start of December 2024 nearly doubled deminers' daily allowance from VND 180,000 (US$7) to VND 350,000 (US$14), substantially increasing operational costs.

According to VNMAC, government support for mine action has included the following:

- establishing coordinating agencies and associations to support all levels of mine action;
- completing a legal framework, mechanism, and policies for demining (the MoD cooperates with other ministries to develop Circulars guiding QCVNs, TCVNs, and standing operating procedures (SOPs) on quality management (QM), survey, and clearance, and related issues);
- facilitating the capacity development of demining organisations in management, administration, survey, and clearance;
- setting up a national QM system for survey and clearance in accordance with international standards; and
- developing an information management system.[17]

Vietnam's regional mine action centres coordinate operations at the regional level with support from operators. Quang Binh province's database and coordination unit (DBCU), technically supported by NPA through a US-funded capacity development project, tasks operators applying a prioritisation system introduced in 2022 and holds regular coordination meetings with operators.[18] Quang Tri Mine Action Centre (QTMAC), technically supported by NPA through a US-funded capacity development project, and with additional support from MAG and PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), is implementing a five-year action plan covering 2021–25 under which it sets task priorities and conducts quality assurance (QA) for operators in the province.[19]

VNMAC participates in a Mine Action Working Group (MAWG), previously co-chaired by MAG and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provides a platform for discussion and joint planning. It met four times in 2024, discussing sector concerns, including the planned mine action ordinance. The chairmanship rotates every two years, and in December 2023, PTVN replaced MAG. MAWG sub-task forces also met in 2024, including those dealing with risk education, the environment, victim assistance, and gender, diversity, and inclusion (GDI).[20] In 2024, Vietnam's MoD agreed with the United States to re-establish a Mine Action Partnership Group as a platform for engaging with stakeholders, including donors, operators, and the UN.[21]

VNMAC is collaborating with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and UNDP in the KVPVP, which combines mine action with a programme for sustainable rural development in central Vietnam. The $29 million first phase in 2018–22 involved ERW survey and clearance in Binh Dinh and Quang Binh provinces. The $25 million second phase, which started in May 2024 and was due to run until 2026, focuses on survey and clearance of explosive ordnance in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien Hue provinces, working on priorities set by provincial authorities with an emphasis on maximising post-clearance land use.[22]

Vietnam also receives capacity development support from MAG, NPA, PTVN, the GICHD, and the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West), as well as UNDP.[23] As mentioned, NPA supports capacity development of the Quang Binh and Huang Tri provincial authorities, funded by PM/WRA, and in 2024, NPA also provided capacity development of Hue DBU with funding from the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA). MAG concluded a new Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with VNMAC

9 Prime Ministerial Decree (No. 738 of 2013) on the management and implementation of mine action activities, Hanoi.

10 Decree on Implementation and Management of Mine Action, No. 18/2019/ND-CP, 1 February 2019.

11 Decree on the management and implementation of mine action activities, Hanoi, April 2018.

12 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020; and Tim Horner, Senior Technical Adviser, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

13 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023.

14 Ibid.

15 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.

16 Email from Tim Horner, VNMAC, on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

17 Ibid.

18 Emails from Helene Kuperman, MAG, 10 April, 23 June 2020, and 31 March 2021; Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 24 June 2020; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, Country Director, PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN), 11 May 2021.

19 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.

20 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

21 Emails from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

22 Email from Goosoon Kwon, Chief Technical Adviser for Mine Action, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

23 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024; Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 27 May 2024.

in October 2024, providing for cooperation, including technical training, in 10 key areas, including non-technical survey (NTS) and TS, explosive ordnance clearance, and data management.[24] NPA supported VNMAC with a Senior Technical Adviser and information management adviser as well as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training and legal and professional advice in preparation of the new mine action ordinance.[25]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

The Constitution of Vietnam prohibits gender discrimination, and it is State policy to guarantee equal gender rights and opportunities. In mine action, women participate more in victim assistance and risk education, however, while national survey/clearance and information management are still male-dominated and managed by the Vietnam Army.[26] A MAWG sub-task force on gender was established in 2022 and renamed the GDI task force in December 2023 to emphasise the focus on inclusivity.[27] In 2024, VNMAC put forward a female candidate to undertake EOD training for the first time.

The number of women employed by demining NGOs increased by about 10% in 2024 compared to the previous year in line with the increase in total staff (see Table 1). The percentage of women employed by NPA in managerial or field positions dipped from the previous year, but it began integrating gender and diversity training into staff training and undertook a number of projects, including implementing a German-funded gender and diversity project that included GDI and leadership training for women in Quang Binh, Hue, and Quang Tri.[28]

Table 1: Gender composition of NGO operators in 2024[29]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
MAG	755	228 (30%)	80	15 (19%)	706	207 (29%)
NPA	395	127 (32%)	14	8 (57%)	318	91 (29%)
PTVN	314	79 (25%)	16	6 (38%)	270	60 (22%)
Totals	**1,464**	**434 (30%)**	**110**	**29 (26%)**	**1,294**	**358 (28%)**

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

VNMAC engaged actively in the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board discussions on a revised IMAS on the environment and reportedly plans to issue a TCVN on the issue, though this had not occurred as at the end of 2024.[30] Demining operators applied their own standards. MAG hired a Vietnamese environmental consultant, Keep Vietnam Clean, to assess the impact of its operations and waste management practices.[31] NPA applied the global organisation's Green Field and Green Office tools, and provided training to field staff and operational management.[32]

PTVN applied a General Code of Conduct on environmental management for its staff, partners, and the communities it supported along with measures to minimise and manage waste by office and field staff, promoting use of environmentally-friendly materials and integrating environmental protection messaging in its risk education sessions. It also plants trees to strengthen communities' resilience to the environmental impacts of mine action and climate change, including the dangers of soil erosion and landslides.[33]

Table 2: Environmental policies and action

Operator	Environmental policy in place	Environmental assessments conducted to support survey and clearance	Environmental focal point at country-programme level
MAG	Yes	Yes	Yes
NPA	Yes	Yes	Yes
PTVN	Yes	Yes	Yes

N/R = Not reported

24 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.
25 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
26 Email from the GICHD, 5 May 2023.
27 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April and 19 May 2023, and 17 May 2024.
28 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
29 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.
30 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024.
31 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
32 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
33 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

Mine action in Vietnam contends with a number of environmental challenges in its diverse habitats ranging from tropical forest to coastal wetlands. PTVN reported losing more working days in 2024 to heavy rain and flooding which also displaces items of explosive ordnance, making their detection and removal more challenging. Additionally, erosion and sediment transport caused by intense rainfall can bury or expose explosive ordnance, necessitating frequent re-surveying and clearance of affected areas. Severe flooding following intense rainfall in Thua Thien Hue province in October 2023 prevented NPA deploying survey teams for several weeks and landslides necessitated relocating its clearance team from A Luoi, the province's most heavily contaminated district.[34]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

VNMAC has made improving information management a top priority.[35] VNMAC completed consolidation of five IMSMA databases into a central national database using IMSMA NG at the end of 2022 and was preparing in 2024 to upgrade the database from IMSMA NG to Core. The GICHD conducted an assessment in March 2024 to prepare for the transition with VNMAC planning to complete the process by the end of 2025, with technical support and facilitation by NPA.[36] Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue provinces continue to operate their own mine action databases, which collect and analyse data from operators and task operators. The operators report activities to these databases that in turn report to VNMAC's central Information Management Unit.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Vietnam does not have a strategy specifically targeting CMR. Programme 504, approved by the Prime Minister in April 2010, set out a National Mine Action Plan for 2010–25. It provides a broad policy framework for responding to explosive ordnance and covers mines, CMR, and other ERW. It aimed to "mobilize domestic and international resources in making efforts to minimize and finally create impact-free environment for social economic development." The programme called for clearance of 8,000km^2 of ERW between 2016 and 2025[37] and planned to complete an impact survey to map contamination nationwide; develop national standards; and establish a database management centre.[38]

Vietnam prepared a five-year plan for the 2021–25 final phase of the National Mine Action plan, without input from NGOs or other members of the MAWG. The plan was eventually adopted in June 2023 for the last two years through to 2025.[39] It calls for improved organisational structures, enhanced legislation and national standards, international cooperation for funding and resources, research and development, establishing a national mine data system, promoting awareness of ERW risk, and assistance to the victims.[40]

VNMAC has been preparing a 10-year plan covering 2026–35 and a draft was reportedly under review by the MoD and other government agencies, but it has not consulted demining organisations or shared information on priorities. It is also understood to be developing a new national mine action programme for 2026–45, with a vision for mine action through to 2065.[41]

Vietnam does not have a national prioritisation system for CMR clearance.[42] Quang Binh Database and Coordination Unit (DBCU) has operated a reporting and tasking system in the province since 2021, and applies a province-wide prioritisation system.[43] The DCBU also submitted a Quang Binh Provincial Mine Action Programme 2024–2035 to the Provincial People's Committee for official approval in the first quarter of 2024, setting specific objectives and timelines to minimise the impact of CMR and ERW and with the longer term ambition of becoming impact-free by 2045.[44] In Quang Tri, QTMAC tasks operators and sets annual work plans approved by provincial authorities in consultation with operators.[45] Thua Thien Hue provincial authorities similarly task NGO operators in accordance with the provincial socio-economic development plan.[46]

34 Email from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024.
35 Interview with Mr Hop, VNMAC, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.
36 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.
37 Prime Minister, "Decision on Approval of the National Mine Action Plan Period 2010–2025", Hanoi, 21 April 2010.
38 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.
39 Emails from Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 29 April and 20 June 2022; and Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 22 June 2022.
40 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
41 Emails from mine action stakeholders, April 2025.
42 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023; and Do Quy Linh, NPA, 16 June 2023.
43 Emails from Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 21 April 2022; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.
44 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 17 May 2024.
45 Emails from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020; Simon Rea, MAG, 24 April 2019; Helene Kuperman, MAG, 31 March 2021; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.
46 Email from Jan Erik Støa, NPA, 6 April 2020.

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Vietnam has two types of national standards: QCVNs, which are mandatory for all operators, and TCVNs, which are only guidelines for organisations that do not receive Vietnamese funding.[47]

Vietnam has drafted 15 TCVNs, which have been the subject of a lengthy review, and which had not been released by the start of 2025. The review is now reportedly complete and the TCVNs are being translated with a view to their release before the end of 2025.[48] The TCVNs are: (1) General regulations, (2) Appraisal and certification of MA organisations' capacity, (3) Monitoring & Evaluation, (4) Contamination inspection, (5) Survey, (6) Safety assurance, (7) Survey and clearance, (8) Disposal of landmines/bombs, (9) Medical insurance, (10) Inspection over incidents, (11) Collecting, processing, and providing mine action information, (12) Quality management, (13) Risk management, (14) Risk education, and (15) Victim assistance. A further TCVN on environmental protection in mine action is also expected to be developed.[49]

QCVNs were promulgated by the MoD in a Circular (No. 59) in 2022 after extensive review over the course of several years by four working groups. The process was co-chaired by VNMAC, and included consultation with operators and international organisations, including the GICHD.[50] The QCVNs include general provisions, technical regulations, regulations on safety and on management, and the responsibilities of organisations and individuals.[51]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Most clearance in Vietnam is conducted by the Army Engineering Corps and 43 military-owned commercial companies. Vietnamese officials have previously reported that it had 250 mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) teams nationally,[52] but the current strength and deployment of military-related demining is unknown. International operators mainly work in the central provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien Hue provinces, and most recently also in the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum.

MAG started 2024 with 41 clearance teams totalling 410 personnel working in Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces, but from June it had 44 clearance teams working with a total of 484 deminers. It achieved the increase by integrating what were previously 14 support teams into clearance teams, expanding the number of deminers in each team from 10 to 11 and creating three new clearance teams. MAG planned to add two more clearance teams in 2025 and another team operating a Scorpion mine and UXO detection system supplied by the US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining & Research Department. MAG also deployed one NTS team and eight two-strong teams conducting risk education.[53]

NPA had 18 clearance teams and 194 deminers operating in 2024, working mainly in Quang Tri and on a smaller scale in Thua Thien Hue. It also operated with two NTS teams, one each in Quang Binh and Thua Thien Hue, and four technical survey teams with 24 personnel in Quang Binh. In 2025, it planned to expand its NTS and TS capacity in Quang Binh and to start field operations in the Central Highlands province of Kon Tum.[54]

PTVN expanded significantly in 2024 from 11 clearance teams with 142 deminers, to 18 teams and 184 clearance personnel. It increased to 6 teams with 47 personnel in Quang Binh, and 12 teams with 137 personnel in Quang Tri. Four of the Quang Binh teams and two of the Quang Tri teams are multi-task teams mainly responsible for spot EOD tasks but which are also available to conduct area clearance if required. PTVN planned further expansion in 2025 by adding two more teams and 26 clearance personnel in Quang Binh.[55]

KVPVP, funded by KOICA and managed by UNDP, had 836 VNMAC staff employed in battle area survey and clearance. These included 14 TS teams with 224 personnel and 34 clearance teams with 612 personnel deployed in Binh Dinh, Quang Ngai, and Thua Thien Hue. Their BAC tasks include some CMR, but these make up only a small proportion of the items cleared.[56]

47 Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 6 May 2019.

48 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

49 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 5 April 2023; Do Quy Linh, NPA, 16 June 2023; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 3 May 2023.

50 Emails from Kimberley McCosker, NPA, 8 April 2021 and 21 April 2022; Valentina Stivanello, MAG, 29 April 2022; GICHD, 24 April 2022; and Tim Horner on behalf of Mr Phuc, VNMAC, 6 April 2021.

51 STA Capacity Development Project (NPA), "Vietnamese legal framework in mine action", January 2023.

52 Interview with Sr. Col. Nguyen Thanh Ban, Engineering Command, Hanoi, 18 June 2013.

53 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.

54 Emails from Melissa Andersson, NPA, 30 April 2024; and NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

55 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025; and Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

56 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 3: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	60.13	
Technical Survey	0	
Non-Technical Survey	0	
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	
Submunitions destroyed	10,857	Includes 1,250 in TS and 1,379 in spot tasks

The three international NGOs working in central Vietnam reported clearing 60km^2 in 2024, an increase of nearly 9% on the previous year. This is only a partial result, but Vietnam's army and army-owned commercial companies do not publicly report results of any activities. The three NGOs destroyed 10,626 submunitions, 9% fewer than the 11,675 items they destroyed in 2023, although BAC by the KVPVP added another 231 submunitions, bringing the total number destroyed to 10,857.[57]

SURVEY IN 2024

International NGO survey identified CHAs covering nearly 48km^2 in 2024 (see Table 4), 26% less than in 2023 and one-third of the area confirmed in 2022. A major share of the CHAs confirmed in the previous two years were in Quang Tri province, but after completion of all Quang Tri's accessible villages in 2023, no survey was recorded there in 2024 and all the CHAs identified were in Quang Binh.

Table 4: Confirmation of cluster munition-contaminated area through TS in 2024 (NGO data)[58]

Operator	Province	Area surveyed (m²)	Area confirmed (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
MAG	Quang Binh	865,738	1,076,143	337	81
NPA	Quang Binh	18,000,000	46,809,786	913	80
Totals		**18,865,738**	**47,885,929**	**1,250**	**161**

KVPVP's VNMAC teams, operating with a mandate for survey and clearance of all forms of explosive ordnance, confirmed another 34.3km^2 of contamination in three provinces in 2024,[59] which included some secondary contamination by CMR. KVPVP's technical survey of these areas also reduced 29km^2.[60]

CLEARANCE IN 2024

Clearance by INGOs released 60km^2 in 2024 (see Table 5), 9% more than the previous year. The area cleared in Quang Binh and Thua Thien Hue was marginally down on the previous year but increased by 13% in Quang Tri. MAG, which cleared 28 CHAs covering 29km^2 in Quang Tri (compared with the previous year's 24 CHAs covering 26.5km^2), attributed the higher productivity to teams working in more open and flat terrain.[61] PTVN linked the 15% increase in the area it cleared to increasing both the number and size of clearance teams.[62] NPA cleared 22% more land in Quang Tri in 2024 than the previous year and destroyed more submunitions – 1,624 in 2024 compared with 1,374 in 2023.[63]

57 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

58 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; and NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

59 KVPVP confirmed explosive ordnance contamination in Binh Dinh (9.7km^2); Quang Nghai (14.2km^2); and Thua Thien Hue (10.3km^2).

60 Emails from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May and 9 June 2025.

61 Email from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025.

62 Email from Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

63 Email from NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025.

Overall, the three NGOs destroyed 9,247 submunitions in survey and clearance in 2024, 11% less than during survey and clearance in 2023. As Table 5 illustrates, 7,997 submunitions were destroyed during full clearance while 1,250 were destroyed during TS (see Table 4 above). They destroyed a further 1,379 submunitions in spot EOD tasks (a small increase on 2023), while KVPVP's VNMAC teams destroyed another 231 submunitions,[64] bringing the cumulative total to 10,857. This is still below the total of 11,675 items destroyed in 2023.

Table 5: CMR clearance in 2024 (NGO data)[65]

Province	Operator	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	Submunitions destroyed in spot tasks	Other UXO destroyed
Quang Binh	MAG	8,506,241	1,293	155	1,415
Quang Binh	PTVN	2,527,137	559	1,049	70
Quang Tri	MAG	29,200,813	4,166	2	3,221
Quang Tri	NPA	11,641,994	1,624	18	2,436
Quang Tri	PTVN	7,654,676	176	61	1,930
Thua Thien Hue	NPA	596,967	179	94	291
Totals		**60,127,828**	**7,997**	**1,379**	**9,363**

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

The results achieved by VNMAC and NGOs in 2024 provided a platform for progress but prospects in 2025 are overshadowed by funding setbacks. The temporary suspension of funding from the US Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), a key donor, resulted in productivity losses, job cuts, and project delays.[66] The KVPVP expressed concern that without a substantial and unforeseen increase in its budget, the near doubling of deminer allowances decreed in December 2024 could result in a reduced number of teams and deminers and set back its 2025 plan to technically survey 22.1km² and clear 6.2km².[67]

Table 6: Five-year summary of NGO clearance

Year	Area (km²)
2024	60.1
2023	55.3
2022	51.2
2021	48.0
2020	48.5
Total	**263.1**

64 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

65 Emails from Sarah Goring, MAG, 25 April 2025; NPA Vietnam management, 5 May 2025; and Phạm Hoàng Hà, PTVN, 12 May 2025.

66 Emails from international operators April and May 2025.

67 Email from Goosoon Kwon, UNDP, 21 May 2025.

YEMEN

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

State not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

Unknown, but heavy

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (m^2)	Release in 2023 (m^2)
Clearance	Unknown	Unknown
Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown
Non-Technical Survey	Unknown	Unknown

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	At least 17	Unknown

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

The United Nations continued discussions with Yemen's mine action authorities, donors, and other stakeholders on a strategy for restructuring and strengthening mine action in Yemen. Sanaa's National Committee for Mine Action released a five-year strategic plan for 2025–29. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with YEMAC North (the so-called De Facto Authorities, DFA) and conducted operations in three DFA-controlled governorates.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **Yemen should accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a matter of priority.**
- **The DFA in Sana'a should expedite access for international demining organisations in order to accelerate survey and clearance.**
- **YEMAC-DFA (YEMAC North) and YEMAC-IRG (YEMAC South) should each report annually on mine action capacity and activities in their area of responsibility.**
- **YEMAC-IRG (the authority of the internationally recognised government) should release its revised national mine action standards (NMAS).**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC), which in practice is split between YEMAC DFA (YEMAC North) based in Sana'a and YEMAC-IRG (YEMAC South) based in Aden.
- Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- YEMAC

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
- Humanity & Inclusion (HI)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- Project Masam/SafeLane Global
- The HALO Trust

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

The extent of cluster munition remnants (CMR) contamination in Yemen is not known but is thought to be heavy. YEMAC North has previously reported the presence of CMR in seven mostly northern governorates, with the heaviest contamination in al-Jawf and Saada governorates bordering Saudi Arabia.[1] YEMAC North has reported that non-technical survey (NTS) conducted between 2017 and 2021 in 35 districts of 7 governorates had identified 527 areas affecting a total of 1,199km^2 suspected to contain explosive ordnance, but it did not disaggregate the extent of cluster munition-contaminated area.[2]

Yemen had CMR before 2015[3] but the escalation of conflict from late March 2015 significantly increased both the extent of contamination and the threat to the civilian population. CMR were the result of airstrikes by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition on territory controlled by the Houthis (Ansar Allah).[4] In December 2016, Human Rights Watch reported that 18 coalition attacks using cluster munitions since the previous year had killed at least 18 civilians and injured 74 more.[5] NGOs recorded coalition use of cluster munitions until February 2017 and suspected continued use in 2018 but have not reported use since then.[6]

YEMAC North reports contamination from 15 types of cluster munition, of which 10 are produced in the United States (US), along with two British- and three Brazilian-made types.[7] Human rights groups have documented the use of US BLU-63 submunitions (in Sana'a City); BLU-97 combined-effect submunitions (in Saada governorate); CBU-58 and CBU-105 sensor-fuzed munitions (in Amran and Sanaa governorates); Brazilian Astros ll munitions (in Saada governorate and city); and British-made BL755 submunitions (in Hayran district of Hajjah governorate). They have also reported use of artillery-delivered ZP-39 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) of indeterminate origin.[8]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Yemen has huge contamination from landmines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Yemen for further information). There is also a significant, but unquantified problem from unexploded ordnance (UXO) other than unexploded submunitions.

1 Interview with Ahmed Alawi, Executive Officer, YEMAC North, 17 February 2016.

2 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p. 9. The seven governorates cited are: governorates: Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Amran, Hodeida, Marib, Saada, and Sana'a.

3 Human Rights Watch has said it recorded Saudi air strikes using cluster munitions dating back to 2009: "Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians", 31 May 2015, at: http://bit.ly/32sdP0x.

4 UNDP, Grant Progress Report for 1 October–31 December 2015, 25 January 2016.

5 Human Rights Watch, "Brazil-made cluster munitions wound children", 23 December 2016, at: http://bit.ly/32ub4vE.

6 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Yemen country profile, 2022, at: https://bit.ly/4evj4R7.

7 Email from Ahmed Yahya Alawi, YEMAC North, 18 April 2023.

8 Human Rights Watch, "Brazil-made cluster munitions wound children", 23 December 2016; Human Rights Watch, "Yemen: Cluster munitions harm civilians", 31 May 2015; Amnesty International, "Yemen: children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb 'minefields'", 23 May 2016; and Legal Centre for Rights and Development, Sanaa, "The bombing of civilians and residential neighbourhoods with international forbidden weapons (cluster munitions)", undated but 2018.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Management of mine action in Yemen is geographically divided along the lines of the conflict that erupted in March 2015 between the Houthi movement (the DFA) controlling the capital Sana'a as well as much of the north and west of the country, and the internationally recognised government (IRG), operationally based in Aden and the south. A Sana'a-based inter-ministerial National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), which was created to set national mine action policy, strategy, and priorities is no longer recognised by the IRG, which reported it had disbanded in 2019 but continues to be cited by the DFA as the institution leading mine action. It states it meets once or twice a year to discuss progress, challenges, and funding.[9]

YEMAC was established in Sana'a in January 1999 as a national mine action agency under the NMAC and functioning as both regulator and operator. It nominally maintained a national role, and in 2021, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that, in total, YEMAC conducted clearance in 19 of Yemen's 21 governorates.[10] In practice, YEMAC had split into two operations, centred round Sana'a and Aden, respectively. YEMAC South informed Mine Action Review there was no coordination between the two because YEMAC North was under the control of Houthi militia.[11]

YEMAC South, headquartered in Aden, operated through three branches serving Hadramaut, Marib, and Taiz. It identified Aden, Abyan, Dhale, Hodeida, Lahej, and Taiz as high-priority districts for mine action interventions.[12] Yemen's Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2022, said that YEMAC was planning to open an office in Marib to support operations in Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf governorates, as well as the western Shabwah governorate. Operations included explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks, NTS, and risk education.[13] Those plans are thought to have been halted by the cessation of donor funding at the end of June 2023. YEMAC reported that as a result it had been forced to suspend 66 demining teams and some departments. It said it continued discussions with the UN Resident Coordinator in 2024 but "no roadmap or solutions have been reached."[14]

In April 2020, YEMAC South opened YMACC in Aden with a view to strengthening programme management in areas controlled by the IRG. The centre, which is intended to facilitate cooperation with international organisations, has responsibility for accrediting organisations and issuing task orders. It has departments for planning, information management, and quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC)[15] and had set up technical working groups focused on NTS and risk education.[16] Termination of the UNDP emergency project in 2023 resulted in reduced staffing and left YMACC without funding for essential utilities, including electricity or fuel for vehicles, leading to delays in its activities. YEMAC and YMACC continued to function in 2024 with the help of technical support from implementing partners (IPs) and financial support, notably from Project Masam.[17] Despite lack of funds, IPs said YMACC continued to convene regular meetings for project managers and supported operators on issues of accreditation, task orders, access, the import of equipment, and security.[18]

YEMAC North (YEMAC-DFA) functions as both the coordinator of mine action in northern governorates controlled by Houthi forces and as operator involved in all aspects of mine action including survey and clearance, risk education, victim assistance, information management, and quality management – a situation seen as creating a problematic conflict of interest.[19] To address that issue, YEMAC North and the DFA's Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (SCMCHA) agreed in principle to set up a coordination centre similar to YMACC in the IRG-controlled areas[20] but as at June 2025 no further action had been taken to implement the proposal.

HI signed an MoU with YEMAC North in January 2024 to conduct a range of activities, including NTS, EOD, and risk education while building YEMAC capacity building and providing support including transport, trauma kits, and personal protective equipment.[21] Three international demining NGOs—Danish Refugee Council (DRC), The HALO Trust, and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)—visited Sana'a in February 2023 and negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with YEMAC North that would provide a basis for operating in the DFA-controlled areas. But although contact has continued, no agreements have yet been signed.[22]

The United Nations provided technical and administrative support to YEMAC for two decades but in 2023 ended the Emergency Mine Action Project managed by UNDP and embarked on a review of its involvement in mine action in Yemen.[23] UN engagement with mine action came under the Resident Coordinator pending a review of mine action sector management structures and international support.[24]

9 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p 12.

10 "UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020", February 2021, p. 9.

11 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, Director, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.

12 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 21 May 2023.

13 Yemen Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, pp. 26–27.

14 Statement by Yemen (IRG) to the APMBC 5th Review Conference, 24-29 November 2024.

15 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 12; and email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.

16 UNDP Annual Report on Mine Action in Yemen 2020, p. 14.

17 Interview with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2025.

18 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, Humanitarian Demining Project Programme Manager, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 6 May 2025; and Azza Sameer, Project Officer, NPA, 25 March 2025; and interview with Ousama Algosaibi, Managing Director, Project Masam, in Geneva, 10 April 2025.

19 *UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022"*, 15 February 2023, p. 21.

20 Ibid.

21 Email from Reshma Azmi, Country Director, HI, 17 June 2025.

22 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, Programme Manager, HALO, 6 May 2025.

23 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 24.

24 Interviews with Patrick Fruchet, UN Adviser, in Geneva, 21 June 2023; and Aleksandar Mihajlov, UNDP, in Geneva, 22 June 2023.

YEMAC has since received some technical and financial support to maintain essential functions from its main implementing partners.

Two UN staff deployed to Yemen in January 2024 under a six-month project funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), "Strategic Coordination of Ways Forward for Humanitarian Mine Action interventions in Yemen", to make recommendations for the UN's future engagement with mine action in Yemen. Recommendations included strengthening national coordination structures, increasing international support for deployment of international NGOs in the North and the South of Yemen, and supporting reactivation of the National Mine Action Committee. From October 2024, the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) implemented a Netherlands-funded project, "Addressing Explosive Threats for the Protection of Civilians". This was expected to include funding of US$160,000 over a period of eight months to support YMACC's coordination activities, including planning, tasking, monitoring/QA, completions and handovers, and information management.[25]

The UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), set up under UN Security Council Resolution 2452, opened a joint operations centre in the city in October 2019. Its mine action section includes a senior mine action adviser in Hodeida undertaking an advisory and advocacy role, supported by a mine action officer based in Aden and a staff member in Sana'a.[26]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Yemen does not have an NMAS on environmental management, and the emergency character of the response to mines and other explosive ordnance does not take account of environmental issues in planning and tasking. International operators report complying with relevant international standards, but said no environmental issues were identified or discussed with YEMAC or YMACC in 2024.[27]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

YEMAC-IRG (YEMAC South) has identified inclusion of women in mine action as a priority[28] and reaffirmed its commitment to advancing gender and diversity at the end of 2024.[29] Implementation remains challenging in the face of conservative cultural norms and restricted mobility for women, and at a time when donor funding cuts have severely curtailed mine action employment.

YEMAC South started training female staff for EOD, improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD), NTS, and risk education in 2020.[30] Yemen's 2022 Article 5 deadline extension request noted that YEMAC had employed women in NTS, risk education, information management, and victim assistance. It stated that "there is no objection to including more women",[31] although YMACC was reportedly resistant to employing women in multitask teams.[32] Any plans for employing women were put on hold with the suspension of donor funding in 2023. YEMAC North affirmed to UNDP that women made up half of their NTS staff[33] but no details were available of overall staffing or the gender composition. Its strategic plan for 2025–29 omits any reference to gender.

Employment of women among international operators generally remained at a low level. DRC's NTS/risk education teams, however, are made up equally of men and women and in the last quarter of 2024 started training a female technical field manager.[34] Of HALO's five international staff, three (60%) are women; among its 65 national staff, 12 (18%) are women, including four in field operations.[35] Half of NPA's staff were women, whether in managerial or field positions, but 27 employees seconded from YEMAC were all men.[36] Saudi-funded Project Masam, much the biggest operator in Yemen, remains an almost entirely male organisation.[37]

In the North, HI reported a balance of employment for women and people with disabilities in the risk education team enabling delivery of safety messages to all community groups, but not in the NTS and EOD teams due to policy and because it said there were no qualified females for these activities. HI said it planned with YEMAC to consider gender diversity in upcoming training of NTS and EOD staff to ensure overall gender diversity.[38]

25 Interview with Charles Frisby and Habibulhaq Javed, UNOPS, in Geneva, 10 April 2025; and email from Charles Frisby, 15 April 2025.
26 Email from Leon Louw, Mine Action Adviser, UNMHA, 25 June 2024.
27 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.
28 Email from Ameen Saleh Al-Aqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 21.
29 Statement of Yemen to the APMBC Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 24–29 November 2024.
30 Email from Ameen Saleh Al-Aqili, YEMAC, 5 May 2021; and "UNDP Annual Report 2020", p. 15.
31 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 21.
32 Email from Marie-Josée Hamel, DRC, 30 March 2022.
33 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 15.
34 Email from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025.
35 Email from Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.
36 Email from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.
37 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.
38 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.

Table 1: Gender composition of operators in 2024[39]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
DRC	52	10 (19%)	6	2 (33%)	34	6 (18%)
HALO	70	15 (21%)	11	3 (27%)	35	5 (14%)
HI South	33	11 (33%)	7	4 (57%)	20	7 (35%)
HI North	45	26 (58%)	19	4 (21%)	24	9 (38%)
NPA	49	10 (20%)	7	3 (43%)	4	2 (50%)
Project Masam	557	10 (2%)	32	0 (0%)	301	1 (0.3%)
Totals	**806**	**82 (10%)**	**82**	**16 (20%)**	**416**	**30 (7%)**

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

Information management in the YEMAC South area of operations is supported by an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core database installed in YMACC at the end of 2021 with support from UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[40] Since 2022 it has been populated with data on clearance, victims, and accidents as well as receiving results of the baseline survey.[41] Operator access is restricted to data relating to their own operations. They are able to request maps and other data to support operations and report that data received on tasks have proved reliable.[42] Project Masam reported its operating results to YMACC, but the data were held separately from other operators' results.[43] After closure of UNDP's programme, the GICHD continued to deploy an information management officer contracted by DRC.[44]

In 2024, YMACC upgraded IMSMA reporting forms to Version 2 with support from the GICHD and held meetings with implementing partners to update them on the reporting requirements of the new version.[45] NPA also facilitated IMSMA workshops for YEMAC and YMACC at its offices.[46]

YEMAC North works with an older IMSMA New Generation system.[47] Its information management capacity in 2024 was not known, and implementing partners have no access to the database. HI said it is coordinating with YEMAC North so that its database can be upgraded to IMSMA Core.[48] The DFA mine action strategy for 2025–29 makes no reference to information management.

PLANNING AND TASKING

Mine action in Yemen is conducted on an emergency basis in a context of continuing armed conflict, responding to immediate threats from all forms of explosive ordnance.[49] UNDP has previously observed that YEMAC needed to organise field operations to also address longer term impacts of contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW).[50] Yemen's CMR challenge, however, appears to be concentrated almost exclusively in northern governorates controlled by the DFA.

A work plan in Yemen IRG's 2022 APMBC Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2022, identified general areas of activity such as emergency response, survey, and risk education, but gave no details. It said it would update its plans every year or two.[51] Implementing partners in IRG-controlled areas, did not record any clearance of CMR.[52]

39 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; Azza Sameer, Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025; NPA, 5 May 2025; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

40 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 9.

41 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

42 Emails from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 15 May 2023; and Matthew Smith, HALO, 11 July 2023.

43 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 11 July 2023.

44 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024; and email from Christina Hendryx, DRC, 17 July 2024.

45 Emails from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025; and Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025.

46 Email from Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025.

47 Interview with Mukahhal Sulaiman, GICHD, Geneva, 27 June 2024.

48 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.

49 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 26.

50 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project – Phase II, Annual Report for 2022", 15 February 2023, p. 23.

51 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2022, p. 27.

52 Emails from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025; Mara van der Kamp, HALO, 6 May 2025; Azza Sameer, NPA, 5 May 2025; and Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

The DFA mine action strategic plan for 2025–29 sets out general plans for marking, survey, and clearance of explosive ordnance, including unexploded submunitions, expanding mine action teams, building capacity, and employing mine detection dogs and drones. The targets include marking 11.7km^2 and clearing 11km^2 of hazardous areas and "releasing a total of 1,456,941,500 square meters of SHA," but it does not set targets disaggregated by type of contamination. YEMAC-DFA put the cost of implementing the strategy at US$152.7 million.[53]

YEMAC North prioritised tasks on the basis of needs and demands for rapid interventions identified by YEMAC, local authorities, community committees, and community focal points. HI worked closely with YEMAC North, meeting three times a week to plan field operations, workshops, and other activities. HI reported regular field visits by its Field Technical Manager and EOD Supervisor as well as by a YEMAC North QM unit.[54]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Yemen-IRG had embarked on the process of revising and updating its NMAS before the 2023 termination of UNDP's Emergency Mine Action Project. The existing standards were based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) when they were drawn up in 2007. YEMAC South (IRG) had acknowledged that the standards were obsolete and that standard operating procedures (SOPs) based on the standards were not consistently applied by its clearance personnel.[55]

By 2023, YEMAC South reported it had revised 31 chapters of NMAS, which were undergoing a final review and were expected to be approved and adopted before the end of 2023.[56] They included standards relating to land release and are said to be compliant with IMAS and the 2019 Oslo Action Plan.[57] Dual-language standards have been drafted but have not yet been officially released.[58] Further action appears to have ceased with the termination of the UNDP programme and suspension of international funding.

YEMAC North (DFA) briefly mentions in its strategic plan for 2025–29 that it is responsible for maintaining national standards and implementing plans in accordance with them, but it gave no details of the scope of standards or when they were released.[59]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

Until 2023, YEMAC was nominally the biggest operator, employing some 400 personnel under YEMAC-DFA in the north and 550 personnel under YEMAC-IRG in the south, but estimates of operational capacity in both areas were complicated by the reported presence of ghost deminers and lack of clarity on the number of personnel operational at any one time in either the north or south.[60]

YEMAC North, operating in the region mainly affected by CMR, said it had 568 personnel working in 29 field teams: nine manual clearance teams, three NTS and six technical survey (TS) teams, five mine detection dog (MDD) teams, two mechanical clearance teams, one ERW team, one QA team, one monitoring team, and a victim assistance team.[61]

HI had five EOD/battle area clearance (BAC) teams with a total of 25 personnel operating in three northern governorates together with three NTS teams (12 personnel) and nine risk education teams (45 personnel). In the South, HI worked from two offices in Aden and Taiz governorates with two EOD/BAC teams totalling 12 personnel, together with three NTS teams (10 personnel) and four risk education teams (16 personnel).[62]

In the YEMAC South reported that since the cessation of its donor support it has only been able to deploy teams for emergency call-outs.[63] Project Masam remains much the biggest operator with 32 teams with 264 personnel trained for NTS, TS, and manual clearance. It foresaw a substantial increase in capacity to 42 teams in the second half of 2025. The nine governorates in which Project Masam operated in 2024 included three reportedly affected by CMR (Al-Jawf, Hodeida, and Marib) but although it reported clearance of hundreds of mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and more than 45,000 items of UXO in 2024, it said it did not clear or receive reports of any CMR.[64] The other international operators included DRC, HALO, HI, and NPA who focused on survey and clearance of mines and of which only DRC and HI encountered cluster munitions in 2024.

53 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, pp. 5, 10, 23-24.
54 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.
55 UNDP, "Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2019", 20 January 2020, p. 17; and 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 16.
56 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 21 May 2023.
57 Email from Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, 26 December 2021.
58 Email from Jack Lister, HALO, 6 June 2024.
59 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated, p. 12.
60 Interview with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 23 June 2022.
61 "Yemen National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029", National Mine Action Committee (Sanaa), undated but 2025, p. 30.
62 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.
63 Interviews with Ameen Saleh Alaqili, YEMAC, in Geneva, 1 May 2024 and 20 June 2025.
64 Email from Retief Horn, Project Masam, 16 April 2025.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Mine action in Yemen is conducted on an emergency basis focused on survey to identify the extent of contamination by all forms of explosive ordnance and on urgent clearance to remove explosive hazards that pose an immediate threat to communities. No data were received from YEMAC-DFA on the extent or outcome of any land release operations in 2024.

HI did not release areas in the North, but NTS confirmed 0.6km^2 of CMR contamination in Sana'a and Hodeida North governorates and EOD operations in Hodeida North destroyed 14 submunitions among a wide range of other explosive ordnance.[65]

In the south, DRC reported that its EOD teams destroyed three submunitions during 2024 in Nabta village in Taiz governorate's Almashaliha sub-district. They included one BLU-63 and two Greek HEDP M20G submunitions, all of which it destroyed in situ.[66]

65 Email from Reshma Azmi, HI, 17 June 2025.

66 Email from Dua'a Almadi, DRC, 30 April 2025.

OTHER AREAS

KOSOVO

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

Not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION: 6.27KM²

Medium
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Release in 2023 (km²)
Clearance	1.51	1.92
Technical Survey	0.08	0.31
Non-Technical Survey	5.54	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	89	196

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATORS IN 2024:

- Kosovo Security Force (KSF)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- The HALO Trust

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

In 2024, Kosovo launched its new Mine Action Strategy for 2025–30, which targets the completion of all landmine and cluster munition remnants (CMR) clearance by 2030. Clearance output was lower in 2024 than 2023 and the majority of land release output was due to cancellation through non-technical survey (NTS), which at the time of writing was still awaiting verification by the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **While formal accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is not currently possible for Kosovo, as it is not recognised as a State by the depositary, Kosovo should submit a letter to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General pledging to comply fully, on a voluntary basis, with the CCM and, as is planned for this year, submit annual voluntary Article 7 reports.**
- **In addition to survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), Kosovo should also review the basis on which confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) are established. In particular, it should conduct survey to confirm contamination from CMR before embarking on full clearance and continue to release areas through survey where possible.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC)

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Kosovo Security Force (KSF)

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- The HALO Trust (HALO)
- Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
- The Kosovo Force (KFOR), a NATO-led international peacekeeping force

OTHER ACTORS

- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

At the end of 2024, Kosovo reported 6.27km^2 of CMR contamination across 35 hazardous areas, comprising 22 CHAs covering 3.84km^2 and 13 SHAs covering 2.42km^2 (see Table 1).[1] The overall estimate has decreased by 2.51km^2 from the 8.78km^2 at the end of 2023.[2] This does not equate with the amount of area released through survey and clearance in 2024, which totalled 7.13km^2. According to KMAC, this is because the area ostensibly cancelled by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) was not included in the national mine action database as contaminated area. At the time of writing, KMAC was awaiting the final NTS reports to verify the relevant figures.[3]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area (KMAC data) (at end 2024)[4]

District	CHAs	Area (m^2)	SHAs	Area (m^2)	Total areas	Total area (m^2)
South	3	346,168	3	436,400	6	782,568
North	5	2,062,880	3	1,391,903	8	3,454,783
Centre	5	363,952	0	0	5	363,952
East	1	320,000	0	0	1	320,000
West	8	748,614	7	595,375	15	1,343,989
Totals	**22**	**3,841,614**	**13**	**2,423,678**	**35**	**6,269,292**

Kosovo has a reasonable understanding of CMR contamination remaining on its territory over two decades of mine action activities, including surveys in 2013, 2015, 2022, and 2024. In 2013, HALO and KMAC conducted joint non-technical survey (NTS) of cluster munition strikes and mined areas across Kosovo, with the exception of four municipalities in the north.[5] These four municipalities were subsequently surveyed in 2015 by NPA, in coordination with KMAC and local municipality authorities with CMR contamination found in Leposavic, Zubin Potok, and Zvecan, while no CMR contamination was found in Mitrovica North.[6]

In 2022, HALO completed a NTS project to create CHAs and SHAs, as this was not done during the 2013 survey and up to that point there had been no classification of CHAs and SHAs in Kosovo.[7] In 2024, NPA completed NTS of nine hazardous areas in Leposavic, Mitrovica, and Zubin Potok, in line with Kosovo's newly launched national mine action strategy for 2025-30.[8] This was the first survey in these areas since the initial NTS in 2015.[9] A total of 151,914m^2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was added to the database as a result of the survey.[10]

Contamination is primarily a result of conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s; and between the FRY and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999. During Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft bombed 333 locations between 24 March and 10 June 1999, dropping 1,392 bombs that released more than 295,700 submunitions.[11] FRY forces also used cluster munitions during the 1998–99 conflict in Kosovo. A large clearance programme followed in 1999 under a UN mandate, but this ended prematurely in 2001, leaving many CMR-contaminated areas still needing to be cleared.[12]

1 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Head, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
2 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 24 April 2023.
3 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 19 June 2025.
4 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
5 A. Moore, HALO, "Action on cluster munitions in Kosovo", Side event, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.
6 NPA, "Cluster Munition Remnants in Northern Kosovo: non-technical survey of contamination and impact", September 2015; and email from Goran Peršic, NPA Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 May 2016.
7 Email from Michael Montañ, Programme Manager, HALO, 18 April 2023.
8 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Country Director, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
9 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 25 April 2024.
10 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
11 ICRC, "Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo", rev. June 2001, pp. 4 and 6; and HALO, "Action on cluster munitions in Kosovo", 10 September 2015, at: https://bit.ly/30P1X70.
12 A. Moore, HALO, "Action on cluster munitions in Kosovo", Side event, First CCM Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 10 September 2015.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Kosovo is also contaminated with anti-personnel mines (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Kosovo for further information) and remains affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW) other than CMR. Most ERW consists of unexploded aircraft bombs and items of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) from the conflicts in the 1990s. However, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams continue to encounter items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) dating back to the Second World War.[13] The Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Kosovo Security Force (KSF) EOD teams regularly dispose of ERW in response to information provided by the public and demining organisations.[14]

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

KMAC is responsible for managing survey and clearance of mines and ERW throughout Kosovo. The Centre prepares an annual work plan in cooperation with the international demining NGOs and coordinates their operations along with the national demining teams of the KSF. It also coordinates survey, quality assurance (QA), risk education, public information, and victim assistance.[15] KMAC's role and responsibilities as head of the national mine action programme under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence were established and institutionalised by Kosovo's 2012 Law on Humanitarian Demining, which was amended in 2022.[16]

NGO operators in Kosovo report a constructive working relationship with KMAC and say there is an enabling environment for mine action in Kosovo with clear administrative processes in place for obtaining visas and annual accreditation.[17]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, Kosovo's government provided €1.1 million in financial support to KMAC and the KSF for mine and CMR clearance, as in previous years.[18] In 2025, NPA's CMR survey and clearance activities were funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), the European Union (EU), and the Japanese Embassy, while the Swiss Embassy began funding HALO and NPA as a consortium.[19] NPA and HALO had both received funding from the United States (US) Department of State's Office of Weapon Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) but this was discontinued in early 2025. The grant from the EU was due to end in October 2025 and negotiations for a continuation were ongoing at the time of writing.[20]

It has been estimated that €3.5 million will be required on an annual basis to meet Kosovo's mine action strategy's objectives, totalling €21 million between 2025 and 2030. The programme currently has limited international funding that is confirmed beyond the middle of 2025. To address this gap, the mine action programme will actively seek to mobilise funds.[21]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

Kosovo's mine action strategy for 2025–30 prioritises gender and diversity mainstreaming as a guiding principle. The strategy directs that mine action activities be sensitive to gender and inclusive of ethnic and disability considerations and that gender and diversity considerations should be integrated into all phases of planning, implementation, and follow-up.[22]

Both KMAC and KSF have gender policies in place. KMAC reported that the KSF's gender policy aims to facilitate the consultation of all groups affected by mines and ERW – and explicitly women and children. KMAC hired a Gender and Safeguarding focal point who began working in 2023.[23]

13 UNMIK, "OKPCC EOD Management Section Annual Report 2008", Pristina, 12 January 2009, p. 4.
14 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 1 August 2012.
15 Ibid.
16 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 16 June and 3 July 2017; Ministry of Defence, "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 3; and Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 4.
17 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 30 March 2023; and Michael Montañ, HALO, 18 April 2023.
18 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
19 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
20 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
21 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 16.
22 Ibid., p. 18.
23 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.

Table 2: Gender composition of operators in 2024[24]

Operator	Total staff	Women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
KMAC	5	1 (20%)	1	0 (0%)	3	0 (0%)
KSF	112	27 (24%)	14	2 (14%)	60	9 (15%)
NPA	76	27 (35%)	8	3 (38%)	67	20 (30%)
HALO*	155	42 (27%)	28	6 21%)	134	36 (27%)
Totals	**348**	**97 (28%)**	**51**	**11 (22%)**	**264**	**65 (25%)**

* Data correct as at December 2024.

Kosovo's mine action strategy recognises the lack of economic opportunities in Kosovo, with women and youth particularly impacted by limited employment prospects. This leads many to seek better prospects abroad, posing both a challenge and an opportunity for the mine action sector. It poses a threat of losing valuable talent and human capital, yet it also provides an opportunity to recruit new talent within Kosovo. By hiring both women and men from diverse ethnic groups and offering competitive salary packages and benefits, NPA and HALO actively promote gender equality and economic empowerment within local communities. This approach aligns with the principles outlined in their respective Gender and Diversity Policies.[25]

KMAC recognises that explosive contamination affects women, girls, men and boys differently and that gender-specific mobility patterns, roles, and responsibilities mean that females and males of various ages and ethnic backgrounds have different information on contaminated areas in their communities – and also different priorities for clearance and land use.[26]

HALO's gender policy, developed with the Kosovo Women's Network, aims to improve recruitment and retention of women by addressing barriers such as childcare responsibilities.[27] In 2024, HALO continued its provision of childcare stipends and explicitly mentioned them in job announcements to attract female applicants and support retention. Health insurance was also extended to all staff. In 2024, nine women received childcare stipends, two baby boxes were issued, and 92 school supply packages were distributed to employees' children during the spring and winter semesters.[28]

NPA hired a Gender and Safeguarding focal point who began working in January 2024 after receiving training from the global advisor at NPA's Head Office.[29]

Both HALO and NPA continue to ensure inclusion of women, children, and ethnic minorities in community liaison (CL) activities and that survey and CL teams are multi-ethnic and gender balanced.[30]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

Kosovo has a national mine action standard on the environment although it has not yet been updated in line with the revised IMAS 07.13 (second edition, 3 July 2024).[31] KMAC reported that environmental assessments are integrated into the planning and delivery of survey and clearance operations.[32] It prioritises clearance based on risk reduction, development, environmental protection, and poverty reduction, with contaminated land whose clearance would reduce emissions by enabling better land management or support climate adaptation given the highest priority.[33] The Law on Climate Change, adopted in December 2023, seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure.[34]

Demining takes place from April to November, but increasingly frequent and unpredictable weather due to climate change is affecting operations. NPA Kosovo has an environmental policy in place, conducts environmental assessments to support the planning and delivery of survey and clearance, and, since 2023, has an environmental focal point for the programme.[35] In March 2024, HALO's Kosovo programme introduced a standard operating procedure (SOP) on Environmental Management for Operations, aligned with HALO's global environmental management SOP. This SOP aims to ensure minimal environmental impact and mitigates potential negative effects of survey and clearance operations.[36]

24 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, Programme Manager, HALO, 15 April 2025.
25 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
26 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 24 April 2023.
27 Email from Olivia Meader, HALO, 22 May 2020.
28 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
29 Emails from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 25 April 2024 and 10 April 2025.
30 Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 June 2022; and Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
31 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 24 April 2023.
32 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 May 2024.
33 Mine Action and the Resilience of Communities to Climate Change, GICHD, December 2023, p. 40.
34 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 5.
35 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
36 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 7 May 2024.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

KMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) New Generation version for its national mine action database. Data are disaggregated between mines, CMR, and other ERW.[37] Operators were positive in their assessments of the quality and accessibility of data contained in the database and of KMAC's information management systems in general. KMAC is collaborating with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to install IMSMA Core, which was expected to be operational by late 2024 but at the time of writing was still in development.[38]

Operators report to KMAC on a weekly basis; NPA reported all data collection forms are consistent and enable collection of the necessary data.[39] HALO was similarly positive, adding that the database is checked against HALO's quarterly reports. Once a task is completed or when KMAC agrees and signs off on a re-survey or survey conducted by an NTS team, the data is fed into IMSMA.[40] The land release data reported to Mine Action Review by clearance operators and the KMAC was aligned, an improvement compared to previous years' reports, which typically contained discrepancies.

KMAC reported to Mine Action Review that Kosovo was planning to submit a voluntary Article 7 report for the CCM.[41]

PLANNING AND TASKING

Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy for 2025–30, developed by KMAC in consultation with operators and with the support of the GICHD, declares that the risk of explosive ordnance contamination will be considered tolerable once all high and medium-priority tasks have been completed by 2030, and provided that there are no incidents for five years thereafter. The general expectation is that any remaining contamination after 2030 would be considered as residual.[42] Strategic objective 1 on land release is supported by four strategic outcomes:

- Greater clarity on the remaining contamination in Northern municipalities will be established;
- Mine action organisations will continue clearance operations to fulfil task completion, prioritising high and medium-priority tasks and concluding with low-priority tasks;
- In light of current efficiency challenges and anticipated obstacles posed by difficult terrain such as dense vegetation and steep slopes, KMAC will reassess clearance requirements to enhance efficiency and effectiveness; and
- Recognising that 2030 marks the conclusion of the international mine action organisations' presence in Kosovo, the mine action programme will implement staff transition plans.[43]

The target of 1.8km^2 of annual battle area clearance (BAC) has been set, along with zero high and medium priority tasks remaining by 2030 and as few low priority tasks remaining as possible. It is planned that the 38 municipalities that were contaminated with mines and CMR when the strategy was drafted will be declared free from risk by 2030.[44]

KMAC elaborates an annual work plan for survey and clearance of CMR. In 2024, it planned for release of 14 of the 38 hazardous areas, and in 2025 it planned for the release of a further 20.[45]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

In 2024, the national mine action standard (NMAS) for land release in Kosovo was updated in accordance with IMAS and in consultation with clearance operators.[46] Key changes introduced by KMAC included reducing the required fade-out distance around component parts of BLU-97 and BL755 submunitions from 50m to 25m. Additionally, the required detection depth for munitions was increased from 50cm to 56cm. Detectors are able to locate a submunition when the top is 50cm subsurface and the base is at 56cm.[47]

HALO updated its SOPs in 2024 to reflect the changes. The excavation process was revised to require the first 10cm of soil to be removed in two 5cm increments, rather than a single 10cm layer. HALO also introduced two methods for lane preparation using the VMX10 and Schonstedt: the "pre-laid" and the "concurrent" methods. The concurrent method, used in open and flat terrain, involves laying a rope on one side of the lane before mapping, while the second rope is pulled by the operator during mapping. The pre-laid method, used in areas with obstacles, requires ropes to be laid on both sides prior to mapping.[48]

37 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 30 April 2019.
38 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
39 Emails from Olivia Meader, HALO, 1 May 2019; Terje Eldøen, NPA, 25 April 2019; and Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 1 June 2022.
40 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
41 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
42 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, p. 8.
43 Ibid., p. 10.
44 Ibid., p. 11.
45 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 May 2024 and 22 April 2025.
46 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
47 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
48 Ibid.

Since 2018, NPA has implemented the Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) methodology for technical survey (TS) in Kosovo. Adapted to local conditions and aligned with IMAS, the approach allows operators to walk on ground with subsurface contamination within strike areas, improving survey efficiency and the accuracy of confirmed hazardous area definitions.[49] HALO uses the same approach following a field risk assessment.[50]

HALO Kosovo also conducts research and development to enhance safety and efficiency. The Scorpion detection system—developed by the US Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program—was successfully trialled in 2019 and is now used in BAC. It combines a large-loop electromagnetic induction sensor, caesium vapour magnetometer, and differential GPS for high-precision anomaly detection, mounted on a trolley for deployment over open terrain.[51]

The Scorpion system has notably increased BAC productivity in areas that are not densely vegetated or steep. In 2023, it achieved average clearance rates of 168m² per day, more than double that of the Large Loop Detector (82m²/day).[52]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

In 2024, Kosovo's national mine action programme's capacity consisted of two international operators, HALO and NPA, and a national operator, the KSF, which provided a round-the-clock EOD emergency response. KFOR also supports the KSF and Kosovo Police with EOD response tasks and organising mine and ERW demolitions in Mitrovica and the north of Kosovo, including in NPA's areas of operations.[53]

HALO's operational personnel are cross-trained for mine clearance and BAC and can move readily between the two.[54] There was no substantial change to the number of clearance personnel deployed by HALO in 2024 compared to the previous year. In 2025, two major funding contracts were due to expire. Unless new funding is secured, the programme may close by the end of the year.[55]

In 2024, NPA deployed one NTS team of three personnel. Its clearance capacity was much the same as 2023 until the end of 2024 when it was reduced to five teams due to discontinuation of US funding for Kosovo.[56]

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[57]

Operator	Manual CMR clearance teams	Total CMR clearance personnel
KSF	4	50
HALO	*9	**58
NPA	8	80
Totals	**21**	**188**

* Average across the year with 7 teams in March–April, 9 in May–June, and 10 in September–December.
** Average across the year with 48 personnel in March–April, 61 in July–September, and 62 in October–December.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

Table 4: Land release outputs in 2024

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Comments
Clearance	1.51	National authority/operator data
Technical Survey	0.08	National authority/operator data
Non-Technical Survey	5.54	National authority/operator data
Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	**2024**	**Comments**
Submunitions destroyed	89	National authority/operator data

49 Interview with Terje Eldøen, NPA, Pristina, 5 April 2019; and email, 25 April 2019.
50 Email from Laura Moreno-González, HALO, 25 June 2024.
51 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 7 May 2024.
52 Ibid.
53 "Mine Action Strategy 2019–2024 in Republic of Kosovo", 4 April 2019, p. 4; and interview with Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, Pristina, 5 April 2019.
54 Email from Megan Dwyer, HALO, 11 May 2022.
55 Email from Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.
56 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
57 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

SURVEY IN 2024

In 2024, 5.54km^2 was cancelled through NTS (see Table 5), an increase from 2023 when no land was cancelled in this manner. A total of 0.08km^2 was reduced through TS (see Table 6), a reduction from the 0.31km^2 reduced in 2023.[58]

Table 5: Cancellation through NTS in 2024[59]

District	Operator	Area cancelled (m²)
Mitrovica	NPA	2,417,021
Gracanica	NPA	0
Leposavic	NPA	1,831,558
Zubin Potok	NPA	1,294,410
Total		**5,542,989**

Table 6: Reduction through TS in 2024[60]

District	Operator	Area reduced (m²)
Pejë	HALO	47,216
Prizren	HALO	32,740
Total		**79,956**

CLEARANCE IN 2024

In 2024, more than 1.51km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with the destruction of 89 submunitions (see Table 7).[61] This is a reduction from 2023 when over 1.93km^2 of CMR-contaminated area was cleared with 196 submunitions destroyed.[62] The number of submunitions found per square metre of clearance has also dropped from 1 for every 9,813m^2 in 2023 to 1 in every 16,967m^2 in 2024. In addition, almost 0.2km^2 was cleared with no CMR found (see Table 8), which indicates a persistent problem with survey.

Table 7: CMR clearance in 2024[63]

District	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	AP mines destroyed	Other UXO destroyed
East	KSF	1	36,400	0	0	185
South	KSF	2	66,100	8	0	0
Mitrovica	NPA	3	606,700	11	0	63
Gracanica	NPA	1	35,940	2	5	328
Prishtina	NPA	1	33,640	0	0	1
Zubin Potok	NPA	1	302,815	20	0	1
Gjakovë	HALO	3	217,186	38	0	0
Pejë	HALO	2	18,522	1	0	0
Prishtinë	HALO	2	64,572	9	0	0
Prizren	HALO	3	128,212	0	0	0
Totals		**19**	**1,510,087**	**89**	**5**	**578**

Table 8: Area cleared in 2024 in which no CMR were found[64]

Operator	Area cleared (m²)	Comments
NPA	33,640	
HALO	128,212	The area contained fragmentation from exploded submunitions and other direct evidence of contamination, such as craters from exploded submunitions.
KSF	36,400	185 other items of UXO were found and destroyed
Total	**198,252**	

58 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025 and 14 May 2024; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025 and 25 April 2024; Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025; and Michael Montafi, HALO, 7 May 2024.

59 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.

60 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

61 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025; and Fred Wellesley, HALO, 15 April 2025.

62 Emails from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 14 May 2024; Claus Nielsen, NPA, 25 April 2024; and Michael Montafi, HALO, 7 May 2024.

63 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.

64 Ibid.

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Kosovo cannot formally adhere to the CCM and therefore does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. Nonetheless, it has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.

In Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025-30 Kosovo has set a completion deadline for 2030. Operators expect that Kosovo will be able to meet this deadline as long as donor funding can be secured to maintain capacity.[65] According to KMAC, securing sufficient donor support to clear the remaining mine and cluster munition contamination in Kosovo will be one of the primary challenges in 2026 and beyond.[66] This effort is seen as a crucial contributor to enhancing human security, economic development, and stability in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans region.[67]

Table 9: Five-year summary of CMR clearance

Year	Area cleared (km^2)
2024	1.51
2023	1.92
2022	1.32
2021	1.30
2020	0.34
Total	**6.39**

PLANNING FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

The second strategic objective of Kosovo's Mine Action Strategy 2025–30, which focuses on enhancing national capacities, includes a strategic outcome on the management of residual contamination. As clearance operations conclude in 2030, Kosovo will shift from proactive clearance efforts to the reactive management of residual threats by KMAC with support from KSF units. Recognising the unique requirements of risk management, KMAC will seek to ensure that both KMAC and KSF are equipped, staffed, and resourced to address residual contamination effectively.[68] A comprehensive residual contamination strategy is planned for development and submission to the Government of Kosovo by 2029.[69]

65 Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 10 April 2025.
66 Email from Ahmet Sallova, KMAC, 22 April 2025.
67 Email from Michael Montañ, HALO, 7 May 2024.
68 Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030, 18 June 2024, pp. 8 and 12.
69 Ibid., p. 13.

WESTERN SAHARA

KEY DATA

NO CCM ARTICLE 4 DEADLINE:

Not party to the CCM

CMR CONTAMINATION:

1.73KM²

Light
(National estimate)

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS

Release of cluster munition-contaminated area	Release in 2024 (km²)	Release in 2023 (km²)
Clearance	0.49	0.27
Technical Survey	0	0
Non-Technical Survey	0	0

Destruction of submunitions during clearance, survey, and spot tasks	2024	2023
Submunitions destroyed	354	33

MAIN CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE OPERATOR IN 2024:

- SafeLane Global

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Clearance output nearly doubled in 2024 compared to 2023, largely due to the suspension of operations during the first five months of 2023, which had limited productivity. While the renewed conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco has remained low intensity, with no recorded use of cluster munitions, previously unrecorded cluster munition remnants (CMR) continued to be found, with 111,115m² of cluster munition-contaminated area identified in 2024.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

- **The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) should reaffirm in writing its commitment to respect and implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), including clearance of all cluster munition remnants (CMR), consonant with its international human rights obligations. This commitment should include annual submission of voluntary Article 7 transparency reports.**
- **The Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) should finalise and adopt the newly drafted strategy, ensuring it includes a revised deadline for completion of CMR clearance, annual survey and clearance targets, and a detailed budget.**
- **Greater support should be provided to SMACO to enable it to continue coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm and to ensure that the remaining explosive ordnance contamination is addressed.**

CLUSTER MUNITION SURVEY AND CLEARANCE CAPACITY

MANAGEMENT

- Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO) [Western Sahara, east of the Berm]
- Royal Moroccan Army [west of the Berm]

NATIONAL OPERATORS

- Royal Moroccan Army

INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS

- SafeLane Global

OTHER ACTORS

- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Western Sahara

UNDERSTANDING OF CMR CONTAMINATION

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), at the end of 2024, Western Sahara east of the Berm[1] had a total of 37 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing CMR, covering a total of 1.73km^2.[2] This is a 17% decrease from 2023 and reflects the clearance that took place in 2024. Both the north and south of Western Sahara east of the Berm are still affected by CMR, as summarised in Table 1.[3]

Table 1: Cluster munition-contaminated area east of the Berm (at end 2024)[4]

Region	CHAs	Area (km^2)
North	22	0.77
South	15	0.96
Totals	**37**	**1.73**

The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used both artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario Front military forces during their conflict in Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991. According to the SADR, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces employed BLU-63, M42, and Mk118 submunitions at multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Dougaj, Mehaires, Mijek, and Tifariti.[5] UNMAS reported that submunitions have also been found in Agwanit.[6]

In November 2020, Morocco sent troops into the UN-monitored buffer zone to end Polisario Front supporters' three-week blockade of the strategic Guerguerat road. In response, Polisario withdrew from the almost 30-year-long ceasefire and renewed attacks on Moroccan military units.[7] To date, the renewed conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco has been of low intensity, without any recorded use of cluster munitions.[8]

But while CMR clearance had been projected to be completed by the end of 2012,[9] discovery of previously unrecorded contamination meant this target date was not met. According to UNMAS, new strike areas have continued to be identified since 2013 as mine action activities continued and additional information was received from local populations.[10] In 2024, two new cluster munition-contaminated areas totalling 111,115m^2 were identified and released.[11]

Of the 37 recorded CHAs, seven cluster munition strike areas are located inside the buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.[12] Clearance of mines and explosive ordnance (EO) in the buffer strip and along the Berm itself is not foreseen in the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) mission agreements.[13] After the resumption of hostilities, the Polisario Front also issued instructions that clearance of mines and EO could not take place in restricted areas.[14]

OTHER EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR AND LANDMINES

Western Sahara also remains significantly affected by other ERW and mines due to the conflict (see Mine Action Review's *Clearing the Mines* report on Western Sahara for further information).

1 A defensive wall (the Berm) was built during the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east.

2 Email from Elhadji Kebe, Chief Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

3 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

4 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

5 SADR Voluntary CCM Article 7 Report, dated 20 June 2014, Form F.

6 Email from Artyom Harutyunyan, Head of Project Unit, UNMAS – MINURSO, 11 June 2024.

7 International Crisis Group, *Time for International Re-engagement in Western Sahara*, Middle East and North Africa Briefing No. 82, 11 March 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3mPfYgl.

8 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 24 May 2022.

9 Email from Karl Greenwood, Chief of Operations, Action on Armed Violence/Mechem Western Sahara Programme, 18 June 2012.

10 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; Dandan Xu, UNMAS, 28 June 2019; and Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.

11 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

12 Ibid. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide, east of the Berm.

13 "Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara", UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8.

14 Email from Artyom Harutyunyan, UNMAS – MINURSO, 11 June 2024.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

UNMAS Western Sahara, formerly the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC), facilitates MINURSO monitoring of the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel. On 31 October 2024, under UN Security Council Resolution 2756, MINURSO's mandate was extended for an additional 12 months until 31 October 2025.

UNMAS Western Sahara serves as the UN focal point for mine action activities within the MINURSO area of operations. Its contracted teams work only in areas east of the Berm. The Royal Moroccan Army conducts its own demining in areas west of the Berm. In 2013–14, the Polisario Front, with UN support, established the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office (SMACO), which is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara east of the Berm, excluding the buffer strip.[15]

FUNDING FOR CMR SURVEY AND CLEARANCE

In 2024, SMACO received funding from the Kingdom of Spain to cover its running costs and UNMAS received funding from MINURSO for its clearance activities.[16]

GENDER AND DIVERSITY

UNMAS has reported that gender policies are implemented in accordance with UNMAS, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and MINURSO guidelines, as well as with direction from the Polisario Front.[17] UNMAS has a gender strategy as part of its overall country strategy with a work plan and system to monitor its implementation.[18] UNMAS also reported that gender has been mainstreamed into Western Sahara's national mine action work plans and the SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy.[19] During survey, efforts are made to consider the needs of men, women, girls, and boys to ensure more effective and efficient operations, despite challenges presented by conducting survey activities targeting Bedouin populations.[20]

UNMAS reported equal access to employment for qualified women and men in survey and clearance teams in Western Sahara east of the Berm, including for managerial level/supervisory positions. In 2024, there was one woman employed by SMACO and eleven (14%) by SafeLane Global (UNMAS's contractor), including eight in operational roles (14%) (see Table 2).[21] This is unchanged from 2023.[22]

Through SMACO, UNMAS also supports the Sahrawi Mine Action Women's Team (SMAWT), an all-female organisation working on risk education in Rabouni and the five Sahrawi refugee camps. All national deminers, both male and female, are ethnic Sahrawi.[23]

Table 2: Gender composition of SMACO and SafeLane Global in 2024[24]

Entity	Total staff	Total women staff	Total managerial or supervisory staff	Women managerial or supervisory staff	Total operational staff	Women operational staff
SMACO	5	1 (20%)	2	0 (0%)	0	0
SafeLane Global	77	11 (14%)	17	2 (12%)	57	8 (14%)
Totals	**82**	**12 (15%)**	**19**	**2 (11%)**	**57**	**8 (14%)**

15 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014, and email, 25 February 2014; and email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.
16 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
17 Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March and 5 May 2018.
18 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
19 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.
20 Emails from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2019 and 14 March 2018.
21 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
22 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
23 Email from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 30 March 2021; and SMAWT newsletter, March 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3yN542U.
24 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES AND ACTION

There is no national standard on environmental management in mine action, but SMACO have a policy on environmental management with a requirement that all implementation plans consider environmental impacts.[25] UNMAS Western Sahara does not have an environmental management policy but reported that environmental impact is considered as part of the tasking process and implementation plan in order to minimise potential harm from demining activities.[26] This includes waste disposal procedures for rubbish and grey and black water disposal; how and where to set up camps; and how to dismantle camps without leaving an operational footprint.[27]

Risks from extreme weather such as high temperatures and sandstorms are factored into the planning and prioritisation of survey and clearance tasks. Operations are halted during sandstorms; during periods of extreme heat, teams start earlier and work shorter hours.[28]

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND REPORTING

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for Western Sahara, east of the Berm, was upgraded to IMSMA Core in 2022.[29] All data have been successfully migrated to the new database. Review and verification of the data, which began at the end of 2023, was ongoing at the time of writing.[30] In addition, a process is now in place to validate any newly submitted information from the implementing partner.[31]

PLANNING AND TASKING

SMACO 2019–23 mine action strategy for Western Sahara east of the Berm, included no specific objectives on CMR, but it set goals toward a Western Sahara free of mine and ERW impact, including effective accident data collection, sustainable funding by 2020, and adequate staffing.[32] These goals were not achieved.

SMACO has developed a new Mine Action Strategy 2024–2028 and UNMAS is supporting SMACO in reviewing and updating the strategy in line with the political and regional developments.[33] A mine action work plan was in place for UNMAS in 2024, developed by UNMAS Western Sahara, in support of MINURSO's mandate.[34]

UNMAS and SMACO identify priorities for clearance of both minefields and cluster munition strikes east of the Berm in conjunction with MINURSO. Priorities are identified based on humanitarian needs for the safety and freedom of movement of local populations, while UNMAS Western Sahara facilitates the ceasefire and ensures the safe passage of UN personnel.[35]

LAND RELEASE SYSTEM

STANDARDS AND LAND RELEASE EFFICIENCY

Local mine action standards were developed and finalised in 2016 by UNMAS, together with SMACO, and in coordination with mine action partners. UNMAS reported in 2019 that translation of the standards into Arabic had been completed and shared with SMACO.[36] UNMAS said that the standards are reviewed annually but that no updates were made in 2024.[37] An external quality management system was in place from 2018 and implemented by UNMAS and SMACO to the east of the Berm.[38]

OPERATORS AND OPERATIONAL TOOLS

SafeLane Global was the sole implementing operator for UNMAS Western Sahara in 2024.[39]

25 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 18 June 2020.
26 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 21 March 2022.
27 Email from Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 24 May 2022.
28 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
29 Emails from Leon Louw, UNMAS, 4 February 2022; and Nadine Husseine, UNMAS, 30 May 2023.
30 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
31 Ibid.
32 SMACO, "Strategic Plan 2019–2023", at: http://bit.ly/38jaGm^2; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 31 July 2019.
33 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
34 Ibid.
35 Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March and 5 May 2018; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 6 August 2020.
36 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Dandan Xu, UNMAS, 28 June 2019.
37 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
38 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 29 April 2019; and Edwin Faigmane, UNMAS, 28 July 2020.
39 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.

Table 3: Operational clearance capacities deployed in 2024[40]

Operator	Manual teams	Total deminers	Comments
SafeLane Global (for UNMAS Western Sahara)	2	24	No change from 2023*
Totals	**2**	**24**	

* Two teams have been deployed since 23 May 2023 when demining operations resumed.

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

LAND RELEASE OUTPUTS IN 2024

No CMR-contaminated area was released through survey in 2024 or the previous year.[41]

In 2024, 12 cluster munition-contaminated areas totalling 490,100m^2 were cleared with the destruction of 354 submunitions.[42] This represents an 81% increase from 2023 when five cluster munition-contaminated areas totalling 270,100m^2 were cleared along with the destruction of 33 submunitions.[43] The increase is due to the suspension of demining operations during the first five months of 2023, which reduced productivity compared to the fully operational year of 2024.[44]

Table 4: CMR Clearance in 2024[45]

Region	Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m^2)	Submunitions destroyed
North	SafeLane Global	3	36,200	3
South	SafeLane Global	9	453,900	351
Totals		**12**	**490,100**	**354**

PROGRESS TOWARDS COMPLETION

Western Sahara is neither a State Party nor a signatory to the CCM—it is not recognised as a State by the UN Secretary-General and therefore cannot formally adhere to the treaty—and hence does not have a specific clearance deadline under Article 4. However, the SADR submitted a voluntary CCM Article 7 transparency report to the UN in 2014, stating that "the SADR would like to reaffirm its commitment to a total ban on cluster munitions as well as its willingness to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and be bound by its provisions".[46] The SADR has obligations under international human rights law to clear CMR as soon as possible.

Western Sahara's draft strategy aimed to release all cluster munition strike areas east of the Berm (outside the buffer strip) by 2019,[47] and UNMAS had expected to clear all CMR in the Northern Sector by end-2018.[48] These targets were not met. SMACO's 2019–23 strategy set a new vision of being mine and ERW impact-free by 2023, which was also not met. A new strategic plan 2024-2028 plan has been developed, but UNMAS has stated that due to the current political and security situation, it is challenging to estimate a completion date for clearing mines and explosive ordnance in Western Sahara.[49]

Additional challenges include maintaining consistent support for funding, capacity-building, and access to new clearance technologies, all of which are vital to improving clearance efficiency. Alongside demining, UNMAS Western Sahara, as part of the MINURSO mission, provides 24/7 emergency response to EO-related incidents, as well as logistical support in response to mission requests.[50]

40 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
41 Emails from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024 and 29 April 2025.
42 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
43 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
44 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
45 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 16 May 2024.
46 SADR Voluntary CCM Article 7 Report, Form F, 20 June 2014.
47 Emails from Virginie Auger, UNMAS, 29 March 2017; and Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 31 March 2018.
48 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.
49 Email from Elhadji Kebe, UNMAS, 29 April 2025.
50 Ibid.

ANNEX

CCM ARTICLE 4: CLEARANCE AND DESTRUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITION REMNANTS AND RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION

1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as follows:
   (a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from that date;
   (b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
   (c) Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding international cooperation and assistance:
   (a) Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
   (b) Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences and methodologies;
   (c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
   (d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control; and
   (e) Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants.

3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, each State Party shall take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
   (a) In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human resources assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.
   (b) Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.

5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article.

6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party. Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is to be considered. Each request shall set out:
   (a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   (b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to and required by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants during the proposed extension;
   (c) The preparation of future work and the status of work already conducted under national clearance and demining programmes during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any subsequent extensions;
   (d) The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered after such entry into force;
   (e) The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since entry into force of this Convention;
   (f) The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be cleared during the proposed extension;
   (g) The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability during the proposed extension;
   (h) The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications of the proposed extension; and
   (i) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, including, inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as appropriate.

8. Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AP mine	Anti-personnel mine
APMBC	1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AV mine	Anti-vehicle mine
AXO	Abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	Battle area clearance
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CCM	2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CHA	Confirmed hazardous area
CMR	Cluster munition remnants
CMRS	Cluster Munition Remnants Survey
DCA	DanChurchAid
DDG	Danish Demining Group
EDD	Explosive detection dog (team)
EO	Explosive ordnance
EOD	Explosive ordnance disposal
EORE	Explosive ordnance risk education
ERW	Explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
FSD	Fondation suisse de déminage
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GIS	Geographic information system
HI	Humanity and Inclusion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
IP	Implementing partner
ITF	International Trust Fund (ITF) Enhancing Human Security
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MDD	Mine detection dog (team)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine risk education
MTT	Multi-task team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	Non-State armed group
NTS	Non-technical survey
OAP	Oslo Action Plan
OAS	Organization of American States
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PPE	Personal protective equipment
QA	Quality assurance
QC	Quality control
QM	Quality management
SHA	Suspected hazardous area
SOP	Standing (or standard) operating procedure
TS	Technical survey
TWG	Technical working group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VA	Victim assistance
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund (United Nations)

Designed by www.optimadesign.co.uk

Funded by Global Affairs Canada, the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.

Published by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).

Canada

MINISTÈRE DE L'EUROPE ET DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES
Liberté
Égalité
Fraternité

Norway

Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA

Norwegian People's Aid

Norwegian People's Aid
PO Box 8844 Youngstorget
N-0028 Oslo, Norway

Telephone: **+ 47 2203 7700**
Email: **npaid@npaid.org**

www.npaid.org