NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN
MONITOR 2022
TRACKING PROGRESS TOWARDS A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
THE TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TPNW)

- The TPNW is the only legally binding global treaty that outlaws nuclear weapons.
- It was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic conference established by the United Nations General Assembly.
- A total of 122 states, more than three-fifths of the world's total, voted in favour of the Treaty's adoption. Only one state participating in the conference, the Netherlands, voted against adoption, while a second, Singapore, abstained.
- The Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017.
- The TPNW received its 50th ratification or accession on 24 October 2020, triggering entry into force on 22 January 2021.

ABOUT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor is a research project managed by Norwegian People's Aid and with contributions from a broad range of external experts and institutions, including the Federation of American Scientists and the Norwegian Academy of International Law. It tracks progress towards a world without nuclear weapons and highlights activities that stand between the international community and the fulfilment of the United Nations' long-standing goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In measuring progress, the Ban Monitor uses the TPNW as the primary yardstick, because this Treaty codifies norms and actions that are needed to create and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Ban Monitor records progress in universalisation of the TPNW, but also tracks gaps in adherence to all the other key treaties in the existing legal architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Ban Monitor also evaluates the nuclear-weapons-related policies and practices of each of the 197 states that can become party to the TPNW and all of the above-mentioned treaties: the 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), as well as the two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).

www.banmonitor.org

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Editor: Grethe Lauglo Østern (Norwegian People's Aid).

Data collection and analysis contributed by:
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, and Eliana Reynolds, Federation of American Scientists
Stuart Casey-Maslen, University of Pretoria
Torbjørn Graff Hugo, Norwegian Academy of International Law
Nick Ritchie, University of York
Bonnie Docherty, Harvard Law School
Matthew Bolton, Pace University
Elizabeth Minor, Article 36

This edition also comprises and builds on earlier contributions from Tim Caughley, Kjølv Egeland, Cecilie Hellestveit, Peter Herby, Togzhan Kassenova, Sverre Lodgaard, Richard Lennane, Gro Nystuen, Thomas Shea, and Angela Woodward.

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Cover photo: A man gestures in front of an evacuation train at Kyiv central train station on 4 March 2022, days after Russia invaded Ukraine and President Vladimir Putin instructed the Russian defence ministry to place Russia's nuclear forces on a 'special regime of combat duty'. (Photo by Sergei Chuzakov/AFP/NTB)
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FOREWORD BY IZUMI NAKAMITSU,
UNITED NATIONS HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

Now in its fifth annual edition, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor is an important tool to track adherence to and compliance with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and norms. I commend Norwegian People’s Aid for continuing to manage this project, collaborating with a broad range of external experts and institutions, including the Federation of American Scientists and the Norwegian Academy of International Law.

The Ban Monitor publishes the most updated publicly available data on the nuclear arsenals of the states possessing nuclear weapons. It also evaluates the nuclear-weapons-related policies and practices of states in order to track progress towards a world without nuclear weapons and to highlight what still needs to be done to achieve this vital global goal. To this end, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the United Nations’ top disarmament priority.

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, said on the occasion of the first Meeting of States Parties, ‘The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an important step towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons.’ The treaty contains comprehensive prohibitions on all nuclear-weapons-related activities, as well as obligations related to victim assistance and environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance.

The Secretary-General and I have also consistently emphasized the place of the TPNW within the broader disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It is therefore useful that the Ban Monitor tracks adherence to other key treaties and agreements related to weapons of mass destruction, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

While states remain the key actors in international disarmament negotiations, the evolution of the TPNW has shown the usefulness of a partnership between states, civil society and academia. Projects such as this show that well-researched information and thoughtful analysis can stimulate discussion and thus contribute to achieving our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

March 2023
KEY FINDINGS

CONTEXT

In 2022, fear of nuclear war surged to the highest levels since the Cold War.

The Ukraine crisis highlighted the limits of what nuclear weapons can do: they did not deter Russian aggression; they cannot win the war for Russia; and they are only potentially useful for preventing a nuclear war while incentivising risk-taking that could lead to that very outcome.

The 9 nuclear-armed states continued to refuse to adhere to, or engage constructively with, the TPNW.

32 umbrella states continued to play an important role in perpetuating the idea that nuclear weapons are both legitimate and necessary, making nuclear disarmament more difficult.

156 states—four-fifths of the world’s total of 197—maintained defence postures that were based exclusively on non-nuclear means.

Despite resistance from the nuclear-armed states, and after the COVID-19 pandemic, the TPNW’s speed of ratification and accession increased in 2022, and was not far behind the speed of adherence to some of the other key treaties on weapons of mass destruction.

Support for the TPNW is generally high in every region apart from Europe. In Africa, 100% of the states are now either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or other supporters of the Treaty. Most of the resistance is centered in Europe, where 70% of the states were opposed to the Treaty in 2022.

Sweden and Finland’s decisions in 2022 to subscribe to NATO’s nuclear doctrine and join nuclear-armed states and umbrella states in voting against the TPNW in the UN, highlights how some non-nuclear-armed states are leaning towards the security logic of nuclear deterrence rather than disarmament.

Australia, however, became the first of the 30 states under the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ that did not vote against the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. Instead it abstained on the vote.

Five states under the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ observed the TPNW’s First Meeting of States Parties, showing early signs of willingness to engage constructively with the Treaty.

In several opposed states, political debate about whether or not to join the TPNW was ongoing in 2022.

The TPNW is the youngest treaty in the broader legal architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The objective must be universal adherence to all of the components in this architecture. Only four states have not yet adhered to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has five outliers, the Biological Weapons Convention had four signatories and 9 outliers at the end of 2022, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 11 signatories and 11 outliers.
PROHIBITIONS

All 94 states that were either states parties or signatories to the TPNW in 2022 were compliant with all of its prohibitions. 57 states that were not yet parties to the Treaty had policies and practices that were fully compliant with all of the prohibitions. A total of 44 states not party, however, engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. The conduct of two states was of concern.

All of the nine nuclear-armed states engaged in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on developing and producing nuclear weapons. The conduct of a further two states, Iran and Saudi Arabia, was of concern in relation to this prohibition.

At the beginning of 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states had a combined inventory of approximately 12,512 nuclear warheads, which is evidently not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

The estimated collective yield of the stockpiled warheads that are available for use by the military is equal to more than 135,000 Hiroshima bombs.

The total inventory of warheads worldwide decreased by approximately 193 from 12,705 warheads in early 2022 to 12,512 in early 2023. This reduction is, however, only due to Russia and the United States dismantling a small number of previously retired nuclear weapons during the course of 2022.

China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia continued to expand their nuclear arsenals in 2022. The global stockpile of nuclear weapons available for use by the military has been steadily increasing since 2017.

The TPNW's prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons was contravened in 2022 by Russia, North Korea, and France.

The prohibition on assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities is the provision of the TPNW that is contravened by the greatest number of states. A total of 38 states aided and abetted other states' nuclear-weapons programmes in 2022.

POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS

In the course of 2022, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Palestine brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with their 18-month deadlines under Article 3(2). This reduced the global number of non-nuclear-armed states that do not have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to six.

Once again, the conduct in 2022 of all the nuclear-armed states was manifestly incompatible with the TPNW's obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. There was no evidence that any of the nuclear-armed states have the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States therefore also continued to fail to comply with their existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to 'pursue negotiations in good faith' on nuclear disarmament.

The TPNW's First Meeting of States Parties in 2022 adopted a deadline of a maximum of 90 days for removal of foreign nuclear weapons. Thus, if Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey adhere to the TPNW, they would be obliged to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that they currently host on their territory within this deadline.

The year 2022 saw unprecedented international attention to the rights of people affected by nuclear weapons and the need for victim assistance. States parties took steps to initiate implementation of the TPNW's obligation to assist victims, which in turn influenced priorities and discussions in forums beyond the Treaty itself.

Also with respect to environmental remediation after nuclear-weapons testing, positive progress was made in 2022 at the international level. States parties to the TPNW agreed to steps to begin implementation and voiced support for the process. There were minimal developments at the national level, however.

The states parties to the TPNW also adopted commitments to establish mechanisms for international cooperation and assistance. This was an important step, which must be followed by more tangible progress in order to advance implementation of victim assistance and environmental remediation under the Treaty.

States parties and signatories to the TPNW took a broad range of actions in 2022 to implement the Treaty's obligations to encourage further states to sign and ratify, with the goal of universal adherence. At the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, states parties vowed not to rest ‘until the last state has joined the Treaty’ and ‘nuclear weapons have been totally eliminated’.
As fear of nuclear war in 2022 surged to the highest levels since the Cold War, the fractures in the ‘global nuclear order’ deepened – between nuclear-armed states, within umbrella states, and between non-nuclear-armed states and nuclear-armed states. Two themes dominated: Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine and nuclear threats on the one side, and the further embedding of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on the other.

It is clear that, as far as Moscow is concerned, it has successfully used the threat of escalation to nuclear use to deter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from entering the war directly on Ukraine’s side. This was compounded by statements from United States (US) President Joe Biden, who said before the Russian invasion that US forces would not be directly involved for fear of escalation to ‘World War III’. In this sense, the war in Ukraine appears to have validated nuclear ‘deterrence’ and the containment of the conflict to Ukraine, at the time of writing. But there are problems with this picture. First, irrespective of the possibility of escalation to nuclear violence, there are many reasons for NATO leaders not to enter the conflict directly and risk escalation to a major conventional war between NATO and Russia, especially for the Biden administration that had finally extricated the United States from its long war in Afghanistan in August 2021. It is therefore legitimate to ask what the added deterrence role of Russia’s nuclear threats has really been.

Second, the deterrence logic that Russian nuclear threats should prevent more direct Western military intervention has been deeply frustrating to many in Europe and the US, and indeed has been actively resisted by some. In particular, there were widespread calls for a no-fly zone to stop Russia’s aerial attacks against Ukraine. These

often went hand-in-hand with reassurances that any escalation this might induce would be controlled because of a shared fear between Russia and NATO governments of the fighting getting out of control. 4 Convincing yourself you know the other’s red lines and that you can push right up to or even cross them while managing escalation, based on the idea of a shared understanding of nuclear deterrence and escalation control between enemies, remains a very big bet to place.

Third, the war has demonstrated once again that leaders of nuclear-armed states are capable of profound strategic miscalculation. 5 This reinforces widespread concerns about the reliability in practice of nuclear deterrence in crisis situations in which decisions are made by fallible people in fallible organisations. 6

Under any circumstances, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the limits of what nuclear weapons can do: they did not deter Russian aggression; they have not aided Russia in its military quest to take Ukraine; they cannot win the war for Russia; and they are only potentially useful for preventing a nuclear war while incentivising risk-taking that could lead to that very outcome.

**BEYOND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE**

If the war in Ukraine ends without the use of nuclear weapons, advocates of nuclear deterrence will insist that this outcome was preordained and that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence has been ‘proven’ once again. Other scholars and policymakers argue that the Ukraine crisis should stimulate processes of critical re-evaluation in nuclear-armed states and umbrella states of the value they place on nuclear weapons and nuclear ‘deterrence’. Stephen Young of the Union of the Concerned Scientists wrote in September 2022 that ‘the world should not tolerate a status quo in which any nuclear-armed country can conduct conventional wars with impunity, slaughter tens of thousands and seize and annex territory, simply because its nuclear arsenal inhibits a strong military response. The international security system should not work that way.’ He continued: ‘It turns out nuclear weapons don’t “keep the peace.” Quite the contrary, they enable conventional conflicts where escalation to the “ultimate weapon” is entirely too possible.’ 7

**RIPPLE EFFECTS**

The nuclear dimensions of the Ukraine conflict rippled through nuclear politics in different ways. Hopes of a resumption of US-Russia nuclear arms control talks were dashed, when Russia in November 2022 postponed a meeting scheduled to take place in Egypt, before President Putin announced in February 2023 that Moscow would suspend its participation in the New START Treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty with the United States. 8 In the context of the US-China rivalry, the invasion of Ukraine generated much speculation in 2022 about how the United States would respond to a decision by Beijing to invade Taiwan, including on nuclear use. 9

Finland and Sweden’s decisions to reject the TPNW, join NATO, and subscribe to its nuclear doctrine 10 highlight how the value of nuclear weapons is being reinforced as far as nuclear-armed states are concerned and how some non-nuclear-armed states are leaning towards the security logic of nuclear deterrence rather than disarmament. A fresh round of calls was also sparked in Germany for the country to develop its own nuclear weapons, or at least contribute financially to France’s arsenal as a ‘joint deterrent’. 11 As discussed in later chapters of this report, there was also an offer by Poland to host US nuclear weapons, 12 while Belarus agreed in principle on a nuclear-sharing scheme with Russia. 13 Moreover, North Korea’s continuing advancement of its ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear-weapons programme led to a resurgence of support in South Korea to redeploy US nuclear weapons in South Korea or even develop its own nuclear weapons. 14

**UMBRELLA STATES**

In 2022, the so-called umbrella states, or states with arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence with one or more nuclear-armed states, continued to play an important role in perpetuating the idea that nuclear weapons are both legitimate and necessary. In doing so, they make nuclear disarmament more difficult. While there were few signs in the governments of umbrella states of reflection on the need to move beyond nuclear deterrence, South Korea did express concern during the year about the credibility and value of its arrangement of extended nuclear deterrence with the US, doubting that Washington would defend it in the event of a war with North Korea, where Kim Jong-un’s arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would pose a potential threat to mainland US cities. 15

As illustrated in Figure 1 and detailed in Table A overleaf, the number of umbrella states remained at 32 in 2022, 16 while 156 states—four-fifths of the world’s total of 197—maintained defence postures that at the time were based exclusively on non-nuclear means.

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4 See, e.g. ‘Open Letter Calling for Limited No-Fly Zone’, Politico, at: https://politi.co/3Yw4tO4.
8 Russia suspends only remaining major nuclear treaty with US’, Associated Press, 21 February 2023, at: https://bit.ly/3E5BaUJ.
11 ‘Germany’s Schäuble calls on Berlin to help fund French nukes’, Reuters, 23 July 2022, at: https://reut.rs/3S4Rakk.
13 N. Sokov: ‘Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing would mirror NATO’s—and worsen Europe’s security’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2022, at: https://bit.ly/40MSrCC.
15 Ibid.
16 The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has not yet recorded Finland and Sweden as umbrella states. Pending their accession to the alliance, both Finland and Sweden received security guarantees from a number of individual NATO members, including nuclear-armed United Kingdom. However, the United Kingdom’s then prime minister Boris Johnson ‘refused to clarify if the UK’s assistance would include nuclear weapons’ when the arrangement was announced. The United Kingdom thus stopped short of extending a so-called nuclear umbrella. See, e.g. C. Gallardo, ‘UK commits to defending Sweden and Finland if they are attacked’, Politico, 11 May 2022, at: https://politi.co/3YveOzd.
INCREASING THE AUTHORITY OF THE TPNW

The second theme that shaped the politics of nuclear weapons and disarmament in 2022 was the further embedding of the TPNW. Supporters of the Treaty recognise that the only sustainable solution to the risks nuclear weapons engender is to firmly reject nuclear deterrence, get organised, and cooperate now on forging a path for elimination. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis, the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) was held in Vienna on 21–23 June 2022. This meeting, which adopted the Treaty’s first Action Plan and Declaration, represented a major step forward in increasing the authority of the Treaty as an institution in world politics and in setting in motion processes to further stigmatise and delegitimise nuclear weapons and develop ‘a robust global peremptory norm against them’. The Action Plan sets out commitments and practical actions for the states parties to undertake on universalisation of the Treaty; the elimination of nuclear weapons; victim assistance; environmental remediation; international cooperation and assistance; complementarity with other treaties; an inclusive and cooperative approach among the Treaty’s stakeholders; and implementing the gender provisions of the Treaty. A Scientific Advisory Group, a Coordinating Committee, and informal working groups were established to support implementation in the intersessional period.

One analyst, Tarja Cronberg, noted the 1MSP’s demonstration of ‘political will for nuclear disarmament, the commitment to get rid of nuclear weapons, and the will to create mechanisms for this.’ She also noted that this was belittled by certain observers who referred to the fact that none of the nuclear-weapon states was present, and added: ‘While this is true, a parallel with the feminist movement indicates that in the first phases of radical change, it is important for the like-minded to meet first among themselves.’

EARLY SIGNS OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

In several NATO states, there was widespread support for joining the TPNW as well as being an active member

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18 ‘Our Commitment to a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’, Declaration of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, UN doc. TPNW/MSP/2022/CRP.8, 23 June 2022, Vienna, at: https://bit.ly/3XOF93V.
19 Ibid.
of the NATO alliance.\textsuperscript{21} Pressure from the nuclear-armed members of the alliance has so far rendered this a binary either/or choice, but it need not be so.\textsuperscript{22} The challenge remains one of carving out political space within NATO to be full members of a military alliance while rejecting nuclear deterrence and working to achieve mutual and balanced nuclear disarmament through the TPNW.\textsuperscript{23}

The Philippines, a state party to the TPNW, is an interesting example of how TPNW membership and US security guarantees are not as incompatible as is often alleged. In November 2022, US Vice President Kamala Harris travelled to the Philippines to launch ‘new initiatives to strengthen the US-Philippines Alliance’.\textsuperscript{24} Washington will defend the Philippines if it comes under attack in the South China Sea, pledged Harris, reaffirming the United States ‘unwavering’ commitment.\textsuperscript{25} A White House statement issued on the occasion said: ‘Now and always, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Philippines is ironclad.’\textsuperscript{26} Other US partners in the ‘major non-NATO ally’ category have also signed or ratified the TPNW. These include Brazil, Colombia, New Zealand, and Thailand.\textsuperscript{27}

The United States has sought to sustain consistent opposition to the TPNW among all members of NATO and other military allies under its ‘nuclear umbrella’. Nevertheless, Australia, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway decided to participate as observers at the 1MSP, showing early signs of positive will to engage constructively with the Treaty and its members, while not yet prepared to adhere to it.

In its statement to the 1MSP Germany said it believes that ‘supporters and sceptics of the TPNW can work shoulder to shoulder’ and that it ‘is committed to engaging in constructive dialogue and exploring opportunities for practical cooperation’\textsuperscript{28} Germany also stated that it ‘especially value[s] the humanitarian perspective put forward’ in the TPNW.\textsuperscript{29}

**COMMON CHALLENGES**

Ahead of the 1MSP, Austria hosted the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,\textsuperscript{30} to discuss existing and planned research on the humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons. ‘The humanitarian perspective has transformative and unifying potential for the urgently needed reinvigoration of nuclear disarmament’, said Austria’s Federal Minister for European and International Affairs Alexander Schallenberger in his opening address to the conference.\textsuperscript{31}

As a result of the efforts of TPNW supporters, but also constructive sceptics like Germany, the ideas, principles and discourses of the humanitarian initiative that generated the TPNW moved from the margins of nuclear disarmament diplomacy to a more mainstream position in 2022. At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the draft outcome document, which ultimately was not adopted, recognised key aspects of the humanitarian initiative.\textsuperscript{32} This opened up common areas of interest across NPT groupings. Chief among these is nuclear disarmament verification, but increasingly also the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, victim assistance and environmental remediation after nuclear-weapons testing, and gender and inclusivity.

Competing perspectives on the value and legitimacy of nuclear weapons reflect different paradigms of national and global security. Yet the potential for nuclear omnicide means that a security paradigm of common, shared world security has become a strategic necessity. The need to address the inescapable challenges of climate change and our rapidly heating planet has also made this necessity unambiguously clear. This is a fact of which the younger generation is acutely aware.\textsuperscript{33} A national, militarised security paradigm within which retaining and modernising national nuclear armouries and threats of nuclear war are seen to make sense, is one that is incapable of dealing with existential transnational challenges. The extent to which we make progress or not on nuclear disarmament will therefore shape the scope for international cooperation on climate action and vice versa.\textsuperscript{34}

The nuclear-armed states claim that now is not the time for reductions in their nuclear arsenals, and with the risk of nuclear use in Ukraine umbrella states are even less inclined than in the past to challenge this view. But, as a flagship UN report on climate change published in 2022 said, if we want to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees, it is ‘now or never’.\textsuperscript{35} This, then, is the overarching common challenge: reconfiguring and transforming our notions of security ‘common sense’ to prioritise profound, existential transnational challenges, which include the threat of nuclear war.

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{21}] See, e.g.: Pathways To Peace, ‘A Strong Majority Wants Albania to Join the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)’, January 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3bdxUlH.
  \item[\textsuperscript{22}] D. Hurst, US warns Australia against joining treaty banning nuclear weapons’, The Guardian, 8 November 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3kSw74.
  \item[\textsuperscript{24}] K. Lena, ‘Harris affirms “unwavering” U.S. defence commitment to Philippines’, Reuters, 21 November 2022, at: https://reut.rs/3K7yiFy.
  \item[\textsuperscript{25}] Ibid.
  \item[\textsuperscript{26}] The White House, FACT SHEET: Vice President Harris Launches New Initiatives to Strengthen U.S.-Philippines Alliance’, 20 November 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3YpRnBr.
  \item[\textsuperscript{29}] Ibid.
  \item[\textsuperscript{31}] Ibid.
  \item[\textsuperscript{33}] T. Thompson, ‘Young people’s climate anxiety revealed in landmark survey’, Nature, 22 September 2021, at: https://go.nature.com/3YzmTMU.
  \item[\textsuperscript{34}] K. Egeland, ‘Climate security reversed: the implications of alternative security policies for global warming’, Environmental Politics, 17 November 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3mQuhm.
  \item[\textsuperscript{35}] ‘UN climate report: It’s “now or never” to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees’, UN News, 4 April 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3njdXE.
\end{itemize}
The membership of the TPNW continued to grow in 2022, with nine new states parties and five signatories. By the close of the year, the Treaty had 68 states parties and 26 states that had signed but not yet ratified. Thus, 94 states—approaching half of all states—had accepted binding obligations in international law under the TPNW. Only five more signatures or accessions were needed to pass the 50% mark.

A further 45 states were identified by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor as ‘other supporters’, on the basis of their most recent voting record on the TPNW in the UN General Assembly. As illustrated in Figure 2 opposite, this means that a total of 139 states (more than 70% of the global total of 197 states) were supportive of the TPNW, while 43 states (almost 22%) were opposed, and 15 states (almost 8%) were undecided.

The criteria for the Ban Monitor’s categorisation of states by their position on the TPNW are explained in Table B opposite. For details about individual states, see the state profiles in this report.

STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES

The nine states that ratified the TPNW in 2022 were Cabo Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Malawi, and Timor-Leste, and the new signatories were Barbados, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and Sierra Leone.

Of the 68 states that as of 31 December 2022 were parties to the TPNW, three—the Cook Islands, Mongolia, and Niue—had acceded to the Treaty while the remainder had signed and ratified it. In several of the 26 states that were signatory states, the executive branch of government had submitted the TPNW to the legislature for review and approval for ratification. These included Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, and Indonesia.

Of the combined total of 94 states parties and signatories, 81 were among the 122 states that negotiated and adopted the TPNW at the diplomatic conference in the UN in June–July 2017. Of the adopting states, therefore, 66% had by the end of 2022 proceeded to become either a state party or at least a signatory. In addition, 13 states that did not take part in the Treaty adoption in 2017 had also become a state party or a signatory.¹

¹ Barbados, Central African Republic, Comoros, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Libya, Maldives, Nauru, Nicaragua, Niger, Niue, Tuvalu, and Zambia.
Figure 2: Global distribution of support for the TPNW, as of 31.12.2022

### Table B: Criteria for TPNW support categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States parties</td>
<td>States that have either signed and ratified or have acceded to the TPNW.²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signatories</td>
<td>States that have signed the TPNW but not yet ratified it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other supporters</td>
<td>States that are not in category 1 or 2 but whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'yes'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was an abstention, or which never participated in such a vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed</td>
<td>All states that are not in category 1 or 2 and whose most recent vote in the UN on the TPNW (the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017 or on the subsequent annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW) was 'no'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² In accordance with Article 15(2), a state formally becomes party to the TPNW 90 days after it deposits its instrument of ratification or accession with the UN Secretary-General. For the purpose of this report, states are considered as parties from the date of their deposit.
OTHER SUPPORTERS

While they have not yet signed or adhered to the Treaty, the 45 states in the group of other supporters have expressed their support to the TPNW by voting in favour—and in some cases also co-sponsoring—the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. The resolution calls upon all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, or accede to the Treaty ‘at the earliest possible date’. Several of the 45 states that were other supporters at the close of 2022 had already started domestic processes to sign or accede to the TPNW. These included the Bahamas, Eritrea, Eswatini, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Uganda. Djibouti signed the TPNW on 9 January 2023. Six of the other supporters (Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Qatar, Senegal, and Yemen) participated as observers at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022.

Most of the states in this category were among the 122 states that adopted the TPNW in July 2017, but it also includes a total of ten states that did not take part in the adoption of the TPNW in 2017, but which have subsequently expressed their support for the Treaty by voting in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution.

UNDECIDED STATES

As mentioned above, less than 8% of the global total of states were undecided on the TPNW in 2022. This mixed group of 15 states is spread out across all five continents, and now includes three umbrella states. Armenia and Belarus—are the only states with arrangements of extended nuclear ‘deterrence’ with Russia—have abstained on all the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW since it was initiated in 2018, including in 2022. That year, Australia became the first umbrella state allied to the United States to abstain rather than vote against the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. Ahead of the vote, the Australian government indicated that it is assessing its position on the TPNW, ‘taking account of the need to ensure an effective verification and enforcement architecture, interaction of the Treaty with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and achieving universal support’. The Australian Labor Party, which formed the new government in May 2022 after a general election, adopted a resolution in 2018 committing it to sign and ratify the TPNW in government, after taking account of the above-mentioned factors.

The category of undecided states also includes five states that voted to adopt the TPNW in 2017 but which have not yet proceeded to adhere to the Treaty: Argentina, the Marshall Islands, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Tonga. Saudi Arabia’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation has been open to question in recent years. Argentina, the Marshall Islands, and Switzerland are in protracted processes to arrive at a final national position on the TPNW.

Argentina stated in 2022 that it has ‘initiated an analysis and review process of the [TPNW] that has not yet been completed’. In announcing its decision to participate as an observer at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW in 2022, the Marshall Islands—a state severely impacted by nuclear-weapons testing—said that it wanted ‘to see what concrete victim assistance provisions actually come forward by states parties and if they are at scale’.

In November 2022, 34 prominent Swiss citizens, including former government officials, federal councillors, and presidents and vice-presidents of the International Committee of the Red Cross, criticised the government’s decision not to sign the TPNW to date as an ‘unjustifiable anomaly’ and called on it to become a signatory immediately. Both houses of the Swiss Parliament have previously instructed the government to proceed with signature and ratification of the TPNW without delay. Switzerland’s highest executive authority, the Federal Council, intended to decide in ‘early’ 2023 whether or not Switzerland will become a state party to the TPNW based on a report to be published by the federal administration. At the time of writing, no decision had been announced.

OPPOSED STATES

The group of states opposed to the TPNW increased from 42 to 43 in the course of 2022. As discussed above, Australia ended its opposition to the Treaty, while 29 of the 30 umbrella states that are allies of the United States remained opposed to the TPNW, along with all nine nuclear-armed states. In addition, Sweden and Finland rejected the TPNW and voted no on the UN General
Assembly resolution on the TPNW instead of abstaining as in previous years, following their applications for NATO membership. Finally, three states with nuclear-free defence postures but with close ties to nuclear-armed states—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, and Monaco—continued to vote against the resolution.

In several opposed states, however, political debate about adherence to the TPNW continued in 2022. An opinion poll commissioned by Pathways To Peace and published in March 2022 found that 98% of Albanians want their country to join the TPNW, with 90% believing that Albania should be among the first NATO members to do so.\(^ {17}\) In May, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in the Italian parliament passed a resolution compelling the government to take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament and evaluate the compatibility between alliance commitments and the TPNW in order to find ways of supporting the Treaty’s goals.\(^ {18}\) In June 2022, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, the most influential umbrella organisation of labour unions in Norway, resolved to work for Norway’s signature and ratification of the TPNW and for the integration of the TPNW into NATO’s disarmament strategy.\(^ {19}\)

NATO states Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway participated as observers at the TPNW's First Meeting of States Parties in June,\(^ {20}\) in the face of strong pressure from the United States and from NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg not to do so.\(^ {21}\) Also NATO applicants Finland and Sweden participated as observers. Japan opted not to attend as an observer, generating anger and disappointment among atomic bomb survivors.\(^ {22}\)

### REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT

Breaking down all states’ positions on the TPNW by region, Figure 3 overleaf and Table C on page 18 show that support for the TPNW is high in all regions of the world apart from Europe. As of 31 December 2022, all states in Africa now formally support the Treaty, either as states parties or signatories, or as other supporters. Africa is followed by the Americas, where all but three states are either states parties, signatories, or other supporters, with only Argentina remaining undecided and the United States and Canada opposed. The Americas is also the region with the highest share of states parties, with 26 states parties (or over 74%) among the regional total of 35 states by the end of 2022. With Guatemala’s ratification of the TPNW in June 2022, Central America became the first entire subregion where all states are party to the Treaty.\(^ {23}\) The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) also announced in October that all of its member states are now ‘either parties, signatories or [the] process of acceding to the TPNW’.\(^ {24}\)

In Oceania, too, the share of states parties is high, with 10 states parties (62%) among the 16 states in the region. Micronesia is now the only opposed state in this region, while Australia, the Marshall Islands, and Tonga are undecided. In Asia, the five nuclear-armed states located in this region (China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan) were opposed to the TPNW in 2022, together with US umbrella states Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Support for the TPNW, however, is relatively high also in Asia. A total of 32 of 45 states in the region (71%) are states parties, signatories, or other supporters.

Europe continues to be the region with the highest concentration of opposed states. A total of 33 of the 47 states (70%) in Europe were opposed to the TPNW in 2022. The region has only five states parties: Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Malta, and San Marino; and one signatory that has not yet ratified: Liechtenstein.

### SPEED OF ADOPTION ACROSS WMD TREATIES

The TPNW is the youngest Treaty in the broader legal architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As mentioned above, nine states ratified and five states signed the TPNW in 2022. Figure 4 overleaf shows the speed of ratification and accession of the TPNW relative to the other WMD treaties. In its first years, the TPNW’s speed of ratification and accession was on average the same as for the other WMD treaties, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states. During the course of 2021—the second year of the COVID pandemic—the TPNW fell behind the other treaties. It then picked up more speed again in 2022 and was not far behind the levels of ratification and accession levels of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The patterns of ratifications/accessions for the BWC and NPT serve as a timely reminder that it took several years also for those treaties to accrue authority. Just over five years and three months (63 months) after opening for signature, the TPNW had, as mentioned above, attracted 68 ratifications and accessions. Over the same period of time following opening for signature, the BWC had obtained 71 ratifications and accessions, the NPT 76, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 89, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 107 ratifications and accessions.

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18 'Nuclear weapons, House Foreign Affairs Committee passes Resolution for global disarmament', Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, 18 May 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3k61GJ1
22 ICAN, 'All Central American nations have now ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, 13 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Y5Z55h.
24 The outliers were Israel, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Sudan.
Figure 3: TPNW support by region, as of 31.12.2022

Figure 4: Speed of ratification and accession – WMD treaties compared, as of 31.12.2022
LEVEL OF ADHERENCE ACROSS WMD TREATIES

Some treaties allow only UN member states to adhere (the obvious example being the UN Charter), but most treaties—including all of the above-mentioned treaties in the legal architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD—use the ‘all states’ formula. This currently allows a total of 197 states to adhere: the 193 UN Member States, the two UN observer states (Holy See and the State of Palestine), as well as the two other states (Cook Islands and Niue). The objective must be universal adherence to all of the components in this architecture, meaning that all 197 states should be states parties to each and every one of them. Figure 5 below therefore highlights the gaps in adherence as of 31 December 2022, across all the treaties. Where a state is not yet a state party to any of these five treaties, this is noted in its respective state profile in this report, along with a recommendation for urgent adherence.

The most ratified WMD treaty is the CWC, to which 193 states are party. Of the four states that have not yet adhered to this Treaty, one is a signatory.²⁵ The NPT has five outliers,²⁶ the BWC had four signatories and 9 outliers at the end of 2022,²⁷ and the CTBT 11 signatories and 11 outliers.²⁸ As discussed above, as of the end of 2022, there were in total 103 states²⁹ that were not yet states parties or at least signatories to the TPNW.

Two states (Israel and South Sudan) are outliers on all of the five treaties; two states (Egypt and North Korea) are outliers on four; and four states (India, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria) are outliers on three treaties.

In building upon and contributing to the other WMD treaties, the TPNW has the potential to reinforce the legitimacy of the legal WMD architecture as a whole. In 2022, the CTBT gained six new states parties (Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste, and Tuvalu), and the BWC one new state party (Namibia). All of this progress took place in states that were already states parties or signatories to the TPNW, apart from Equatorial Guinea, which ratified the CTBT the day before it signed the TPNW in October 2022. For the CWC, the latest development was Palestine’s accession in 2018. Palestine was also the most recent country to adhere to the NPT, in 2015.

Figure 5: Gaps in adherence – WMD treaties compared, as of 31.12.2022

²⁵ The outliers were: Egypt, Israel (signatory), North Korea, and South Sudan.
²⁶ The outliers were India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. The Cook Islands and Niue have not adhered to the NPT in their own right, but New Zealand’s ratification of the NPT included territorial application to both states, which remain bound by the Treaty’s provisions.
²⁷ The outliers were: Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt (signatory), Eritrea, Haiti (signatory), Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, Somalia (signatory), South Sudan, Syria (signatory), and Tuvalu.
²⁸ The outliers were: Bhutan, China (signatory), Egypt (signatory), Equatorial Guinea (signatory), India, Iran (signatory), Israel (signatory), Mauritius, Nepal (signatory), North Korea, Pakistan, Palestine, Papua New Guinea (signatory), Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands (signatory), Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka (signatory), Syria, Tonga, United States (signatory), and Yemen (signatory).
²⁹ See the states listed in the categories opposed, undecided, and other supporters in Table C overleaf.
TABLE C: ALL STATES BY REGION AND THEIR POSITION ON THE TPNW, AS OF 31.12.2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States parties (68 states)</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Palestine, Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Viet Nam</td>
<td>Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Malta, San Marino</td>
<td>Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa</td>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela</td>
<td>Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signatories (26 states)</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal</td>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Barbados, Brazil, Colombia, Haiti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other supporters (45 states)</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen</td>
<td>Andorra, Cyprus, Moldova</td>
<td>Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda</td>
<td>Bahamas, Suriname</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Undecided (15 states)</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Tajikistan</td>
<td>Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Australia, Marshall Islands, Tonga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposed (43 states)</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea</td>
<td>Albania, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada, United States</td>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Djibouti signed on 9 January 2023.
** Liberia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2022, but confirmed to ICAN that this was a mistake, and that it intended to vote yes, as in previous years. (Email from Seth Shelden to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, 20 February 2023.)
All of the 94 states that were states parties or signatories to the TPNW were compliant with all of the Treaty’s prohibitions throughout 2022. The conduct of 57 states not party was also fully compatible with the prohibitions, while 44 states not party—two more than in the previous year—engaged in conduct that was not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions. States not party Iran and Saudi Arabia were again recorded as states of concern.
The prohibitions of the TPNW are contained in Article 1 of the Treaty. In the following sections, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor sets out interpretations of each of the prohibitions and evaluates the extent to which all states—regardless of whether they have consented to be bound by the Treaty—acted in accordance with them in 2022. On the basis of their policies and practices, states parties and signatories are categorised as either ‘compatible’ or ‘not compliant’, whereas states not party are categorised as either ‘compatible’ or ‘not compatible’. Where a state has been assessed to be ‘of concern’, this means that worrying developments in the state warrant close attention. The conclusion of the assessments for each respective state can be found in the state profiles in this report.

Every state may lawfully sign and ratify the TPNW, but the 57 states not yet party whose conduct is fully compatible with all of the prohibitions can adhere to the Treaty knowing that they meet its demands without making any changes to their existing policies and practices. The 44 states listed in Figure 6 above that engaged in conduct in 2022 which is not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions would have to make varying degrees of changes to their existing policies and practices to enable compliance.

**ARTICLE 1(1) – PROHIBITIONS**

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

a. Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

b. Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;

c. Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;

d. Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

e. Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

f. Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;

g. Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

**CHANGES IN 2022**

Figure 7 overleaf disaggregates compliance and compatibility in 2022 for each of the Article 1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the conduct of the nine nuclear-armed states was again not compatible with the prohibitions in Article 1(1)(a) on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons, or on possessing or stockpiling them. In 2022, however, three states—Russia, North Korea, and France—were found to be not compatible with the TPNWs prohibition in Article 1(1)(d) on threatening to use nuclear weapons, whereas in the previous year no clear cases of states threatening to use nuclear weapons had been recorded.

The prohibition in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts, continued in 2022 to stand out as the one where the greatest number of states have policies and practices that are not compatible. The Ban Monitor found that a total of 38 states assisted, encouraged, or induced acts in 2022 that are prohibited by the TPNW. This was an increase of two compared with 2021, because Sweden and Finland in 2022 made declarations and statements that amount to encouragement of other states’ possession of nuclear weapons.

There was also an increase by one in the number of states that were found to be not compatible with the prohibition in Article 1(1)(f) on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited act under the TPNW, as a result of South Korea’s requests in 2022 for further integration into the United States’ nuclear planning and exercising.

**COMPLIANCE AND COMPATIBILITY BY REGION**

As Figure 8 overleaf shows, Europe is the region with the most states whose conduct conflicts with the TPNW. With the addition of Sweden and Finland in 2022, a total of 32 of the 47 states in Europe (68%) currently maintain policies and practices that are not compatible with one or more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In Africa, all of the 54 states are fully compliant or compatible. In the other regions, compliance and compatibility with the TPNW is also generally high.
Figure 7: Compliance and compatibility in 2022, by prohibition

- **Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire:** 186 compliant/compatible, 9 not compliant/not compatible, 2 of concern.
- **Test:** 197 compliant/compatible.
- **Stockpile:** 188 compliant/compatible, 9 not compliant/not compatible, 1 of concern.
- **Transfer:** 196 compliant/compatible, 1 not compliant/not compatible, 1 of concern.
- **Receive transfer or control:** 196 compliant/compatible, 1 not compliant/not compatible, 1 of concern.
- **Use:** 197 compliant/compatible.
- **Threaten to use:** 194 compliant/compatible, 3 not compliant/not compatible.
- **Assist, encourage, or induce prohibited activity:** 159 compliant/compatible, 38 not compliant/not compatible.
- **Seek or receive assistance:** 191 compliant/compatible, 6 not compliant/not compatible.
- **Allow stationing, installation, or deployment:** 192 compliant/compatible, 5 not compliant/not compatible.

Figure 8: Compliance and compatibility in 2022, by region

- **Africa:** 54 compliant/compatible, 2 not compatible, 2 of concern.
- **Americas:** 33 compliant/compatible, 2 not compatible.
- **Asia:** 35 compliant/compatible, 8 not compatible, 2 of concern.
- **Europe:** 32 compliant/compatible, 15 not compatible.
- **Oceania:** 14 compliant/compatible, 2 not compatible.
In the Americas, only 2 states (Canada and the United States) of the 35 states across the region engage in conduct which is not compatible with the Treaty.

In Asia, where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of the 45 states maintain policies and practices that are not compatible: Armenia, China, India, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, and South Korea. In addition, the two states listed as being ‘of concern’—Iran and Saudi Arabia—are both in Asia. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands are the two states with policies and practices that are not fully compatible with the TPNW among the 16 states in the region.

The 151 states (94 states parties and 57 states not party) that in 2022 were fully compliant or compatible with all of the prohibitions of the TPNW, are listed in Table D below. The states not party that engaged in conduct that was not compatible with all of the prohibitions, or that were of concern in relation to any of the prohibitions, are broken down by region and prohibition in Table E opposite. For more information, see the following sections on the respective prohibitions, and the state profiles.

### TABLE D: STATES WITH POLICIES AND PRACTICES THAT ARE COMPLIANT OR COMPATIBLE WITH ALL OF THE PROHIBITIONS OF THE TPNW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE CATEGORY</th>
<th>STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliant states parties and signatories (94)</td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States not party with policies and practices that are compatible (57)</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Andorra, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Georgia, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Morocco, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL (151)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### TABLE E: STATES NOT PARTY WITH POLICIES OR PRACTICES THAT ARE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH, OR OF CONCERN IN RELATION TO, ONE OR MORE OF THE TPNW’S PROHIBITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW Article</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(a)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(b)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(c)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(d)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(e)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(f)</th>
<th>Art 1(1)(g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prohibition</td>
<td>Develop, produce, manufacture, or otherwise acquire</td>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Receive, transfer or control</td>
<td>Use</td>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Asia

- **Armenia**: Not compatible
- **China**: Not compatible
- **India**: Not compatible
- **Iran**: Of concern
- **Israel**: Not compatible
- **North Korea**: Not compatible
- **Japan**: Not compatible
- **Pakistan**: Not compatible
- **Saudi Arabia**: Of concern
- **South Korea**: Not compatible

#### Europe

- **Albania**: Not compatible
- **Belarus**: Not compatible
- **Belgium**: Not compatible
- **Bulgaria**: Not compatible
- **Croatia**: Not compatible
- **Czechia**: Not compatible
- **Denmark**: Not compatible
- **Estonia**: Not compatible
- **Finland**: Not compatible
- **France**: Not compatible
- **Germany**: Not compatible
- **Greece**: Not compatible
- **Hungary**: Not compatible
- **Iceland**: Not compatible
- **Italy**: Not compatible
- **Latvia**: Not compatible
- **Lithuania**: Not compatible
- **Luxembourg**: Not compatible
- **Montenegro**: Not compatible
- **Netherlands**: Not compatible
- **North Macedonia**: Not compatible
- **Norway**: Not compatible
- **Poland**: Not compatible
- **Portugal**: Not compatible
- **Romania**: Not compatible
- **Russia**: Not compatible
- **Slovakia**: Not compatible
- **Slovenia**: Not compatible
- **Spain**: Not compatible
- **Turkey**: Not compatible
- **United Kingdom**: Not compatible

#### Americas

- **Canada**: Not compatible
- **United States**: Not compatible

#### Oceania

- **Australia**: Not compatible
- **Marshall Islands**: Not compatible
The nine nuclear-armed states continued to engage in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. Two further states not party—Iran and Saudi Arabia—were again recorded as states of concern.
The Key released financial lobbyists, the 2022, an United States institutions that nuclear modernisation programme.1 on governmental nuclear policy decisions—makes it contractors, their follow-on systems more than a decade before they with weapons development, states often begin planning arsenals. Given the long timelines typically associated persistent advantages, but others are simply an inherent feature of as states continuously seek to negate their adversaries’ capabilities. Growing international tension is fuelling this and production of new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or armed state is actively engaged in the development and sustainment operations. In reality, every nuclear—but their actions go well beyond simple maintenance components in a nuclear weapon. Delivery platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key components of nuclear weapons as such, and are not captured by the prohibitions in Article 1, though they may be integral to a nuclear-weapon system.

Key components are of course also the fissile material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction. Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes prohibited development when this is done with the intent to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. To research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is permitted both under the NPT and the TPNW.

Development and production of dual-use components, such as navigation or guidance systems, which could be used in both nuclear and conventional weapons, would only be prohibited under the TPNW when they were intended to be used in nuclear weapons.

Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to the non-nuclear-weapon states designated under the Treaty and does not prohibit nuclear-weapon states from continuing to develop, produce, and manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Most nuclear-armed states brand their ongoing development and production efforts as ‘modernisation’, but their actions go well beyond simple maintenance and sustainment operations. In reality, every nuclear-armed state is actively engaged in the development and production of new nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, in addition to upgrading their existing nuclear capabilities. Growing international tension is fuelling this trend. Some modernisation programmes are prompted by the nature of the 21st-century nuclear arms competition, as states continuously seek to negate their adversaries’ advantages, but others are simply an inherent feature of persistent planning for the indefinite retention of nuclear arsenals. Given the long timelines typically associated with weapons development, states often begin planning their follow-on systems more than a decade before they are eventually inducted into service. This dynamic—coupled with the tremendous influence that weapons contractors, lobbyists, and financial institutions have on governmental nuclear policy decisions—makes it extremely difficult to reduce the scope of a country’s nuclear modernisation programme.1

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor collaborates with the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project to estimate and analyse global nuclear forces. The following summary of the nine nuclear-armed states is intended to be a snapshot of each country’s primary nuclear developments in 2022. It is not an exhaustive overview.2

United States

The United States is in the midst of a wide-ranging modernisation programme to upgrade or replace every nuclear warhead and delivery system in its nuclear arsenal. The cost of this programme could reach up to US$2 trillion, and it is expected that this will serve to maintain nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal through most of the remainder of this century. In 2022, the United States released an unclassified version of its long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review, which formally announced the eventual retirement of the B83-1 gravity bomb and the cancellation of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) proposed by the Trump administration. However, the status of the SLCM-N-
remains unclear, as Congress may decide to override the executive branch and fund the system anyway.

In 2022, the United States also displayed the B-21 Raider heavy bomber, which will eventually replace the current B-2 nuclear bomber. The B-21 will be equipped to carry the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile and the B61-12 gravity bomb. The B61-12 began mass production in 2022 and special airlift planes were certified in late-2022 to be ready to deliver the bomb to bases in the United States and Europe in the near future.3

Russia
Russia is currently in the late stages of a decades-long modernisation programme to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear systems with more modern ones. This includes both long-range strategic and a large inventory of shorter-range non-strategic weapons.

In 2022, Russia conducted the first test-launch of its newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), known as the RS-28 Sarmat, and the missile has now entered serial production, although more tests will be needed before it becomes operational. Upgrading of silos to receive the new missile is progressing. The first silos of a second regiment with Russia’s new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle reportedly began its alert duty.4

In 2022, the Russian Navy also accepted its sixth improved Borei-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)—the Generalissimus Suvorov—for sea trials, and was expected to begin deploying the vessel in early 2023.5 The Navy is expected to receive the remainder of a total of 10 Borei boats over the coming years, in addition to several special-purpose submarines that will be able to launch Poseidon nuclear torpedoes.

China
China’s nuclear stockpile is expected to increase significantly in the next decade, though its arsenal is still expected to remain significantly smaller than that of either Russia or the United States. In 2022, China continued rapid construction on all three of its new solid-fuel missile silo fields and additional liquid-fuel missile silos further south, totalling more than 350 new silos. This development, coupled with other elements of its nuclear modernisation programme, indicates that China aims to dramatically increase the size of its nuclear arsenal. In 2022, the US Department of Defense estimated that China’s nuclear stockpile could grow to more than 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 if its current pace of growth continues.6

United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has committed to a comprehensive nuclear modernisation programme that includes replacing its SSBNs, re-entry bodies, and warheads. This programme is expected to keep nuclear weapons in the UK military arsenal until at least 2065.

In 2022, the United Kingdom continued to incorporate its existing warheads into the US-supplied Mk4A re-entry body with enhanced targeting capability, advance its new warhead programme, which is based on the United States’ planned W93 warhead, and build its next generation of Dreadnought-class SSBNs.

France
France is modernising both of its nuclear delivery systems—its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)—and has also recently begun a programme to build a new fleet of SSBNs, known as SNLE 3G. This programme is expected to keep nuclear weapons in the French arsenal until at least 2070. It is also planning to build a new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Israel
Israel is modernising its arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles and may be upgrading its plutonium and warhead production facility. In 2022, Israel continued its significant construction effort at its Dimona nuclear weapons facility, which is likely to be associated with a life-extension campaign.

India
India is in the midst of completing and operationalising its nascent nuclear triad, and is modernising its existing nuclear forces to place increased emphasis on prompt missile launches.

In 2022, India test-launched its new Agni-V near-ICBM, and is preparing the missile for operational deployment. India also completed the development trials for its new Agni-P medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which will

5 President of Russia, ‘Ceremony to hoist navy flag on ships entering Navy and launch Imperator Aleksandr III nuclear submarine’, 9 December 2022, at: http://bit.ly/3ZAc2El

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likely replace older shorter-range Agni missiles. Unlike earlier versions of Agni missiles, both the Agni-V and the Agni-P will be deployed in new mobile canister systems, which will reduce the time required to launch the missiles in a crisis because they can be transported with the warhead installed. India also completing its second SSBN (INS Arihant), which might become operational in 2024.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan is in the midst of building a nuclear triad, placing particular emphasis on developing several short-range, tactical nuclear-capable weapon systems specifically designed to deter large-scale conventional strikes against or incursions into Pakistani territory.

In 2022, Pakistan continued the development of its new dual-capable Shaheen-III MRBM, and conducted a successful test-launch of the system in April.9

**North Korea**

North Korea appears to be focusing its nuclear development on deploying new types of shorter-range, solid-fuel missiles to potentially enable a strategy of regional nuclear warfighting.

In 2022, North Korea tested several new types of missiles, including hypersonic glide vehicles, tactical ballistic missiles, and the likely first successful full flight of its new Hwasong-17 ICBM. North Korea is also increasingly practicing high-volume salvo launches; in November, for example, North Korea fired 23 missiles in a single day, with one landing less than 60km from South Korea's coast.9 It is uncertain which of North Korea's many missiles are nuclear-capable.

**STATES OF CONCERN**

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor continues to list Iran and Saudi Arabia as states of concern in relation to the prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons. They do not possess nuclear weapons, but both have latent nuclear breakout capabilities. Therefore, in the event that either state intended to become party to the TPNW, possible compliance issues would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties or review conference.

**Iran**

Following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran restarted uranium enrichment beyond levels previously permitted by the agreement; as of August 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated that Iran possessed a stockpile of 331.9kg of uranium (in UF6 form) enriched up to 20%. This represents approximately 13 ‘significant quantities’ of enriched uranium, which the IAEA describes as the ‘approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.’ This is particularly worrisome, because very little additional work is required to enrich uranium from 20% purity to weapons-grade quality. Additionally, the IAEA estimated that Iran possessed approximately 55.6kg of uranium enriched up to 60%.10

These developments have reduced Iran's potential nuclear break-out time from approximately a year under the JCPOA to just a couple of months, although there is currently little public indication that Tehran intends to take that highly consequential step at this time. That being said, the IAEA noted that Iran's February 2021 decision to halt the implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA has 'had detrimental implications for the Agency's ability to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme'.11 The Biden administration appears to be working to negotiate a new agreement or a potential resumption of the JCPOA with Iran; however, even if this effort were to be successful, the IAEA noted that Iran would need to backfill its missing declarations and that the Agency would still struggle to verify their validity at this stage.12 As this report was going to print in March 2023, the IAEA had raised concern that Iran's uranium enrichment might even have gone beyond 60% U-235.13

**Saudi Arabia**

If Iran obtained a true nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia would almost certainly follow through on its promise to acquire one as well. Although Saudi Arabia's capabilities are much further behind Iran’s, the country possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear warheads. While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country's interest in developing nuclear weapons at this time, Saudi Arabia’s Original Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.

**FISSILE MATERIAL**

Fissile material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—is essential for nuclear weapons. Both military and civilian stocks of HEU and plutonium must be secured and reduced (and further production limited) in order to achieve nuclear disarmament, halt proliferation of nuclear weapons-grade quality. Additionally, the IAEA estimated that Iran possessed approximately 55.6kg of uranium enriched up to 60%.10

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8. Inter Services Public Relations (@OfficialDGISPR), Tweet, 9 April 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3ZGwaQG.
11. Ibid, para. 62.
12. Ibid, para. 62.
14. Natural uranium consists mostly of the isotope U-238 and very little U-235. To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U-235 it contains. Enrichment can be accomplished through a variety of methods, but centrifuges are today the standard technology. From 20% U-235, the uranium is considered highly enriched (HEU). Standard nuclear power fuel has 3–5% U-235. In nuclear weapons it is common to use HEU with at least 90% U-235, but the enrichment level may also vary over a wide range.
weapons, and ensure that terrorists do not acquire them. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), as of May 2022 the global stockpile of HEU was estimated to be approximately 1,255 metric tonnes: approximately 75 metric tonnes less than in 2021. Approximately 1,110 metric tonnes of HEU was either in weapons or available for use in weapons production.15 Enriched uranium is also used in civilian reactor fuel; as of May 2022, 13 non-nuclear-armed states (Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and Syria) had at least 1kg of HEU in civilian stockpiles, with some holding between 1 and 10 tonnes.16

At the time of writing, no updated numbers were available for 2022, but as of 2021, the global stockpile of separated plutonium was about 540 tonnes, of which about 317 tonnes was civilian plutonium.17 It is notable that, outside of waste, no significant reductions in stockpiles of weapons plutonium have taken place since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force.18 The largest stockpile of separated plutonium belongs to Russia, followed by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.19 In July 2022, the UK’s remaining plutonium reprocessing plant completed operations and will be decommissioned, thus formally ending all of the United Kingdom’s reprocessing activities after 70 years.20

Japan also has a very large stockpile of approximately 46 metric tonnes of separated plutonium, some in storage in the United Kingdom and in France, and some on its territory, theoretically sufficient for the production of thousands of nuclear weapons. This makes Japan the only non-nuclear-armed state that separates plutonium for peaceful purposes. However, Japan has a standing policy to not possess more plutonium than it needs for civilian energy purposes, and there is currently no indication that Japan intends to develop a military nuclear-weapons programme.21

Facilities that can produce fissile material (reprocessing plants and/or enrichment facilities) exist in 15 states (the nine nuclear-armed states plus Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands).22 Of these, production of fissile material intended for nuclear weapons appears to continue in India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. China, Russia, and the United States do not currently appear to be producing new fissile material for weapons, but continue to operate at least one reprocessing plant or enrichment facility without non-proliferation safeguards attached.

THE TPNW AND MINING AND TRANSFER OF URANIUM

Under international law, mining and transfer of uranium is generally lawful, unless it is being done for the purpose of developing or assisting in the development of a nuclear explosive device. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is protected under Article IV of the NPT (and customary international law), and the Preamble to the TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting that right. A state may therefore extract uranium and either use the nuclear material itself or provide it to another state for peaceful purposes, as long as it is subject to Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA.

Under the TPNW, the provision of uranium to any other state is prohibited where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements or if the state party transferring the uranium knows that the material in question will, or is likely to, be used to develop a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. Otherwise, states parties to the TPNW are permitted to transfer uranium, including to nuclear-armed states and states not party to the TPNW. Several states that mine and export uranium are party to the TPNW, including Kazakhstan, Namibia, and South Africa.

Under the NPT, the provision of uranium to any non-nuclear-weapon state is unlawful where it is not subject to appropriate Safeguards Agreements. The NPT does not directly address the legality of provision of uranium to the five nuclear-weapons states designated under that Treaty. If a state exports uranium to a nuclear-armed state or any other state subject to IAEA safeguards and on the understanding that the uranium would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, the exporting state could not be considered to be in violation of either the TPNW or the NPT if the importing state unexpectedly decided to use the uranium for weapons development instead. This would, though, affect the legality of any future exports of uranium to that state.

When armed groups control areas of a state’s territory, or when an armed conflict is ongoing, situations could occur where it would be difficult for the authorities of a state in which uranium deposits exist to effectively control all extraction and transfers. If a non-state actor in such a situation were to transfer uranium to an actor intending to develop a nuclear explosive device, the territorial state could not be considered to be in violation either of the TPNW or the NPT, provided that it has made all reasonable efforts to prevent such extraction and transfers. All reasonable efforts would include the adoption of national legislation and implementation of other practical measures to secure as far as possible sites in which uranium is present or where stocks of uranium are held.

16 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 3.
19 Ibid., p. 16.
At the beginning of 2023, the nine nuclear-armed states had a combined inventory of approximately 12,512 nuclear warheads, which is evidently not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. An estimated 9,576 of the total inventory are stockpiled warheads that are available for use by the military. The remaining 2,936 warheads had previously been retired and are awaiting dismantlement in Russia and the United States.

Pakistani Shaheen-III and Ghauri missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, are displayed during a military parade to mark Pakistan’s National Day in Islamabad, 23 March 2022. (AP Photo/Anjum Naveed)
ARTICLE 1(1)(a) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: [...] possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:

- The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Possession does not require legal ownership.
- One nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute a stockpile.
- The prohibition on possession activities such as maintenance and deployment of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Indirectly, it also acts to render deterrence practices unlawful.

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor collaborates with the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project to estimate and analyse global nuclear forces. The world’s nuclear warhead inventories at the beginning of 2023 are shown in Table F below and Figure 9 opposite. China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia continued to expand their nuclear arsenals in 2022, bringing about a corresponding increase in the world’s total stockpile of warheads available for the use by the military, from 9,440 warheads in January 2022 to, 9,576 warheads in January 2023. These stockpiled warheads have an estimated collective yield of approximately 2,025.6 megatons (MT), which is more than 135,000 times the approximate yield of the 15-kiloton (Kt) bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945.

Combined, the United States and Russia now possess approximately 89% of the world’s total inventory of nuclear weapons, and 86% of the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military. These percentages are likely to shrink over the coming years as other states increase their nuclear arsenals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total inventory of warheads</strong></td>
<td>5,889</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retired warheads for dismantlement</strong></td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockpiled warheads</strong></td>
<td>4,489</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated yield in megatons</strong></td>
<td>978.6 MT</td>
<td>857.6 MT</td>
<td>126.5 MT</td>
<td>29 MT</td>
<td>22.5 MT</td>
<td>3.4 MT</td>
<td>4.1 MT</td>
<td>2.5 MT</td>
<td>1.5 MT</td>
<td>2,025.6 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hiroshima-bomb equivalents</strong></td>
<td>65,240</td>
<td>57,173</td>
<td>8,433</td>
<td>1,933</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>135,043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A  The arrows refer to general trends over the last few years. Red upwards arrows (⬆) indicate increasing numbers, and downward arrows (⬇) indicate decreasing numbers.
B  Stockpiled warheads are available for the use by the military, and include both deployed warheads and warheads in reserve.
C  An estimated 45 warheads were previously scheduled for dismantlement but are now retained as a result of the UK government’s decision to increase the upper limit of the stockpile to 260 warheads.
Figure 9: The world’s nuclear warhead inventories at the beginning of 2023

- Stockpiled warheads available for use by the military
- Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement

While the number of stockpiled nuclear warheads available for use increased in 2022, the world’s total inventory of warheads decreased by approximately 193 from 12,705 warheads in early 2022 to 12,512 in early 2023. This reduction is, however, only due to Russia and the United States dismantling a small number of previously retired nuclear weapons during the course of 2022. As demonstrated in Figure 10 below, the total number of nuclear weapons in the world is slowly decreasing each year, almost entirely due to the dismantlement of retired warheads by Russia and the United States. But, scratching below the surface of the data yields a much bleaker picture: the global number of stockpiled nuclear weapons available for use has been steadily increasing since around the year 2017, when it reached an all-time low of 9,227 warheads, and is expected to continue to do so. Meanwhile, the number of warheads dismantled each year appears to be decreasing. As illustrated by the following graph, this means that we could soon reach a point where the total number of nuclear weapons in the world will actually increase for the first time since 1986.

Estimates of nuclear warhead inventories can fluctuate from year to year depending on a variety of factors like routine maintenance, the changing pace of warhead retirement, and modernisation schedules. As a result, it is more appropriate to consider the general trends of each country’s inventory over a multi-year period. As mentioned above, China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia are all generally increasing the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles. The stockpiles of France, Israel, and the United States are generally stable, although the United States’ multi-year modernisation programme will eventually result in a slightly smaller stockpile with more capable warheads upon completion. The UK government in 2021 announced a significant increase to the upper limit of its warhead inventory compared with previous plans, but there is no publicly available evidence to indicate that such an increase has begun.

Countries are increasingly, and unnecessarily, withholding information about their nuclear arsenals from their publics, allies, and adversaries. In particular, states that had previously been more transparent about their nuclear arsenals, including the United States and the United Kingdom, recently decided to no longer provide details of the sizes of their nuclear stockpiles or the numbers of warheads they have deployed. In 2022, in a reversal from the previous year, the Biden administration did not disclose the size of the US nuclear stockpile or the number of warheads dismantled. The UK government said it would no longer disclose how many warheads it deploys. This trend of increased nuclear secrecy poses challenges for understanding trends in nuclear arsenals, undercutting efforts to increase transparency. A lack of clarity as to nuclear stockpiles, deployments, and employment policies can lead to worst-case assumptions about how states will develop or use nuclear weapons in the future, thereby exacerbating the arms race and increasing the possibility of miscalculation.

**Figure 10: The world’s total inventory of nuclear warheads compared with the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military**

![Graph showing the comparison between the total inventory of warheads and the stockpiled warheads available for use by the military from 2020 to 2030.](image)

*The total inventory of warheads includes both the stockpiled warheads and the retired warheads.*

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DEPLOYMENT AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Of the global total of stockpiled warheads in early 2023, a total of 3,804 were at all times deployed on siloed and mobile missiles, at bomber bases, and on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), while the remaining 5,772 warheads were held in reserve. As shown in Table G above, only France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States currently deploy warheads on delivery vehicles and at bases with delivery vehicles. It is believed that China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan likely keep all of their nuclear warheads in central storage during peacetime.

Around 1,950—or more than 50% of the deployed warheads—are deployed on SSBNs. At all times, a significant number of nuclear warheads are carried through the world’s oceans on SSBNs on active patrol, ready to be launched on short notice. France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States deploy at least one SSBN each at sea at all times and can increase their numbers of deployed submarines during times of heightened tensions. For example, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, France briefly practiced deploying three SSBNs concurrently, rather than just one. As of January 2023, the United States was operating 14 SSBNs.

TABLE G: STATUS OF STOCKPILED WARHEADS AT THE BEGINNING OF 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>North Korea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployed*</td>
<td>1,674</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In reserve</td>
<td>2,815</td>
<td>1,938</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>4,489</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9,576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Deployed warheads are either deployed on a delivery vehicle or at a base with delivery vehicles.

TABLE H: THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSBNs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (SSBN)</th>
<th>Average destructive power of a single SSBN</th>
<th>Hiroshima-bomb equivalent</th>
<th>Comparative notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States (Ohio-class)</td>
<td>19 MT</td>
<td>1,266</td>
<td>The destructive power of a single US SSBN is roughly equivalent to twice that of the entire, combined nuclear arsenals of India, Pakistan, and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Borei-class)</td>
<td>6.4 MT</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>The destructive power of a single Russian SSBN is roughly equivalent to the entire, combined nuclear arsenals of India and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (Le Triomphant-class)</td>
<td>8 MT</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>The destructive power of a single French SSBN is roughly equivalent to the entire, combined nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (Vanguard-class)</td>
<td>4 MT</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>The destructive power of a single UK SSBN is roughly equivalent to India’s entire nuclear arsenal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Jin-class)</td>
<td>3 MT</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>The destructive power of a single Chinese SSBN is roughly equivalent to Pakistan’s entire nuclear arsenal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India (Arihant-class)</td>
<td>0.14 MT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

capable of carrying nuclear weapons while Russia was operating 11, China 6, the United Kingdom 4, France 4, and India 1 (with two more being fitted out). North Korea has one ballistic missile submarine (SSB) which is not thought to be currently operational. Russia also has attack submarines that can launch nuclear weapons, as does Israel.

Most SSBNs can carry a very large number of warheads because their missiles can deliver multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). This means that the total firepower onboard a single SSBN can be larger than the entire arsenal of a lesser nuclear-armed country. Table H above describes these relationships in more detail for each nuclear-armed country that deploys SSBNs.

In addition to submarines, the nuclear-armed states operate a wide variety of delivery vehicles from which they can launch nuclear weapons, including siloed and mobile missiles, heavy bombers, tactical aircraft, surface ships and naval aircraft, and defensive systems. These systems all have vastly different characteristics, and thus, each country generally operates a unique combination of delivery systems in accordance with their respective strategies. Table I opposite provides an overview of the diversity of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles in each nuclear-armed state’s arsenal, and the breakdown of the number of nuclear warheads that are assigned to each type of delivery vehicle. Russia has by far the most types of nuclear-capable delivery systems.

NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear-armed states are generally moving away from megaton-level yields in favour of more accurate lower-yield warheads, although some analysts suggest that this could make nuclear weapons more ‘usable’, potentially lowering the threshold for nuclear use as a consequence.

Russia, the United States, North Korea, and Pakistan officially possess so-called tactical, or non-strategic, nuclear weapons that are intended to be used for shorter-range strike missions. There is, however, no universally accepted definition for what officially constitutes a ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon, and a common misconception is that all such weapons have lower yields and shorter ranges. The reality is much less clear: tactical nuclear weapons can have a wide range of yields and ranges; and a shorter-range weapon might be considered ‘non-strategic’ in US and Russian arsenals but ‘strategic’ in French, Indian, and Pakistani arsenals. The United Kingdom is the only nuclear-armed state that does not have nuclear weapons that can be considered non-strategic. Furthermore, the United States is the only nation known to deploy non-strategic warheads in other countries; the other nuclear-armed states are believed to keep their non-strategic warheads in central storage during peacetime.

Given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s sizable stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of particular concern. Russia possesses approximately 1,816 such weapons for use by naval, tactical air, and missile defence forces, as well as in the form of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. It is likely that all of these warheads are kept in central storage, and at the time of writing, there was no indication that Russia had changed that. Nevertheless, tactical nuclear weapons are considered the most likely to be used if Russia ever decided to use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine war. Even the use of a lower-yield tactical nuclear weapon could immediately trigger a dramatic escalation of nuclear tensions.

It is of further concern that several nuclear-armed states are placing increased emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrine. Russia has added several types of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and North Korea declared in 2021 that it would work to ‘make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter for more tactical uses’, and it continued to develop and deploy those capabilities throughout 2022. Many analysts believe that this increased emphasis on nuclear warfighting could lower North Korea’s nuclear threshold and increase the risk of nuclear use at the outset of a conflict.

Explanation for Table I

A Table I opposite contains the best available information on types of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles currently fielded by each nuclear-armed state, as well as the estimated numbers of nuclear warheads (wh) that they have assigned to the delivery vehicles in each category. Some of the delivery systems listed in the table are currently deployed with warheads, but others are not. The table uses some national designations, and some US/NATO designations. It is possible that certain systems in the table are nearing retirement, or that they are nearing entry into the respective state’s nuclear forces, but had not yet been declared fully operational by the beginning of 2023.

B The total for Pakistan includes 8 warheads that are not yet assigned to delivery vehicles, but which are thought to have been produced eventually to arm delivery vehicles once they become operational.

C The total for India includes 20 warheads that are not yet assigned to delivery vehicles, but which are thought to have been produced eventually to arm delivery vehicles once they become operational.

D It is uncertain which of North Korea’s missiles are assigned nuclear weapons and are operational.

### TABLE I: NUCLEAR-CAPABLE DELIVERY VEHICLES FIELDED BY THE NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES AT THE BEGINNING OF 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Siloed Missiles</th>
<th>Mobile Missiles</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
<th>Surface Ships and Naval Aircraft</th>
<th>Air/Coast/ Missile Defence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia</strong> 4,489 stockpiled warheads Incl. 1,674 deployed warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS-18 ICBM</td>
<td>SS-27 Mod 1 ICBM</td>
<td>Tu-160/M/M2</td>
<td>Delta-IV SSBN carrying SS-N-23 M2/3 SLBM</td>
<td>A-135 ABM SH-08 Gazelle SSC-1B Sepal S-300/400 SAM P-800 ASCM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-19 Mod 4 ICBM</td>
<td>SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM</td>
<td>Tu-95M5/6/16/M</td>
<td>Borei-/4 SSBN carrying SS-N-32 SLBM</td>
<td>Reserve: 306 wh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-27 Mod 1 ICBM</td>
<td>9K720 Iskander SRBM</td>
<td>Tu-22M3/M</td>
<td>Various SSGNs and SSNs carrying the following weapons: SS-N-21 LACM SS-N-30/A LACM SS-N-15 ASW SS-N-16 ASW SS-N-19 SLCM SS-N-26 SLCM Torpedoes Mines Torpedoes</td>
<td>Reserve: 385 wh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-27 Mod 2 ICBM</td>
<td>9M728 Iskander GLCM</td>
<td>Su-24/M2</td>
<td>SS-N-21 LACM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9M729 Smerchder GLCM</td>
<td>Su-34</td>
<td>SS-N-22 SLCM</td>
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<td>Su-57</td>
<td>SS-N-26 SLCM</td>
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<td>MiG-31K</td>
<td>SS-N-30/A LACM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Air/Coast/ Missile Defence</td>
<td>Various SSNs and SSNs carrying the following weapons: SS-N-21 LACM SS-N-30/A LACM SS-N-15 ASW SS-N-16 ASW SS-N-19 SLCM SS-N-26 SLCM Torpedoes Mines Torpedoes</td>
<td>Reserve: 306 wh</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-N-23 M2/3 SLBM</td>
<td>Reserve: 306 wh</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States 3,708 stockpiled warheads Incl. 1,770 deployed warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minuteman III ICBM</td>
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<td>Ohio-class SSBN carrying Trident II D5/LE SLBM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deployed: 400 wh Reserve: 400 wh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deployed: 550 wh Reserve: 970 wh</td>
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<td>China 410 stockpiled warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>DF-5A/B ICBM</td>
<td>DF-21A/E MRBM</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying CHAS-13 ALBM and gravity bombs</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying Type 094 SSBN carrying JL-3 SLCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reserve: 66 wh</td>
<td>DF-26 IRBM DF-31A/AG ICBM DF-41 ICBM</td>
<td>Reserve: 20 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 72 wh</td>
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<td>France 290 stockpiled warheads Incl. 240 deployed warheads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Le Triomphant-class SSBN carrying MS1.2 SLM</td>
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<td>Deployed: 240 wh Reserve: 10 wh</td>
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<td>Rafale MF3 carrying ASMP-A ALCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom 225 stockpiled warheads Incl. 120 deployed warheads</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vanguard-class SSBN carrying Trident II D5/LE SLBM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deployed: 120 wh Reserve: 105 wh</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rafale Bf3 carrying ASMP-A ALCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan 170 stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>Abdali SRBM Ghaznavi SRBM Shaheen-I/A SRBM Shaheen-II MRBM Ghauri MRBM NASIR SRBM Babur-1A GLCM</td>
<td>Mirage III/V carrying Raad ALCM and gravity bombs</td>
<td>Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS carrying gravity bombs</td>
<td>Sukanya-class carrying Dhruv SLBM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reserve: 126 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 36 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 48 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 4 wh</td>
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<tr>
<td>India 164 stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>Prithvi-II SRBM Agni-I SRBM Agni-II MRBM Agni-III IRBM Agni-IV IRBM</td>
<td>Mirage 2000H and Jaguar IS carrying gravity bombs</td>
<td>Arjun-class SSBN carrying K-15 SLCM</td>
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<td>Reserve: 80 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 12 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 12 wh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel 90 stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>Jericho II MRBM Jericho III IRBM</td>
<td>F-16I and F-15 carrying gravity bombs</td>
<td>Dolphin-III SSQN carrying Popeye Turbo SLCM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reserve: 50 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 30 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 10 wh</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Korea 30 stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>Hwasong-5/6 SRBM KN15/21 SRBM KN23/24/25 SRBM Hwasong-7 MRBM Hwasong-9 MRBM Pukguksong-2 MRBM Hwasong-12 IRBM Hwasong-14/ICBM Hwasong-15 ICBM Beagle-2 SLBM Beagle-3 SLBM</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying Type 094 SSBN carrying JL-3 SLCM</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying Type 094 SSBN carrying JL-3 SLCM</td>
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<td>Reserve: 30 wh</td>
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<td>France 290 stockpiled warheads Incl. 240 deployed warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minuteman III ICBM</td>
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<td>United Kingdom 225 stockpiled warheads Incl. 120 deployed warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>China 410 stockpiled warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>DF-5A/B ICBM</td>
<td>DF-21A/E MRBM</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying CHAS-13 ALBM and gravity bombs</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying Type 094 SSBN carrying JL-3 SLCM</td>
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<tr>
<td>DF-5A/B ICBM</td>
<td>DF-21A/E MRBM</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying CHAS-13 ALBM and gravity bombs</td>
<td>H-6K/N carrying Type 094 SSBN carrying JL-3 SLCM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve: 66 wh</td>
<td>DF-26 IRBM DF-31A/AG ICBM DF-41 ICBM</td>
<td>Reserve: 20 wh</td>
<td>Reserve: 72 wh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No state engaged in conduct in 2022 that contravened the TPNW’s prohibition on testing. North Korea, however, the only state known to have engaged in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, was said to be moving towards conducting a new nuclear test as the year drew to a close.

Photo published by North Korean state media of the country’s leader Kim Jong-un hand-in-hand with his daughter during his inspection of a test launch of an unarmed Hwasong-17 ICBM on 18 November 2022. As the year drew to a close, North Korea was said to be moving towards a new explosive test of a nuclear weapon. (Photo: NTB/EyePress News/Shutterstock)
In November 2022, South Korea's president Yoon Suk-yeol said any new nuclear test by North Korea will be met with an international response ‘not seen in the past’. He also called on China to play a greater role to deter the North's provocations.1

North Korea's last test detonation occurred in September 2017 and Pyongyang subsequently announced a moratorium on nuclear testing in April 2018, ostensibly destroying its Punggye-ri test site the following month. At the end of 2019, however, North Korea declared an end to its unilateral moratorium, with the change of position reaffirmed in January 2020.2 At the end of April 2022, there were signs that North Korea was rebuilding tunnels at the site.3 In mid-December 2022, the South Korean Prime Minister, Han Duck-soo, said publicly that the North was ‘ready’ to test a nuclear explosive device.4

A new nuclear test detonation by North Korea would violate UN Security Council resolutions and contravene the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as well as, arguably, customary international law, in addition to being incompatible with Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW.

Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at least eight states have conducted a total of at least 2,050 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test sites around the world.5 India and Pakistan both exploded nuclear devices in 1998. The United Kingdom undertook its last explosive test in 1991. France completed its last nuclear explosive test in 1996 and completely dismantled its nuclear testing site in the Pacific. The United States conducted its last explosive tests in 1992, but in November 2017 the US government decided to shorten its testing readiness timeline from between 24 and 36 months to between 6 and 10 months for a simple test.6

China's last explosive nuclear test was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly.7 The Soviet Union/Russia undertook its last known explosive test in 1990. Speaking in February 2023, a few days before the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Putin pledged that Russia would resume nuclear testing should the United States do so first.8

In September 1979, a flash over the Indian Ocean detected by a US satellite (Vela) was suspected of being a South African nuclear test, conducted in collaboration with Israel. This was never confirmed officially by either of these states.9

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ARTICLE 1(1)(A) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘test […] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

- The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing.
- All non-explosive forms of testing are outlawed by the prohibition on development in the TPNW.
- All explosive testing also contravenes the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (a treaty not yet in force) and, arguably, customary international law.
- The preamble of the TPNW recognises ‘the vital importance’ of the CTBT and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

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One state not party—the United States—engaged in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on transfer of nuclear weapons, by virtue of its export of key components to the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal.
The United States has transferred nuclear weapons to the United Kingdom, because the UK nuclear-weapon system in very large measure is imported from the United States: the United Kingdom leases its Trident II (DS) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from the United States’ missile inventory; the design for the UK’s Holbrook nuclear warhead for its Trident missiles is partially based on the US W76 design; the Mk4A reentry vehicle for the Holbrook warhead is imported from the United States, and key components of the UK’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) (the Trident SLBM fire control system and missile compartment) are also imported from the United States.1, 2

These transfers of key components also violate the corresponding prohibition on transfer by nuclear-weapon states in Article 1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

UK officials have reportedly lobbied the US Congress to expedite the development of a new warhead, the W93, on which a replacement for the Holbrooke warhead would be based.3 One commentator has suggested that over the course of 25 years of studies, engineering, and production, the W93 programme may cost up to US$14 billion, with production of the first warheads expected between 2034 and 2036. But, Shane Ward observes, the United States’ need for the W93 ‘is not as urgent as the timeline suggests.’ Rather, the programme’s urgency ‘seems attributable to the United Kingdom’s nuclear modernization efforts’.4 In 2020, a senior civil servant at the UK Ministry of Defence told the Parliament’s Select Committee of Defence that there is ‘a close realignment’ between the US W93 warhead and the new British warhead. He further explained that ‘[i]t’s not exactly the same warhead but...there is a very close connection in design terms and production terms. So we are intimately involved in that.’5 In January 2022, a US Department of Energy fact sheet on the W93 programme stated that it was ‘vital for continuing the United States’ longstanding support to the United Kingdom’.6 These statements imply that the UK’s replacement nuclear warhead is inextricably linked to the status of the United States’ W93 programme, and that the degree of technical information-sharing will amount to indirect transfer under Article 1(1)(b) of the TPNW as well as under Article 1 of the NPT.

As discussed under the section below on the parallel prohibition under the TPNW on receiving transfer or control of nuclear weapons, another potential compatibility issue concerns the US B61 nuclear bombs that are stored in Europe but remain under the command and control of the United States. If, in a future war, full control over any of the bombs should be transferred by the United States to any of the host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, or the Netherlands, for loading and use in their dual-capable NATO-designated aircraft, this would contravene the prohibition on transfer in Article 1(1)(b) of the TPNW, and also the prohibition on transfer in Article 1 of the NPT.

ARTICLE 1(1)(B) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly.

- ‘Transfer’ means to transmit either possession or ownership. ‘Control’ means the power to use a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device.
- Because transfer is prohibited ‘to any recipient whatsoever’ and irrespective of whether this occurs ‘directly or indirectly’, it is also illegal to transmit possession or ownership to any other state or to any natural or ‘legal’ person (e.g. a company or organisation) of key components of any nuclear explosive device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or third parties where there is knowledge they will be used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device.
- Providing another state with sufficiently detailed technical information for a nuclear warhead or other nuclear explosive device to be developed, and in the knowledge that it will be so used, would also constitute indirect transfer under Article 1(1)(b) of the TPNW. This is in addition to assistance with development under Article (1)(e).
- Unlawful transfer does not necessarily involve payment or other form of ‘consideration’.
- Under Article 1 of the NPT, the five nuclear-weapon states parties have already committed never to transfer nuclear weapons ‘to any recipient whatsoever’, also whether this occurs ‘directly or indirectly’.
- The NPT does not include a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states to assist in a transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This important lacuna is addressed by Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of the TPNW.

5 UK defense committee meeting with UK MOD, 8 December 8 2020. at: https://bit.ly/40oy9fB.
Only one state not party—the United Kingdom—engaged in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the TPNW’s prohibition on receiving the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons. As discussed in the section above, the United Kingdom leases Trident missiles and imports other key nuclear components from the United States.
As discussed in the previous section, the transfers by the United States are not only prohibited by the TPNW, but are also highly questionable under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The receipt of the transfers by the United Kingdom as a nuclear-weapon state, however, is not regulated by the NPT. This lacuna is addressed by Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW, which does not permit any state to receive transfer or control of nuclear weapons. As also discussed above, the planned replacement for the United Kingdom’s Holbrooke warhead will be partly based on the W93 warhead, which is being developed by the United States. If the United Kingdom receives from the United States comprehensive technical information, such as in the form of a design blueprint, and uses it for the development of its new warhead, this will amount to indirect receipt of transfer under the TPNW. Another potential future compatibility issue under this prohibition concerns the US B61 nuclear bombs stored in Europe. Arrangements are reportedly in place for control over the bombs to be given by the United States to the host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, for loading and use on their dual-capable NATO-designated aircraft. If this were to occur such that the receiving state could use the weapons itself, this would contravene Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW (and also the NPT). This specific task division arrangement has therefore been much discussed, not least when the German Bundeswehr in 2008 handed out directives, in the form of a pocket card (Taschenkarte), stipulating that German soldiers were prohibited from using nuclear weapons under international law. The directives have since been changed and the sentence in question omitted. Currently, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands all have an active nuclear role in NATO and retain the dual-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the weapons at bases on their territory. The weapons are controlled by the United States but could be released to the host country for use in a war. In the case of the B61 bombs stationed at Incirlik in Türkiye, however, any use of the weapons would reportedly be carried out by NATO aircraft stationed at other bases. Türkiye’s F-16 fighters are capable of delivering nuclear bombs but are not fully certified to do so. A seventh state, Greece, also contributes to the nuclear sharing mission. Greece does not have a committed fighter unit, but has a contingency mission.2 Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are procuring the F-35A fighter aircraft to continue the nuclear-sharing arrangements.3 In the Netherlands, a majority of the members of parliament supported a motion in 2014 stating that the F-35s should have no nuclear role.4 The Dutch government decided to ignore the parliamentary vote, opting to procure nuclear-capable F-35s. Germany decided in March 2022 to replace its ageing Tornado fleet, which includes nuclear-capable aircraft, with F-35 fighters.5 The decision, which was taken following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was formally ratified by the German Parliament in December 2022. The ‘Block 4’ software upgrade enabling the F-35A to employ nuclear weapons is expected to be implemented across the relevant host states through 2026.6 See the section below on the prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons for further information on the US nuclear weapons stored in Europe.

ARTICLE 1(1)(C) – INTERPRETATION
Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly’

• To ‘receive’ a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take possession or control over it. This broad notion does not require that ownership also pass to the recipient.
• The prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device as well as an assembled version. This extends to transfers made through intermediaries.
• Receiving comprehensive technical information for the design of a nuclear warhead or other nuclear explosive device with the intent of using it to develop a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, would also constitute indirect receipt of transfer under Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW.
• Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding prohibition in that Treaty applies only to those states that are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states and not to the five states designated as nuclear-weapon states.

1 See: O. Nassauer, ‘Pilots practice delivering nuclear bombs. Tornado pilots between orders and international law’, [Piloten üben Atombomben-Abwurf. Tornado-Piloten zwischen Befehl und Völkerrecht], Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, 10 July 2008, at: https://bit.ly/3fMOQSi. The pocket card (Taschenkarte) is the summary of the central service regulation 15/2 of the Bundeswehr, which was adapted in 2013 to no longer include this prohibition (and resulting personal responsibility under international law).
No state has contravened the TPNW’s prohibition on use of nuclear weapons, but 2022 was a year of exceptional danger. The nuclear taboo, a 77-year norm of non-use, was eroded while still being protected. The risk that Russia’s war in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear weapon use remains a deep concern.
Several times during 2022, commentators in state-controlled Russian media seriously contemplated or even encouraged the use of nuclear weapons both in Ukraine and against NATO members.1 In western media, the probability of Russian use and likely responses by NATO was analysed almost on a daily basis;2 often understating the humanitarian consequences that even a single nuclear explosion would have, and potentially contributing to normalising the idea of use.

There were also certain voices in Russian media that sought to protect the nuclear taboo. An editorial in the newspaper Nezavisimaya critiqued the nuclear rhetoric of ‘high-ranking representatives of the Russian authorities’, describing it as ‘not emotions, not trolling, not games of the mind, but a style of thinking, a serious agenda’. The editorial continued: ‘In Russia, entire generations have been brought up on the idea that a nuclear strike is something completely unacceptable. The story of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has become a tragic textbook, a story that has been preserved in the minds of people since childhood. ... It is surprising how, with all this, high-ranking officials in Russia, in a situation where conventional weapons do not allow unambiguous dominance, turn to talking about a nuclear button. They do it with ease, as if it were just a new tactical decision and not a systemic leap. ... Allowing nuclear conflict in thought and word is a sure step towards allowing it in practice. And this is the potential destruction of not even cities and countries, but civilizations. It is hardly possible to protect someone’s interests in this way.’3

This editorial was an important reminder of how crucial it is to continue to work to stigmatise nuclear weapons, bring realism back, and counter ignorance about nuclear risk on the part of nuclear-armed states and their allies, as well as irrational complacency among many in the public. Building on the previous Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo (March 2013), Nayarit (February 2014), and Vienna (December 2014), Austria convened a fourth such conference on 20 June 2022. At the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,4 Dr Tytti Erästö of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said that while nuclear deterrence has always been fragile, technology has created new vulnerabilities and increased the risk of escalation. Certain new weapon systems might contribute to misunderstandings owing to ambiguity about their target, destination, or payload.5

In a speech about the real risk of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, Dr Zia Mian of Princeton University addressed how illusion of control is key to nuclear deterrence but we cannot possibly know how nuclear crises might actually emerge and play out, how people understand and respond to the decisions of others, and how time and uncertain information will matter.6

A study published in the journal Nature Food in 2022 shows that soot from fires triggered by nuclear-weapon use could cause disruptions to the Earth’s climate, leading to mass food shortages, with livestock and aquatic food production unable to compensate for reduced crop output in almost all countries. As illustrated in the maps overleaf, the study estimates more than 2 billion people could starve to death after a relatively small-scale nuclear war between India and Pakistan, and more than 5 billion could die from a large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia – underlining the importance of global cooperation in preventing nuclear war.7

In the Declaration of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, adopted in June 2022, the states parties said: ‘Far from preserving peace and security, nuclear weapons are used as instruments of policy, linked to

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ARTICLE 1(1)(D) – INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘Use ... nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.’

- Preventing use is a fundamental aim of the TPNW - unquestionably central to the Treaty’s object and purpose.
- To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to launch, release, deliver, or detonate it with hostile intent or for so-called ‘peaceful’ use, such as in civil engineering. Intent can be discerned from the circumstances and does not have to be publicly espoused. Possession or deployment of nuclear weapons for the purpose of ‘deterrence’ does not amount to their use under the TPNW but is covered by the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).
- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not address the use of nuclear weapons in so far as it allows ‘peaceful’ detonation of nuclear explosive devices by nuclear-weapon states. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all such ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions, has not entered into force.
- Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945 when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki. Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used since some 150 such devices were detonated for ‘peaceful’ use (for civil engineering purposes) between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 1980s by the erstwhile Soviet Union and the United States.

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3 See the original Russian text at: https://bit.ly/3X5HP0n.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Figure 11: Proportion of population that would starve to death after a war between India and Pakistan where 250 nuclear weapons of a yield of 100 Kt were detonated

Figure 12: Proportion of population that would starve to death after a war between the United States and Russia where 4,400 nuclear weapons of an average yield of 100 Kt were detonated

coercion, intimidation and heightening of tensions. ... We thus insist that, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-armed states never use or threaten to use these weapons under any circumstances.8

In August 2022, speaking at the opening of the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres reiterated his warning that humanity is ‘just one misunderstanding, one miscalculation away from nuclear annihilation’.9

In November 2022, during a visit by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, China's leader, Xi Jinping, specifically warned President Putin not to use nuclear arms in Ukraine. The international community should 'jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons', said Xi according to a statement carried by Xinhua, China's government news agency. Xi added that the world should also 'advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis in Europe or Asia.'10

Also in November 2022, the G20 Summit in Bali issued a declaration stating that the 'use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible'.11

With the nuclear risk dimension of the war in Ukraine, it was, however, deeply regrettable that only two NATO states (Greece and Northern Macedonia) voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution 77/53 on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The Resolution, which was adopted on 7 December 2022 by overwhelming majority, stated that 'it is in the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons never be used again, under any circumstances'.12 Those NATO states that voted against the resolution's adoption or abstained reportedly did so in order to protect NATO's Strategic Concept, where readiness to use nuclear weapons remains a key feature.

POLICIES ON USE

Five of the nine nuclear-armed states—France, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States— maintain nuclear doctrines that allow for the ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons. In June 2022, NATO's updated Strategic Concept reaffirmed the alliance's preparedness to use nuclear weapons.13 In October, the Biden administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also reaffirmed the necessity and acceptability of use, stating that the US would ‘consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its Allies and partners’. This includes the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict and the use of nuclear weapons in response to a major non-nuclear attack.14

Two other nuclear-armed states (China and India) have long maintained so-called no-first-use policies, ostensibly declaring that they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to prior use by an adversary. In October 2022, China publicly reaffirmed its no-first-use policy before the UN General Assembly.15 Yet both China and India are in the process of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have interpreted as an indication they might also be in the process of changing their nuclear postures.16 Moreover, India's doctrine potentially allows for use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for use of biological or chemical weapons against it, at any rate where such an attack inflicts mass casualties.17

US defense officials have maintained that China is shifting to a nuclear ‘launch-on-warning’ posture. In November 2022, the US Department of Defense reported to Congress that the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) was already implementing a launch-on-warning posture. Called ‘early warning counterstrike’ domestically, this policy concerns a situation where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike ‘before an enemy first strike can detonate’.18 It appears from PLA writings that multiple manned command-and-control organs are involved in the process, warned by space- and ground-based sensors, and that this posture is ‘broadly similar’ to the US and Russian launch-on-warning postures. The US Department of Defense further speculates that China may seek to keep at least a portion of its force, especially its new silo-based units, on a launch-on-warning posture, and that, ‘since 2017, the PLARF [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force] has conducted exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and launch on warning responses’.19

Kim Jong-un stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea would not use nuclear weapons unless ‘its sovereignty is encroached upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons’.20 However, other statements from his government, including threats of a ‘pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice’21 against Japan and South Korea, undercut the credibility of these comments. In 2022, analysts warned that the threat from North Korea's nuclear arsenal had entered ‘an alarming new phase’.22

9 UN, ‘Humanity's just one misunderstanding away from nuclear annihilation’ warns UN chief, News release, New York, 1 August 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3VfApkE.
12 UN General Assembly Resolution 77/53 (Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons), adopted on 7 December 2022 by 138 votes to 14 with 31 abstentions, at: https://bit.ly/3XwXSBw.
15 K. Xie, ‘China underlines “no first use” nuclear policy as if seeks stronger power to deter’, South China Morning Post, 19 October 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Fh4N8D.
19 Ibid
22 A. Mount and J. Kim, ‘North Korea’s Tactical Nuclear Threshold Is Frighteningly Low’, Foreign Policy, 8 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3YgEsBq.
and argued that North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons were ‘the likeliest of any nuclear weapons in the world to be used in war’. In April 2022, Chairman Kim said his nuclear forces will ‘never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent’. In April 2022, Chairman Kim said his nuclear forces will ‘never be confined to the single mission of war deterrent’.

Russian President Putin’s apparent claim in October 2018 that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not reflected in Russia’s official nuclear weapons doctrine, which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider using nuclear arms in response to aggression against Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy. In early December 2022, President Putin mused openly on the rising threat of nuclear war during a Kremlin meeting on 7 December but said that Russia ‘will under no circumstances use them first’. Later in December, President Putin declared that Moscow was considering adopting what he described as a nuclear first-strike policy to the country’s military doctrine. President Putin and other Russian officials have also repeatedly said that Russia would be prepared to use nuclear weapons to protect Russia’s ‘territorial integrity’.

The ninth nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear its policy on their use.

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23 Mount and Kim, ‘North Korea’s Tactical Nuclear Threshold Is Frighteningly Low’.
26 Zeleb.es, ‘Putin says Russia may adopt preemptive first strike nuclear policy’, MSN, 13 December 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3HAnAQm.
27 See, e.g., Reuters, ‘Russia says seized Ukrainian lands are under its nuclear protection’, 18 October 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3WPpArN.
The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor finds that Russia, North Korea, and France in 2022 acted in contravention of the TPNW's prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons. It is hard to recall a year with more nuclear sabre-rattling than 2022. The overwhelming majority of the provocative statements regarding potential use of nuclear weapons were made by Russia's president Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian officials in an attempt to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine, heightening tensions and increasing the risk of nuclear calamity.

Russian operator presses the button when a Yars intercontinental ballistic missile was test-fired as part of a Russian nuclear drill on 26 October 2022, in Plesetsk, north-western Russia. (Photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press O/UPI/Shutterstock/NTB)
While most of the statements made in 2022 regarding potential use of nuclear weapons may be dismissed as blustering, the following were in the view of the Ban Monitor clear instances of threatening to use nuclear weapons as prohibited under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW:

- At the start of the war in Ukraine, Putin stated quite explicitly: ‘I would now like to say something very important for those who may be tempted to interfere in these developments from the outside. … [T]hey must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history. No matter how the events unfold, we are ready. All the necessary decisions in this regard have been taken. I hope that my words will be heard.’

- In September 2022, when Putin signed four treaties of accession to ‘annex’ four occupied regions of Ukraine, he once again stated that: ‘In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.’

- In October 2022, North Korea launched a nuclear-capable missile over Japan. This act, which resulted in alarms from cell phones, radios, and public speakers across northern Japan warning residents to seek shelter, could also be considered a threat to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW.

- At the beginning of November 2022, North Korea issued an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons, vowing that the United States and South Korea would ‘pay the most horrible price in history’ if either nation attempted to use armed force against North Korea. ‘Without any fear, the special means of the [North’s] armed forces will carry out their strategic mission without delay’, said Pak Jong Chon, a secretary of the ruling Workers’ Party who is considered a close confidante of Chairman Kim.

**ARTICLE 1(1)(D) – INTERPRETATION**

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to 'threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.

- Article 1(1)(d) prohibits threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device at all times, and regardless of whether such use would itself be a violation of international law or in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression. It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on threat of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

- To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be credible in the circumstances. This means that the threat must emanate from a state or an authority in a position to either direct or authorise the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically, therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior, pertinent government official or member of the ruling party in a nuclear-armed state.

- The narrow wording in Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW with the active verb 'threaten to use' requires that any signalled intention by a state to use nuclear weapons be specific as to the target of threatened use.

- Prohibited threats may, however, be implicit as well as explicit. A stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer to use of nuclear weapons, although it would be more likely to violate the norm in the TPNW should it do so.

- In certain circumstances of tension, a show of force by means of missile testing, an explosive test of a nuclear weapon, a military exercise involving possible use of nuclear weapons, or a nuclear strike exercise, could amount to unlawfully threatening to use nuclear weapons under the TPNW (along with other violations of the Treaty).

- Policies of nuclear ‘deterrence’ rest on willingness to use nuclear weapons. Accordingly, reflecting the severity of the danger, some experts take the view that a practice of nuclear ‘deterrence’ in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is the view of the Ban Monitor that the broader concept of nuclear deterrence, where the threat to use nuclear weapons is general and not specific in nature, is not sufficient in itself to constitute threatening to use the TPNW. Deterrence practices are, however, illegal under the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.

- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) does not prohibit the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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1. Such threats are not new, but part of a pattern of nuclear threat-making that has escalated the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbass by Russia in 2014. For example, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at the time that Moscow would consider using nuclear weapons should NATO and Ukraine try to retaliate Crimea by force. The nuclear aspects of the war in Ukraine are therefore only the latest expression of a ‘nuclearised’ East-West relationship. See: Z. Keck, ‘Russia Threatens Nuclear Strikes Over Crimea’, The Diplomat, 11 July 2014, at: https://bit.ly/3i65SM2.


4. ‘Macron under fire for saying France wouldn’t respond in kind if Russia launched nuclear attack on Ukraine’, Politico, 13 October 2022, at: https://politico.com/39kDq.


A silver lining around this very dark cloud is that 2022 also saw widespread efforts to reaffirm the unacceptability of threatening to use nuclear weapons and any serious contemplation of recourse to such weapons.

Most forcefully, the ‘Vienna Declaration’ adopted by the TPNW’s First Meeting of States Parties (IMSP) stated: ‘We are alarmed and dismayed by threats to use nuclear weapons and increasingly stringent nuclear rhetoric. We stress that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. We condemn unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances,’ provoking a strong response from Russia. Leading states parties of the TPNW, including Austria, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mexico and New Zealand also issued a statement condemning Russia’s nuclear threats and calling on all nuclear-armed states to work towards nuclear disarmament. The G20 Summit in Bali in November 2022 also issued a strong declaration in which it stated that the ‘use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible’. Also in November 2022, China’s leader Xi Jinping felt moved to warn President Putin not to use nuclear arms in Ukraine. India similarly condemned threats of nuclear use by Russia after being initially reluctant to do so.

The UN Secretary-General issued a strongly worded rebuke to Russia for ‘totally unacceptable’ nuclear threats. Finally, at the G7 Summit held in Elmau, Germany in late June 2022, the leaders of the seven nations issued a communiqué in which they welcomed the ‘Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-War States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races’ of 3 January 2022, ‘including the important affirmation that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought’. But they also condemned Russia’s ‘provocative statements which signal the threat of use of nuclear weapons’, which, they said, ‘undermines the credibility of Russia’s commitment to the Joint Statement’.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) praised these statements, saying that ‘consistent and unequivocal condemnation from governments and civil society can stigmatise and delegitimise nuclear threats, [and] help restore and strengthen the norm against the use of nuclear weapons’. Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association made the point, however, that the international community’s reaction to Putin’s nuclear antics has been far too mild. ‘The U.S. response to Putin’s nuclear threats, as well as those of Western governments that also embrace nuclear deterrence ideologies and rely on the credible threat of nuclear use, has been particularly underwhelming’, said Kimball.

NUCLEAR ‘RESPONSIBILITY’

Western nuclear-armed states and their allies in 2022 called out Russia’s nuclear threats as illegitimate and dangerous. This de-legitimation, however, was in most cases framed within a narrative of ‘responsible’ versus ‘irresponsible’ nuclear behaviour. For example, at the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August, a working paper by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, stated: ‘We reject irresponsible rhetoric concerning potential nuclear use intended for military coercion, intimidation or blackmail, whilst at the same time legitimising their own nuclear threats by stating that ‘the use of nuclear weapons should only be considered in extreme circumstances of self-defence’. NATO said much the same.

This focus on ‘responsible’ nuclear behaviour in practice emphasised the value of nuclear weapons and thus lent legitimacy to Putin’s nuclear threats. It was also problematic because coercive diplomacy through threats of nuclear violence has been a standard script of the Western nuclear-armed states and their allies in 2022, much the same. This focus on ‘responsible’ nuclear behaviour in practice emphasised the value of nuclear weapons and thus lent legitimacy to Putin’s nuclear threats. It was also problematic because coercive diplomacy through threats of nuclear violence has been a standard script of the Western nuclear-armed states and their allies in 2022. It was also problematic because coercive diplomacy through threats of nuclear violence has been a standard script of the Western nuclear-armed states and their allies in 2022. It was also problematic because coercive diplomacy through threats of nuclear violence has been a standard script of the Western nuclear-armed states and their allies in 2022.
The prohibition on assistance, encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities is the provision of the TPNW that is contravened by the greatest number of states. A total of 38 states—all states not party to the TPNW—aided and abetted other states’ nuclear-weapons programmes in 2022. This was two more than in the previous year, with Finland and Sweden as the new states.
ARTICLE 1(1)(E)—INTERPRETATION

Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: ‘Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty.’

- Under this provision, a state party is precluded from assisting any other state, alliance, or international organisation, company, non-state actor, or individual to develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, deploy, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- States parties to the TPNW are allowed to participate in security alliances and military cooperation arrangements with nuclear-armed states—and may continue to carry out all planning, operations, exercises, and other military activities with them—so long as this does not involve nuclear weapons. Participation in nuclear-weapon-related military activities, however, would need to be discontinued.
- Other disarmament treaties contain a similarly worded prohibition, and there is an established understanding in international law of the concepts of assistance, encouragement, and inducement.
- Conduct by omission as well as act is covered by the prohibition. This is so, irrespective of the inclusion of the words ‘in any way’.
- The effects of violating this prohibition are identical, regardless of which alternative has been violated. If an act is clearly assistance, it is not necessary to determine whether the act also constitutes encouragement, and vice versa.

ASSISTANCE

- In order for conduct to constitute assistance, there must be a causal link between the conduct and a prohibited activity. In addition, the conduct must contribute significantly to this activity, although it does not need to be essential to its occurrence. Insignificant contributions would not constitute prohibited assistance. Inherent in the requirement that the contribution is significant is that the prohibited activity which is assisted must be ongoing or temporally proximate. This means that while the prohibited activity need not have happened or be ongoing, it cannot be only a theoretical possibility.
- The state must have acted with the knowledge that the conduct would, in the ordinary course of events, assist a prohibited activity. This effectively excludes temporally remote or incidental contributions.
- The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among others, financial (such as through economic assistance for nuclear-weapon production), technological (for example, by the export of equipment/components for such production); operational (for instance, by conventional military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through the provision of expert information); or human (such as by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state’s nuclear-weapons programme).

ENCOURAGEMENT

- ‘Encouraging’ in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person to carry out a prohibited activity or continue an ongoing violation of any of the other Article 1 prohibitions.
- The prohibited activity being encouraged does not need to materialise as it is the act of encouragement that is prohibited and not the result.
- Encouragement could take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional support, whether from a government as such (for instance, through the adoption of a particular policy or document) or from pertinent senior government or military officials. Where such support has been given, the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the point at which it is clearly withdrawn.

INDUCEMENT

- Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone something in exchange for the performance of that activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.

Of the 38 states not party that in 2022 engaged in conduct that was not compatible with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW (see the full list opposite), three—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are nuclear-armed while the remainder are non-nuclear-armed (and mostly European). They assisted development, production, or possession of nuclear weapons in multiple ways, as discussed under subheadings A) to I) below. Given the secrecy surrounding military activities, the information is likely incomplete.

A) PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR STRIKE EXERCISES

In October 2022, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye, along with a number of other unidentified non-nuclear-armed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states, acted in conflict with Article 1(1)(e) when, together with the United States, they took part in the nuclear strike exercise ‘Steadfast Noon’. In recent years, Czechia and Poland have also taken part in the annual exercise, which simulates the use of nuclear weapons. Norwegian authorities explained in 2022 that Norway would not take part in the drill and never had. Specifically, the participating states’ involvement in the exercise amounted to encouragement of US possession and development of nuclear weapons. After all, practising nuclear-weapon use implies an endorsement of the potential use of the weapons in the future and, by extension, an encouragement of the possession of nuclear weapons in the present. Nuclear-weapon-use exercises are frequently conducted precisely with a view to building collective resolve and commitment to continued possession as well as for potential use of nuclear arms in certain circumstances.

The drill, which in 2022 was centred at Kleine Brogel Airbase in Belgium, allows NATO members to practise for the use of the B61 nuclear bombs stationed in Europe. The nuclear weapon host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands practised the loading of dummy B61 nuclear bombs onto their dual-capable aircraft and simulated use, and the other states likely practised air-cover manoeuvres using conventional fighter aircraft.

The year 2022 also saw a number of joint manoeuvres between conventional fighter planes or other military capabilities of non-nuclear-armed states and US or Russian strategic bombers. While these joint manoeuvres were not necessarily in direct conflict with the Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, they nevertheless cast nuclear shadows over the participation of non-nuclear-armed states. For example, in August 2022, Norwegian and Swedish warplanes took part in manoeuvres with an American nuclear-capable B-52 bomber over Northern Norway. Another example is when Russian strategic bombers flew repeated patrols over Belarus, engaging in military exercises with Belarusian forces.

The dual capability of most strategic bombers renders unequivocal legal assessment of such participation difficult. Provided that the manoeuvres in question are not specifically ‘nuclear’, i.e. that the deployed nuclear-capable bombers are not practising for the use of nuclear weapons but are instead involved in conventional-weapon roles, participation by non-nuclear-armed states is not unlawful under the TPNW. That said, the deployment of strategic bombers often has a clear nuclear ‘signalling’ effect. In most cases, information about the true nature of such manoeuvres (and the roles of the various non-nuclear-armed states involved) is not available.

B) LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The five nuclear host states—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye—continued in 2022 to provide logistical and security services at the bases where US nuclear weapons are deployed to their territory. This constitutes assistance with possession and stockpiling of nuclear weapons under the TPNW. (Of course, these five states are also acting in conflict with Article 1(1)(g), which explicitly prohibits the hosting of another state’s nuclear weapons.)

The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor has not found evidence that other non-nuclear-armed states provided logistical and technical support in 2022 that would contravene the TPNW, but lack of transparency prevents a full picture. The provision of logistical and technical support to, for instance, a submarine specifically designed to carry nuclear weapons, would likely constitute assistance with possession of the weapons, provided that the support is a significant contribution. Port visits by ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are rare, however, as such...
submarines typically seek to remain undetected and untraceable while on patrol. It is particularly rare that they visit non-nuclear-armed states.

The United Kingdom provided logistical and technical support to the United States when US nuclear-armed submarines made port visits in 2022 to UK territory. In July, a US SSBN visited the United Kingdom's naval base at Faslane in Scotland. In October 2022, a US SSBN docked for several days at the island of Diego Garcia, an overseas territory of the United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean used by the United States as a naval and air base. Finally, in early November, a US SSBN also made a short stop in Gibraltar.

In the case of logistical and technical support for dual-use delivery vehicles, such as bombers or fighter-bombers, there will normally be no presumption of nuclear involvement. It will therefore be generally legally unproblematic for states parties to the TPNW that are allies and partners of nuclear-armed states to continue to host or provide logistical and technical support to those states' dual-use delivery vehicles. For instance, Russian dual-capable bombers and fighters were hosted in Belarus during 2022. In Australia, plans were put in motion in 2022 to upgrade Tindal airbase in the Northern Territory. The upgrade will be funded by the United States and will allow the base to house up to six B-52 bombers at a time. There is no evidence that the aircraft in question were or will be specifically engaged or deployed in nuclear roles. If, however, the purpose of a mission or presence with a nuclear-armed state's dual-use delivery vehicle is clearly nuclear, the provision of logistical or technical support is likely to contravene the prohibition on assistance to, or encouragement of, prohibited activities.

C) INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHARING

If a state party to the TPNW were to share intelligence with a nuclear-armed state in the knowledge that it would be used to identify targets for a temporally proximate use or threat to use nuclear weapons, this would amount to assisting use or threatening to use nuclear weapons. Norway, for example, plays an important role in intelligence gathering, including the observing of the movement of nuclear-armed Russian submarines in the Arctic. Sharing such information in the knowledge that it would be used for nuclear targeting in a proximate attack would amount to unlawful assistance under the TPNW. Another example is Pine Gap, an intelligence facility built and funded by the United States outside Alice Springs in Australia and operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office. More than 800 Australian and US personnel staff the facility, including members of units from all four branches of the US military. One of the components of the facility is a Relay Ground Station in Pine Gap's western compound, whose Overhead Persistent Infra-Red (OPIR) sensors will detect the heat bloom of any intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missiles launched against the United States. It provides early warning of an incoming attack but also indicates whether a nuclear missile launch site/launcher is empty (following firing) or not.

If Australia were to adhere to the TPNW and the Relay Ground Station were nevertheless used to identify imminent targets for US nuclear weapons, this would violate the prohibition on assisting use or the threatening of use. (This would not be the case if the data were used to identify targets for conventional strikes or to alert a vulnerable target population.) Since such future use or threat to use nuclear weapons remains a theoretical possibility, the operations of the Relay Ground Station do not presently constitute assistance or encouragement to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

In so far as it applies to nuclear weapons, however, the current arrangement with the Australian government at Pine Gap is part of the United States’ nuclear-strategic infrastructure and can thus be considered a manifestation of Australia’s encouragement of continued US possession of such weapons. Maintaining a capability and preparedness to identify targets for nuclear strikes also runs counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW.

To ensure compatibility with the TPNW, Australia should provide assurances that the Relay Ground Station's OPIR systems will not be used for nuclear targeting.

D) PARTICIPATION IN NUCLEAR PLANNING

With the exception of France, all NATO allies are members of the NATO's Nuclear Planning Group

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**OBTAIN AND PURPOSE OF THE TPNW**

- In some cases, it may not be possible to conclude that a specific practice or capability in a given state presently amounts to assistance or encouragement of a prohibited act under the TPNW, while it is clear that it may well do so in the future.
- For umbrella states considering which changes they would need to implement in order to ensure compatibility with the TPNW, the central issue is whether maintaining a particular practice or capability would run counter to the object and purpose of the TPNW — which is to ensure that nuclear weapons are never again used under any circumstances. (See TPNW preambular paragraph 2.)
- Article 5 of the TPNW also obligates each state party to take all appropriate legal, administrative, and other measures to prevent and suppress prohibited activities undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. There is a general obligation under international law to implement in good faith every treaty to which a State adheres.

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(NPG), the alliance’s senior body on nuclear strategy. Their participation in nuclear strike planning entails an endorsement of the potential use of nuclear weapons in the future and thus an encouragement of the possession and development of nuclear weapons in the present. Participation in planning of temporally proximate use or threats to use nuclear weapons would amount to prohibited assistance for use or the threatening of use.

Japan and South Korea are engaged in ‘extended deterrence dialogues’ with the United States, covering conventional as well as nuclear deterrence. Japan and the United States met for an extended deterrence dialogue in Japan in November 2022. South Korea, for its part, reportedly ‘reactivated’ its extended deterrence dialogue in 2022 after a few years without actual meetings.

Any assessment of the compatibility with the TPNW of Japan’s and South Korea’s participation in extended deterrence dialogues is largely context-dependent. To the extent that such dialogue is on general nuclear deterrence where future use is theoretical, Japan and South Korea’s participation should be considered as encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons. To the extent that the nuclear-related dialogue concerns specific targets and is directed and communicated towards a specific adversary, it could also amount to assistance to threatening to use nuclear weapons. If Japan and South Korea were to adhere to the TPNW in the future, they would have to provide assurances that their respective ‘extended deterrence dialogues’ with the United States would not involve nuclear planning.

E) ALLOWING THE TESTING OF MISSILES DESIGNED TO CARRY NUCLEAR WARHEADS.

The Marshall Islands, which is undecided on the TPNW, is the only non-nuclear-armed state that in 2022 permitted the testing of missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads on its territory. Allowing such testing is not consistent with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance with development of nuclear weapons. The Marshall Islands hosts a test site that regularly serves as the destination point for US test launches of nuclear-capable long-range missiles. The site in question is the Ronald Reagan range at Kwajalein Atoll, a military station established after the Second World War. The land on which the site is located is leased to the United States through a long-term agreement. It is not the testing site in and of itself that conflicts with the TPNW, but the United States’ use of it to maintain and develop nuclear-weapon missile technology.

Having initially postponed such tests due to the risk of escalation associated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States launched Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to Kwajalein Atoll in August and September 2022. Should the Marshall Islands decide to resume such testing?
to adhere to the TPNW, such testing would need to stop if it involved nuclear-capable missiles. Marshallese adherence to the TPNW could thus lead to friction with the United States, perhaps helping to explain the Marshall Islands’ hesitancy about joining the Treaty. With its long history as a testing ground for US nuclear weapons, the Marshall Islands has been a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament and the campaign to end nuclear testing.

Also Kazakhstan, which is a state party to the TPNW, hosts a test site which has previously been the destination for test launches of nuclear-capable long-range missiles. The Sary-Shagan missile range was established by the Soviet government in 1956. There is no evidence that Russia used the Sary-Shagan site to test missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads in 2022. Sary-Shagan appears not to have been used as the destination point for intercontinental ballistic missile tests for some time now, possibly in reaction to Kazakhstan’s ratification of the TPNW. In fact, Russian officials have noted the problem of not having testing grounds on Russian soil, and Russia has begun constructing a new missile test site on Russian territory.16 That said, Russia announced in 2022 that it planned to launch missiles from the Kaputsin Yar range in Russia in 2023. Missiles launched from Kaputsin Yar have traditionally landed at the Sary-Shagan site.17

As a state committed to the goals of the TPNW and the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) treaty,18 Kazakhstan should communicate its priorities to Russia and request that it continues to abstain from using the Sary-Shagan site to test any missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads (unless the sole purpose is to test the conventional capability of dual-capable missiles).

It has been suggested that the obligation in TPNW Article 4(2) to ensure ‘the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities’ obligates Kazakhstan to close the Sary-Shagan site.19 However, Article 4(2) applies to any state that ‘owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’ and can therefore not be applied to Kazakhstan. To the extent that Sary-Shagan is ‘clearly connected to Russia’s nuclear weapon complex’, any responsibility to eliminate or irreversibly convert the Sary-Shagan test site under Article 4(2) would fall on Russia.

F) ENDORSEMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS DOCTRINES, POLICIES, AND STATEMENTS

A total of 34 non-nuclear-armed states contravened Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW in 2022 through specific nuclear-related doctrines, policies, and/or statements to which they subscribe. This concerns the 27 umbrella states in NATO; prospective NATO members Finland and Sweden; US allies Australia, Japan, and South Korea; and Russian allies Armenia and Belarus.

18 The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty similarly obligates its member states not to ‘assist’ the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons.
NATO's foundational document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention nuclear weapons, but every NATO member has supported possession and potential use of nuclear weapons through their endorsement of various other alliance documents, particularly the Strategic Concept, which was last updated in 2022. None of the alliance’s members has so far rejected the possession or use—or even the first use—of nuclear weapons on its behalf. In the view of the Ban Monitor, their endorsement of the Strategic Concept amounts to encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons. It does not, however, amount to encouragement of use, as that would require, for instance, a request for use of nuclear weapons in a specific context, or agreeing to rules of engagement allowing the use of nuclear weapons in a concrete multinational operation.

Two prospective NATO members, Sweden and Finland, submitted letters of intent in 2022 where they declared that they accept ‘NATO’s approach to security and defence, including the essential role of nuclear weapons’ and that they are ‘willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions.’ These documents, and several public statements in support of nuclear weapons by the governments of Sweden and Finland, are inconsistent with the TPNW’s Article 1(1)(e) as they encourage the possession of nuclear weapons by NATO members.

Three non-NATO US allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) also encourage possession of nuclear weapons through explicit statements they have made or strategy documents they have endorsed. For example, the United States and Japan expressed through a joint statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the compatibility of the Strategic Concept amounts to encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons. It does not, however, amount to encouragement of use, as that would require, for instance, a request for use of nuclear weapons in a specific context, or agreeing to rules of engagement allowing the use of nuclear weapons in a concrete multinational operation.

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Three non-NATO US allies (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) also encourage possession of nuclear weapons through explicit statements they have made or strategy documents they have endorsed. For example, the United States and Japan expressed through a joint statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the security of Japan through the ‘full range of capabilities, including nuclear’. US and South Korean authorities regularly publish joint communiqués that endorse similar language.

With respect to Australia, the most recent example of a government document which appears to directly encourage the United States to retain nuclear weapons was published in 2020, stating that ‘only the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia.’

In addition to NATO, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is understood by some observers as a ‘nuclear alliance’. In 2010, the CSTO’s Secretary-General suggested Russia had extended a ‘nuclear umbrella’ over all members of the alliance. Yet, CSTO members do not appear to have adopted official documents stipulating a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three members have actively distanced themselves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk—the treaty establishing Central Asia as an NWFZ—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed never to ‘assist or encourage’ the development, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons. As noted above, Kazakhstan is also a state party to the TPNW.

Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has on multiple occasions expressed support for nuclear deterrence (including through requests to host Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil) and is therefore not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on encouragement of possession of nuclear weapons. Armenia, the last CSTO member, has, to the Ban Monitor’s knowledge, not explicitly endorsed the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would, though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear deterrence in order to

### ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP AND THE TPNW

- Non-nuclear-armed states may adhere to the TPNW and remain within an alliance with one or more nuclear-armed states as long as they explicitly distance themselves from specific statements or formulations in alliance documents that amount to encouragement of use or possession of nuclear arms.

- It could be argued that, for example, a NATO member may, without having to explicitly ‘override’ previous endorsement of extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the TPNW through the acts of signing and ratifying the Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state would be obliged to refrain from endorsing future NATO language supporting the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by adjusting the current language or by the state clearly rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through ‘footnotes’, an interpretive or declaratory statement, or other means of signalling disagreement with any endorsement of the potential use or possession of nuclear weapons.

- Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: ‘State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.’

- NATO members are not obliged to endorse every line of alliance language. Indeed, there is a tradition of member states ‘footnoting’ or otherwise distancing themselves from specific statements in alliance documents.

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be considered compliant with Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, as fellow CSTO members Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have already done through their adherence to the Treaty of Semipalatkinsk, and in Kazakhstan's case also to the TPNW.

Through their continued endorsement of nuclear deterrence, umbrella states contribute to the resolve of nuclear-armed states continuously to rebuild and maintain their nuclear capabilities. Nuclear-armed states often assert a need on behalf of non-nuclear allies and partners to ‘assure’ and fulfil ‘extended deterrence commitments’ as pretexts for their nuclear deployments and modernisation programmes, including the building of new capabilities.

**G) DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, AND MAINTENANCE OF KEY COMPONENTS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

The conduct in 2022 of umbrella states Belarus, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on assistance, because they allow companies within their jurisdiction to be involved in development, production and maintenance of key components for nuclear weapons.

**Belarus**

Belarus continued to assist Russia with development and production of nuclear weapons, through two Belarusian companies that provide launch capability for the Russian Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile. The Minsk Automobile Plant manufactures the mobile launchers and Volat (Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant Joint Stock Company) designed, and continues to produce, the MAZ-7917 specialised chassis system to carry the Topol missiles.

**Germany and the Netherlands**

Germany and the Netherlands continued to assist France with development, production, and possession of nuclear weapons, as a result of Airbus Defence and Space's activities in the joint venture companies MBDA and ArianeGroup. MBDA produces France's current nuclear-tipped ASMPA air-launched cruise missiles and takes part in the production of the next generation of longer-range ASNA4G nuclear-tipped air-launched cruise missiles. ArianeGroup is the lead contractor for the ongoing maintenance and the modernisation of France's M51 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The international responsibility of Germany is engaged because Airbus Defence and Space is headquartered in Germany. The international responsibility of the Netherlands is engaged because Airbus Defence and Space's parent company Airbus, which considers that the work done by its subsidiaries is indivisible from the group, is headquartered in the Netherlands.

**Italy**

Italy continued to assist France with the development and production of nuclear weapons, because it allows the Italian company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica) to be involved in the abovementioned joint venture MBDA.

**H) OWNERSHIP IN AND OTHER FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE NUCLEAR-ARMS INDUSTRY**

The conduct in 2022 of umbrella states Belarus, Italy, Germany, and Spain was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on assistance because of their significant ownership shares in companies involved in the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons.

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CORPORATE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

- A company that develops, produces, or maintains key components (such as a ballistic missile) for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, or which maintains nuclear weapons, would thereby engage the international responsibility of the state in which it is operating. Such a state party would be responsible for prohibited assistance under the TPNW (assistance to development, production, or possession, depending on the acts the company was performing).

- Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiaries. The general position in domestic law is that a parent company is not liable where its subsidiary acts unlawfully. However, jurisprudence has established a number of exceptions to this general principle, allowing the veil of separate legal status to be pierced. Under international law, contravention of the provisions of a disarmament treaty or of customary disarmament law by a corporation would suffice to render the state or states responsible on whose territory that corporation committed the relevant act or acts.

- In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture that develops or produces key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon development or production. This is so wherever a company establishes a new body corporate, and is holding shares in that company. Under international law, the states on the territory of which the participating and shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have their headquarters or any involved divisions, departments, or production facilities would be responsible for the acts of the joint venture where those do not comply with an international treaty or customary law on disarmament.

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32 Ibid.
34 Muñoz, Risky Returns.
Belarus

Belarus owns 100% of the two companies Minsk Automobile Plant and Volat, which as discussed above produce key components for Russia’s nuclear weapons.

Germany and Spain

The German state and the Spanish state both have significant ownership shares in Airbus, which in turn through Airbus Defence and Space has significant ownership shares in the joint venture companies MBDA and ArianeGroup. As discussed in the section above, MBDA and Ariane Group develop, produce, and maintain key components for France’s nuclear weapons.

Italy

Italy has a significant ownership share in Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica), which in turn has a significant ownership share in the above-mentioned joint venture, MBDA.

More research is needed on direct state ownership in companies involved in the nuclear-arms enterprise. Such ownership appears to exist only for nuclear-armed states and certain umbrella states. In terms of private financial institutions’ shareholding in and other financial assistance to the nuclear-arms industry it is similarly in the nuclear-armed states and umbrella states that we see the most activity.

According to the 2022 Pax/ICAN Don’t Bank on the Bomb report, ‘Risky Returns’, 306 financial institutions based in 26 states made over US$746 billion available to the 24 companies most heavily involved in the production of nuclear weapons in nuclear-armed states between January 2020 and July 2022. This funding was made available through shareholding and debt financing in the form of bondholding, loans, and underwriting. Looking more closely at its findings for the Ban Monitor, Pax/ICAN found that 72 of the financial institutions which held shares or bonds or had loans or underwriting in effect in 2022 were headquartered in 18 non-nuclear-armed states.
(listed in Table J overleaf). They are mostly umbrella states, with Canada and Japan standing out as the non-nuclear-armed states with the most financial involvement in the nuclear-arms industry, closely followed by Australia and Germany. The table also includes the following states with nuclear-weapons-free security policies: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates, and one state party to the TPNW – South Africa.

Only two of the 72 investors in non-nuclear-armed states had ownership shares above 3% in an individual company involved in the nuclear-arms industry, and it is the Ban Monitor’s assessment that neither of the two had significant ownership shares: the Canadian investor Sunlife Financing had a 3.2% share in the US company Northrop Grumman,39 while the Japanese investor Orix Corporation had a 3.2% ownership share in the US company Leidos and another 3.2% ownership share in the US company Textron.

The South African investor NinetyOne held a smaller number of shares in Jacobs Engineering, which is involved in US and UK nuclear-weapon modernisation efforts, through a UK registered subsidiary.40 Also in South Africa, Standard Bank had an outstanding loan for general corporate purposes to Fluor,41 which produces in South Africa, Standard Bank had an outstanding loan for general corporate purposes to Fluor,41 which produces tritium for the US nuclear arsenal. Because the ownership share of NinetyOne was small, and because Standard Bank’s loan to Fluor was for general corporate purposes and not linked to the nuclear-related activities of Fluor, the international responsibility of South Africa is not formally engaged under the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance. It is clear, however, that any ownership of and any financial support to companies involved in the nuclear-arms industry to some degree will facilitate such activities. There is, for instance, no guarantee that a loan issued for ‘general corporate purposes’ is not in effect being applied to support a nuclear-weapons related project.

The Ban Monitor therefore calls upon all states parties to the TPNW to take action to prevent and suppress any ownership of and financial assistance to the nuclear-arms industry and adopt clear national guidance embedded in domestic law for financial sector actors, whether public or private. Financial institutions benefit from guidance provided by governments on the ways to interpret norms and international law. At the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in June 2022, a group of 37 financial institutions called on the TPNW membership to provide this clarity and oversight.42 In their statement, they said: ‘It would be illogical to prohibit the production of nuclear weapons without prohibiting the financing that enables the production to proceed. Financing gives life to the production process.’43

Since 2021, the year the TPNW entered into force, Don’t Bank on the Bomb reports that as many as 139 financial institutions ended financial support to companies involved in the nuclear-weapons business, including 55 new institutions in 2022.44 Several of these institutions cited the TPNW in their exclusion policies, or in reports to the press asking about their divestment activities. For example, in March 2022, Swedish banking group SEB changed its sector policy on arms and defence to include the list of prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW as criteria for exclusion from investment as a nuclear weapon producer.45 Investors also raised concerns about risks faced by continued production of key components

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39 Ibid.
41 Refinitiv, ‘Deal summary 4536097116’, viewed in March 2022.
43 Ibid.
44 Muñoz, Risky Returns.
for nuclear weapons at the shareholder meetings of Lockheed Martin\textsuperscript{46} and General Dynamics\textsuperscript{47} in 2022. Proposals cited the ‘production and sale of nuclear missile components’, which ‘expose the Company to heightened material risks following the entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)’.\textsuperscript{48}

I) COOPERATION BETWEEN NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

The United Kingdom and France are engaged in close cooperation on technology related to weapons renewal and maintenance of the two countries nuclear stockpiles, which amounts to prohibited (mutual) assistance with both development of nuclear weapons and possession and stockpiling under the TPNW.\textsuperscript{49} The France-UK Teutates Programme comprises a joint testing facility called EPURE in Valduc in France and a joint Technology Development Centre (TDC) located at Aldermaston in the United Kingdom. Research carried out at the two facilities enables France and the UK to ‘ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear warheads in a safe, secure environment, without having to conduct any nuclear tests.’\textsuperscript{50}

US–French cooperation is conducted under a 1961 Mutual Defence Agreement, which permits limited cooperation on the operation of nuclear-weapon systems and amounts to (mutual) assistance with possession and stockpiling. Later amendments have enabled enhanced cooperation, notably on issues of safety, security, and reliability.\textsuperscript{51}

As discussed above under the prohibitions on transfer and on receiving transfer or control of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to engage in close cooperation on the UK’s nuclear-weapons capability, including on the maintenance of Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The nature of the cooperation also amounts to US assistance with the United Kingdom’s possession and development of nuclear weapons.

A screen grab from a video on the France-UK Teutates Programme website shows an experiment hall at the EPURE testing facility in Valduc, France.
# Table J: Financial Institutions in Non-Nuclear Armed States that in 2022 Made Funding Available to the 24 Companies Most Heavily Involved in the Production of Nuclear Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parent State</th>
<th>Shareholders</th>
<th>Bondholders, lenders, underwriters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUSTRALIA (8)</strong></td>
<td>AustralianSuper, Aware Super, HESTA, Macquarie Group, Pendal Group, Perpetual</td>
<td>ANZ, Macquarie Group, Westpac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BAHRAIN (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Arab Banking Corporation (Bank ABC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DENMARK (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Danske Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GERMANY (7)</strong></td>
<td>Allianz, Deka Group</td>
<td>Allianz, BayernLB, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, DZ Bank, KfW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITALY (10)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anima, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Banco BPM, BPER Banca, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca Banca di Credito Finanziario, UniCredit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LUXEMBOURG (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NETHERLANDS (4)</strong></td>
<td>Aegon, Philips Pension Fund</td>
<td>Aegon, ING Group, Pensioenfonds voor Huisartsen (SPH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORWAY (1)</strong></td>
<td>Government Pension Fund Global</td>
<td>Government Pension Fund Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SAUDI ARABIA (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Riyad Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SINGAPORE (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>DBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTH AFRICA (2)</strong></td>
<td>Ninety One</td>
<td>Standard Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTH KOREA (2)</strong></td>
<td>Mirae Asset Financial Group, National Pension Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPAIN (4)</strong></td>
<td>Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales</td>
<td>Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), La Caixa Group, Santander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWEDEN (1)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWITZERLAND (5)</strong></td>
<td>Quaero Capital, Schweizerische Nationalbank, UBS</td>
<td>Credit Suisse, EFG International, UBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2)</strong></td>
<td>Abu Dhabi Investment Authority</td>
<td>First Abu Dhabi Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total: 72 Financial Institutions in 18 Non-Nuclear-Armed States**
Six states not party—Belarus, France, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States—engaged in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the TPNW's prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in a prohibited act.
Belarus had already sought assistance from Russia in 2021 for the stationing of Russian nuclear weapons on its territory (an act that would itself not be compatible with the prohibition in Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW on the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons). This was followed in February 2022 with a referendum to allow the country to host nuclear weapons (and for Russian forces to remain permanently), part of a package of constitutional reforms that also extended the rule of President Alexander Lukashenko.

In June 2022, Lukashenko again sought assistance from Russia when he agreed with President Vladimir Putin that Belarus would be involved in a nuclear sharing scheme involving the deployment of Russian Iskander missiles to Belarus, conversion of Belarusian warplanes to nuclear-capable status, and training of Belarusian pilots. The retrofit of Su-25 combat aircraft in service with the Belarusian Air Force and the training of pilots was to be conducted in Russia. The upgrade of the aircraft was reportedly complete by August 2022, enabling the aircraft to carry and deliver battlefield weapons.

Deployment of nuclear warheads to Belarus has not taken place, but could be an option. As this year's Ban Monitor was going to print, Russia was reporting that it would construct a storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by 1 July 2023.

South Korea's government also petitioned the United States to 'further integrate South Korea in nuclear planning and exercising'. While the South Koreans reportedly found the Americans uncomfortable with the term 'nuclear sharing' (a concept used in NATO), President Yoon Suk Yeol said that South Korea and the United States had agreed that while the United States would retain possession and ownership of all nuclear weapons, 'the planning, information sharing, exercises, and training should be carried out jointly by South Korea and the US'. He added: 'In the sense that South Korea and the US are jointly involved, this is tremendous progress from the previous concept of extended deterrence.'

US diplomats later indicated that President Yoon's understanding of the agreement was not the same as the United States. As well, the Government of Poland stated in 2022 that it is open to allowing deployment of US nuclear weapons on its territory, but there is no evidence that it actively requested such deployment.

The United Kingdom in 2022 unsuccessfully sought assistance with production and possession of nuclear weapons from Belgium. The Belgian government in November 2022 blocked the export to the United Kingdom of a specialised isostatic press which is produced in Belgium and critical for the production and maintenance of the UK's nuclear warheads. The press is manufactured in Antwerp by the US-Belgian company EPSI. Since Britain's exit from the European Union, a special license from the Belgian government is required to export the product. The export licence was stopped by Belgium's deputy prime minister Georges Gilkinet, who is a member of the green party Ecolo and is opposed to nuclear weapons. In response, the UK government threatened to tear up an arms order worth up to €600 million for machine guns made by the Belgian company FN Herstal.

The other applicable cases in 2022 are described under the section above on the prohibition of assistance with prohibited activities (although with the focus on the parallel provision of assistance). They are also summarised below:

**France**

France continued to receive assistance from Germany and the Netherlands and Spain with development, production, and possession of nuclear weapons through the company Airbus and its involvement in the joint venture companies MBDA and ArianeGroup. (See page 57.)

France also continued to receive assistance from Italy with the development and production of nuclear weapons, through the Italian company Leonardo.
(formerly Finmeccanica) and its involvement in the joint venture MBDA. (See page 57.)

Russia
Russia continued to receive assistance from Belarus with development and production of nuclear weapons through the Belarusian companies Minsk Automobile Plant and Volat (Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant). (See page 57.)

The United States
The United States continued to receive assistance with possession and stockpiling from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye, which provide logistical and security services at the bases where the US nuclear weapons are stored on their territory. (See the section below.)

The United States’ missile-testing programme, and by extension, its development of nuclear weapons also received assistance from the Marshall Islands. (See page 54.)

The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less continuous assistance from the United States to maintain and develop its nuclear capability. (See pages 40 and 60.)

The United Kingdom and France
The United Kingdom receives continuous assistance with development and possession of nuclear weapons from France and vice versa, through a cooperation arrangement on maintenance of both states’ stockpiles. (See page 40.)

The United States and France
France receives continuous assistance with possession of nuclear weapons from the United States and vice versa, through a cooperation arrangement on the operation of nuclear-weapon systems. (See page 60.)
ALLOWING STATIONING, INSTALLATION, AND DEPLOYMENT

Five states not party to the TPNW—Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Türkiye—engaged in conduct in 2022 that was not compatible with the Treaty’s prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Between them, they continue to host a total of approximately 100 US B61 gravity nuclear bombs on their territories.
The United States is the only nuclear-armed state that still stations nuclear weapons outside its own territory. As shown in the map below, they are believed to be located at six air bases in Europe: Kleine Brogel in Belgium, Büchel in Germany, Aviano and Ghedi-Torre in Italy, Volkel in the Netherlands, and Incirlik in Türkiye.

The nuclear-sharing relationships between the United States and its NATO allies were concluded prior to the establishment of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968; however, the legality of these arrangements remain a source of international controversy and their deterrence value is often disputed. The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be governed by classified bilateral agreements, known as ‘Service-Level Agreements’, between the United States and the respective host state. Nuclear weapons are also occasionally transported between locations for deployment, retirement, maintenance, or modification.

The B61 bombs hosted under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements in Europe are assumed to have explosive yields ranging from an equivalent of 300 tons to 50 kilotons (Kt) of TNT for the B61-4, to 170 Kt for the B61-3. These older versions of the B61 will soon be replaced with the incoming B61-12, which has the same selectable yields as the B61-4.¹ Mass production of the B61-12 began in 2022. The Pentagon denied reports that deployment to Europe had been accelerated.²

The bombs are stored in underground vaults at national airbases in the five European host nations and remain under US custody. In a scenario of use, the United States would authorise the release of these bombs, and European pilots would be tasked with delivering the US nuclear bombs to their targets using NATO dual-capable aircraft. The bases where the nuclear weapons are stored are currently being modernised with upgraded storage vaults, new command, control, and communications systems, and improved security perimeters and arrangements.³

In 2022, Pentagon documents indicated that, in addition to the existing host sites, a nuclear storage site in the United Kingdom—thought to be at Lakenheath Air Force Base—would also be receiving an upgrade. While this does not necessarily indicate that nuclear weapons will be imminently returning to Lakenheath, it could allow the base to host US nuclear weapons in the future, particularly in the event that they are removed from Türkiye due to ongoing security concerns.⁴

In February 2022, voters in Belarus approved a new national constitution that removed the country’s previously enshrined commitment to the absence of nuclear weapons from its territory.⁵ The Belarusian President, Alexander Lukashenko, said that ‘if necessary’ the country would host Russian nuclear weapons ‘in order to defend our territory’.⁶ As discussed on page 62, Russia

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and Belarus agreed in June 2022 that Belarus would be involved in a nuclear sharing scheme. Analysts have suggested that, while deployment of nuclear warheads to Belarus would not necessarily follow, this could occur.7 However, at the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August 2022, Belarus insisted that ‘any insinuations regarding a change in Belarus’ non-nuclear status, as well as its non-compliance with NPT obligations, are unfounded’.8 In December 2022, at a press conference after Russian-Belarusian talks, the respective presidents of Belarus and Russia then spoke about training the Belarusian crews of aircraft converted in 2022 to deliver a ‘special warhead’, a clear reference to nuclear weapons.  ‘I emphasise that this form of cooperation is not our invention. The United States of America, for example, has been conducting similar activities with its allies within the NATO bloc for decades’, President Vladimir Putin said.9 As this year’s Ban Monitor was going to print, Putin said that Russia would construct a storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus by 1 July 2023.10 The Government of Poland stated in 2022 that it is open to allowing deployment of US nuclear weapons on its territory.11 In prospective NATO members Finland and Sweden, there were discussions on whether deployment of nuclear weapons on their respective territories should be allowed or not.12 There was also a resurgence of public support in South Korea for redeployment of US nuclear weapons or even a domestic nuclear-weapons programme.13 At the time of writing, however, there were no indications that the United States is planning to deploy its nuclear weapons to further countries.

In 2019, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), whose members number 120 states, declared that ‘nuclear-weapon sharing by States Parties constitutes a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations under Articles I and II of the NPT’.14 At the NPT’s Tenth Review Conference in August 2022, the compatibility of NATO nuclear sharing arrangements with the NPT was again questioned by a number of states, including China15 and the United Arab Emirates.16 China warned that: ‘Any attempt to replicate the NATO’s nuclear sharing model in the Asia-Pacific region would undermine regional strategic stability and would be firmly opposed by the countries in the region and, when necessary, face severe countermeasures.’17 Many states consider nuclear sharing to pose a significant challenge to broader nuclear non-proliferation efforts.

5 Reuters, ‘Belarus referendum approves proposal to renounce non-nuclear status’, 27 February 2022, at: https://reut.rs/3ZIWZuX.
7 N. Sokov, Russia-Belarus nuclear sharing would mirror NATO’s – and worsen Europe’s security, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2022, at: https://bit.ly/40MSyCC.
14 Statement by the Delegation of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the NPT, Preparatory Committee for the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT, Cluster 2, May 2019, at: https://bit.ly/3I7wJG.
THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TPNW IN 2022

In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions, the TPNW obligates its states parties to take a number of positive measures to implement the Treaty. In the following sections, interpretations of the TPNW’s positive obligations are set out and states parties’ compliance is assessed. Where relevant, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor also reviews the global status in observance of the norms that the TPNW’s positive obligations seek to promote or establish in order to prevent and remediate harm inflicted by nuclear weapons.

Most of the positive obligations do not set out specific deadlines or criteria for the states parties to meet, but are rather long-term goals to work towards in good faith. Implementation is therefore in its early stages. Furthermore, certain of the TPNW’s positive obligations also only apply to nuclear-armed states or states with foreign nuclear weapons on their territory, none of which has yet adhered to the Treaty.

Positive obligations are key elements of humanitarian disarmament treaties. The parallel positive obligations in the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) have significantly enhanced their humanitarian impact. While much work remains to be done, the obligations in those treaties have led to a dramatic reduction in the stockpiles of banned weapons, clearance of wide swaths of land, vital support for victims, and an increase in international assistance from states parties as well as states not party. The positive obligations of the TPNW will similarly advance the Treaty’s broader humanitarian and developmental goals.
A total of 11 states parties to the TPNW had deadlines in 2022 to submit their declarations under Article 2 of the Treaty to the UN Secretary-General. The Secretary-General received the declarations of Cabo Verde, Chile, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia, Timor-Leste, and Peru, whilst at the time of writing the declarations of Grenada and Malawi had not yet been submitted.

The only outstanding declaration after the deadlines that expired in 2021, that of the Seychelles, was submitted in early 2022.

On behalf of the Secretary-General, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) receives the declarations and transmits them to the other states parties. The state profiles of this report contain the dates that the declarations are received by the UN, or they indicate if a state has not yet submitted its declaration. The declarations are posted on the website of UNODA, at: https://bit.ly/3Y96vBU.

The TPNW does not prescribe a standard form or format for the declarations, but the above-mentioned UNODA website contains model declarations in English, French, and Spanish that have been prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

**ARTICLE 2 – INTERPRETATION**

- Article 2 of the TPNW imposes a duty on each state to submit a declaration to the UN Secretary-General within 30 days of becoming party to the Treaty.
- The declaration must clarify whether the state party has ever owned, possessed, or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If it has, it must further declare whether it has already eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including by destroying or irreversibly converting all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, or whether it still owns, possesses, or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- Finally, the declaration must state whether foreign weapons or devices are located (stockpiled, stationed, deployed, or installed) either in its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control.
- The overwhelming majority of potential states parties are non-nuclear-armed. Once the requisite Article 2 declaration has been submitted by a non-nuclear-armed state party, their only reporting duties under the TPNW will be those committed to in action plans adopted by meetings of states parties.
- For potential states parties that formerly possessed or which currently possess nuclear weapons and for states that have foreign nuclear weapons on their territory or in any other place under their jurisdiction or control, Article 4 imposes a duty to submit a report to each meeting of states parties and each review conference on progress towards the implementation of its obligations under that article, until such time as they are fulfilled.
THE OBLIGATION TO

HAVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS WITH THE IAEA

Of the 68 states that were parties to the TPNW at the close of 2022, 47 (or 69%) had brought into force both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thus having committed to the current ‘gold standard’ of safeguards.

A further 20 TPNW states parties had brought a CSA into force, but not yet an AP. Of these, four had already signed an AP and need only to bring it into force, while the remaining 16 states had thus far not taken any steps towards an AP. Only one of the states parties—Timor-Leste—had not yet brought into force a CSA, although it had signed one already in 2009. Since Timor-Leste had not brought its CSA into force before becoming a state party to the TPNW in 2022, it must now do so within the 18-month deadline set by Article 3(2) of the TPNW, which for Timor-Leste is 18 March 2024.

Figure 14 opposite and Tables K and L overleaf summarise the status at the end of 2022 of safeguards agreements among states parties to the TPNW, and among all of the world’s 188 non-nuclear-armed states.1

1 Also with respect to safeguards agreements, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor’s methodology is to track the status of each of the 197 states that under the ‘all states’ formula can become parties to most global treaties, including the NPT and the TPNW. In some cases, the total figures of the Ban Monitor may therefore differ from those of the IAEA because they include South Sudan (which is not a party to the NPT) and Cook Islands and Niue (which have not adhered to the NPT in their own right, but remain bound by its provisions through New Zealand’s ratification of the Treaty).
ARTICLES 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), AND 4(3) – INTERPRETATION

- It is mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties to the TPNW to maintain in force or to conclude and bring into force (and thereafter maintain) a CSA with the IAEA. The TPNW specifies that the CSA must be based on the most recent CSA model in INFCIRC 153 (Corrected). If a non-nuclear-armed state has not brought into force a CSA upon adhering to the TPNW, Article 3(2) stipulates that it must do so within a deadline of 18 months from the entry into force of the TPNW for the state in question.

- An Additional Protocol (AP) with the IAEA, or an instrument of equivalent or higher standard, is also mandatory for all non-nuclear-armed states parties that had one in force upon the entry into force of the TPNW on 22 January 2021.

- These are only minimum requirements, and the TPNW implicitly encourages states parties to adhere to the highest safeguards standard. At present, this is the above-mentioned CSA and an AP.

- If a nuclear-armed state eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme and then adheres to the TPNW it will be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole’. (Article 4(1)). This formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and a full AP. This means that the state in question will have to upgrade its existing safeguards agreement to a CSA and the requisite AP. Negotiations on these safeguards must start within 180 days, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months of the TPNW’s entry into force for the state in question. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards, but may adopt more far-reaching safeguards in the future.

- If a nuclear-armed state adheres to the TPNW before eliminating its nuclear-weapons programme it will also be obliged to conclude a safeguards agreement that provides ‘credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole’. (Article 4(3)). Again, this formulation equates to, at least, a CSA and an AP. Negotiations on these safeguards are mandated to start no later than the completion of nuclear elimination, with the resultant treaty entering into force within 18 months. These states must maintain, as a minimum, these safeguards but may adopt further safeguards in the future. The Treaty does not specify safeguards that should be applied between entry into force and the completion of nuclear elimination for these states, but these may be agreed in the legally-binding, time-bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of these states’ nuclear-weapons programmes that is required, and which includes the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities.

Figure 14: Status of safeguards agreements in non-nuclear-armed states, as of 31.12.2022

### TABLE K: SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN THE 68 STATES PARTIES TO THE TPNW, AS OF 31.12.2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>47 states with a CSA and an AP in force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Chile, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>20 states with only a CSA in force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CSA in force, AP signed (4 states) |
Bolivia, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Malaysia.

CSA in force, no steps towards AP (16 states) |
Belize, Cook Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Palestine, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Venezuela.

1 state with no CSA in force |

CSA signed, AP signed (1 state) |
Timor-Leste.

### TABLE L: SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN ALL OF THE WORLD’S 188 NON-NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES, AS OF 31.12.2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>134 states with a CSA and an AP in force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, DR Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>48 states with only a CSA in force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CSA in force, AP signed (11 states) |
Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Iran, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zambia.

CSA in force, AP approved (1 state) |
Sri Lanka.

CSA in force, no steps towards AP (36 states) |
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei, Cook Islands, Dominica, Egypt, Grenada, Guyana, Lebanon, Maldives, Micronesia, Nauru, Nepal, Niue, Omar, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Venezuela, Yemen.

6 states with no CSA in force |

CSA approved, AP approved (1 state) |
Sao Tome and Principe.

CSA approved, no steps towards AP (1 state) |
Equatorial Guinea.

CSA signed, AP signed (2 states) |
Timor-Leste, Guinea.

CSA approved, AP approved (1 state) |
Equatorial Guinea.

No steps towards CSA (2 states) |
Somalia, South Sudan.

* New Zealand’s CSA and Original SQP also apply to Cook Islands and Niue.

# 18-month deadline to bring into force a CSA under Article 3(2) of the TPNW.

States shown in bold have nuclear facilities but have not brought into force an AP with the IAEA.

WHAT ARE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS?

- The NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, and the TPNW oblige non-nuclear-armed states parties to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards agreements are important both to prevent further states from developing nuclear weapons and to maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world once nuclear disarmament has been achieved.

- Under these agreements, the IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear facilities and material in order to verify that those facilities are not misused, and that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful purposes to the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA analyses state declarations, data derived from IAEA safeguards activities in-country (such as visits and inspections) and at IAEA headquarters, and other sources of information in order to reach a safeguards conclusion. If positive, this is intended to provide credible assurance to the international community that states are abiding by their safeguards obligations.

- There are three types of safeguards agreements: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with NPT non-nuclear-weapon states; voluntary offer safeguards agreements with NPT nuclear-weapon states; and item-specific safeguards agreements with states not party to the NPT.

- The CSA provides for safeguards on all nuclear material in all peaceful activities in non-nuclear-armed states, to verify that it is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The objective is to ensure the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices for or purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

- The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol (AP) to safeguards agreements in 1997, which expands the Agency’s access to information and sites, including to undeclared locations, and authority to investigate inconsistencies in states’ declarations. According to the IAEA, it is only in countries with both a CSA and an AP in force that the Agency has sufficient information and access to provide credible assurances of both the non-diversion of nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

- Non-nuclear-armed states with minimal quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility may conclude a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their CSA, which suspends certain CSA safeguards under specific conditions, to reduce their safeguards burden while still enabling effective verification of their non-proliferation obligations. The IAEA Board of Governors approved a Modified SQP in 2005 to reduce the number of suspended provisions of the CSA, and strengthen declaration and inspection procedures. Many states are yet to upgrade their SQP to this new standard, and some of these are yet to conclude an AP meaning that the IAEA’s capability to conduct activities to detect any undeclared material and facilities is reduced.


Of the global total of 188 non-nuclear-armed states, 134 (or 71%) had brought both a CSA and an AP into force with the IAEA as of 31 December 2022, while 48 states (26%) had a CSA in force but not yet an AP. These 48 outliers of the AP are all states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences urged all states parties to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible.3 A quarter of these 48 outliers have, however, already taken steps towards an AP: 11 states have signed an AP and need only to bring it into force, and one state (Sri Lanka) has agreed upon a text for an AP which has also been approved by the Board of the IAEA. See Tables K and L opposite for details.

Finally, six states (3%) did not yet have a CSA in force, and therefore also not an AP. As already discussed above, TPNW state party Timor-Leste was one of the outliers on the CSA in 2022. The remaining five outliers were Equatorial Guinea (TPNW signatory), Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe (TPNW signatory), Somalia, and South Sudan. All of these states apart from South Sudan are states parties to the NPT and have a pre-existing obligation under that Treaty to conclude and bring into force a CSA.4 If they also adhere to the TPNW they will, like Timor-Leste, have to comply with that Treaty’s 18-month deadline to bring their CSAs into force. Along with Timor-Leste, Guinea has already signed a CSA, while Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe have agreed upon texts for CSAs that have also been approved by the Board of the IAEA.

The only two non-nuclear-armed states in the world that have not taken any steps towards a CSA are Somalia and South Sudan.

PROGRESS IN 2022

The TPNW is an additional forum where diplomats, civil society, and the IAEA can advocate for the universal application of CSAs and APs. In the course of 2022, three new CSAs were brought into force with the IAEA, all by TPNW states parties that had deadlines to meet under Article 3(2) of the TPNW. Palestine brought into force a CSA approximately six weeks after its deadline on 22 July 2022, while Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau brought into force their CSAs well in advance of their respective deadlines of 18 March 2024 and 15 September 2023. With the three new CSAs in force, the global number of non-nuclear-armed states that are outliers on the CSA was reduced from nine at the end of 2021 to six at the end of 2022, indicating that Article 3(2) of the TPNW is valuable in efforts for universal application of the CSA.

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4 Art. III, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All of the five regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaties also oblige their states parties to conclude CSAs with the IAEA. The Central Asian NWFZ Treaty goes one step further than any other existing treaty and also requires that its states parties also adopt an AP with the IAEA.
The year 2022 also saw two new APs brought into force with the IAEA, as well as one that was signed. This progress similarly took place in states that, in addition to being states parties to the NPT, are either signatories or states parties to the TPNW: TPNW states parties Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau brought into force APs at the same time as they brought into force their CSAs, and TPNW signatory Sierra Leone signed an AP on 31 October.

At the close of 2022, a total of 101 of the non-nuclear-armed states had an operative Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which suspends some of the provisions of their CSA. Of these, 77 were Modified SQPs while the other 24 states still retained operative Original SQPs. During the course of 2022, Namibia, Lao PDR, Suriname, and Tuvalu upgraded their Original SQPs to Modified SQPs, and Lithuania rescinded its Original SQP.

The state profiles in this report contain information on all states’ respective safeguards agreements or lack thereof, as well as recommended actions. States that have not brought into force both a CSA and an AP should do so as a matter of urgency. States that maintain an operative Original SQP should upgrade to a Modified SQP, or in those cases that no longer meet the criteria for scaled down safeguards, rescind it.

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN STATES WITH NUCLEAR FACILITIES

It is in states with nuclear facilities that it is most critical to have a strengthened safeguards system through both a CSA and an AP. A total of 64 non-nuclear-armed states currently have nuclear facilities. The state profiles of this report specify whether or not a state has nuclear facilities.

Of the 64 non-nuclear-armed states with nuclear facilities, ten have not yet brought into force an AP with the IAEA. The ten states are indicated in bold in Tables K and L above. Four have already signed an AP: Algeria (TPNW signatory), Belarus, Iran, and Malaysia (TPNW state party). The remaining six states have not yet taken any steps towards an AP: Argentina, Brazil (TPNW signatory), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Venezuela (TPNW state party).

SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS IN NUCLEAR-ARMED STATES

The NPT’s five nuclear-weapon-states (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States) have concluded so-called ‘voluntary offer’ safeguards agreements, based on the CSA model, which involve safeguards only on certain nuclear material and facilities in their nuclear fuel cycle. They have also concluded limited APs to their voluntary offer agreements. Three nuclear-armed states not party to the NPT (India, Israel, and Pakistan) have concluded item-specific safeguards agreements, which prohibit the use of specified items under safeguards for military purposes or the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. India has concluded a limited AP to its item-specific agreement. North Korea had originally brought into force a CSA, but the IAEA’s in-country verification activities ceased in April 2009. As discussed above in the interpretation of the TPNW’s safeguards requirements, upon adherence to the Treaty nuclear-armed states will have, as a minimum, to upgrade their existing safeguards agreements to a full CSA over all nuclear material and upgrade to, or conclude and bring into force, a full AP.

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7 See Tables A35 (a) and (b) of ‘IAEA Annual Report. Additional Annex Information’, at: https://bit.ly/3HKcpnR. The Ban Monitor also includes Saudi Arabia as a state with nuclear facilities, as it has a research reactor close to operation.


10 The ten states are indicated in bold in Tables K and L above. Four have already signed an AP: Algeria (TPNW signatory), Belarus, Iran, and Malaysia (TPNW state party). The remaining six states have not yet taken any steps towards an AP: Argentina, Brazil (TPNW signatory), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Venezuela (TPNW state party).
ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Once again, the conduct in 2022 of all the nuclear-armed states was manifestly incompatible with the TPNW's obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons. There was no evidence that any of the nuclear-armed states have the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The five-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—therefore also continued to fail to comply with their existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT to 'pursue negotiations in good faith' on nuclear disarmament.

All of the nuclear-armed states have a declared commitment to nuclear disarmament and the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. Their stance, however, is that the prevailing security environment is not conducive to further reductions. Ultimately, they reject the commitment to actually achieve nuclear disarmament (and by extension the objective of both the NPT and the TPNW).

1 China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have agreed to an 'unequivocal undertaking' to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, consonant with their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Of the four other nuclear-armed states (all states not party to the NPT), India and Pakistan have longstanding and frequently referenced policies in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states. (See, e.g., https://bit.ly/3kNGb2G and https://bit.ly/36OHhzU). North Korea intermittently expresses support for a nuclear-weapon-free world and joins statements and policy documents of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) that call for nuclear disarmament. (See, e.g., https://bit.ly/3fgKR9P). Israel too is on record as supporting nuclear disarmament, although it does so in abstract terms since it does not officially acknowledge its own possession of nuclear weapons. (See, e.g., https://bit.ly/333LKOa).
the TPNW), in favour of an open-ended commitment to work towards it, seemingly in perpetuity. Their focus is not on nuclear disarmament, but on risk reduction, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and arms control measures, where the underlying logic is that nuclear deterrence as a system will continue.

According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986 at around 70,300 warheads. That number has since been reduced by 82%, to the estimated 12,512 warheads at the beginning of 2023. These reductions were mainly done in the 1990s and early 2000s and predominantly because of cuts in the massive US and Russian arsenals. Each year since then, including in 2022, the total number of warheads in the world has decreased slightly, but this is only still true because Russia and the United States each year dismantle a small number of their older nuclear warheads that have been retired from service.

![Figure 15: Dismantlement of US nuclear warheads](source: Federation of American Scientists)

The number of nuclear warheads dismantled each year now appears to be decreasing, as illustrated by the data on US nuclear warhead dismantlements in Figure 15 below. Russia does not release information on dismantlements. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor in collaboration with the Federation of American Scientists estimate that Russia during the course of 2022 dismantled approximately 100 warheads, and the United States 184 warheads. As of January 2023, Russia had an estimated 1,400 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement, and the United States 1,512 warheads. Dismantlement of Cold War-era retired nuclear weapons will soon be exhausted as a course of action to reduce the global nuclear arsenal. No further progress in nuclear disarmament will then be in sight, unless nuclear-armed states can accept that their current usable arsenals are not indispensable.

TENTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August 2022 ended in failure to agree on the text of a draft outcome document. Russia’s objection to wording on nuclear safety at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, occupied by its forces since March 2022, meant no consensus could be reached. However, the final text circulated for approval contained no substantive progress on nuclear disarmament issues. As Ray Acheson of Reaching Critical Will concluded: ‘Russia was fully aligned with the other NPT nuclear-armed states in actively preventing any meaningful commitment to advance nuclear disarmament, stop nuclear threats, or reduce nuclear risks from being included in the outcome document.’ The final session of the Review Conference therefore saw expressions of concern at the lack of ambition on disarmament in the outcome document, a weakening of language agreed at previous review conferences, and

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3 See the section above on the prohibition on possession and stockpiling.
resistance from the nuclear-armed states to greater accountability for their disarmament obligations. A number of states parties and signatories to the TPNW said in a joint statement that: While the document before us points to the urgency to act upon the unacceptable humanitarian consequences and risks of nuclear weapons, it then falls dramatically short of advancing nuclear disarmament and actually implementing Article VI of the NPT or even concretely addressing the serious risks inherent in nuclear weapons.

The failure at the NPT Review Conference reinforced the case for the TPNW. The Austrian delegation to the NPT noted that: ‘the last four weeks have shown us again how the NPT primarily cements the status quo or even backtracks. No matter the existing obligations and commitments, the Treaty does little in real life to move us forward on nuclear disarmament … we see once again how little is possible.’ The status quo, Austria said, ‘is simply not an option’, calling on ‘all states who want to achieve actual progress on Article VI of the NPT to join the TPNW.’

In advance of the NPT Review Conference, Ban Ki-moon—former UN Secretary-General and now a deputy chair of The Elders—had warned against a growing fatalism about nuclear disarmament and said that the P5 states needed to ‘step up at the review conference and show the world they are serious about peace and disarmament’. He also said: ‘the need for new ideas and fresh commitment is paramount. Yet there is a striking contrast between the low expectations for and gloom surrounding the NPT Review Conference and the energy that was visible at the first meeting of states parties to the TPNW: ‘if nuclear states want to be taken seriously, they need to respond with the same energy and purpose as the TPNW states in advancing arms control and disarmament’, said Ki-moon.

**FIRST MEETING OF STATES PARTIES TO THE TPNW**

“We have no illusions about the challenges and obstacles that lie before us in realizing the aims of this Treaty’ the states parties said in the final paragraph of the Declaration they adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. ‘But we move ahead with optimism and resolve. In the face of the catastrophic risks posed by nuclear weapons and in the interest of the very survival of humanity, we cannot do otherwise. We will take every path that is open to us, and work persistently to open those that are still closed. We will not rest until the last state has joined the Treaty, the last warhead has been dismantled and destroyed and nuclear weapons have been totally eliminated from the Earth.’

The 1MSP also adopted the Vienna Action Plan, where, inter alia, the states parties resolved to pursue further discussions in the intersessional period on the ‘competent international authority or authorities (IA)(s)’ which they will designate to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons programmes of destroy-and-join states and join-and-destroy states (Action 15). They also agreed to designate contact points with regard to the designation of IA(s) (Action 16). New Zealand and Mexico were appointed co-chairs of an informal working group on the implementation of Article 4 of the TPNW, in particular with respect to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities to oversee such work. Participation in the working group is open to all states parties. The 1MSP also decided to establish a Scientific Advisory Group, which will provide guidance for Treaty implementation, including on the disarmament and verification obligations in Article 4.

**ARTICLE 4(1), (2), AND (6) – INTERPRETATION**

- In accordance with Article 4(6) of the TPNW, the states parties are explicitly obligated to designate a ‘competent international authority or authorities’ to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons programmes.
- The TPNW provides two pathways to the future adherence of nuclear-armed states: one for so-called destroy-and-join states (Article 4(1) states) and a second for so-called join-and-destroy states (Article 4(2) states).
- Article 4(1) obligates each nuclear-armed state that destroys its nuclear weapons and eliminates its nuclear-weapons programme before adhering to the TPNW, to cooperate with the ‘competent international authority that states parties will designate to verify nuclear disarmament, in order to ascertain that its nuclear-weapon programme has been irrelevantly eliminated.
- Article 4(2) obligates those nuclear-armed states that decide to adhere to the Treaty before completing nuclear disarmament, to immediately remove the weapons or devices from operational status and to destroy them as soon as possible but not later than the deadline of ten years determined by the First Meeting of States Parties in 2022. The process of destruction must be detailed in a legally-binding, time-bound plan that provides for the verified and irreversible elimination of that state party’s nuclear-weapons programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities. Such a state must submit a draft of the plan to the other states parties or to the competent international authority within 60 days of becoming a party. The plan must then be negotiated with this authority and submitted to the next meeting of states parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval.
- Article VI of the NPT requires that the states parties to the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states parties ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’ on nuclear disarmament. The TPNW is one avenue by which any nuclear-armed state can effectively pursue nuclear disarmament.
Meetings in the working group on Article 4 were expected to be held about once a month in 2023. In accordance with Article 4(2), the 1MSP set a ‘maximum upper limit’ of ten years for the destruction of a state party’s nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. In a single ten-year period, it might even be feasible to achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon stockpiles (i.e. those of the United States and Russia). The deadline of ten years is, however, renewable for a period of up to five years, upon request to the other states parties. The extension will be granted where the additional time is necessary to ‘overcome unexpected difficulties in the disarmament process’. Some nuclear-armed states, umbrella states, and NATO continue to frame the TPNW as a call for ‘unilateral’ and ‘unverifiable’ disarmament. These claims are misleading. It is certainly possible for a nuclear-armed state to adhere to the Treaty and disarm without other nuclear-armed states doing the same, and it is important that such an option exists. (Indeed, many critics of the TPNW insist that, for example, North Korea should disarm unilaterally). Few would, however, expect the United States or Russia to do so, and nuclear-armed states may therefore of course also commit under the TPNW to eliminate their nuclear-weapons programme through bilateral or multilateral disarmament arrangements that provide for mutual elimination.

**NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION**

The TPNW is the first and only legally binding multilateral instrument that specifically provides for and requires verification of nuclear disarmament. No such requirement exists in the NPT. The TPNW is helping to create the conditions for nuclear disarmament by establishing a framework for verified and irreversible elimination of states’ nuclear-weapons programmes. The value of the TPNW as a contribution to disarmament goals should therefore be recognised even by those states not yet ready to adhere to the Treaty themselves.

Action 18 of the Vienna Action Plan committed states parties to ‘advancing and supporting progress on nuclear disarmament verification, while recognizing that verification is not an end in itself, nor a substitute for nuclear disarmament, but a positive enabler for progress on disarmament’. In addition, states parties resolved through Action 37 to cooperate with other international bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), in order to enhance cooperation, including in the areas of nuclear safeguards and verification, with a view to enhance the complementarity between the TPNW, the NPT, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The complexity of verification of nuclear disarmament means that many years are likely to be required before TPNW states parties are in a collective position to adopt their approach. When any nuclear-armed state adheres to the TPNW, the general verification model will also need to be tailored to the particular circumstances of that state. The designation of the competent international authority (or authorities) will probably follow substantive progress on the model for verification.

A 2022 report edited by Pavel Podvig and published by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) argues that, as a new paradigm, ‘the TPNW opens a new political and technical space for innovation and offers opportunities for a new generation of disarmament science researchers and disarmament practitioners from around the world with different kinds of skills to identify possible disarmament-verification measures that would be significantly different from those identified as part of the existing arms control experience’. That experience it described as ‘shaped by active suspicion and distrust of treaty partners and by national security imperatives to protect nuclear weapon information, arsenals, capabilities and policies’.

In contrast, Podvig and his co-authors foresee that cooperation and transparency will have an important role to play in verification of nuclear disarmament under the TPNW, because a nuclear-armed state’s decision to relinquish nuclear weapons and join the TPNW would necessarily be accompanied by a deep transformation of the state and be a highly visible process, ‘where the disarming state would be actively seeking cooperation with the international community to demonstrate its commitment to the obligations it assumed by joining the Treaty’. This view of disarmament as a political process focused on cooperation, transparency, problem-solving, and consultation significantly expands the set of tools that can be used to verify compliance with the TPNW. It is therefore important to strengthen institutions that can turn this vision into reality, which is a challenging task considering the non-participation of or active opposition from nuclear-armed states. To overcome these obstacles, the UNDIR report recommends ‘building capacity and assembling a critical mass—economic, institutional, bureaucratic and maybe military as well—to support a world that does not rely on nuclear weapons’. This will be a long process, but the TPNW is assuredly one of its elements.

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14 Information provided by N. Clutterbuck, First Secretary (Disarmament) and Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, New Zealand Permanent Mission, Geneva, and A. Martinez Ruiz, Counsellor, Mexican Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Zoom meeting, 2 February 2023.
15 Decision 1(a) of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.
17 Decision 1(b) of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.
18 Decision 1(c) of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW.
20 Information provided by N. Clutterbuck, First Secretary (Disarmament) and Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, New Zealand Permanent Mission, Geneva, and A. Martinez Ruiz, Counsellor, Mexican Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Zoom meeting, 2 February 2023.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
Within 90 days after becoming a state party to the TPNW, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Türkiye would be obliged to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that they currently host on their territory. The United States is the only state known to station nuclear weapons in other countries today, while Russia and the United Kingdom also did so in the past.

Within 90 days after becoming a state party to the TPNW, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Türkiye would be obliged to ensure the removal of the US nuclear weapons that they currently host on their territory. The United States is the only state known to station nuclear weapons in other countries today, while Russia and the United Kingdom also did so in the past. A total of at least 19 states are believed to have previously hosted foreign nuclear weapons, in some cases even without their knowledge.1

1. Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark (Greenland), France, East Germany and West Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Türkiye, United Kingdom. The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam, Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, ‘Where the Bombs Are’, Federation of American Scientists (9 November 2006); M. Fuhrmann and T. S. Sechser, ‘Appendices for “Signalling Alliance Commitments”’ (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, ‘Where they Were’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, ‘Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe’, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, No. 42 (2015).
Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and the majority of the weapons were withdrawn after the Cold War. All but the above-mentioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since been discontinued. A US hosting arrangement with Greece (at Araxos Air Base) was ended in 2001, while in 2003 Germany closed its Air Base in Memmingen, which led to the removal of 20 US nuclear warheads. The United States also withdrew its nuclear weapons from RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom and from RAF Ramstein in Germany in 2006. Further reductions of the US arsenals in Aviano (Italy) and Incirlik (Türkiye) were conducted in 2016.3

Over the years, there have been several attempts by European policymakers to have the remaining nuclear weapons removed from their territory. Numerous non-governmental organizations have continued to advocate for removal. In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, several political initiatives, involving parliamentary debates and motions, have also sought to achieve the removal of nuclear weapons.

The Dutch parliament, in particular, has been vocal in its support of the removal of the US nuclear weapons on its territory and has adopted several motions explicitly calling on the government to do so.4

The Belgian Senate in 2005 unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.5 In January 2020, a similar motion — calling also for the signature of the TPNW — failed to pass but gained considerable support from parliamentarians.6

In Germany, in 2009, the coalition government committed through its governing platform to have remaining nuclear weapons withdrawn. The then Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle, promoted the initiative enthusiastically for some time, but the United States responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved the next year.7 The national debate on Germany’s role in nuclear sharing, has not subsided, however. It was particularly questioned in the run-up to the federal elections of 2021, prompting NATO’s Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to publish an op-ed in the German newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, reiterating the importance of Germany’s support for nuclear sharing for transatlantic peace and security.8

The current coalition agreement of 24 November, 2021 includes a strong commitment to NATO and the importance of being part of ‘strategic discussions and planning processes’ within the alliance. While committing to uphold a ‘credible deterrent capability’ in the alliance, the coalition government also reiterates the goal of Global Zero and a Germany free of nuclear weapons.9

The Italian parliament in May 2022 passed a resolution by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, obliging the government to ‘continue to assess ... possible measures to approach the contents of the TPNW’.10 In Türkiye, on the other hand, there has been no perceptible support for removal of the US nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.

In four of the five host states—excluding Türkiye—public opinion polls have in the past continuously shown clear support for withdrawal of the nuclear weapons on their soil.11 In 2022, poll results in Germany shifted after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In May and June, a poll with over 1,300 respondents was conducted, where 52 per cent were in favour of keeping US nuclear weapons on German soil, including 12 per cent of respondents wanting modernisations and reinforcement.12 For the other hosting countries no new poll results were published in 2022.

For more information on the ongoing deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe, see page 66.

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6 The motion was defeated by a vote of 74 to 66. Belgian Chamber of Representatives, Plenary Session, 16 January 2020, at: https://bit.ly/3xK5GMV.
ADOPT NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

Mexico and Saint Kitts and Nevis are examples of states parties that in 2022 reported that they intend to or are in the process of adopting new or complementary legislation comprehensively to implement the TPNW. Niue adopted national legislation in 2021 specifically to implement the TPNW.

Mexico was the first state to ratify the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). It is also the treaty depositary. According to Mexico’s Federal Constitution, all ratified international treaties, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the TPNW, are part of the law of the land. Existing provisions of its criminal law largely address the prohibitions established in the TPNW, but Mexico is elaborating a comprehensive ‘Non-proliferation Law’, which will include complementary provisions on the implementation of the TPNW.¹

Saint Kitts and Nevis has informed the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor that it intends to adopt specific implementing legislation on the TPNW.² Currently, many of the Treaty’s prohibitions are effectively covered by the country’s 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act.³ But the new legislation would seek also to cover the TPNW’s positive obligations, which are not addressed by existing laws in force in Saint Kitts and Nevis.⁴ It had hoped to adopt the new legislation in 2022, but this was not achieved.

The Gambia has also stated that it intends to take measures to give effect to the TPNW at domestic level.

¹ Email to Grethe Lauglo Østern from María Antonieta Jáquez Huacuja, coordinator for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control in Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 February 2022.
² Attachment to email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from Michael Penny, Senior Foreign Service Officer, Security and Legal Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Aviation, Basseterre, 13 November 2021, para. 2.
³ Saint Christopher and Nevis 2002 Anti-Terrorism Act (Act No. 21 of 2002).
⁴ Attachment to email to the Ban Monitor from Michael Penny, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Aviation of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Basseterre, 13 November 2021, para. 8.
The Gambia already has ‘a self-imposed moratorium on the development, production, use, transfer of nuclear material (e.g. uranium) and provision of assistance to the development, production, transfer or use of nuclear weapons or their key components’.\(^5\)

New national legislation should be adopted by each state party to the TPNW that does not yet have in place laws to criminalise the acts prohibited by the Treaty and, where necessary, to implement its positive obligations. Most non-nuclear-armed states are already today implementing most of the core prohibitions of the TPNW. As illustrated by Table M opposite, this is because they pursue nuclear-weapon-free security policies and are states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty (CTBT), and the nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, and because they have brought into force safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAE). Typically, therefore, they already have in place appropriate national measures, including legislation that addresses all or at least some of the core obligations under the TPNW. Accordingly, the adoption of new national legislation to implement the TPNW may not be necessary.

Crucially, however, all states parties to the TPNW have to establish whether their existing national laws would make it illegal for a national or any other person under their jurisdiction or control to develop, produce, possess, control, transfer, or use nuclear weapons, or to assist any other person to do so, and whether they could prosecute them. If the answer is a clear yes, they have the required national legislation. In most states, engaging in conduct prohibited by the TPNW would ordinarily be a crime even if it is not specifically outlawed, because the handling of dangerous substances (which would encompass nuclear material) is prohibited. Another reason why a state party may not see the need to adopt new legislation is that in many cases (those with a monist constitutional law system), a ratified international treaty may automatically become part of national law.

That said, the Ban Monitor recommends that all states parties adopt dedicated legislation to implement the TPNW. This can also be the simplest and best solution, rather than undertaking a complex mapping of existing legislation. To the knowledge of the Ban Monitor, to date only states parties Ireland and Niue have adopted national legislation specifically to implement the TPNW. Ireland adopted its Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act in 2019. The Act, which was signed into law by the Irish President in December 2019, is formally entitled an Act to give effect to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons done at New York on 7 July 2017 and for those purposes to provide for offences relating to acts prohibited by that Treaty; and to provide for related matters. The list of offences in Section 2 of the Act reflects Article 1(1) of the TPNW and an offence may be committed by both an individual and a company.\(^6\)

Niue adopted its Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act in 2021. The Act is explicitly aimed at giving effect to the TPNW. The law defines ‘nuclear explosive device’ as an explosive device ‘whose harmful effects result primarily from uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions’ and a nuclear weapon is a ‘weaponised nuclear explosive device’.\(^7\) The prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW are effectively implemented in Section 6 of the Law, including the prohibitions on assistance or encouragement. Assistance is defined as aiding or abetting prohibited conduct, while encouraging pertains to urging, demanding, or inciting prohibited conduct where the person has influence over whether that conduct will actually occur.\(^8\) The maximum penalty for an offence under Section 6 is ten years’ imprisonment.\(^9\)

TPNW states parties New Zealand and Mongolia are examples of countries that already before adhering to the TPNW had in place comprehensive existing legislation that addresses some or all of the obligations under the Treaty. The 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, possession, or taking control over any nuclear explosive device as well as the

### ARTICLE 5 – INTERPRETATION

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<tr>
<td><strong>•</strong> Article 5 of the TPNW obligates every state party to take ‘the necessary measures’ to implement its obligations under the Treaty.</td>
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<td><strong>•</strong> Paragraph 2 of Article 5 stipulates that the duty to implement the Treaty nationally includes the taking of ‘all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress’ any prohibited activity. It concerns any such prohibited activity whether it is undertaken by natural or legal persons under its jurisdiction or control or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.</td>
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<td><strong>•</strong> Appropriate criminal legislation should cover at the least all of the core prohibitions set forth in Article 1 of the Treaty.</td>
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<td><strong>•</strong> The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has developed and published a model law for common-law states which can serve as a valuable basis for states parties to the TPNW to draft and enact such legislation (at: <a href="http://bit.ly/3faEDXY">http://bit.ly/3faEDXY</a>).</td>
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<td><strong>•</strong> The CTBT and the CWC also require national implementation measures, but there is no such obligation in the NPT or the NWFZ treaties.</td>
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5 Response to Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor Questionnaire by The Gambia, 1 December 2021, paras. 1 and 2.
6 Section 6(1) of Ireland’s 2019 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act stipulates that where an offence under the Act is committed by a company (‘body corporate’) and where an officer of the company consented to or was guilty of wilful neglect, both the human and legal person is guilty of an offence.
7 Section 3(1), Niue 2021 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act, Act No. 353 of 2021.
8 Ibid.
9 Section 7(1), Niue 2021 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act.
transport on land or inland waters or internal waters and deployment of any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone. Mongolia adopted a Law on its nuclear-weapon-free status in 2000. Article 4 of the Law prohibits any natural or legal person or any foreign state from involvement in the development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, or control over nuclear weapons, their stationing or transportation, or their testing or use anywhere on Mongolian territory.

A number of other states parties have criminal provisions in their domestic laws on terrorism that implement the TPNW. Grenada, for instance, incorporated the following provisions in its 2012 Terrorism Act:

whoever—
(a) knowingly causes a nuclear weapons explosion;
(b) develops or produces or participates in the development or production of a nuclear weapon;
(c) has a nuclear weapon in his possession;
(d) participates in the transfer of a nuclear weapon; or
(e) engages in military preparations or in preparation of a military nature intending to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon, commits an offence.

TPNW signatory Indonesia also contains provisions on nuclear material in its terrorism legislation. Where a person is engaged in an unlawful importation of nuclear material there is no need to prove an intent to engage in terrorism. It may be the case, however, that existing terrorism legislation is not sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 5 of the TPNW. It may also be the case that existing criminal law provisions do not have the requisite extraterritorial effects and/or do not implement the positive obligations of the TPNW.

**ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES**

Beyond the adoption of legislation, other measures, including of an administrative nature, need to be taken to implement the Treaty. Clear instructions should for instance be given to a state party’s diplomats to promote adherence to the Treaty among other states. Preparation may also be needed within government for how to respond to requests for international cooperation and assistance from other states parties. In particular, clear instructions should be given to the administrators of the national health system to ensure the provision of assistance to any victims of nuclear-weapons use or testing who are resident in each state party. For some states, there may also be a need for national measures to enable environmental remediation of affected land.

Algeria, which has signed but not yet ratified the TPNW, issued a prime ministerial decree already in May 2021 that created and mandated a National Agency for the rehabilitation of the former French nuclear test sites in the south of Algeria. The Agency is empowered to contract and manage rehabilitation works and to seek national and international assistance for these operations.

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10 Sections 4–6, 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.
12 Section 6(1), Grenada 2012 Terrorism Act. The Act further stipulates that a person participates in the development or production of a nuclear weapon if he does any act which (a) facilitates the development by another of the capability to produce or use a nuclear weapon; or (b) facilitates the making by another of a nuclear weapon knowing or having reason to believe that his act has or will have that effect. Section 6(2), 2012 Terrorism Act.
13 Art. 10A(2), Law No. 3 of 2018 on Amendment to Law No. 15 of 2003 on Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism to become a Law.
14 Decree No. 21-243 of 31 May 2021 on the creation, organisation, and functioning of the National Agency for the Rehabilitation of the Former French Nuclear Test Sites in the South of Algeria.
THE OBLIGATION TO

ASSIST VICTIMS

In most cases so far, communities affected by nuclear weapons have received inadequate support. The TPNW’s obligation to provide victim assistance, articulated in Article 6(1), seeks to change this situation. The year 2022 saw unprecedented international attention to the rights of people affected by nuclear weapons and the need for victim assistance. States parties took steps to initiate implementation of the TPNW’s positive obligations, which in turn have already influenced priorities and discussions in forums beyond the Treaty itself.

Sumiteru Taniguchi shows a picture of himself in black and white taken one month after the explosion of the atomic bomb in Nagasaki, and a colour photograph 6 months after. He devoted his life to informing people of the consequences of the atomic bombing and campaigned for a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, before passing away on 30 August 2017. His business card featured the colour photograph with the caption ‘I want you to understand, if only a little, the horror of nuclear weapons.’ (Photo by Lucas Vallecillos, Science Photo Library/NTB)

The extensive suffering from the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is well known. It has also been documented that more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions were carried out at locations within what are today 15 states,1 causing countless deaths, injuries, long-term illnesses, psychological trauma, socio-economic exclusion, and displacement. Exacerbating the situation, illnesses can manifest themselves years later, and the adverse impacts of radiation, which often alter DNA, sometimes span across generations. Nonetheless, a 2021 review of the current state of knowledge about past nuclear-weapons activities and their impacts today noted major gaps in research on the consequences of nuclear-weapons programmes.2

Victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance are often referred to collectively as the ‘positive obligations’ of the TPNW. While implementation of these obligations will require different measures, especially over time, grouping them in some cases makes sense because they deal with the same problem—addressing the harm caused by the use and testing of nuclear weapons—and a number of the initial implementation steps are the same. As a result, many of the developments discussed in this section are also relevant to the following sections on environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance.

2 Ibid.
1MSP

The most notable progress in advancing the implementation of victim assistance occurred as a result of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP), held in Vienna, Austria, on 21–23 June 2022, which adopted two outcome documents. The Vienna Declaration says that the ‘humanitarian spirit of the Treaty is reflected in its positive obligations, aimed at redressing the harm caused by nuclear weapons use and testing.’ It additionally articulates the states parties’ pledge not just to deliver victim assistance but also to work with affected communities to do so. The Vienna Action Plan dedicates a section to victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance. The section’s chapeau notes that the positive obligations are ‘central to the humanitarian goals of the Treaty’ and aim to address harm both from past use and testing and from ongoing contamination.

Many of the actions outline steps that are essential to starting the process of assisting victims. For example, Action 30 calls on states parties to assess the effects of nuclear weapons use and testing in areas under their jurisdiction or control, including the needs of victims, as well as their ability to address them. The action commits those states to share their initial assessments of existing knowledge with the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP). Action 31 further commits affected states parties to develop national plans for implementation, including budgets and time frames, and to report on progress in this area by the 2MSP. Under other actions, states parties resolved to appoint national focal points for Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty within three months and to adopt or adapt national laws and policies. Such measures are designed to create a framework for implementing victim assistance as well as environmental remediation and international cooperation and assistance.

The Vienna Action Plan also establishes fundamental principles that states parties should follow throughout the implementation process. Reflecting the principle of inclusivity, Action 19 emphasises the importance of engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, including international organisations, civil society, affected communities, Indigenous Peoples, and youth. It also says that states parties ‘[i]n particular’ will closely consult with, actively involve, and disseminate information to affected communities at all stages of the victim assistance and environmental remediation process.

The Action Plan in addition highlights the importance of transparency. It commits states parties to ‘develop guidelines for voluntary reporting’ and, before the 2MSP, to consider developing a ‘voluntary and non-burdensome format for reporting’, drawing on precedent from previous disarmament treaties. Such reports could gather information about the effects of nuclear weapons, progress in implementation, and needs for external support.

### ARTICLE 6(1) – INTERPRETATION

- To address the ongoing suffering inflicted by the use and testing of nuclear weapons, Article 6(1) of the TPNW obligates each state party to provide ‘adequate’ assistance to affected individuals within its jurisdiction. It is not required that the harm be caused by the state under whose jurisdiction they fall or that it occurred within that territory.
- Assistance includes, but is not limited to, medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support, as well as support for social and economic inclusion.
- Assistance under Article 6(1) must be provided in accordance with applicable international human rights and humanitarian law. The paragraph requires that assistance in all cases must be age- and gender-sensitive and provided to all on the basis of need ‘without discrimination’. The duty of non-discrimination ensures that states parties do not adversely distinguish among recipients based on the basis of sex, race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, political opinion, or other status identified in international human rights law. (See: Art. 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Art. 5(2), Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as disarmament law precedent in Art. 5(2)(e), Convention on Cluster Munitions.)
- Because addressing the human impacts of nuclear weapons is a complex and long-term humanitarian task, the TPNW facilitates the process by creating a framework of shared responsibility for victim assistance (as well as environmental remediation, discussed in the next section). The framework enables those who are willing to start addressing these issues to act together now. Affected states parties bear the primary responsibility for implementation as this protects their sovereignty and follows the precedent of international human rights law and humanitarian disarmament law. But other states parties in a position to do so are required to provide international cooperation and assistance to help affected states parties meet their victim assistance (and environmental remediation) obligations.
- To make victim assistance more manageable, Article 6(1) can also be understood to allow affected states parties to realise some of their obligations, particularly those related to economic, social, and cultural rights, progressively. International human rights law requires a state to take steps to achieve those rights ‘to the maximum of its available resources’, while recognising that full realisation may be a gradual process. (See: Art. 2(1), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.)
- Article 6(3) makes clear that the TPNW’s victim assistance obligations do not preclude affected states parties or individuals from seeking redress or assistance through other means, such as judicial measures or bilateral treaties with states not party.

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5 Ibid., para. 9.
8 Ibid., para. 9, Action 19. See also ibid., Actions 39–42.
support. States parties also resolved to exchange information, not only with the stakeholders noted above, but also with states not party in order to promote victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Other enumerated principles, which are particularly important in the victim assistance context, are accessibility and non-discrimination, the latter of which is an explicit requirement of the TPNW. The Action Plan specifies that victim assistance, as set forth in Article 6(1) of the TPNW, must be age- and gender sensitive, and commits states to developing guidelines for providing such assistance. Finally, recognising the evolving nature of situations and information, the Action Plan calls for states parties regularly to review the implementation framework and to draw on lessons from other treaty regimes.

States’ interventions at the 1MSP showed that the positive obligations of the TPNW have strong political backing. States parties from around the world emphasised the humanitarian nature of victim assistance and the other positive obligations, and their centrality to the TPNW’s objectives. The Cook Islands said Articles 6 and 7 bring a human face and heart to the Treaty.

Driven by the progress at the 1MSP, states also raised the need for mention in the NPT’s outcome document under its disarmament pillar before.

At the UN General Assembly First Committee, states engaged in a similar exchange of views. Although unsuccessful, Austria, the Holy See, Kazakhstan, and Kiribati advocated for a reference to victim assistance or the remediation of areas contaminated by nuclear testing, some states, including Austria, Kazakhstan, and Kiribati, and the Pacific Small Island Developing States, advocated for a reference to victim assistance and environmental remediation to be included in the conference’s outcome document in the context of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Though unadopted, the draft final document of the conference welcomed ‘the increased attention in the last review cycle on assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing and environmental remediation following nuclear use and testing and calls on States parties to engage with such efforts to address nuclear harm’, in a paragraph that no state ultimately sought to block.

While, previously, there has been some attention to addressing harm from nuclear legacies under the NPT’s discussion of ‘peaceful uses’ of nuclear energy, victim assistance and environmental remediation have not seen significant attention nor been considered for mention in the NPT’s outcome document under its disarmament pillar before.

The Treaty approach issues of addressing nuclear harm. They could also, in turn, advance implementation of the TPNW’s positive obligations by increasing states parties’ engagement with and commitment to them.

During the disarmament discussions of the NPT Review Conference, several states highlighted the TPNW’s obligation on victim assistance explicitly or the positive obligations in general. The states parties and signatories to the TPNW also delivered a joint statement that raised the need for victim assistance and environmental remediation. Germany mentioned victim assistance in the context of noting its participation in the 1MSP as an observer, and stated a desire to ‘improve dialogue and cooperate in addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons – in the field of victim assistance or the remediation of areas contaminated by nuclear testing’. Some states, including Austria, Kazakhstan, and Kiribati, and the Pacific Small Island Developing States, advocated for a reference to victim assistance and environmental remediation to be included in the conference’s outcome document in the context of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Though unadopted, the draft final document of the conference welcomed ‘the increased attention in the last review cycle on assistance to the people and communities affected by nuclear weapons use and testing and environmental remediation following nuclear use and testing and calls on States parties to engage with such efforts to address nuclear harm’, in a paragraph that no state ultimately sought to block.

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**NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Ultimately, the success of victim assistance under the TPNW will depend on whether the words of the Treaty are translated into actions on the ground that make a demonstrable positive difference in affected people’s lives. States parties to the TPNW that are affected by nuclear-weapons testing did not report any significant developments in their existing national victim assistance...
programmes over the past year, although at least two states not party, the UK and the US, updated policies to increase recognition of victims of nuclear testing. For an overview of victim assistance programmes in states parties Fiji, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, and New Zealand, as well as signatory Algeria and states not party France, Japan, United States, and United Kingdom, see the 2021 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.22

Since nuclear-armed states have not yet adhered to the TPNW, they are not legally bound by the Treaty's obligations for victim assistance and environmental remediation. Nevertheless, these states have moral duties, as well as obligations under national and international law, including under human rights law and in some cases through bilateral agreements, towards the foreign and domestic victims of their tests. For the most part, they have not fulfilled these obligations, but in 2022 there were some encouraging developments in efforts to assist victims outside of the TPNW legal framework.

**Marshall Islands/United States**

As described in more detail in the section on International Cooperation and Assistance, in October 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands, which acknowledged ‘that the people of the Marshall Islands living with the impacts of exposure to nuclear waste, radiation and contamination should continue to be assisted to advance the full realization and enjoyment of their human rights’, especially those ‘suffering from adverse health and other effects’.23 The Marshall Islands told the Council that it needed assistance: ‘We have suffered the cancer of the nuclear legacy for far too long and we need to find a way forward, for a better future for our people’.24 In its statement, the US ‘specifically acknowledge[d] the hardships the people of the Marshall Islands experienced’, although it disagreed with some of the resolution’s language.25

At the time of writing, negotiations were also underway on a renewal of the Marshall Islands’ Compact of Free Association with the United States, which is set to expire at the end of 2023. Press reports indicated that ‘U.S. negotiators have agreed to drastically increase funding’ including for ‘upgraded health care’ for ‘people affected by U.S. nuclear testing in the islands’. The agreement reportedly also includes resources for ‘a new museum and a research facility dedicated to the legacy of U.S. nuclear testing in the region, including funding to better access documentation and files that have yet to be declassified’. Any finalised agreement requires ratification by the US Congress.26

In June 2022, US President Joe Biden signed into law the RECA Extension Act of 2022, which extends for an additional two years a trust fund set up by the 1990 and 2000 Radiation Exposure Compensation Acts (RECA), as well as the deadline for filing claims. RECA awards ‘lump-sum’ compensation for ‘claims relating to atmospheric nuclear testing and uranium industry employment’. The scheme ‘does not require claimants to establish causation. Rather, claimants qualify for compensation by establishing the diagnosis of a listed compensable disease after working or residing in a designated location for a specific period of time.’27 Despite the temporal extension, the renewed RECA continues to exclude those who lived downwind of the Trinity test site in New Mexico, as well as many civilian populations in the Pacific who suffered from the humanitarian impact of US Pacific nuclear testing. At the time of writing, US Congress was negotiating potential expansions of RECA's geographic eligibility requirements.28

**United Kingdom**

While the US programmes focused on providing compensation, health care, and research, the UK took a step in the assistance of affected individuals through recognising their experiences. In November 2022, the UK government held a recognition ceremony to announce a new medal to ‘honour the significant contribution of veterans and civilian staff from across the Commonwealth, who participated in Britain’s nuclear testing programme’. The medal will be available to all military and civilian personnel of the test programmes, including scientists and local employees, as well as those from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Kiribati. It can also be awarded posthumously. The British government estimates 22,000 people will qualify for the medal. Efforts to award the medal will be accompanied with £450,000 in programming to ‘commemorate and build further understanding of the experiences of veterans who were deployed to Australia and the Pacific’.29

Unlike the TPNW, UK recognition of its test personnel is not rooted in a rejection of nuclear weapons, but rather ‘to pay tribute to nuclear heroes, who have kept the country safe’.30 Nevertheless, advocacy and diplomacy related to the TPNW’s victim assistance obligations may have had an effect on UK policymaking. UK politicians asked several Parliamentary Questions regarding the TPNW and the legacies of UK Pacific nuclear tests. In response, James Cleverly, the then Minister for Europe, responded that the government ‘appreciates the importance of the biodiversity and cultural value’ of Kiribati’s islands, ‘including those affected by nuclear testing in the pre-independence period’. He expressed hope that increased UK aid ‘for environmental and climate related initiatives in the Pacific region will be able to contribute to ... the needs of Kiribati communities in the islands’.31

23 Technical assistance and capacity-building to address the human rights implications of the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands’, UN Human Rights Council Resolution 51/35, adopted without a vote on 7 October 2022, operative paras. 2, 6, and 7.
25 Ibid., starting at 08:58:46.
30 Ibid.
In 2022, positive progress was made on environmental remediation at the international level. States parties to the TPNW agreed to steps to begin implementation and voiced support for the process. There were, however, minimal developments at the national level.

Article 6(2) of the TPNW aims to respond to an under-addressed humanitarian challenge: contamination from the use and testing of nuclear weapons. Radioactive materials from these activities have damaged ecosystems and had severe, often intergenerational, impacts on human health and human rights. The contaminants will persist for decades or even centuries to come. As is the case for victim assistance, however, no comprehensive overview yet exists of areas with ongoing contamination. Affected populations often do not even have access to knowledge about the level of threat, how to protect themselves, which areas not to enter, and which food types to avoid.

By addressing the root cause of the problem, environmental remediation serves to protect affected communities from harm and helps them realise their rights. It also benefits the environment by working to restore damaged ecosystems and promoting biodiversity.

1MSP

As is the case with victim assistance, most of the international progress on environmental remediation occurred in association with the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. The Vienna Declaration specifically underscores states parties’ duty to ‘remediate environmental contamination’. ¹ The Vienna Action Plan’s commitments to create an implementation framework, discussed in the previous section, are as relevant to environmental remediation as they are to victim assistance.² For example, affected


states parties should assess the impacts of nuclear-weapons use and testing, in this case documenting environmental contamination, along with national capacities to address them. They should provide initial assessments of existing knowledge and updates on national plans, including budgets and timelines, by the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) in December 2023. States parties’ focal points and national laws and policies should deal with environmental remediation as well as victim assistance.3

The principles outlined in the Action Plan also apply to environmental remediation. Including affected communities at all stages of the environmental remediation process is essential because these groups bring unique expertise about the harm and how to address it and have a right to be involved in decisions affecting their lives. States should engage with other relevant stakeholders, too.4 Accessibility, non-discrimination, and transparency in the implementation of environmental remediation programmes are also important.5 For example, state parties are called upon to develop voluntary reporting mechanisms, which provide information on nuclear-weapons contamination, progress in remediating the environment, and need for external support.6 Finally, states parties should regularly review and update their implementation framework as necessary.7

In their interventions at the 1MSP, as discussed in the victim assistance section, states expressed widespread support for environmental remediation.

An informal intersessional working group established by the 1MSP and co-chaired by Kazakhstan and Kiribati is addressing environmental remediation along with victim assistance and international cooperation and assistance. It will submit recommendations on all three topics to the 2MSP.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT FORUMS

Environmental remediation saw increased attention during 2022 also in the NPT Review Conference and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Numerous states raised the issue of environmental remediation during the disarmament discussions in both forums,8 and as mentioned above, the unadopted draft final document of the conference welcomed ‘the increased attention in the last review cycle on … environmental remediation following nuclear use and testing’.9

Attention to this theme in 2022 again indicates how the TPNW and steps to implement its positive obligations are already influencing the agenda in forums beyond the TPNW. This influence in turn could have a broader normative and practical impact on how to address the effects of nuclear weapons.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

States parties to the TPNW that are affected by nuclear-weapons testing did not report any significant developments in their existing national environmental remediation programmes over the past year. For an overview of environmental remediation programmes in states parties Kazakhstan and Kiribati, as well as signatory Algeria, see the 2021 edition of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor.10 An update on the situation in Kazakhstan is provided below.

As discussed under the section on victim assistance above, the nine nuclear-armed states have not yet adhered to the TPNW and are therefore not legally bound by the Treaty’s obligations for environmental remediation or victim assistance. Nevertheless, these states have moral duties, as well as obligations under national and international law, which for the most part have not been fulfilled. In 2022, there were some encouraging, albeit still tentative, signs that efforts were being made to address environmental remediation outside of the TPNW.

Ibid., para. 9, Action 19. See also Actions 39–42.
Ibid., para. 9, Action 25.
Ibid., para. 9, Actions 27 and 28.
Ibid., para. 9, Action 26.
This analysis relies on publicly available records and reporting by Reaching Critical Will, at: http://bit.ly/3IkMiEr.
Kazakhstan

Although Kazakhstan, site of almost 500 Soviet nuclear tests, did not report any new developments, Sergey Berezin from the National Nuclear Center gave a presentation on the history and status of the country’s environmental remediation measures to the TPNW’s informal intersessional working group on the positive obligations in December 2022. Specifically, he addressed efforts ‘to bring the former Semipalatinsk Test Site [STS] to a safe condition’, conducted in partnership with the United States and the Russian Federation.11 Semipalatinsk was renamed Semey in 2007. Environmental remediation falls under the center’s responsibilities for ‘Radiation Safety and Ecology’ and ‘Nonproliferation Support’. The presentation outlined three phases of environmental remediation in the STS site, which covers a total area of some 18,300km². The first phase, in 1996–2000, sought to dismantle test site infrastructure, focused in the areas of Degelen and Balapan. The second phase, in 2000–12, aimed to exclude access to ‘residues of nuclear activity’ through the installation of ‘physical barriers’, ‘warning notices’, and alarm systems.12 Since 2013, the third phase has been ‘nuclear testing consequences elimination’. It has included radiological surveys and remediation of sites where there was a ‘high concentration of nuclear residues’. Removed waste was ‘brought to a safe condition and placed for long-term storage in controlled conditions’. Where remediation was deemed infeasible, the project has built ‘special protective structures to completely exclude unauthorized access to the object without industrial vehicles’.13

In his presentation to the informal working group, Berezin stated that ‘all significant areas of radioactive contamination, the main pathways and mechanisms of radioactive substances distribution at all STS testing sites have been identified’. However, further efforts were needed to ‘rehabilitate certain areas, as well as examine the territories adjacent to the test site and affected by nuclear tests’.14

Marshall Islands

A major environmental issue for the Marshall Islands, which is not a state party to the TPNW, is the status of Runit Dome. In an effort in the 1970s to contain radiation after its nuclear-weapons tests in the Marshall Islands, the United States dumped contaminated soil from the atoll Enewetak into an unlined pit on a beach on Runit Island and covered it with the concrete. Rising tides due to climate change now threaten the integrity of the structure.15 A report by the US Department of Energy in 2020 concluded that Runit Dome ‘is not in any immediate danger of collapse or failure’. It stated that the department is ‘in the process of establishing a groundwater radiochemical analysis programme that is designed to provide scientifically substantiated data that can be used to determine what, if any, effects the dome contents are having, or will have, on the surrounding environment now and in the future’.16

In October 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on the nuclear legacy in the Marshall Islands, which calls on ‘States, relevant United Nations agencies and other stakeholders to support the Government of the Marshall Islands in its efforts to improve the health of its people and environment’. The resolution recognises the right of the Marshallese people to the ‘enjoyment of a clean, healthy and sustainable environment’ and particularly highlights ‘concerns regarding the integrity of the concrete dome containing nuclear and toxic wastes on Runit Island’.17 In its statement to the Council, the Marshall Islands said, ‘we put to you the dire human rights situation of a people whose only land was pulverized, with nuclear waste left behind. This legacy is beyond our capacity and we need technical assistance to help overcome the challenges and barriers to the full realisation and enjoyment of the human rights of our people.’18

IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION

A 2022 report by the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and the Conflict and Environment Observatory identified nineteen principles for remediating nuclear weapons contamination, which provide more in-depth guidance for implementing the TPNW’s environmental remediation obligation over time. To start with, affected states parties should implement national assessments of the extent and nature of contamination and their capacity to address it, as well as of responses to date. They should also develop national plans, with budgets and time frames; appoint government focal points; and adopt relevant laws and policies. Such practical steps promote efficiency, coordination, and accountability. Throughout the process, they should conduct risk reduction education and limit access to contaminated sites, including by marking, fencing, and posting warning signs. Finally, they should treat and contain the contamination itself and engage in proper long-term site management.19

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
17 Human Rights Council Resolution 51/35, see further on the resolution in the section above on International Cooperation and Assistance.
As was the case for victim assistance and environmental remediation, the year 2022 saw growing support for international cooperation and assistance. The states parties to the TPNW also adopted commitments to establish mechanisms to make it happen. These developments are important steps, but they must be followed by more tangible progress in order to advance implementation of victim assistance and environmental remediation under the Treaty.

Addressing the effects of nuclear-weapons use and testing is a shared responsibility. Article 7 of the TPNW requires all states parties to cooperate on implementation of the Treaty, and all states parties in a position to do so to provide technical, material and financial assistance to affected states parties, which will help them fulfil their victim assistance and environmental remediation obligations. Support from other states parties enhances the ability of affected states to take meaningful ownership of their own situation, secure resources, and build capacity. It also advances the humanitarian goals of the Treaty by saving lives, alleviating suffering, promoting human dignity, and protecting the environment.

According to available information, states parties to the TPNW did not provide any international assistance for victim assistance or environmental remediation under the Treaty in 2022. The Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor encourages affected states parties to submit voluntary reports to the Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (2MSP) in 2023 to provide information on their needs and donor states to report on international assistance they provide in return.

Assistance can come in a variety of forms. For example, donor states parties can provide: technical support in the form of medical, scientific, or environmental expertise or implementation experience from other frameworks; material support, such as health care or remediation equipment; or financial support to fund affected states’ victim assistance and environmental remediation programmes. Assistance can also come in the form of the release of official information and documents regarding nuclear testing and fallout monitoring. Given
The obligations in the TPNW’s Article 6 to assist victims and remediate the environment should be read in conjunction with Article 7 of the Treaty.

Article 7(1) obligates each state party to the TPNW to cooperate with other states parties to ‘facilitate the implementation’ of the Treaty, and Article 7(2) grants all states parties ‘the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible’. In addition, under paragraph 3 of Article 7 each state party ‘in a position to do so’ is required to provide technical, material, and financial assistance to states parties affected by nuclear-weapon use or testing.

Article 7(6) of the TPNW provides that any state party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices ‘shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance’ to affected states parties for victim assistance and environmental remediation. This responsibility is without prejudice to any other duty or obligation the state may have under international law. This provision was especially important to affected states during the drafting of the Treaty, they argued that user and testing states should be both legally and morally responsible for their actions.

International and non-governmental organisations also have a role to play. As referenced in Article 7(5) of the TPNW, assistance may be provided through the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, civil society groups, or other organisations.

While most of Article 7 is directed at supporting victim assistance and environmental remediation, assistance can also be provided in relation to other obligations of the Treaty, such as the development of national implementation legislation or destruction of nuclear-weapons stockpiles.

**1MSP**

The Vienna Declaration, adopted at the 1MSP, emphasised the moral and legal importance of international cooperation and assistance. In the Declaration, states parties list ‘moral and ethical imperatives which inspired and motivated the creation of the Treaty and which now drive and guide its implementation’. Among those imperatives is the belief that ‘all states share the responsibility ... to assist victims, redress the harms and remediate environmental damage caused by previous use and testing of nuclear-armed States in accordance with their respective obligations under international law and bilateral agreements’.

Later in the Declaration, states parties pledge to ‘strengthen international cooperation among States Parties to advance’ implementation of the TPNW’s positive obligations.

The Vienna Action Plan includes multiple actions specifically dedicated to international cooperation and assistance. Building on TPNW Article 7(3), Action 32 commits states parties in a position do so to assist states parties ‘with clear demonstrated needs for external support’ by mobilising resources and providing technical, material, and financial assistance.

Action 23 calls for the development of mechanisms to facilitate provision of such assistance, noting that they should match needs ... with offers of assistance. These actions emphasise the importance of tailoring assistance to affected states’ needs and establishing tools to facilitate its delivery.

Other actions address international cooperation and assistance alongside victim assistance and environmental remediation. For example, in setting up their implementation framework, states parties should establish a focal point and adopt or adapt relevant national laws and policies on both Article 6 and Article 7. According to Action 31, ‘international cooperation and assistance should be provided where needed to reduce the burden on affected States parties’ who have resolved to develop national plans for the implementation of victim assistance and environmental remediation. Furthermore, the principles of accessibility, inclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency apply to international cooperation and assistance as well as the other positive obligations.

The Action Plan also puts an international trust fund on states parties’ agenda. States parties resolve to ‘discuss

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2 Ibid.
3 Vienna Declaration, 1MSP, Annex I, para. 3.
4 Ibid., para. 10 (emphasis added).
6 Ibid., para. 9, Action 23.
7 Ibid., para. 9, Actions 21-22.
8 Ibid., para. 9, Action 31.
9 Ibid., para. 9, Action 25. See also, para. 9, Actions 19, 27-28.

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the feasibility of, and propose possible guidelines for establishing an international trust fund for States that have been affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons’. The fund would ‘provide aid to assist survivors and to support measures toward environmental remediation’. The Action Plan calls on states to consider relevant precedent in the course of their discussions.10

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 2MSP

Leading up to 2MSP, the informal intersessional working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and cooperation and assistance that was established at 1MSP will dedicate a significant portion of its time to international cooperation and assistance.

At the time of writing, the co-chairs Kazakhstan and Kiribati had focused their consultations with states parties and other stakeholders on the proposed trust fund, which would support victim assistance and environmental remediation projects.11 In January 2023, the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic presented to the working group the findings of a new report, which compares the design features of ten existing trust funds in disarmament, international human rights law, and international criminal law. It then draws on that precedent, adapting it to the nuclear-weapons context to propose a structure for a TPNW trust fund.12

OTHER INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT FORUMS

States addressed international cooperation and assistance in different ways at the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Cooperation in matters relating to victim assistance and environmental remediation was noted as an area where states party and not party to the TPNW could engage to explore common ground and work towards shared humanitarian goals. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Holy See suggested that this was an area to explore opportunities for mutual reinforcement or complement environmental remediation projects.13 In January 2023, the Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic presented to the working group the findings of a new report, which compares the design features of ten existing trust funds in disarmament, international human rights law, and international criminal law. It then draws on that precedent, adapting it to the nuclear-weapons context to propose a structure for a TPNW trust fund.12

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

During the course of 2022, there were some indications of support for providing international cooperation and assistance to specific states independent of the TPNW. As noted in the sections on victim assistance and environmental remediation above, in October 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted without a vote a resolution affirming ‘the importance of addressing the adverse impact of the nuclear legacy on the realization and enjoyment of human rights by the people of the Marshall Islands’. Recognising the importance of international cooperation and assistance, the resolution calls on ‘States, relevant United Nations agencies and other stakeholders to support the Government of the Marshall Islands in its efforts to improve the health of its people and environment’. In particular, it mandates the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to ‘prepare a report on addressing the challenges and barriers to the full realization and enjoyment of the human rights of the people of the Marshall Islands’ resulting from US nuclear testing. The resolution requests the OHCHR to work in cooperation with the Marshall Islands ‘to provide technical assistance and capacity-building’, including in the field of ‘transitional justice’ to aid the National Nuclear Commission’s ‘national strategy for nuclear justice’.16 The resolution was presented to the Human Rights Council by TPNW state party Fiji, on behalf of TPNW states parties Samoa, Vanuatu, and Nauru, as well as states not party the Marshall Islands and Australia.17 In its statement, Fiji said, ‘we stand in solidarity’ with the Marshall Islands in prioritizing the addressing of nuclear legacy issues in the Pacific ‘... It is a legacy that we must not forget and one that we have to learn from’.18 Germany and China also spoke in favour of the resolution. India, Pakistan, the US, and the UK raised concerns with some of the language but did not block consensus.19

At the time of writing, the US was engaged in Compact of Free Association negotiations with the Marshall Islands and had reportedly ‘agreed to drastically increase funding’, including for measures to address the legacies of nuclear testing (see the section on Victim Assistance).

While Italy has not participated in TPNW negotiations or meetings, its Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution in May 2022 committing the government to follow ‘Italy’s great humanitarian tradition’ by evaluating ‘possible actions to approach the contents of the TPNW Treaty, in particular with regard to actions of “Assistance to victims and environmental rehabilitation”’.20

10 Ibid., para. 9, Action 29.
14 Statement of Germany, Tenth NPT Review Conference, New York, 1 August 2022.
16 Human Rights Council Resolution 51/35.
18 Ibid., starting: 08:44:50.
19 Ibid., starting: 08:53:45.
THE OBLIGATION TO
PROMOTE UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY

States parties and signatories alike took a broad range of actions in 2022 to implement the TPNW’s obligation under Article 12 of the Treaty to encourage further states to sign and ratify, with the goal of universal adherence.

At the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, states parties resolved ‘to make universalisation efforts a priority’, vowing not to rest ‘until the last state has joined the Treaty’ and ‘nuclear weapons have been totally eliminated’.

They emphasised that universalisation should be ‘understood broadly’ to include not only further signatures and ratifications, but also greater acceptance of ‘the underlying rationale of the total elimination of nuclear weapons owing to their inherent risks and catastrophic humanitarian consequences’. Moreover, it should ‘serve as a strategy to maximise the authority of the core norms and principles of the Treaty in international politics’.

The Vienna Action Plan, adopted at the 1MSP, lists 14 actions for universalisation, including making diplomatic démarches and outreach visits to the capitals of non-

parties, providing technical support for states to complete their ratification processes, highlighting the importance of the Treaty in national and regional statements, and coordinating outreach efforts with partners such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The states parties also agreed to nominate national contact points to facilitate this work.4

In Vienna, an informal working group on universalisation was also set up, with Malaysia and South Africa to serve as its co-chairs until the Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP).5 As one of their first initiatives, the co-chairs facilitated a TPNW signing and ratification ceremony in September on the sidelines of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly.6 Five states signed the Treaty on this occasion (Barbados, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, and Sierra Leone) and two ratified it (the Dominican Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

In the course of 2022, TPNW states parties made numerous individual and collective appeals in the UN and other relevant international forums for further states to sign and ratify the Treaty. At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August, for example, 65 TPNW states parties and signatories issued a joint statement, coordinated by Mexico, urging all states that are committed to a world free of nuclear weapons ‘to join the TPNW without delay’.7

TPNW states parties also actively promoted the Treaty on a regional basis. The TPNW featured prominently in discussions at the general conference of states parties to the Latin American and Caribbean Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWZF) Treaty held in Mexico in November.8 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), announced in October that all of its member states are now ‘either parties, signatories or in [the] process of acceding to the TPNW’. It pledged to continue encouraging all states to support the TPNW as ‘a vital and progressive step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons’9.

In August, Namibia chaired an African Group meeting in New York to promote adherence to the Treaty,10 and the group subsequently urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called “nuclear umbrella”, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date’.11 The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCON) – the secretariat for the African NWZF Treaty – participated in African Group meetings where the TPNW was discussed, and in October 2022 signed a memorandum of understanding with ICAN to cooperate in efforts to universalise the TPNW.12

In February, the deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan hosted a meeting with ambassadors from its partner countries in the NWZF in Central Asia, calling on them to also become states parties to the TPNW.13 As a result of the efforts of TPNW states parties in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a statement in October 2022 in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on behalf of all members of this group reiterated that the TPNW ‘is a historic agreement which contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, including the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaties’.14 The Arab Group too, confirmed that the TPNW ‘does not run counter to the NPT; on the contrary, it complements the NPT and gives it impetus to achieve its goals’.15

In many cases, calls to adhere to the TPNW came from the highest levels of government. New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, said in an address to the UN General Assembly in September: ‘The only way to guarantee our people that they will be safe from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is for them not to exist. That’s why Aotearoa New Zealand calls on all states that share this conviction to join the [TPNW].’16 Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, highlighted her country’s ratification of the TPNW as evidence of its full commitment ‘to complete disarmament’.17
At the 1MSP in June, Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama of Fiji said that his country was proud to be among the large group of states working together under the TPNW to ‘take this first step back from the knife-edge of Armageddon’. Pope Francis, in a statement read by his representative, declared on behalf of the Holy See that: ‘At this particular moment in history, where the world seems to be at a crossroads, the courageous vision of this legal instrument, strongly inspired by ethical and moral arguments, appears ever more timely.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October, a record number of states, 75, co-sponsored the annual resolution on the TPNW, calling upon ‘all states that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’, with 124 states voting in favour and 43 against, with 14 abstentions.

Several TPNW states parties also promoted adherence to the TPNW in bilateral meetings with states opposed to or undecided on the TPNW, including at ministerial level.

Ministers and high-ranking government representatives also published opinion articles. Moreover, they actively promoted the Treaty and its universalisation on social media, along with ambassadors and other diplomats, as well as the official accounts of foreign ministries, permanent missions to the UN, and embassies.

Some states parties, including the Maldives, Namibia, Panama, Samoa, and Vanuatu, made use of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review process to encourage adherence to the Treaty by the states under review.

With an agreed action plan and informal working group now in place to promote universalisation of the TPNW, states parties are in a strong position to continue their work in 2023 to build the Treaty’s membership in all regions ahead of the 2MSP. As they declared in Vienna, the states parties will work to ‘harness the public conscience in support of our goal of universal adherence to the Treaty and its full implementation’.

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18 Statement by Fiji delivered by Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama at the 1MSP of the TPNW, 21 June 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3Y9uFFF
22 For instance, New Zealand’s Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, P. Twyford, discussed the TPNW in meetings with Australia and Tonga. See, tweets by @philtwyford, 6 October 2022, at: https://bit.ly/38nljEH and 22 April 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3wHIy5c.
24 See, e.g.: Tweet by Malta at the UN, @MaltaUNMission, 26 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3wOH257; and Maritza Chan, @MaritzaChanV, 22 September 2022, at: https://bit.ly/3jHkk+. 
26 Declaration of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW, para. 11.
The following 197 state profiles have been prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor for each of the states that can become party to the global treaties in the legal architecture for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction. The state profiles are categorised according to each state’s position on the TPNW, with separate sections for the Treaty’s states parties, signatories, other supporters, undecided states, and opposed states.

The state profiles contain summary data on the status of the 197 states in relation to the TPNW as well as the other key treaties relating to weapons of mass destruction, specifically the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) treaties, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They also present an overview of each state’s compliance (for states parties and signatories) or compatibility (for states not party) with the prohibitions of the TPNW in 2022, information on the views they have expressed about nuclear disarmament in the course of the year, latest developments, and relevant further information.

While the narrative of this edition of the Ban Monitor only reports on developments that took place in 2022, the state profiles also reflect any formal actions that states took with respect to the above-mentioned treaties during the time of writing in January and February 2023. The data in the state profiles are drawn from NPA’s Disarmament Treaty Database, which is a continuation of a database project first initiated in 2012 by the International Law and Policy Institute (ILPI). In addition to data from the Ban Monitor’s own analysis and research, the state profiles bring together information from a wide range of open sources, including the UN Treaty Collection, the website of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, the IAEA, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), the Missile Threat website, and Reaching Critical Will’s monitoring of disarmament forums.

The state profiles of the nine nuclear-armed states also contain information about their nuclear-weapons arsenals at the beginning of 2023. The arrows refer to general trends in the stockpiles over the last few years. Red upwards arrows (⬆) indicate that the stockpile is increasing, and green downward arrows (⬇) that they are decreasing. This information is compiled for the Ban Monitor by the Federation of American Scientists.

The state profiles are also available and continuously updated on www.banmonitor.org, which also has a report-back function. The Ban Monitor welcomes all information that can assist us in updating the state profiles and ensuring the information is correct.

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1 To exemplify, this means the state profile of any state that signed the TPNW in early 2023 will be grouped with the signatories, but the state in question is of course not counted as a signatory in the report’s summary narrative and tables on the status of the Treaty in 2022.
5 At: https://bit.ly/3dFm8L0.
6 At: https://bit.ly/3Ju8vgV.
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In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Antigua and Barbuda said that it ‘is fully committed to [the TPNWs] implementation and will continue to engage constructively in the next Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.’

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Antigua and Barbuda and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Antigua and Barbuda was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Antigua and Barbuda should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Antigua and Barbuda should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compliant
(b) Test Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile Compliant
(d) Transfer Compliant
(e) Receive transfer or control Compliant
(f) Use Compliant
(g) Threaten to use Compliant
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compliant
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compliant
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compliant

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1983, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1985)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2006)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 2003)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Acceded 2005)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No
Austria hosted the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in its capital, Vienna, in June 2022. In his opening statement to the 1MSP, Austria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Schallenberg, said: ‘As long as these horrendous weapons exist, they are a threat to us all. Nuclear risks have not been this high for decades ... The logic that nuclear weapons provide security is a fundamental error.’

One day before the 1MSP, Austria also hosted an intergovernmental conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Austria said that the TPNW ‘is not only fully complementary with the NPT but brings a crucial and urgently needed reinforcement of the norms for nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons’. It called on all states ‘to join the TPNW and to engage actively and constructively with the profound arguments on which it is based’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Austria said that the 1MSP ‘delivered concrete results’ with the adoption of a ‘strong political declaration’ and ‘ambitious Vienna Action Plan to implement the Treaty’. ‘Now is the time to step up and support an unequivocal stance against nuclear weapons.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Bangladesh stated: ‘We must now redouble our efforts for full and effective implementation of the Treaty … At the same time, we must relentlessly work for universal adherence.’¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh, A. K. Abdul Momen, said that Bangladesh's ratification of the TPNW demonstrated its ‘unflinching commitment to the total elimination of nuclear weapons’. He welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force in 2021 and the adoption of ‘its landmark 50-point Vienna action plan’, and added: ‘We believe the TPNW will serve as a critical component in strengthening the NPT … We call upon states that are yet to join TPNW to do so without any delay, to attain universal application of this Treaty. We would like to see, as a matter of priority, its full implementation by all, including the nuclear-weapon–possessing states and nuclear-umbrella states.’²

In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Bangladesh and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, highlighted her country’s ratification of the TPNW in 2019 as evidence of its full commitment ‘to complete disarmament’.⁴

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Bangladesh said: ‘Our position towards nuclear weapons is unambiguously clear. We believe that these weapons secure no one; instead, they endanger everyone’s security. Hence, the ultimate guarantee of security lies only in the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It was from that conviction we ratified the TPNW.’⁵

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bangladesh should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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¹ http://bit.ly/3kHrygT
⁴ https://bit.ly/41xP7th
Belize was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Belize and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Belize should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Belize should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Belize should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW STATUS</th>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>6 Feb 2020</td>
<td>19 May 2020 (Ratification)</td>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 22 Feb 2021</td>
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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Transfer</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Use</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1994, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1985)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1986)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2003)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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Benin participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Benin is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ’landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Benin should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Benin should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW STATUS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGNATURE</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 Sep 2018</td>
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</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2007, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1972)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bit.ly/3Y9uVlw
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Bolivia said that the meeting ‘must be the effective beginning of the path towards the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Bolivia said that the TPNW reinforces the NPT ‘so that the states fulfil their commitments and obligations’. It called on all states that have not yet done so to join the TPNW.2 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Bolivia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Bolivia said that the TPNW ‘gives us hope that one day nuclear weapons will be totally eliminated’, adding that the political declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP ‘will help set the course for the implementation of the Treaty and constitute important steps towards our common goal of a world free of nuclear weapons’.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bolivia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Bolivia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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1 https://bit.ly/3KUuJfQ
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Botswana called on all states that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so, ‘as its universalisation is a step in the right direction to complete nuclear disarmament’.¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Botswana said that its early ratification of the TPNW indicated its ‘strong support for the total elimination of nuclear weapons’, adding that its ‘pro-elimination position is influenced by the need to prevent catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons’.² In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Botswana and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Botswana said that the failure of the Review Conference ‘should not overshadow the progress that has been made in relation to the [TPNW], in particular, its entry into force, successful first Meeting of States Parties and the adoption of the Vienna action plan’.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Botswana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Botswana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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¹ https://bit.ly/3kCzoZo
² https://bit.ly/3kFAKm7
⁴ https://bit.ly/3IFojPh
Cabo Verde ratified the TPNW on 20 June 2022, the eve of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna. On 7 September 2022, Cabo Verde also brought into force both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The CSA was brought into force well in advance of Cabo Verde’s deadline under Article 3(2) of the TPNW to do so.

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Cabo Verde and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Cabo Verde was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Cabo Verde should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cabo Verde should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Cambodia said that ‘as long as all States do not join hand in hand with the TPNW, the world is still in danger. It called upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to the TPNW ‘at the earliest possible date.’1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Cambodia said that the ‘successful conclusion’ of the 1MSP, with the adoption by consensus of a declaration and action plan, ‘should accelerate progress towards the goal of totally eliminating nuclear weapons from the world’.2

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Cambodia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Cambodia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Cambodia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 3 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1997, Bangkok)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1972)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2000)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1983)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2005)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1 https://bit.ly/3KUy2Ui
2 https://bit.ly/3EOgCoF
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Chile said: ‘This is, without a doubt, a historic event to advance our inalienable goal, which is to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.’

The 1MSP appointed Chile as gender focal point to work during the intersessional period to support the implementation of the gender provisions of the Treaty and report on progress made to the Second Meeting of States Parties.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Chile welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force and ‘very successful’ 1MSP, describing the Treaty as ‘an instrument that complements and strengthens the implementation and credibility of the NPT’. It called on all states to adhere to the TPNW. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Chile and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Chile said that the TPNW ‘supports the system and the multilateral order’ in the fight against the possession of nuclear weapons, and reiterated its call for states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Chile should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Chile should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

**TPNW voting and participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party to an NWFZ</th>
<th>Yes (Ratified 1974, Tlatelolco)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2000, Annex 2 state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1996)</td>
</tr>
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**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguards agreement</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>Cleared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5. [https://bit.ly/3Zi8qW0](https://bit.ly/3Zi8qW0)
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, the Comoros expressed hope that the meeting would develop ‘recommendations that will make peace and security a priority’.¹

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Comoros and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.²

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Comoros welcomed the adoption and entry into force of the TPNW and the success of its ‘historic’ 1MSP. It called on all states that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty ‘to do so without further ado’.³

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Comoros should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Comoros should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Comoros should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

1 http://bit.ly/3ZAdZ1F
3 http://bit.ly/3Jbbe1i
Congo deposited its instrument of ratification for the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General on 17 May 2022, becoming the 61st state party.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Congo is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.1

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Congo and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.2

Congo was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Congo should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, the Cook Islands said: ‘For the Cook Islands, sandwiched as we are between two major [nuclear] testing sites in Kiribati and French Polynesia, we have long been aware of the threat of nuclear weapons. Given our very proactive stance on this issue in our region, it took little encouragement for us to become one of the first to accede to this Treaty in 2018.’

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Cook Islands and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Cook Islands should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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* Through territorial application by New Zealand
2 https://bit.ly/3Ja6qtl

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**Clean text:**

Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, the Cook Islands said: ‘For the Cook Islands, sandwiched as we are between two major [nuclear] testing sites in Kiribati and French Polynesia, we have long been aware of the threat of nuclear weapons. Given our very proactive stance on this issue in our region, it took little encouragement for us to become one of the first to accede to this Treaty in 2018.’

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Cook Islands and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Cook Islands should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Costa Rica hailed the Treaty as ‘a triumph of multilateralism and clear evidence of the commitment to collective solutions.’

In its statement at 1MSP, Costa Rica also said that ‘We are at a turning point, where the old models of national security – based on deterrence and threats of certain mutually assured nuclear destruction – have been pointed out as outdated, unjustified and insufficient.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Costa Rica said that the TPNW was ‘born from the belief in the capacity of international law to generate significant and substantial change.’ Costa Rica also delivered a statement on behalf of 145 states on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, Arnoldo André-Tinoco, urged more states to sign and ratify the TPNW, as well as endorse the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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2 Ibid.
4 https://bit.ly/3SHJO6x
Côte d’Ivoire deposited its instrument of ratification for the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General on 23 March 2022, becoming the 60th state party. The Treaty entered into force for it on the opening day of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, where Côte d’Ivoire participated.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Côte d’Ivoire called for ‘universal adherence’ to the TPNW and welcomed the successful convening of the 1MSP, including ‘the adoption of an ambitious action plan for the total elimination of nuclear weapons’.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte d’Ivoire, Kandia Camara, said that ‘the most immediate and sure way towards a tangible and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons remains, without question, the [TPNW] and its universalisation’. ‘The success of the First Meeting of States Parties, last June, remains one of the rare reasons for satisfaction, in terms of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, recorded during this year … My delegation would therefore like to launch a strong appeal to all states which have not yet done so to accede to this Treaty without delay, in particular the states possessing nuclear weapons,’ said the Minister.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Côte d’Ivoire said that, as one of the first states to sign the TPNW in 2017, it ‘is honoured to actively contribute to the promotion of its universalisation and its implementation’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Côte d’Ivoire should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.

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1 https://bit.ly/3IDHEQM
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Cuba’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bruno Eduardo Rodríguez Parilla, said: ‘We have the responsibility to adopt, in this first meeting, important decisions aimed at guaranteeing the effective implementation of the Treaty and its universalisation.’¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Cuba described the TPNW as complementary to the NPT and hailed its entry into force in 2021 as ‘an undeniable milestone to advance towards nuclear disarmament’. It urged all states to ratify the Treaty ‘for its prompt universalisation’.²

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, Rodriguez Parilla said that Cuba champions the universalisation of the TPNW. ‘Nothing justifies the fact that humankind continues to remain threatened by the existence of around 13,000 nuclear weapons,’ he said.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Cuba said that the total elimination of nuclear weapons ‘is a matter of survival for humanity’ and ‘must continue to be the top priority in the field of disarmament’. Consistent with this view, ‘Cuba will continue to promote the universalisation of the TPNW.’⁴

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Cuba should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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The Democratic Republic of the Congo deposited its instrument of ratification for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) with the UN Secretary-General at a high-level ceremony in New York on 22 September 2022, becoming the 67th state party to the Treaty, along with the Dominican Republic, which ratified on the same day.

Attending as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, DR Congo said: 'Deterrence is a false guarantee of security that keeps the world in the balance of terror ... Nuclear disarmament is an emergency and is becoming a necessity for our security.'

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, DR Congo welcomed the 'historic adoption' of the TPNW in 2017 and its entry into force in 2021, as well as the success of its 1MSP. It said that the Treaty 'has greatly contributed to the search for the achievement of our common objective, which is a world without nuclear weapons'.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, DR Congo said that it considers the TPNW to complement and reinforce the NPT, and encouraged 'states which have not yet done so to accede to this instrument, because it constitutes an important step towards a world free of nuclear weapons and, if we are sincere in our quest for disarmament, we have a collective responsibility to ensure its universalisation'.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- DR Congo should submit its declaration under Article 2 of the TPNW to the UN Secretary-General without further delay.
- DR Congo should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- DR Congo should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Sep 2017</td>
<td>22 Sep 2022 (Ratification)</td>
<td>21 Dec 2022</td>
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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire
(b) Test
(c) Possess or stockpile
(d) Transfer
(e) Receive transfer or control
(f) Use
(g) Threten to use
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce
(i) Seek or receive assistance
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment

Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant
Compliant

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 13 (8%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2022, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2005)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/Bdw8
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdwa
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdwf
Dominica is one of the states that did not take part in the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 but which have joined the Treaty as a state party. In 2022, it also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 25 May and then quickly ratified it on 30 June.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Dominica is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or 'in the process of acceding to' the Treaty. The statement further said 'CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].'

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Dominica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Dominica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Dominica should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test                                      | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile                      | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer                              | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control           | Compliant |
| (d) Use                                   | Compliant |
| Threaten to use                           | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce          | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance            | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2021)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**
- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1993, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1984)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2022)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 2016)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 2001)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

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1 https://bit.ly/3ISrPFZ
The Dominican Republic deposited its instrument of ratification for the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General at a high-level ceremony in New York on 22 September 2022, becoming the 67th state party to the Treaty, along with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which ratified on the same day.

Attending as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, the Dominican Republic said: ‘The adoption in July 2017 of the [TPNW] and its entry into force in January 2021 are historic achievements ... They represent the culmination of decades of efforts aimed at eliminating these weapons of mass destruction.1

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Álvarez Gil, said that the Dominican Republic ‘supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons’, and that its ratification of the TPNW is proof of this. He said that ‘humanity requires results that favour peace and avoid new conflicts, especially those that imply a danger to the very existence of the planet’.2

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Dominican Republic encouraged ‘states that have not yet done so to accede to the [TPNW] with a view to its universalisation’ and expressed its ‘deep gratitude to the organisations and delegations that work tirelessly towards this overall goal, including ICAN and the International Committee of the Red Cross’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Dominican Republic should submit its declaration under Article 2 of the TPNW to the UN Secretary-General without further delay.
- The Dominican Republic should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Dominican Republic should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Ecuador expressed support for the Treaty's full implementation 'in order to provide it with functionality, connecting it with global challenges and specific thematic aspects, in its different fields of application'.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Ecuador said that the TPNW 'strengthens the effective implementation' of the NPT. 'Nuclear weapons have always been contrary to the principles of international law due to their catastrophic humanitarian impact, and now they are illegal,' it added. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Ecuador and 64 other TPNW supporters urged 'all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.'

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Ecuador highlighted the convening of the 1MSP and said that its declaration 'strengthens the commitment of the states parties' and its action plan 'seeks to facilitate in a practical way the effective and timely implementation of the Treaty.'

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Ecuador should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, El Salvador said that the Treaty ‘constitutes a fundamental step towards the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons and the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, El Salvador celebrated the fact that earlier in the year Central America became ‘the first region in the world to fully ratify this important nuclear disarmament instrument’, reflecting the political will of Central American states to support multilateral efforts for peace and security. El Salvador also emphasised that the TPNW and NPT are complementary, with the TPNW contributing to implementation of Article VI of the NPT. ‘For our country, the humanitarian consequences derived from the use of nuclear weapons are catastrophic, which is why we advocate their complete prohibition and their total elimination,’ it added.2

In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, El Salvador and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, El Salvador expressed support for the Vienna Action Plan adopted at the 1MSP. ‘We call on those states that have not yet done so to ratify or accede to [the TPNW] as soon as possible,’ it said.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

• El Salvador should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

1 https://bit.ly/3ZnuxKH
2 https://bit.ly/3ZMZB6t
3 https://bit.ly/3EZn5gL
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Frank Bainimarama, the Fijian Prime Minister, said that his country was proud to be among the large group of states working together under the TPNW to ‘take this first step back from the knife-edge of Armageddon.’ It is not idealism that convinces us. It is level-headed commonsense that calls on us to do away with this means of species extinction,’ he said.1

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Fiji and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.2

Fiji was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Fiji should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Fiji should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Fiji should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

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2 https://bit.ly/3IUxwDc
3 https://bit.ly/3KYhuLc

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 15 (27%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

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**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1985, Rarotonga)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1972)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1996)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1993)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No
The Gambia was the first state in Africa to ratify or accede to the TPNW. On 24 March 2022, it also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which the Gambia is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Gambia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| (b) Test | Compliant |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (d) Transfer | Compliant |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (f) Use | Compliant |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No
1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1996, Pelindaba) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2022) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1998) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

1 https://bit.ly/41QpofC
Grenada ratified the TPNW on 20 June 2022, on the eve of the Treaty's First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Grenada is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said ‘CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Grenada should submit its declaration under Article 2 of the TPNW to the UN Secretary-General without further delay.
- Grenada should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Grenada should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Grenada should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1975, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1975)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1998)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1986)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2005)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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Guatemala ratified the TPNW a week before the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in June 2022. With Guatemala’s ratification, Central America became the first entire region to join the TPNW.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Guatemala said that the TPNW ‘complements and strengthens the provisions of the [NPT], particularly to legally prohibit these weapons and close the gap on the mistaken interpretation that the possessing states may have regarding Article VI on the “right” to possess these weapons of mass destruction and not to move towards nuclear disarmament’. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Guatemala and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Guatemala said that the convening of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) constitutes a milestone and a firm step towards nuclear disarmament. It reiterated that the TPNW complements the objectives of the NPT and strengthens its three pillars.

Guatemala was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Guatemala should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guatemala should ensure that all of the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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Guinea-Bissau participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. On 23 June, the last day of the 1MSP, Guinea-Bissau brought into force both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. The CSA was brought into force well in advance of Guinea-Bissau’s 18-month deadline under Article 3(2) of the TPNW.

Guinea-Bissau was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Guinea-Bissau is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Guinea-Bissau should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guinea-Bissau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Guyana said: ‘This Meeting of States Parties is faced with a historic task. We meet to develop a blueprint for the implementation of the TPNW, and we must do so conscious of the fact that nuclear weapons today have an expanded role in military doctrines.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Guyana expressed alarm ‘at prevailing negative trends which seek to normalise the threat of use of [nuclear] weapons’, adding that ‘we cannot afford to be complacent about the risk of mutually assured destruction’. It welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force in 2021, noting that the Treaty ‘builds upon, contributes to, and strengthens the NPT and complements efforts to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons’.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Guyana warned: ‘The ongoing war in Ukraine and heightened tensions around the globe have raised the threat of a nuclear disaster. We are but one miscalculation away from a humanitarian catastrophe of global proportions. It also welcomed the adoption of a declaration and action plan at the 1MSP, and said: ‘We are fully committed to working with all states to implement the provisions. We urge states that have not yet done so to ratify the TPNW and commit to a world free of nuclear weapons.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Guyana underscored its ‘full support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the [TPNW], which it described as ‘one of the strongest tools we have’ to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Guyana was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Guyana should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

**TPNW voting and participation**

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | 1 (100%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1995, Tlatelolco) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1993) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2001) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 2013) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Original) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

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The Holy See participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Pope Francis, in a statement read by his representative, noted: ‘At this particular moment in history where the world seems to be at a crossroads, the courageous vision of this legal instrument, strongly inspired by ethical and moral arguments, appears ever more timely.’¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Holy See said that the TPNW constitutes an ‘effective measure’ for nuclear disarmament as required by Article VI of the NPT. ‘The entry into force of the TPNW should encourage this Review Conference to advance progress on nuclear disarmament and further explore how the TPNW and NPT can mutually reinforce one another,’ it added.²

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Holy See said that the outcomes of the 1MSP ‘ensure that progress can be made on nuclear disarmament, especially in the areas of verification, victims’ assistance, and environmental remediation’. It reiterated its hope that, ‘irrespective of their positions on the TPNW, states with nuclear weapons will contribute to such efforts’.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Holy See said that, by signing and ratifying the TPNW, states have signalled ‘their recognition that nuclear deterrence is not only illegal but also immoral’. It added that the success of the 1MSP contrasts with the ‘regrettable failure’ of the latest NPT Review Conference.⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

¹ https://bit.ly/3ZFTosT
⁴ https://bit.ly/3KYBoWw
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Honduras described the meeting as a ‘historic event’ and said it ‘is convinced that nuclear weapons do not represent security for anybody, but rather a threat to all.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Honduras welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force. In a closing statement, Honduras and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Honduras warned: ‘No country is prepared to face a humanitarian catastrophe derived from the use of nuclear weapons, and we must bear in mind that as long as nuclear weapons exist, it is unquestionable that there is a latent threat that they could be used again.’

Honduras was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Honduras should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Honduras should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Ireland hailed the meeting as ‘an important milestone’ but expressed regret that it was taking place ‘at a dark moment for European and global security’.¹

The 1MSP appointed Ireland and Thailand as informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the TPNW and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and other relevant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. They will submit recommendations for distribution through a Coordination Committee, and report to the Second Meeting of States Parties.²

At the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August 2022, Ireland said that the 1MSP ‘successfully demonstrated the value of the TPNW for its states parties as a pathway to fulfilling [NPT] Article VI obligations’.³ In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Ireland and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.⁴

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Ireland said that the 1MSP was ‘a critical milestone in allowing the Treaty to establish the necessary foundations for the implementation of its provisions’.⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Ireland should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.

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¹ http://bitly.ws/Bddr
² http://bitly.ws/BddI
³ http://bitly.ws/BddM
⁴ http://bitly.ws/BddS
⁵ http://bitly.ws/BddW
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Jamaica said: ‘While our Treaty is new, it is a clear demonstration of the belief of the majority of the world that there is neither a legal nor moral justification for the development, possession, reliance on or use of nuclear weapons in any context.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Jamaica described the TPNW’s entry into force in 2021 as ‘a welcome step in implementing Article VI of the NPT.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Jamaica expressed hope that the convening of the 1MSP would ‘focus hearts and minds to summon the political will needed to sensibly and pragmatically confront the issues’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Jamaica welcomed the adoption of the declaration and action plan at the 1MSP and reiterated ‘that the TPNW is a strong complement to the NPT and an effective tool to advance our universally shared disarmament goals.’

Jamaica was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Jamaica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
- Jamaica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1969, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2000)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Rescinded 2006)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: Cleared
- Plutonium stocks: No
Kazakhstan served as a vice-president of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Mukhtar Tleuberdi, the Deputy Prime Minister, hailed the meeting as ‘a remarkable historic achievement following a nearly decade-long collective effort to advance the universal objective of complete nuclear disarmament’.1

Together with Kiribati, Kazakhstan submitted a working paper to the 1MSP with proposals for action to assist victims of nuclear weapon use and testing and to remediate contaminated environments.2 The 1MSP appointed the two states as co-chairs of an informal intersessional working group to address these issues, which will report to the Second Meeting of States Parties. Kazakhstan will also serve as president of the third Meeting of States Parties, the dates for which have yet to be confirmed.3

Prior to the 1MSP, Kazakhstan hosted a meeting in its capital with ambassadors from other Central Asian states to encourage them to join the TPNW. It noted the compatibility of the TPNW with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, to which all states in the region are parties.4

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Kazakhstan welcomed the ‘successful outcomes’ of the 1MSP. It pledged to ‘work tirelessly to achieve our long-cherished aspirations towards a world free from nuclear weapons’.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

● Kazakhstan should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
● Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures, including by requesting that Russia continue to refrain from all testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Sary Shagan.

Kazakhstan

TPNW STATUS

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

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<td>Test</td>
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<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<td>Use</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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TPNW voting and participation

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<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted yes (2022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>26 (19%)</td>
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<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

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<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2008, Semipalatinsk)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 1994)</td>
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<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2002)</td>
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<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 2007)</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2000)</td>
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IAEA safeguards and fissile material

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<th>Material</th>
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<td>Safeguards agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>1-10 tons</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdft
2 http://bitly.ws/BdfC
3 http://bitly.ws/BdfH
4 http://bitly.ws/BdfR
5 http://bitly.ws/BdfV
In its opening statement to the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Kiribati said: ‘Today marks a historic day, a day in which we have risen up to say no to nuclear weapons.’ It also urged the international community to ‘listen to the voices of youth and of those whose families have suffered from nuclear testing,’ and not ‘forget how the former colonial powers treated innocent Pacific islanders in their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.’

Together with Kazakhstan, Kiribati submitted a working paper to the 1MSP with proposals for action to assist victims of nuclear weapon use and testing and to remediate contaminated environments. The 1MSP appointed the two states as co-chairs of an informal intersessional working group to address these issues, which will report to the Second Meeting of States Parties.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Kiribati said it is ‘a proud state party to the TPNW’ and firmly believes that the TPNW complements the NPT by filling the missing legal gap in the NPT and expands the existing international security architecture by addressing victim assistance.

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, the President of Kiribati, Taneti Maamau, welcomed the creation of a scientific advisory group at the 1MSP ‘to help provide the science needed to address health and environmental problems occasioned by past nuclear testing’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Kiribati called upon ‘all states to sign and ratify the TPNW to ensure its universality.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Kiribati should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Kiribati should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
- Kiribati should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

1 http://bitly.ws/Bdgk
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Lao PDR described the meeting as ‘a milestone in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation’ and welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force in 2021 as a ‘crucial step toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons’.1 On 24 June, the day after the 1MSP, Lao PDR upgraded its Original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA to a Modified SQP.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Lao PDR said that the TPNW ‘complements other disarmament and non-proliferation instruments’ and strengthens the global norm against nuclear weapons.2 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Lao PDR and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Lao PDR expressed its strong commitment to the TPNW, noting that the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP ‘will guide the implementation of the Treaty and pave the way for achieving the ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.4

Lao PDR was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lao PDR should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Lao PDR should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party to an NWFZ</th>
<th>Yes (Ratified 1996, Bangkok)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
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<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1973)</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
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IAEA safeguards and fissile material

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguards agreement</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>Yes (Modified)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>No (Signed 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1. http://bitly.ws/Bdh1
Lesotho participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lesotho, Matšepo Ramakoae, welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force in January 2021 as ‘a significant milestone in the efforts towards promoting universalisation and full implementation of the TPNW’. She added that Lesotho supports all efforts to enhance the institutional fabric of the TPNW. In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Lesotho and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Lesotho said that it is ‘strongly committed to the TPNW and will continue to support the principle of complete nuclear disarmament, as the utmost prerequisite for maintaining international peace and security’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Lesotho should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Lesotho should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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<td>(d) Use</td>
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<td>Party to the NPT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
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<th>IAEA safeguards and fissile material</th>
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<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
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</table>

1. http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Malawi deposited its instrument of ratification for the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General on 29 June 2022, becoming the 66th state party. It was the first state to adhere to the TPNW following the conclusion of the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna one week earlier, which resolved to pursue universalisation of the Treaty as a priority.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malawi, Nancy Tembo, said: ‘It should be our ambition as a collective to rid our world of all weapons of mass destruction because of the indiscriminate damage they cause.’ Given the threat that nuclear weapons pose to ‘the very survival of humanity and our environment’, their continued existence ‘challenges the instinctive human desire for self-preservation’, she said. She also noted that by ratifying the TPNW, Malawi further indicated its ‘unwavering commitment to the global disarmament agenda’.

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Malawi and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

At the UN General Assembly in 2022, Malawi voted yes in First Committee on the annual resolution on the TPNW, but then abstained in plenary, apparently in error.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Malawi should submit its declaration under Article 2 of the TPNW to the UN Secretary-General without further delay.
- Malawi should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malawi should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdj8
2 http://bitly.ws/BddS
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Malaysia described the meeting as ‘a gathering of particular moment in our collective endeavours to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons’, adding that the TPNW ‘is undoubtedly a significant contribution to the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture’.1 Together with South Africa, Malaysia was appointed by the 1MSP as a co-chair of an informal working group responsible for promoting universalisation of the TPNW. In this capacity, it co-facilitated a high-level signing and ratification for the TPNW in the margins of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Five states signed and two ratified the Treaty on this occasion.2 At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Malaysia welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force and the convening of its 1MSP, and said that it ‘remains convinced that the TPNW complements and strengthens the NPT, by constituting effective legal measures under Article VI of the NPT’.3 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Malaysia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.4 Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Saifuddin Abdullah, said that the TPNW ‘is underpinned by strong ethical and security imperatives and rests on a firm legal foundation’. He called on ‘all states that have not yet done so to join the Treaty’ and said that Malaysia stands ready ‘to engage with them towards this end’.5

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Malaysia commended the TPNW’s newest signatories and states parties ‘for having taken an important step in consolidating the Treaty, which will undoubtedly continue to grow in strength’.6

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Malaysia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Malaysia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Malaysia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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**TPNW STATUS**

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<th>DECLARATION</th>
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<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 17 Feb 2021</td>
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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire  Compliant  
Test  Compliant  
Possess or stockpile  Compliant  
(b) Transfer  Compliant  
(c) Receive transfer or control  Compliant  
(d) Use  Compliant  
Threaten to use  Compliant  
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce  Compliant  
(f) Seek or receive assistance  Compliant  
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment  Compliant  

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)  Voted yes (2022)  
- Participated in 1MSP (2022)  Yes  
- 1MSP delegation size (% women)  10 (30%)  
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)  Voted yes  
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)  Yes  
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)  Voted yes  

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ  Yes (Ratified 1996, Bangkok)  
- Party to the NPT  Yes (Ratified 1970)  
- Ratified the CTBT  Yes (Ratified 2008)  
- Party to the BWC  Yes (Ratified 1991)  
- Party to the CWC  Yes (Ratified 2000)  

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement  Yes  
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline  N/A  
- Small Quantities Protocol  No (Rescinded 2018)  
- Additional Protocol  No (Signed 2005)  
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants  No  
- HEU stocks  No  
- Plutonium stocks  No

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1 [http://bitly.ws/Bdjg](http://bitly.ws/Bdjg)  
2 [http://bitly.ws/BdjD](http://bitly.ws/BdjD)  
3 [http://bitly.ws/BdjP](http://bitly.ws/BdjP)  
4 [http://bitly.ws/BdjS](http://bitly.ws/BdjS)  
5 [http://bitly.ws/BdjN](http://bitly.ws/BdjN)  
6 [http://bitly.ws/Bdk2](http://bitly.ws/Bdk2)
Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Maldives said that it is ‘unfortunate’ that more states have not yet ratified or acceded to the TPNW, adding that it is proud to be among those that have done so.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Maldives welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force and the convening of its First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP), ‘where the Vienna declaration and action plan had been successfully adopted’.²

The Maldives was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’³

In January 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, the Maldives recommended that Lithuania ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.⁴

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The Maldives should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- The Maldives should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

---

Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Malta said that the ‘current bleak geopolitical situation has created an even greater sense of urgency’ in moving forward with ‘concrete actions to implement our obligations under the TPNW’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Malta said: ‘We strongly believe in the benefits of this humanitarian-led initiative – which complements the NPT. … The TPNW strengthens the global norm against these weapons and fills a legal gap as the first outright prohibition on nuclear weapons.’2 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Malta and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Malta noted that it was among the first 50 states to ratify the TPNW – enabling its entry into force – and ‘continues to advocate for the universalisation of the TPNW and calls, on this occasion, on states that have not yet done so to accede to this important Treaty for nuclear disarmament.’4

Malta was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’5

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Malta should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Malta should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

Malta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
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<td>21 Sep 2020 (Ratification)</td>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 27 Jan 2021</td>
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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes
1MSP delegation size (% women) | 5 (40%)
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2001) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No (Rescinded 2021) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

2 http://bit.ly/2dwF
4 http://bit.ly/2dCN
5 http://bit.ly/2dcf
Mexico served as a vice-president of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. The meeting approved the nomination of the Mexican ambassador Juan Ramón de la Fuente to serve as president of the Second Meeting of States Parties, to be held in New York 27 November to 1 December 2023.¹

Together with New Zealand, Mexico was also appointed by the 1MSP as co-chair of an informal working group responsible for promoting implementation of Article 4 of the TPNW, in particular with respect to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities to oversee such work.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Mexico described the TPNW as ‘the logical culmination of international law and the conviction of the [UN] General Assembly regarding the intrinsically immoral nature of nuclear weapons’.² Mexico also delivered a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference on behalf of 65 TPNW-supporting states that urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Mexico said that it has ‘proudly promoted and will continue to promote’ the TPNW. It described the Treaty as ‘complementary to, fully compatible with and ‘mutually reinforcing’ of the NPT, and ‘a tangible expression of the obligations under its Article VI’. It also said that ‘The TPNW gets more and more signatures and ratifications and continues, inexorably, its path towards universality’.⁴

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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¹ http://bit.ly/BdfH
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Mongolia urged ‘all the states to accede to this significant Treaty, which will forge a new momentum toward achieving a world free of nuclear weapons’.

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Mongolia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Mongolia described the TPNW as ‘instrumental in achieving the objectives of the total elimination of nuclear weapons’ and hailed its entry into force in 2021 as ‘a milestone in the international efforts in banning these weapons’. It also welcomed the adoption by consensus of a declaration and action plan at the 1MSP, and said: ‘We are confident that these documents will enhance the implementation of the Treaty’s objective of achieving a total elimination of nuclear weapons’.

Mongolia was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Mongolia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Mongolia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Mongolia should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

### TPNW STATUS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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<td>10 Mar 2022</td>
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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

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<td>Test</td>
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<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
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<td>(d) Use</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW voting and participation

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote):** Voted yes (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022):** Yes
- **1MSP delegation size (% women):** 3 (33%)
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017):** Voted yes
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017):** Yes
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258):** Voted yes

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- **Party to an NWFZ:** Yes (Declared 1992, unilateral)
- **Party to the NPT:** Yes (Ratified 1969)
- **Ratified the CTBT:** Yes (Ratified 1997)
- **Party to the BWC:** Yes (Ratified 1972)
- **Party to the CWC:** Yes (Ratified 1995)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- **Safeguards agreement:** Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline:** N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol:** Yes (Original)
- **Additional Protocol:** Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants:** No
- **HEU stocks:** No
- **Plutonium stocks:** No
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Namibia said: ‘We must acknowledge that any use of nuclear weapons has devastating humanitarian consequences, and that these weapons continue to be an existential risk to humanity.’\(^1\) On 25 February 2022, Namibia also acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and on 4 July 2022 it upgraded its Original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA to a Modified SQP.

In the margins of the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Namibia chaired an African Group meeting to promote universalisation of the TPNW.\(^2\)

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Namibia said that it is ‘encouraged by the entry into force of the TPNW and the progress in its implementation’. ‘The TPNW remains a major step towards a world free of nuclear weapons and, if we are genuine in our pursuit towards disarmament, we have a collective responsibility to ensure its universalisation,’ it said.\(^3\)

In November 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, Namibia recommended that Brazil ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.\(^4\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Namibia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Namibia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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1. http://bitly.ws/BftC
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, Nauru noted that it is a state party to the TPNW and encouraged ‘those member states who have yet to ratify the TPNW to do so, so we are united in the global goal for a peaceful and just world free of nuclear weapons’.1

Nauru was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.2

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Nauru is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: ‘We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.’ The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).3

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Nauru should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nauru should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Nauru should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1986, Rarotonga)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1982)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2001)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/Bfu4
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
3 http://bitly.ws/BdE3
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022, Philip Twyford, New Zealand’s Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, said: ‘Nuclear weapons are never the answer. But our Treaty can be.’

The 1MSP appointed New Zealand and Mexico as co-chairs of an informal working group responsible for promoting implementation of Article 4 of the TPNW, in particular with respect to the future designation of a competent international authority or authorities to oversee such work.

In a video statement to an ICAN forum held in the days preceding the 1MSP, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, urged states to move ‘from mutually assured destruction to mutually assured disarmament’ under the TPNW.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, New Zealand expressed concern that ‘the nuclear-weapon states and many of their allies are doubling down on deterrence’. ‘More nuclear weapons – whether in the hands of the existing nuclear-weapon states or others – will not make us safer,’ it said.

During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, Ardern said: ‘The only way to guarantee our people that they will be safe from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is for them not to exist. That’s why Aotearoa New Zealand calls on all states that share this conviction to join the [TPNW].’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, New Zealand described the 1MSP as ‘a rare bright spot and a timely opportunity to reiterate our unequivocal rejection of nuclear weapons’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022, Nicaragua said: “The greatest desire of the inhabitants of Mother Earth is for nuclear weapons to disappear, which are a latent threat to all humanity, including the very peoples of the countries that manufacture and possess them.”

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Nicaragua welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW, “which for the first time in history prohibits the existence, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and even nuclear tests”. It also noted that the TPNW complements the NPT and called for its universalisation. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Nicaragua and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Nicaragua welcomed the ‘successful results’ of the 1MSP to the TPNW and emphasised that the Treaty ‘contributes to the strengthening of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime’.

Nicaragua was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Nicaragua should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 2 (100%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Abstained

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1967, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2000)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1999)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

http://bitly.ws/BfvH
http://bitly.ws/Bfvi
http://bitly.ws/BjdS
http://bitly.ws/BfvQ
http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022, Nigeria said: ‘The prohibition of nuclear weapon programmes is a necessary step towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Nigeria expressed full support for the TPNW: ‘Rather than undermine the NPT, the nuclear ban treaty offers a strong and complementary process in furtherance of the disarmament pathways of the NPT.’ In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Nigeria and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Nigeria noted its role as a member of the ‘core group’ of states that promoted the negotiation of the TPNW and reiterated its support for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Nigeria urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called “nuclear umbrella”, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Nigeria was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nigeria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Nigeria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 8 (13%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2001, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1968)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1999)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Rescinded 2012)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: Cleared
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/Bgtb
2 http://bitly.ws/Bgtg
3 http://bitly.ws/BddS
4 http://bitly.ws/Bgtm
5 http://bitly.ws/Bght
6 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
In 2021, Niue adopted The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Act, which is explicitly aimed at giving effect to the TPNW. Niue thus became one of the first states parties that has adopted national legislation specifically to implement the TPNW, in accordance with the Treaty's Article 5.

Niue participated in a virtual Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021 to prepare for the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in 2022.¹

Niue acceded to the TPNW on 6 August 2020, the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. The Premier of Niue, Dalton Tagelagi, issued a national statement on the occasion that said: ‘Niue is honoured to accede to the Treaty on the 2017 Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and draw us closer to witnessing this very significant Treaty enter into force. ... [N]o state is immune to the threats and consequences of nuclear weapons. ... We recall the vision and values of our Pacific Leaders for a region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy and productive lives. As a global citizen we renew our pledge to ensuring the achievement of this vision and endeavour to uphold Niue’s commitment to the international community in the enforcement and implementation of this treaty including the enactment of national legislation in Niue. ... We are hopeful that more States join us in this united commitment to enter this Treaty into force in the near future and eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.’³

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Niue should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.

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* Through territorial application by New Zealand
3 https://bit.ly/3m29EB9
Palau participated in the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Palau is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: ‘We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.’ The statement also said: ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the 1MSP.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Palau should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire  Compliant
(b) Test  Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile  Compliant
(d) Transfer  Compliant
(e) Receive transfer or control  Compliant
(f) Use  Compliant
(g) Threaten to use  Compliant
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce  Compliant
(i) Seek or receive assistance  Compliant
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment  Compliant

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (100%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1995)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2007)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 2003)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2003)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1. [http://bitly.ws/Bdcf](http://bitly.ws/Bdcf)
2. [http://bitly.ws/BdE3](http://bitly.ws/BdE3)
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022, Panama said that the meeting provided ‘a historic opportunity’ to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Panama welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force as a ‘historic milestone for nuclear disarmament’ and for ensuring full compliance with Article VI of the NPT.² In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Panama and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Panama welcomed the convening of the 1MSP and expressed concern at the ‘lack of concrete progress on the part of the states possessing nuclear weapons, regarding the fulfilment of the commitments and legal obligations contained in the NPT’.⁴

Panama was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.⁵

In November 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, Panama recommended that Tunisia and Indonesia ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Panama should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

2. http://bitly.ws/BfVX
Paraguay

Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Paraguay commented that the large and growing number of states adhering to the Treaty is ‘undeniable evidence of the important achievement that this Treaty signifies for the global architecture relating to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Paraguay said that the NPT and TPNW are complementary. It called for the success of the 1MSP to be replicated at the NPT Review Conference.2 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Paraguay and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Paraguay said that the declaration and action plan adopted by the 1MSP ‘not only presents us with a series of practical measures for the full implementation of the Treaty, but is also in line with the application of Article VI of the NPT’. It also said that the declaration and action plan ‘are clear examples of political commitment and how we can collectively work towards the elimination of these weapons’, and called on states ‘that are not party to the TPNW to sign and ratify it without delay’.4 Paraguay was also one of co-sponsors for the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2022.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Paraguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Paraguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compliant
(b) Test Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile Compliant
(d) Transfer Compliant
(e) Receive transfer or control Compliant
(f) Use Compliant
(g) Threaten to use Compliant
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compliant
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compliant
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compliant

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022) Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) 3 (67%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1969, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 1976)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1994)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

1 http://bitly.ws/Bfyr
2 http://bitly.ws/Bfyv
3 http://bitly.ws/Bjds
4 http://bitly.ws/Bfyy
5 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Peru said: ‘The conference that brings us together today is a fundamental chance to advance the objective of universalisation of the TPNW and design joint strategies for its complete implementation.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Peru described the TPNW as ‘an instrument that, in a legal and practical sense, complements the NPT and reinforces the legal framework for nuclear disarmament’ and ‘a significant step forward in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.’

In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Peru and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Peru said that it has promoted the TPNW ‘as part of its humanitarian commitments’. The failure of the recent NPT Review Conference ‘reaffirmed the relevance of the TPNW as the path to follow until nuclear weapons are entirely eliminated’, it said.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Peru emphasised the ‘great importance and relevance’ of the TPNW in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Peru was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Peru should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Peru should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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At the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in June 2022, the Philippines said: 'The humanitarian thrust of the TPNW becomes even more relevant today in the face of an increasingly insecure global security environment. ... This first meeting provides us the opportunity to act with wisdom, decisiveness, and a renewed sense of purpose and urgency to reinvigorate the nuclear disarmament agenda.'

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Philippines said that 'the Filipino people’s aspiration to achieve freedom from the threat of nuclear weapons’ inspired it to join the TPNW. Nuclear weapons ‘are repugnant to global public consciences’ and have been ‘outlawed by the TPNW,’ it said. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, the Philippines and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’. Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Philippines stressed that nuclear deterrence is ‘an obsolete security concept’ and nuclear weapons are ‘a source of insecurity, posing humanitarian risks and existential threat to all mankind’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Philippines called on states that have not done so to accede to the TPNW. The Philippines was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’ The Philippines is an interesting example of how TPNW membership and US security guarantees are not as incompatible as is often alleged. In November 2022, US Vice President Kamala Harris travelled to the Philippines to launch ‘new initiatives to strengthen the US-Philippines Alliance’. Washington will defend the Philippines if it comes under attack in the South China Sea, pledged Harris, reaffirming the United States’ ‘unwavering’ commitment. A White House statement issued on the occasion said: ‘Now and always, the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Philippines is ironclad.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The Philippines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Philippines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
Saint Kitts and Nevis participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.”

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Saint Kitts and Nevis is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said “CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].”

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Saint Kitts and Nevis should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Kitts and Nevis should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Status

<table>
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<td>26 Sep 2019</td>
<td>9 Aug 2020 (Ratification)</td>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 18 Jan 2021</td>
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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Yes
1MSP delegation size (% women) | 1 (0%)
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1995, Tlatelolco) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1993) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2005) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1991) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2004) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

1 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
2 http://bitly.ws/BfAN
Saint Lucia participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Saint Lucia is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said ‘CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saint Lucia should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Saint Lucia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

Saint Lucia

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<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 19 Jan 2021</td>
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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes (100%)
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1995, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1979)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1986)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

2 http://bit.ly/BfAN
In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said ‘CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].’2

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

1 http://bitly.ws/BddS
2 http://bitly.ws/BfAN
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Samoa said: ‘At this important meeting, we must commit to concrete actions to implement, to the fullest extent possible, our obligations as states parties to the TPNW.’ It also stated that ‘For its part, the Pacific is only too well aware of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear detonation as a result of its own experience, with over 300 nuclear weapon tests carried out over many years in our region.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Samoa delivered a statement on behalf of the Pacific Small Island Developing States, which noted the entry into force of the TPNW in 2021 and the convening of its 1MSP. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Samoa and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

Samoa was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In November 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, Samoa recommended that Brazil ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative and other necessary measures.
- Samoa should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

### TPNW STATUS

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<td>20 Sep 2017</td>
<td>26 Sep 2018 (Ratification)</td>
<td>22 Jan 2021</td>
<td>Received 23 Feb 2021</td>
</tr>
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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- (b) Transfer: Compliant
- (c) Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- (d) Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- (e) Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- (f) Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

### TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Yes
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1985, Rarotonga)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1975)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2002)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 2017)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2002)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No
During the high-level segment of the UN General Assembly in September 2022, San Marino’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Luca Beccari, urged all states committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world to join the TPNW. ‘Only by honouring and reinvigorating our multilateral agreements will we be able to put humanity on a new path towards a world free of nuclear weapons,’ he said.¹

San Marino participated in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in June 2022, but did not make a statement.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, San Marino said that nuclear weapons ‘do not bring security’ but rather their mere existence ‘results in a great risk for humanity’. It stressed that it is in ‘the interest of the very survival of humanity that nuclear weapons are never used again, under any circumstances’. It also welcomed the TPNW’s adoption and entry into force, as well as the Vienna Declaration and Action Plan adopted at the 1MSP, and said: ‘This Treaty represents a new step towards the implementation of Article VI of the NPT and towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons.’² In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, San Marino and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, San Marino said that the TPNW’s entry into force represented ‘a historic milestone in our disarmament architecture’ and welcomed the increasing number of signatories and parties.⁴

San Marino was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’⁵

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- San Marino should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- San Marino should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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¹ [http://bitly.ws/BfBv]
² [http://bitly.ws/BfBz]
³ [http://bitly.ws/BddS]
⁴ [http://bitly.ws/BfBG]
⁵ [http://bitly.ws/Bdcf]
Pursuant to Article 2 of the TPNW, the Seychelles submitted its declaration to the UN Secretary-General on 3 March 2022 confirming that it does not own, possess, or control nuclear weapons, has never done so, and does not host any other state’s nuclear weapons on its territory.¹

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which the Seychelles is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Seychelles should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- The Seychelles should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2021)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): N/A
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2014, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1985)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1979)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1993)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

¹ http://bitly.ws/BfCB
² http://bitly.ws/Bdih
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Alvin Botes, South Africa's Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, said: 'It has indeed been a long journey and now we are finally here, working on the implementation of this vital Treaty. ... We must recognise that this Treaty is the democratic wish of the overwhelming majority of UN member states and the people of the world. No longer should the world's peoples be held hostage to the unspeakable terror of these weapons.'

Together with Malaysia, South Africa was appointed by the 1MSP as a co-chair of an informal working group responsible for promoting universalisation of the TPNW. In this capacity, it co-facilitated a high-level signing and ratification for the TPNW in the margins of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2022. Five states signed and two ratified the Treaty on this occasion.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, South Africa said that the momentum behind the TPNW is 'unstoppable', and that the Treaty 'goes hand in hand with the intention of the NPT.'

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, South Africa opined that 'the TPNW serves as a catalyst for much overdue progress in the disarmament pillar of the NPT, and in fulfilling the historic bargain between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states.'

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, South Africa encouraged all states that have not yet done so 'to ratify the TPNW and join the community of nations that are committed to a world free of nuclear weapons. They have a moral duty to join and we have a moral duty to bring them in, under the TPNW umbrella.'

RECOMMENDATIONS

- South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

1 http://bitly.ws/BfEb
2 http://bitly.ws/BdfH
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdjo
4 http://bitly.ws/BfEg
5 http://bitly.ws/BfEj
6 http://bitly.ws/BfEm
Palestine brought into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 7 September 2022, in accordance with its obligation under Article 3(2) of the TPNW, a few weeks after the 18-month deadline. Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Palestine hailed the TPNW’s entry into force and the convening of the meeting as a ‘victory’ for multilateralism, the UN Charter and international law.¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Palestine said that the TPNW was ‘long overdue, as there can be no rational justification for the privileged status granted, de facto, to nuclear weapons over other weapons of mass destruction’. It said that their use and threat of use ‘have always been illegal’.² In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Palestine and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Palestine noted that ‘it has taken seven decades’ – since the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the formation of the United Nations – ‘to finally formalise a just treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons to complement the NPT and help advance its goals’. It added: ‘There is no need for more stark reminders of the urgent and long-overdue imperative to rid the world of one of the most inhumane, illegal, dangerous, and indiscriminate weapons ever created,’ it added. ‘We reject the fatalism that the existence of nuclear weapons is a reality and a necessity and we also reject that their spread is inevitable and unpreventable’⁴.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Palestine should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Palestine should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Palestine should also sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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¹ [http://bitly.ws/BfKh](http://bitly.ws/BfKh)
² [http://bitly.ws/BfKm](http://bitly.ws/BfKm)
³ [http://bitly.ws/BddS](http://bitly.ws/BddS)
⁴ [http://bitly.ws/BfKt](http://bitly.ws/BfKt)
Thailand served as a vice-president of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It urged states to work together to ‘cement the Treaty’s status as a universal legally binding norm against the existence of nuclear weapons’.1

The 1MSP appointed Thailand and Ireland as informal facilitators to further explore and articulate the possible areas of tangible cooperation between the TPNW and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and other relevant nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. They will submit recommendations for distribution through a Coordination Committee, and report to the Second Meeting of States Parties.2

At the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August 2022, Thailand said that the successful conclusion of the 1MSP reaffirmed ‘the compatibility and complementarity of the TPNW to the NPT, notably Article VI’.3

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Thailand welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and the successful adoption of the declaration and action plan at 1MSP as ‘important developments’ in the field of nuclear disarmament.4

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Thailand said that it is working systematically with others to advance the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, ‘including through promotion of the TPNW, its universalisation and its complementarity with the NPT and other relevant frameworks’.5 It described ‘the recent positive developments’ under the framework of the TPNW as ‘encouraging’.6

Thailand was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.7

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bguv
2 http://bitly.ws/BdfH
3 http://bitly.ws/BguC
4 http://bitly.ws/BguF
5 http://bitly.ws/BguI
6 http://bitly.ws/BguM
7 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Timor-Leste deposited its instrument of ratification for the TPNW with the UN Secretary-General on 20 June 2022, the eve of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna. On 1 August 2022 it also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Timor-Leste’s Council of Ministers approved a draft resolution in February 2022 to ratify the TPNW, which the National Parliament adopted with unanimous support on 25 April 2022. Speaking in support of the resolution, Adaljíza Magno, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Timor-Leste, said: “We know the consequence of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and we don’t want the world to experience the same thing.”

When Timor-Leste attended the 1MSP as an observer, as the Treaty had not yet entered into force for it, Magno said that Timor-Leste “continues to believe in the power of peaceful dialogue and constructive role played by all states to promote a conducive atmosphere for a peaceful denuclearisation of the world.”

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Timor-Leste and 64 other TPNW supporters urged “all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.”

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Timor-Leste should submit its declaration under Article 2 of the TPNW to the UN Secretary-General without further delay.
- Timor-Leste should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Timor-Leste should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Timor-Leste should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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1. [http://bitly.ws/BgvM](http://bitly.ws/BgvM)
4. [http://bitly.ws/Bgw9](http://bitly.ws/Bgw9)
5. [http://bitly.ws/BddS](http://bitly.ws/BddS)
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Trinidad and Tobago said that the TPNW “is a decisive, positive step towards achieving a world safe and secure from mutually assured destruction.”

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, Amery Browne, encouraged states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the TPNW. “Trinidad and Tobago regards the TPNW as a decisive, progressive step towards ridding the world of the ominous threat of nuclear confrontation, whether by calculation or by error,” he said.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Trinidad and Tobago highlighted its participation in the 1MSP and the adoption of an action plan and declaration.

Trinidad and Tobago was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon “all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.”

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Trinidad and Tobago should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Trinidad and Tobago should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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1. http://bitly.ws/Bgwv
3. http://bitly.ws/BgwA
Tuvalu was among the first 50 states that ratified or acceded to the TPNW, bringing the Treaty as a whole into force on 22 January 2021. On 31 March 2022, Tuvalu ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and on 1 December 2022 it upgraded its Original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA to a Modified SQP.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Tuvalu, together with 64 other TPNW supporters, urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.1

The Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Tuvalu is a member, delivered a joint statement at the NPT Review Conference which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The joint statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Tuvalu should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Tuvalu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Tuvalu should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Tuvalu should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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1 [http://bitly.ws/BdS](http://bitly.ws/BdS)
2 [http://bitly.ws/BdE3](http://bitly.ws/BdE3)
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Uruguay said: ‘Now more than ever, we must consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that the use of nuclear weapons could bring’. They are absolutely contrary to the inalienable right to life.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Uruguay said that the TPNW ‘constitutes a milestone in nuclear disarmament, a significant commitment in favour of international peace and security’. It invited states that have not yet done so to ratify the TPNW, adding that the Treaty ‘strengthens the disarmament regime’.2 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Uruguay and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Uruguay described the 1MSP as ‘a milestone in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as a significant commitment in the quest for international peace and security’.4

Uruguay was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bgzr
2 http://bitly.ws/Bgzy
3 http://bitly.ws/BddS
4 http://bitly.ws/BgzE
5 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Vanuatu was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Vanuatu is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).

In November 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, Vanuatu recommended that India ratify or accede to the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Vanuatu should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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**Vanuatu**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

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<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
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<td>(d) Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
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<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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**TPNW voting and participation**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
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<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
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**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

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<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
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<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
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<td>Party to the BWC</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 2005)</td>
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**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
2 http://bitly.ws/BdE3
3 http://bitly.ws/BftW
Addressing the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Venezuela said that 'Nuclear weapons are morally unacceptable and must be completely eliminated.'

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Venezuela and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.2

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Venezuela said: ‘Nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction constitute a latent risk that threatens all forms of life on the planet. In an era characterised by increasingly growing conflicts and tensions, the existence of these weapons and their inclusion in the security and defence doctrines of certain countries constitutes a common threat to all of humanity.’3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Venezuela said that it hopes ‘that the entry into force of the [TPNW] will bring us closer, sooner rather than later, to the global goal of eliminating nuclear weapons’.4

Venezuela was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.5

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Venezuela should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.
- Venezuela should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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1 http://bitly.ws/BgA4
2 http://bitly.ws/BddS
3 http://bitly.ws/BgAm
4 http://bitly.ws/BgAp
5 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf

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**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

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<td>Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
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<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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**TPNW voting and participation**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>3 (67%)</td>
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<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 1970, Tlatelolco) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975)              |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2002)              |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1978)              |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997)              |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Speaking at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Viet Nam said: ‘This significant meeting reflects the international community’s desire for a world free of nuclear weapons.’ ... ‘We are confident that this process will help effectively contribute to the universalisation of this vital legally binding instrument.’¹

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam, Kim Ngoc Ha, said that the NPT is complemented by the TPNW. He welcomed the outcomes of the 1MSP and called on others to join the TPNW.² In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Viet Nam and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Viet Nam described the universalisation of the TPNW as a ‘critical measure’, and vowed to ‘strictly implement its obligations’ under the TPNW and other disarmament treaties.⁴

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Viet Nam said: ‘Given the potential catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons to human health, and environment, my delegation encourages other states to sign and ratify the TPNW as soon as possible.’⁵ Viet Nam was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Viet Nam should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
- Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented domestically, through legal, administrative, and other necessary measures.

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¹ http://bitly.ws/BgAx
² http://bitly.ws/BgAF
³ http://bitly.ws/BddS
⁴ http://bitly.ws/BgAL
⁵ http://bitly.ws/BgAN
⁶ http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Algeria attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Algeria said that its decision to sign the TPNW in 2017 was informed by its own experience of the ‘dire consequences’, both environmental and humanitarian, of French nuclear tests carried out on its territory. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Algeria and 64 other TPNW supporters urged all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramtane Lamamra, welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force and the ‘positive and ambitious results’ achieved at the 1MSP. He stressed ‘the necessity of all states’ adherence to the ban treaty’ given the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Algeria should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

Algeria

<table>
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TPNW STATUS

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire
    Compliant
(b) Test
    Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile
    Compliant
(d) Transfer
    Compliant
(e) Use
    Compliant
(f) Threaten to use
    Compliant
(g) Assist, encourage, or induce
    Compliant
(h) Seek or receive assistance
    Compliant
(i) Allow stationing, installation, deployment
    Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) Observer
1MSP delegation size (% women) 2 (0%)
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Rated 1998, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1995)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Rated 2003, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 2001)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Rated 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol No
- Additional Protocol No (Signed 2018)
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

1 https://bit.ly/3Ef1nr2
4 https://bit.ly/3KMs92n
In February 2022, the Association Angola 2000, an ICAN partner organisation, convened a workshop in the capital, Luanda, to share perspectives on the ratification of the TPNW. Participants included representatives of Angola’s foreign and defence ministries, non-government organisations, churches and the media.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Angola warned: ‘Nuclear weapons pose a growing catastrophic danger to humanity, and if states continue to increase and improve nuclear arsenals our collective security will be in danger.’²

Angola was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’³

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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1. [https://bit.ly/3y2b0TT](https://bit.ly/3y2b0TT)
Barbados was one of five states that signed the TPNW on 22 September 2022 at a high-level ceremony at the UN in New York.

Barbados was among the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Barbados delivered a statement on behalf of the member states in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), announcing that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said ‘CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Barbados should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Barbados should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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Brazil attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. ‘Brazil is honoured to participate as an observer in this historic first Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW,’ it said, noting its active role in the Treaty’s negotiation in 2017.1

The text of the TPNW is currently under consideration by the Congress of Brazil, with a view to its ratification. It was submitted to the Congress in 2018, with no action taken as yet. The prospects for its approval appear to have increased significantly with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the Brazilian presidency in October 2022.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Brazil described the adoption of the TPNW as a great achievement, noting that it ‘delegitimises [nuclear] weapons as instruments of power’. It emphasised that ‘nothing in the TPNW stands in the way for the realisation of the step-by-step or gradual approach’.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Brazil welcomed the adoption of a declaration and action plan at the 1MSP and said that it ‘fully subscribes’ to the ‘unequivocal condemnation of any and all nuclear threats’.3

In November 2022, TPNW states parties Samoa and Namibia, in accordance with their Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, recommended that Brazil ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Brazil should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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1 https://bit.ly/3SDrX0s
3 https://bit.ly/3lU64g
Brunei attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Brunei said that it remains committed to the TPNW and highlighted the adoption of the political declaration and action plan at the 1MSP 'which will help set the course for the Treaty's implementation and are important steps toward our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons'.

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Brunei and 64 other TPNW supporters urged 'all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay'.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Brunei should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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**Brunei**

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**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
- Particpated in 1MSP (2022) Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) 1(100%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1996, Bangkok)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1985)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2013)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1991)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso, Olivia Ragnaghnewendé Rouamba, signed the TPNW at a high-level ceremony at the UN in New York on 22 September 2022. In a speech at the United Nations later that week, she said that nuclear weapons ‘constitute a threat to the survival of all humanity because of their humanitarian consequences’.

In a letter to ICAN on 8 December 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs advised that Burkina Faso ‘will take the necessary steps in connection with the ratification of the [TPNW] in accordance with its commitment to building a peaceful, secure and prosperous world free of all nuclear weapons’.

Burkina Faso attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, where it stated: ‘Burkina Faso’s support for the TPNW is unwavering, ... We commit ourselves to make all necessary steps to join it as soon as possible.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Burkina Faso welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force, adding: ‘We are convinced that this Treaty complements the NPT.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Burkina Faso should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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1 https://bit.ly/3ZcFG0G
2 http://bit.ly/3SDzHzw
3 https://bit.ly/3miHTJm
The Central African Republic did not take part in the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017 but was one of the first states to sign the Treaty. The Treaty has not yet been submitted to the National Assembly for approval.

In May 2022, the Central African Republic chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom held a dialogue with parliamentarians on ratification of the TPNW.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which the Central African Republic is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.1

The Central African Republic voted no on the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2022, apparently in error.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW.
Following the inauguration of Gustavo Petro as President of Colombia on 7 August 2022, the government began preparing a bill to be submitted to the Congress which, once enacted, would enable Colombia’s ratification of the TPNW.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Colombia said: ‘The catastrophic, painful and prolonged humanitarian and environmental consequences of any use of nuclear weapons make it necessary to adopt urgent and effective measures for their total elimination … This is a moral imperative and an inescapable responsibility to present and future generations.’\(^1\) In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Colombia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.\(^2\)

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Colombia said that it is ‘our collective ethical and existential responsibility’ to work to avoid ‘the untold suffering’ and ‘global devastation’ wrought by nuclear weapons.\(^3\)

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Djibouti announced that it would adhere to the TPNW as part of its ‘commitment to peace and disarmament’. Djibouti followed up this statement on 9 January 2023, when its Ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Siad Doualeh, signed the Treaty.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Djibouti is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Djibouti should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Djibouti should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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### TPNW STATUS

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<tr>
<td>9 Jan 2023</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW voting and participation

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote):** Voted yes (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022):** No
- **1MSP delegation size (% women):** N/A
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017):** Voted yes
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017):** Yes
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258):** Voted yes

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- **Party to an NWFZ:** No (Signed 1996, Pelindaba)
- **Party to the NPT:** Yes (Acceded 1996)
- **Ratified the CTBT:** Yes (Ratified 2005)
- **Party to the BWC:** No
- **Party to the CWC:** Yes (Ratified 2006)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- **Safeguards agreement:** Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline:** N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol:** Yes (Modified)
- **Additional Protocol:** Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants:** No
- **HEU stocks:** No
- **Plutonium stocks:** No

---

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Equatorial Guinea, Simon Oyono Esono Angue, signed the TPNW at a high-level ceremony at the UN in New York on 22 September 2022. The day before, Equatorial Guinea also ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

On the occasion of Equatorial Guinea’s signature of the TPNW, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simon Oyono Esono Angue, said: ‘Today the world needs the promise of a future without the fear of annihilation that nuclear weapons can cause,’ adding that the TPNW formalises Equatorial Guinea’s ‘firm international conviction that any use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, regardless of its justification.’

Equatorial Guinea was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Equatorial Guinea said that it signed the TPNW based on its commitment ‘to be a contributor to world peace and security, helping to strengthen world regulations against nuclear weapons and promoting efforts towards their total abolition’. It also called on countries that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Equatorial Guinea and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Equatorial Guinea should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Equatorial Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol.

---

2. [https://bit.ly/3ZmZ6Ag](https://bit.ly/3ZmZ6Ag)

---

**TPNW STATUS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
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<th>DECLARATION</th>
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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| Test | Compliant |
| Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (b) Transfer | Compliant |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (d) Use | Compliant |
| Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

---

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

---

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Acceded 2003, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1984)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2022)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1989)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

---

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: No (Approved 1986)
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

---

2. [https://bit.ly/3ZmZ6Ag](https://bit.ly/3ZmZ6Ag)
Ghana attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. During the meeting, Thomas Mbomba, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, announced that the government of Ghana is considering the legal instrument that would seal the ratification of the TPNW. 'It is our hope that our country will soon join the ranks of state parties, before the next Meeting of States Parties,' he said.¹

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Ghana called on all states to adhere to the TPNW. 'As the only legally binding global treaty that outlaws nuclear weapons, Ghana believes that the [TPNW] helps to address the existing loopholes in international law regarding the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,' it said.²

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Ghana and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

Ghana was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’⁴

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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¹ https://bit.ly/3ZqAw1f
³ https://bit.ly/3kRSlHq
Haiti's Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship, Jean Victor Geneus, signed the TPNW at a high-level ceremony at the UN in New York on 22 September 2022.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Haiti is a member, announced that they were all either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty. The statement further said ‘CARICOM is concerned that nuclear weapons continue to figure as a key component of the security doctrine of some states. Promotion of or reliance on nuclear deterrence as a security strategy merely perpetuates the false notion that we are safer by the assurance of mutual destruction. CARICOM resoundly rejects this approach and reminds that the very existence of nuclear weapons continues to present an unacceptable risk to both people and planet. It is for this reason that CARICOM Member States support the implementation of the [TPNW].’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Haiti should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Haiti should ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

---

Indonesia attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, saying that ‘Indonesia is proud to join this notable day, to be part of the right side of history … Nuclear disarmament remains our shared highest priority.’ Referring to its process to ratify the TPNW, Indonesia also announced that it ‘has already established supportive laws and regulations to accommodate the Treaty into our national regulation system.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi, said: ‘Nuclear disarmament must remain a priority for all of us.’ Indonesia looked forward to seeing more signatories to the TPNW, she said. ‘Just like dinosaurs, nuclear weapons must only belong to the past.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Indonesia said: ‘In achieving nuclear disarmament, we shall aim for the universalisation of the [TPNW].’ It also highlighted the successful convening of the 1MSP, noting that ‘This success offered hope in the nuclear disarmament landscape.’

Indonesia was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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<tr>
<td>ENTRY INTO FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- (b) Transfer: Compliant
- (c) Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- (d) Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- (e) Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- (f) Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

### TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 10 (20%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1997, Bangkok)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1979)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2012, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1992)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safeguards agreement</th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
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<td>HEU stocks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdbi
2 http://bitly.ws/BdbY
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdc5
4 http://bitly.ws/Bdca
5 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Libya

Attending as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Libya called on all states ‘to abandon the use of weapons of mass destruction and to end the arms race, in order to uphold international peace and security’.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Libya said that it participated in the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017 due to its concern about the ongoing nuclear arms race and its ‘uncontrollable risks’, and called on nuclear-armed states ‘to show their good faith and solidarity with all efforts to rid the world of these lethal weapons and to accede to this Treaty without delay in order to achieve its universality’.²

Libya was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.³

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
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</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compliant
(b) Test Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile Compliant
(d) Transfer Compliant
(e) Receive transfer or control Compliant
(f) Use Compliant
(g) Threaten to use Compliant
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compliant
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compliant
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) Observer
1MSP delegation size (% women) 12 (8%)
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 2005, Pelindaba)
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1975)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2004)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1982)
Party to the CWC Yes (Acceded 2004)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks Cleared
Plutonium stocks No

¹ http://bitly.ws/Bdln
Liechtenstein attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, but did not make a statement.

In December 2022, in response to an inquiry from the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor about the status of Liechtenstein's ratification process for the TPNW, the foreign ministry referred to a letter that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique Hasler, sent to ICAN one year earlier, in which she wrote that 'Liechtenstein forms a Customs Union with Switzerland and certain Swiss laws apply to Liechtenstein. Those laws include areas falling under the purview of the TPNW. Due to this circumstance we have to await the finalisation of the domestic processes in Switzerland before a ratification can take place. However, we will be monitoring the process and I can assure you that Liechtenstein will continue to strive for ratification in due time.'

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Liechtenstein spoke of its participation in the 1MSP and noted that it 'strongly supports' the Treaty.

Referring to the ongoing war in Ukraine, Liechtenstein said in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022 that Russia's actions have 'brought home in stark terms that the risk of the use of nuclear weapons is indeed real' and 'so long as they exist, such weapons will never make the world a safer place'. It added that this understanding 'is the animating force behind the [TPNW], which strengthens the NPT framework in defining new and concrete perspectives for nuclear disarmament. We hope that more states will join the Treaty.'

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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1 Email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from N. Schmid, Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Education and Sport, Principality of Liechtenstein, 13 December 2022.
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdis
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdiz
In 2021, Madagascar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, along with the national institute on nuclear issues, prepared a ratification memorandum for the TPNW. Approval by the Council of Ministers and Parliament is pending.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Madagascar is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.1

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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Mozambique attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It announced that ‘currently internal procedures are under way’ in Mozambique to ratify the Treaty ‘as quickly as possible’.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Mozambique is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Mozambique should urgently ratify the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Myanmar welcomed the ‘successful convening’ of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna and said ‘This Treaty, support for which is increasing steadily, is contributing to strengthening norms against nuclear weapons’. The statement also said that Myanmar had planned to ratify the TPNW in 2020, ‘but this was thwarted by the illegal coup staged by the military junta against our people, and against peace.’

Myanmar was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Myanmar noted that the TPNW complements the NPT and emphasised that ‘the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nothing other than their total elimination in a verifiable and irreversible manner’. In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Myanmar and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Myanmar should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(b) Test</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Possess or stockpile</td>
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<td>(d) Transfer</td>
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<td>(e) Receive transfer or control</td>
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<td>Compliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Threaten to use</td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
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<tr>
<td>(i) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compliant</td>
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<tr>
<td>(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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TPNW voting and participation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Result</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted yes (2022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
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Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

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<th>Treaty</th>
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<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 1992)</td>
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<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2016)</td>
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<td>Party to the BWC</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
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IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>Yes (Original)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>No (Signed 2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
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<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
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1. http://bitly.ws/BdG0
3. http://bitly.ws/BdG1
Attending as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, Nepal said: ‘We should redouble our diplomatic efforts with strong political will to create an environment of mutual trust and confidence and divert precious resources used for armament towards achieving our common development aspirations,’ adding that it is committed to ratifying the TPNW ‘at the earliest possible’.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Nepal welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and the ‘successful convening’ of its 1MSP. In a closing statement, Nepal and 64 other TPNW supporters urged all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Nepal said: ‘We need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture including NPT, TPNW and [Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]. We stand for the universality of nuclear disarmament treaties.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Nepal said that the TPNW ‘complements and strengthens the objective of general and complete disarmament’ and reiterated its commitment to ratifying the Treaty.

Nepal was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Nepal again said of the TPNW that it ‘is committed to ratifying the treaty at the earliest possible.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Nepal should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
- Nepal should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Note: The TPNW status table is not included in the natural text representation.
Niger attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022. At the meeting, it announced that its ratification process for the Treaty ‘is progressing and certainly high on the agenda’.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Niger said that the TPNW ‘must be perceived by all as “complementary” and “non-contradictory” to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and welcomed the convening of the 1MSP ‘and its conclusions’.²

In a closing statement to the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT in August 2022, Niger and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Niger should urgently ratify the TPNW.

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¹ http://bitly.ws/Bfw5
² http://bitly.ws/Bfwr
³ http://bitly.ws/BddS
On 22 September 2022, Sao Tome and Principe ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Ratification of the TPNW is pending. Sao Tome and Principe’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in July 2021 that a ratification memorandum for the TPNW had been prepared and would soon be submitted to the Cabinet, after which the approval of the Parliament would be sought.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Sao Tome and Principe is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Sao Tome and Principe should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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### TPNW STATUS

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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
- Test: Compliant
- Possess or stockpile: Compliant
- Transfer: Compliant
- Receive transfer or control: Compliant
- Use: Compliant
- Threaten to use: Compliant
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
- Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

### TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2021)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No (Signed 1996, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1983)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2022)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1979)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2003)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: No (Approved 2019)
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Modified approved 2019)
- Additional Protocol: No (Approved 2019)
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1 Communications from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ICAN, 1 July 2021
2 http://bit.ly/Bdih
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone, David J. Francis, signed the TPNW at a high-level ceremony at the UN in New York on 22 September 2022. On 31 October, Sierra Leone also signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Sierra Leone welcomed the adoption and entry into force of the TPNW, which it said ‘serves as a complementary instrument to the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and will end the long impasse in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations’. Sierra Leone also noted that it was ‘an active participant’ in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 and has continued ‘to support the Treaty at every given opportunity’, including with its recent signature. ‘We call on all member states who have not done so to sign and ratify the TPNW. There is an urgent need to make concrete and systematic progress towards this end,’ said the statement.1

Sierra Leone was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Sierra Leone should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Sierra Leone should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

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1 http://bitly.ws/BFCN
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
Sudan is believed to be working on upgrading its status from TPNW signatory to state party.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Sudan said: ‘More efforts must be made for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and without achieving this goal, there will be no lasting peace and security.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Sudan is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Sudan should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Sudan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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1. http://bitly.ws/BfKx
Cabinet and parliamentary approval of Togo’s ratification of the TPNW is pending.

In March 2022, the Togolese chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom convened a training workshop in the capital, Lomé, with government officials and civil society representatives to promote Togo’s ratification of the TPNW.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Togo reaffirmed ‘its position in favour of complete, immediate, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament’ and welcomed the successful convening of the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, including the adoption of an action plan. It also highlighted the commitments on universalisation of the Treaty, assistance to victims of nuclear weapons, measures to clean up the environment, international cooperation and assistance, gender mainstreaming, and an intersessional structure for implementation of the Treaty.²

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 2000, Pelindaba) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970)             |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2004)            |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976)             |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997)             |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

¹ http://bitly.ws/Bgwj
² http://bitly.ws/Bgwn
United Republic of Tanzania

In a statement on the occasion of the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Tanzania announced that its internal ratification process for the TPNW is ‘already ongoing’. It encouraged ‘more states to sign and ratify the Treaty to make the dream of the world free from nuclear weapons realistic’, and noted that ‘what is needed is mutual trust and transparency to achieve the goal.’

Tanzania attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Tanzania welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force.

Tanzania was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26 Sep 2019</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compliant
(b) Test: Compliant
(c) Possess or stockpile: Compliant
(d) Transfer: Compliant
(e) Receive transfer or control: Compliant
(f) Use: Compliant
(g) Threaten to use: Compliant
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce: Compliant
(i) Seek or receive assistance: Compliant
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compliant

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 3 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1998, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1991)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 2019)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/Bgz4
2 http://bitly.ws/Bgza
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdcd
Zambia’s Ministry of Defence had indicated in November 2021 that the government would pursue ratification of the TPNW early in 2022. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has prepared a ratification memorandum. Action by the Parliament is pending.1

Zambia was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date’.2

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Zambia delivered a statement on behalf of the African Group in the UN, which welcomed the adoption of the TPNW and stressed that it ‘does not undermine the NPT, but rather complements and strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its foundation’. The statement also urged ‘all states to support the TPNW by signing and ratifying the Treaty at an early date’.3 In a closing statement to the NPT Review Conference, Zambia and 64 other TPNW supporters urged ‘all states committed to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons to join the TPNW without delay’.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW.
- Zambia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

1 Communications from the Ministry of Defence of Zambia to ICAN, 23 November 2021.
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
3 http://bitly.ws/Bgdg
4 http://bitly.ws/BddS
In the First Committee of the 2021 UN General Assembly, Zimbabwe said that 'consultations, as well as administrative processes for ratification [of the TPNW], are ongoing.'

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Zimbabwe said that it was encouraged by the TPNW’s recent entry into force. ‘Our view is that the [TPNW] complements the NPT and is an important contribution to the disarmament agenda.’ ... ‘We regret that nuclear-weapon states have not embraced that Treaty and hope that, in due course, they will reconsider their positions.’

Zimbabwe was one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, which called upon ‘all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Zimbabwe should urgently ratify the TPNW.

TPNW Status

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compliance in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compliant |
| (b) Test | Compliant |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compliant |
| (d) Transfer | Compliant |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compliant |
| (f) Use | Compliant |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compliant |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compliant |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compliant |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compliant |

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1998, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1991)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 1999)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 1990)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

2 http://bitly.ws/BgFu
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdcf
It is believed that Afghanistan has considered accession to the TPNW, but that this process has stalled with the change of government.

Afghanistan voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of every annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Afghanistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Afghanistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Compatibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Test</td>
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<td>(c) Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<td>(f) Use</td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**

- Voted yes (2022)

- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2003)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2003)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No
Accession to the TPNW remained on Andorra's governmental agenda in 2022. Maria Ubach i Font, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Andorra, wrote in 2019: 'I am confident that soon, once we complete our internal procedures, Andorra will be in a position to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.'

In March 2021, as part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the UN Human Rights Council, Andorra said in response to a recommendation to sign and ratify the TPNW: 'Andorra will examine this possibility.'

Andorra voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2021, and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Andorra maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Andorra should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Test</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(b) Transfer</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TPNW voting and participation**
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**
- Party to an NWFZ No
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1986)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2006)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 2015)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Acceded 2003)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**
- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

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2  https://bit.ly/3ZcujWw
Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Azerbaijan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Azerbaijan delivered a statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which noted the TPNW's entry into force and the convening of its First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna. ‘It is hoped that the Treaty would contribute to furthering the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons,’ the NAM said.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Azerbaijan said that it ‘is strongly committed to its obligations in the areas of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament and will continue supporting international efforts aimed at eliminating the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction [and] achieving the goal of nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Azerbaijan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</table>

Azerbaijan

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 2004) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2000) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No (Rescinded 2015) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

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1 https://bit.ly/3Y5x9LT
The Bahamas has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW, including in 2022, when it was also a co-sponsor.

At the end of 2022, the Bahamas was one of only two states in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) that had not yet become a state party to or signed the TPNW. In a statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, CARICOM announced that all of its member states are now either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty.1.

The Bahamas maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- The Bahamas should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- The Bahamas should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

- (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
- Test Compatible
- Possess or stockpile Compatible
- (b) Transfer Compatible
- (c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
- (d) Use Compatible
- Threaten to use Compatible
- (e) Assist, encourage, or induce Compatible
- (f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
- (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1977, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1976)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2007)
- Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 1986)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 2009)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks No
- Plutonium stocks No

1 https://bit.ly/3mcS5sQ
Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Bahrain maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2022, Bahrain renewed its firm position in support of nuclear disarmament ‘as the only way to ensure that [nuclear] weapons are not used’.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bahrain should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 https://bit.ly/3y1v6hb
In September 2022, the Permanent Mission of Bhutan to the United Nations informed ICAN that the Royal Government of Bhutan 'is in the process of reviewing and studying all international treaties and conventions that Bhutan has not been able to ratify', including the TPNW.¹

Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Bhutan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Bhutan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Bhutan should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
- Bhutan should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

### TPNW STATUS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1985) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1978) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2005) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Original) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

¹ Email to ICAN on 2 September 2022 from the Permanent Mission of Bhutan to the UN in New York.
Burundi attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Burundi maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In December 2022, ICAN partners in Burundi held a multi-stakeholder workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Burundi should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 1 (0%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2009, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1971)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2008)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)
- Ratified the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Its only vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW was in 2018, when it voted yes.

The Cameroonian chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom carried out several activities in the capital, Yaoundé, to promote Cameroon’s accession to the TPNW, including a workshop with various stakeholders in January 2022.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Cameroon said that disarmament is a ‘mechanism of peacekeeping’ and ‘prerequisite for defending our world and our future’.2

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Cameroon is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Cameroon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test                                      | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile                      | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer                              | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control           | Compatible |
| (d) Use                                   | Compatible |
| Threaten to use                           | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce          | Compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance            | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2018)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2010, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2006)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 2013)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1996)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bit.ly/3EKX6msd
2 https://bit.ly/3ENsGGV
3 https://bit.ly/3Y9uVLw
Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. It voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2018, 2020, and 2021. In 2019 and 2022, it did not cast a vote.

Chad maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2022, the Chadian chapter of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, in cooperation with the UN Development Programme, held a debate on the TPNW with the participation of public authorities, media and civil society.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Chad is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the 1MSP. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Chad should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
• Chad should also adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
(b) Test Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile Compatible
(d) Transfer Compatible
(e) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(f) Use Compatible
(g) Threaten to use Compatible
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compatible
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2021)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 2012, Pelindaba)
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1971)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2013)
Party to the BWC No
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 2004)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol Yes (Modified)
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks No
Plutonium stocks No

2 https://bit.ly/3Y9uVLw
Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Cyprus maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Cyprus said: ‘Like other small states, our security relies heavily on the international system of collective security, including the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control regimes. Global security is not served by the existence of nuclear weapons.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

● Cyprus should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Egypt maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Egypt reiterated ‘its concern over the grave threat posed to humanity and international security by the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a few states’, and reaffirmed that ‘the total, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their proliferation, use or threat of use’.¹

Speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, Egypt said that the action plan adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW reflects ‘a commendable political will and true commitment’ by the participating states. ‘As an “effective measure” on nuclear disarmament, the TPNW is fully consistent with and complements the NPT,’ it added.²

In a letter to ICAN dated 2 December 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt indicated that the matter of signing and ratifying the TPNW ‘is subject to an ongoing internal review and assessment by the Egyptian government’.³

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Egypt should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Egypt should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Egypt should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

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2 https://bit.ly/3kQqRlC
Eritrea has indicated that it intends to adhere to the TPNW. In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Eritrea declared the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons to be ‘illegal and immoral’ and described the universalisation of the TPNW as one of a number of ‘critical steps towards complete denuclearisation.’

In 2022 and 2021, Eritrea was one of the co-sponsors of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, which called ‘upon all States that have not yet done so to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date.’

Eritrea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Eritrea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Eritrea should adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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Eswatini has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022, when it was also one of the co-sponsors of the resolution.

Eswatini maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Eswatini is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Eswatini should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Ethiopia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Speaking of the TPNW at the 2020 UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Ethiopia said: ’We have fully supported the treaty and we look forward to ratifying it to facilitate its entry into force.’

In February 2022, the Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organisation, an ICAN partner organisation, convened a meeting in Addis Ababa to mark the first anniversary of the TPNW’s entry into force. In previous years, it also organised workshops with government officials and parliamentarians to promote adherence to the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Ethiopia noted the repeated pronouncements by almost all states ‘that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to humankind and the survival of civilisation’, but lamented the lack of ‘political will to translate our words and resolutions into concrete actions’. It also underscored ‘the primacy of diplomacy to ease global tensions and eliminate the threat of nuclear war’ and called on all states ‘to forge a new consensus to collectively address nuclear threats’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Ethiopia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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3 https://bit.ly/3mp5ur4
Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly Resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Gabon maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Gabon said: "There is a need for collective action to achieve disarmament, as well as the adoption of bilateral and multilateral agreements, such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons."1

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Gabon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

---

Guinea did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Guinea said that ‘no nation in the world can wage nuclear war and emerge victorious’, hence the need for all countries, ‘small or large, rich or poor’, to fight for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. ‘The survival of our planet greatly depends on it.’ Guinea also expressed regret at the ‘marked increase’ in investments in nuclear weapons.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Guinea is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Guinea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Guinea should bring into force its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

---

If Iran were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty’s prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties.

Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2022, Iran described itself ‘as a steadfast supporter of nuclear disarmament’ and ‘equally committed to nuclear non-proliferation’.1 However, it continued to increase its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, prompting concern and criticism from many members of the international community. As this report was going to print in March 2023, the IAEA had raised concern that Iran’s uranium enrichment might even have gone beyond 60% U-235.2

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Iran said that it is of the view that ‘the use of nuclear weapons anywhere, in any way and under any circumstances, is a grave violation of international law and a crime against humanity’.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Iran said: ‘The adoption of the TPNW was a right step in the right direction. It complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.’4

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Iran should return to implementation of its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- Iran should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Iran should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Iran should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

TPNW STATUS

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
- (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Of concern
- Test: Compatible
- Possess or stockpile: Compatible
- (b) Transfer: Compatible
- (c) Receive transfer or control: Compatible
- (d) Use: Compatible
- Threaten to use: Compatible
- (e) Assist, encourage, or induce: Compatible
- (f) Seek or receive assistance: Compatible
- (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: No (Signed 2003)
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: Yes (Civ)
- HEU stocks: 100-1000 kg
- Plutonium stocks: No

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2 http://bit.ly/3KRFcaC
4 http://bit.ly/3DcD
Iraq attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It has previously indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is still under consideration by the government. Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Iraq maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Arab Group in the UN, of which Iraq is a member, delivered a statement that described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty’s adoption in 2017.1

At the Tenth Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Iraq expressed concern about the ‘ongoing nuclear arms race’ and gaps in implementation of disarmament commitments and obligations. It called for ‘united efforts to overcome the impasse’ in advancing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Iraq said that it ‘believes that strengthening the universality of international agreements and instruments on disarmament, especially those on comprehensive nuclear disarmament, is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Iraq should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 http://bitly.ws/BdcX
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdd5
3 http://bitly.ws/Bddb
Jordan has indicated that it is studying the TPNW. It voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Jordan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Jordan pledged to ‘continue to advocate for a world free from all nuclear weapons’.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Arab Group in the UN, of which Jordan is a member, delivered a statement that described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty’s adoption in 2017.2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Jordan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdfln
2 http://bitly.ws/BdcX
Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Kenya said that the ‘rising nuclear rivalry’, ‘dangerous rhetoric by some nuclear-weapon states’, and the ‘increasing modernisation of nuclear weapons’ are undermining the NPT and our shared goals on nuclear disarmament.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Kenya urged ‘all nuclear-weapon states and the “nuclear umbrella states” to aim for new defence and security doctrines devoid of nuclear weapons’. ‘It remains our view that as long as nuclear weapons continue to be maintained anywhere, they constitute a clear and constant existential threat to humanity everywhere,’ it added.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Kenya reaffirmed ‘its longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Kenya should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bdg5
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdg9
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdgd
Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Kuwait maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Kuwait welcomed the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of its First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) in Vienna. It stressed that the TPNW, rather than contradicting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), is part of the process of fulfilling the NPT’s goals.¹

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Arab Group in the UN, of which Kuwait is a member, delivered a statement that described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty’s adoption in 2017.²

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Kuwait should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1. http://bitly.ws/BdgF
In December 2022, the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations informed the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor that the matter of accession to the TPNW is being discussed among ministries concerned in the capital.\(^1\)

Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Lebanon maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Lebanon warned: ‘The world is at risk of sliding into a nuclear war, and the use of nuclear weapons, by design or miscalculation, is higher than anytime before.’ It highlighted the recent entry into force of the TPNW as a sign of hope in otherwise dark times.\(^2\)

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Lebanon cited the TPNW as an example of members of the UN General Assembly showing ‘commitment and courage in leading the way toward achieving the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons’.\(^3\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Lebanon should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Lebanon should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

### TPNW STATUS

#### SIGNATURE

- **SIGNATURE**
- **DEPOSIT WITH UNSG**
- **ENTRY INTO FORCE**
- **DECLARATION**

#### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

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<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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#### TPNW voting and participation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted yes (2022)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2008)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2008)

#### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement                   | Yes             |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline                 | N/A             |
| Small Quantities Protocol              | Yes (Modified)  |
| Additional Protocol                    | No              |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No             |
| HEU stocks                             | No              |
| Plutonium stocks                       | No              |

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\(^1\) Email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from Mohammad-Ali Jardali, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN, 19 December 2022
\(^2\) http://bitly.ws/8dR
\(^3\) http://bitly.ws/8dW

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As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council, Liberia accepted a recommendation in 2021 to sign and ratify the TPNW.¹

Liberia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Liberia is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.²

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Liberia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): *Participated in 1MSP (2022)
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: No (Signed 1996, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2009)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 2016)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 2006)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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¹ Liberia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2022 but confirmed to ICAN that this was an error, and that it intended to vote yes, as in previous years. (Email from ICAN to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, 20 February 2023.
² http://bitly.ws/Bdih
It is believed that Mali’s government is considering accession to the TPNW. Mali did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2020, 2021, and 2022.

Mali maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2022, the Timbuktu Center for Strategic Studies on the Sahel, an ICAN partner organisation, convened a workshop in the Malian capital, Bamako, to promote Mali’s accession to the TPNW. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation participated.\(^1\)

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Mali is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.\(^2\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Mali should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1. http://bitly.ws/Bdwq
Mauritania attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Mauritania maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Mauritania noted that it was among the many states that supported the adoption of the TPNW in 2017. It hailed the Treaty as ‘an important and outstanding collective contribution to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons’.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mauritania should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

¹ http://bitly.ws/BdDi
It is believed that the question of whether Mauritius will adhere to the TPNW was still under consideration in the government in 2022. Mauritius voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW in the UN Diplomatic Meeting in 2017 and has consistently voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Mauritius maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Mauritius delivered a statement on behalf of the African Group in the UN, which recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna. The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.1

ICAN’s partner organisations met with the then Prime Minister of Mauritius, Pravind Kumar Jugnauth, on 27 August 2020 to discuss the TPNW.2 He noted the problem of the colonial administration of the Chagos Islands by the United Kingdom and Mauritius’ lack of control over this archipelago, which includes a US air base on Diego Garcia. This dispute over sovereignty of part of Mauritian territory would not prevent Mauritius from adhering to the TPNW, however. Without effective control of the Chagos Islands, Mauritius is precluded from being able to implement the TPNW across those territories. If it were to secure full sovereignty over the Chagos Islands, Mauritius would need to seek the removal of any unlawful weapons and prohibit any unlawful activities by any states not party to the TPNW on that territory.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Mauritius should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Mauritius should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: **Compatible**
- Test: **Compatible**
- Possess or stockpile: **Compatible**
- Transfer: **Compatible**
- Receive transfer or control: **Compatible**
- Use: **Compatible**
- Threaten to use: **Compatible**
- Assist, encourage, or induce: **Compatible**
- Seek or receive assistance: **Compatible**
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: **Compatible**

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): **Voted yes (2022)**
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): **No**
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): **N/A**
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): **Voted yes**
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): **Yes**
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): **Voted yes**

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFFZ: **Yes (Ratified 1996, Pelindaba)**
- Party to the NPT: **Yes (Ratified 1969)**
- Ratified the CTBT: **No**
- Party to the BWC: **Yes (Ratified 1972)**
- Party to the CWC: **Yes (Ratified 1993)**

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: **Yes**
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: **N/A**
- Small Quantities Protocol: **Yes (Modified)**
- Additional Protocol: **Yes**
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: **No**
- HEU stocks: **No**
- Plutonium stocks: **No**
Morocco attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. In a statement to the meeting, Morocco said: 'This is a moment to deepen our reflection, give impetus to the implementation of the Treaty, and engage in a constructive and frank dialogue with a view to building consensus to free the world from nuclear weapons.'

Morocco maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Morocco noted the ‘historic entry into force’ of the TPNW as a sign of progress towards a world without nuclear weapons, but underscored that this and other positive developments ‘do not hide the lack of tangible progress’ being made by nuclear-armed states towards disarmament.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Morocco said that ‘we should all undertake further efforts to ensure the prohibition of [nuclear] arms’. It highlighted its participation in the 1MSP, which it said ‘breath[ed] new life into dialogue’.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Morocco said that, given ‘the irreversible consequences of nuclear weapons on the environment and human lives’, all states must ‘move resolutely towards the complete prohibition of these weapons’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Morocco should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**: Voted yes (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022)**: Observer
- **1MSP delegation size (% women)**: 3 (33%)
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)**: Voted yes
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)**: Yes
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)**: Abstained

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- **Party to an NWFZ**: Yes (Ratified 2022, Pelindaba)
- **Party to the NPT**: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- **Ratified the CTBT**: Yes (Ratified 2000)
- **Party to the BWC**: Yes (Ratified 2002)
- **Party to the CWC**: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- **Safeguards agreement**: Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline**: N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol**: No (Rescinded 2007)
- **Additional Protocol**: Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants**: No
- **HEU stocks**: No
- **Plutonium stocks**: No

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1. http://bitly.ws/BdFC
As part of the Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council in 2021, Oman noted recommendations that it should sign and ratify the TPNW and stated that it would consider doing so. Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022. Oman maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Arab Group in the UN, of which Oman is a member, delivered a statement that described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty's adoption in 2017.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Oman should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Oman should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.

At a Pacific Roundtable hosted by New Zealand on 7 December 2021, Papua New Guinea stated that it hoped to become a state party to the TPNW soon. Approval by the National Executive Council and Parliament is pending.

Papua New Guinea voted in favour of the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Papua New Guinea maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Papua New Guinea is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of states Parties (1MSP).

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Papua New Guinea should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Papua New Guinea should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Papua New Guinea should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFWZ | Yes (Ratified 1985, Rarotonga) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1982) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1980) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

Qatar attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Qatar maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Qatar said: ‘The disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons on humanity and all life on our planet can only be avoided by completely and definitively banning their use.’\(^1\)

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Qatar said that the TPNW's adoption in 2017 and its entry into force in 2021 reflect the support of the international community for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.\(^2\)

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Qatar stressed ‘the importance of adhering to all agreements and treaties related to the disarmament of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction’.\(^3\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Qatar should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Qatar should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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**TPNW voting and participation**

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<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Observer</td>
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<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1989) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1997) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1997) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

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1. [http://bitly.ws/BfzJ](http://bitly.ws/BfzJ)
2. [http://bitly.ws/BfzN](http://bitly.ws/BfzN)
3. [http://bitly.ws/BfzR](http://bitly.ws/BfzR)
Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Moldova maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Moldova said that it ‘is fully committed to the disarmament agenda with [the] UN playing a central role in ensuring the universalisation and implementation of existing treaties’.1

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Moldova should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

1 http://bitly.ws/BfAn
In January 2022, the Association de Jeunes de Saint Charles Lwanga, in cooperation with the Commission Episcopale Justice et Paix, convened a workshop in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, with government officials and other stakeholders to discuss the TPNW. Following the meeting, the foreign ministry indicated that Rwanda would adhere to the Treaty in due course.

The Rwandan foreign ministry informed the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor in December 2022 that ‘No step to become a state party [to the TPNW] has been taken so far.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Rwanda is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Rwanda maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.


**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Rwanda should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1. http://bitly.ws/BfAA
2. Email to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor from Ambassador Guillaume Kavaruganda, 14 December 2022.
Government officials indicated in November 2021 that Senegal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of the Interior were engaged in consultations on the TPNW. In June 2022, Senegal attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna. It was also one of the co-sponsors for the 2022 UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.

Senegal maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Senegal welcomed the TPNW’s entry into force and the convening of its 1MSP. ‘This Treaty reinforces the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT and deserves the support of the entire international community,’ it said.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Senegal said that nuclear weapons ‘continue to place the world in the permanent threat of a nuclear catastrophe’. ‘To achieve the objective of nuclear disarmament,’ it added, ‘the states in possession of these arsenals must put an end to their modernisation.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Senegal should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 Communications from the Permanent Mission of Senegal to the UN to ICAN, 2 November 2021.
2 http://bitly.ws/BfCg
3 http://bitly.ws/BfCj
Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Solomon Islands maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In April 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade of the Solomon Islands convened a workshop, in partnership with ICAN, to consider accession to the TPNW. Participants included representatives from various government departments and agencies.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Solomon Islands is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Solomon Islands should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Solomon Islands should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
- Solomon Islands should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

TPNW STATUS

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TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1987, Rarotonga)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1981)
- Ratified the CTBT: No (Signed 1996)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1981)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2004)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Original)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/BdE3
Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. In 2021 and 2022, Somalia voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW. In the previous years, it had not cast a vote.

Somalia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Somalia is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Somalia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Somalia should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Somalia should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

TPNW STATUS

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Somalia

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce Compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Did not vote
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No (Signed 2006, Pelindaba)
Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1970)
Ratified the CTBT No
Party to the BWC No (Signed 1972)
Party to the CWC Yes (Acceded 2013)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement No
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks No
Plutonium stocks No

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in February 2020 that South Sudan supports the TPNW and the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons and intends to become a state party ‘in due course’.1

South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. In 2021, it voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW for the first time. In 2022, it did not cast a vote.

South Sudan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which South Sudan is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS
- South Sudan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- South Sudan should conclude and bring into force a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- South Sudan should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

1 Meeting between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Sudan and ICAN in Geneva, 27 February 2020.
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdih
Sri Lanka

The Cabinet of Ministers of Sri Lanka in December 2021 adopted a decision ‘to sign the [TPNW] and to initiate the applicable national legal formulation review with the objective of finalising the ratification process as soon as possible’.¹ No action was taken in 2022 in this regard.

Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Sri Lanka maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Sri Lanka said that the threat of nuclear weapons ‘is one of the most significant and pressing global challenges of our time’, and lamented the fact that nearly 13,000 such weapons exist in the world today, which it described as ‘the most destructive, inhumane, and indiscriminate weapons ever used’.²

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Sri Lanka said: ‘Pursuing non-proliferation while ignoring nuclear disarmament creates two clubs of “nuclear haves” and “nuclear have-nots” and therefore is not sustainable.’³

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Sri Lanka should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Sri Lanka should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Sri Lanka should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty (CTBT).

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¹ http://bitly.ws/BfED
² http://bitly.ws/BfEH
³ http://bitly.ws/BFEK
As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, Suriname supported a recommendation in March 2022 to become a state party to the TPNW.1 On 31 October 2022, Suriname upgraded its Original Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA to a Modified SQP.

Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Suriname maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Suriname said: ‘A world where citizens have to deal with the fear of annihilation by weapons of mass destruction should not be our reality … We have to keep in mind that the survival of humanity is at stake here, and therefore we must refrain from every act with respect to proliferation or even threat of use of these kinds of weapons.’

In a statement to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of which Suriname is a member, announced that all of its member states are now either states parties or signatories to the TPNW or ‘in the process of acceding to’ the Treaty.3 At the end of 2022, Suriname and the Bahamas were the only two non-signatory states in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Suriname should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Suriname should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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As of the most recent update:

- TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
  - (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compatible
  - Test: Compatible
  - Possess or stockpile: Compatible
  - (b) Transfer: Compatible
  - (c) Receive transfer or control: Compatible
  - (d) Use: Compatible
  - Threaten to use: Compatible
  - (e) Assist, encourage, or induce: Compatible
  - (f) Seek or receive assistance: Compatible
  - (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 1977, Tlatelolco)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1976)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2006)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1993)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1 http://bitly.ws/BgtC
2 http://bitly.ws/BgtK
3 http://bitly.ws/BfAN
Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Tunisia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Tunisia delivered a statement on behalf of the Arab Group in the UN, which described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty’s adoption in 2017.1

In November 2022, in accordance with its Article 12 obligation to promote universal adherence to the TPNW, Panama recommended that Tunisia become a state party to the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review.2

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Tunisia should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Tunisia should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compatible
- Test: Compatible
- Possess or stockpile: Compatible
- Transfer: Compatible
- Receive transfer or control: Compatible
- Use: Compatible
- Threaten to use: Compatible
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compatible
- Seek or receive assistance: Compatible
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted yes (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Voted yes
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2009, Pelindaba)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: No (Signed 2005)
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/BdcX
2 http://bitly.ws/BftW
It is believed that the issue of accession to the TPNW is under the consideration of the government of Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty. In 2021 and 2022 it was also one of the co-sponsors of the resolution.

Turkmenistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2022, Turkmenistan attended a meeting in Kazakhstan hosted by the foreign ministry to promote adherence to the TPNW. Kazakhstan emphasised the compatibility of the TPNW with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, to which all states in the region are parties.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Turkmenistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

¹ http://bitly.ws/BdfR

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | Yes (Ratified 2008, Semipalatinsk) |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1994) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1996) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |
In October 2021, a parliamentary motion urging the government to sign and ratify the TPNW was referred to Uganda’s Foreign Affairs Committee.1 The chairperson of the Committee, Norah Bigirwa, said in February 2022 that more time was needed to examine the Treaty: ‘The most critical ministries have not been dealt with and yet their input is very critical if we are to have a report on this matter,’ she said.2

Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Uganda maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the African Group in the UN, of which Uganda is a member, recalled the entry into force of the ‘landmark’ TPNW and reaffirmed its ‘full support’ for the declaration and action plan adopted at the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP). The African Group, moreover, urged ‘all members of the international community, especially nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called nuclear umbrella, to seize the opportunity to sign and ratify the Treaty at an early date and to pursue the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world’.3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Uganda should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

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1 https://bit.ly/3vwbZM1  
2 http://bitly.ws/BgQq  
3 http://bitly.ws/BgFd
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

The UAE maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the UAE said that it ‘supports all international efforts aimed at achieving our common goal of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction’. It stressed that ‘the most effective way to achieve further progress in addressing all aspects of disarmament and international security issues is through intensifying multilateral action, especially amid the declining commitment to the obligations of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime by states and escalating global challenges, including existing conflicts and the rising prices of food and energy’.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UAE should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

The United Arab Emirates

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire
(b) Test
(c) Possess or stockpile
(d) Transfer
(e) Receive transfer or control
(f) Use
(g) Threaten to use
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce
(i) Seek or receive assistance
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment

Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible
Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted yes (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) Yes
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1995)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2000)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 2008)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 2000)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No (Rescinded 2021)
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks No
Plutonium stocks No

¹ http://bitly.ws/Bgyc
Uzbekistan did not cast a vote on the adoption of the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW in 2019, 2020, and 2021.

Uzbekistan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2022, Uzbekistan attended a meeting in Kazakhstan hosted by the foreign ministry to promote adherence to the TPNW. Kazakhstan emphasised the compatibility of the TPNW with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, to which all states in the region are parties.¹

**RECOMMENDATIONS**
- Uzbekistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW.

1 http://bitly.ws/BdfR
Yemen attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. It voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017 and has consistently voted in favour of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Yemen maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Yemen welcomed the TPNW's adoption in 2017 and its entry into force in 2021, and described the convening of the 1MSP as a step towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Yemen should urgently adhere to the TPNW.
- Yemen should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol.
- Yemen should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

### TPNW voting and participation

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted yes (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Observer |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (0%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1986) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Signed 1996) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1979) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 2000) |

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Original) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

1 [http://bitly.ws/BgF5](http://bitly.ws/BgF5)
Argentina is the only Latin American state that has not yet signed the TPNW. In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, it said that it has ‘initiated an analysis and review process of the agreement that has not yet been completed’. In particular, it is assessing the impact of the TPNW on the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime.¹

Argentina maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Argentina delivered a statement on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, or CELAC, which described the TPNW as contributing to a pathway for the elimination of nuclear weapons in a verifiable, time-bound manner.²

More than two dozen deputies of the National Congress of Argentina signed an ICAN parliamentary pledge in 2022 to work for Argentina’s signature and ratification of the TPNW.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Argentina should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• Argentina should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
• Argentina should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW STATUS

SIGNATURE | DEPOSIT WITH UNSG | ENTRY INTO FORCE | DECLARATION
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Argentina

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
(b) Test Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile Compatible
(d) Transfer Compatible
(e) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(f) Use Compatible
(g) Threaten to use Compatible
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compatible
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Abstained (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

Party to an NWFZ Yes (Ratified 1994, Tlatelolco)
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1995)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1979)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol No
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Civ)
HEU stocks Cleared
Plutonium stocks No

2 https://bit.ly/3kDJx86
3 https://bit.ly/3mgsl9a
Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022. Armenian officials have indicated that the issue of adhering to the TPNW is not currently on the government’s political agenda.

Armenia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Armenia said that in the ‘current turbulent international environment the effective implementation and reinforcement of the disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms are of utmost importance’, and reiterated its ‘continuous support to the idea of the world free of nuclear weapons’.1

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Armenia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Armenia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Armenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Abstained (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Abstained

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1993)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2006)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1994)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1 https://bit.ly/3YbBHQH
In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Australia abstained from voting on the annual resolution calling upon all states to sign, ratify, or accede to the TPNW ‘at the earliest possible date’. From 2018 to 2021, it had voted against the resolution. This shift in position brought an end to five years of Australian opposition to the Treaty.

Ahead of the vote in the UN, the Australian government indicated that it is assessing its position on the TPNW ‘taking account of the need to ensure an effective verification and enforcement architecture, interaction of the Treaty with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and achieving universal support’. It added that it is engaging constructively with the Treaty.

The Australian Labor Party, which formed government in May 2022, adopted a resolution in 2018 committing it to sign and ratify the TPNW in government, after taking account of the above-mentioned factors. The resolution was moved by Anthony Albanese, who now serves as Prime Minister and has been a vocal supporter of the TPNW. Labor reaffirmed this position at its national conference in 2021.

Australia attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. A Labor parliamentarian headed the delegation. According to the Australian government, its decision to observe the 1MSP demonstrated ‘the constructive engagement with the Treaty during the current phase of assessment [of its position]’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Australia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
• Australia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• Australia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022. It may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In February 2022, Belarus approved a new national constitution that removed the country’s previously enshrined commitment to the absence of nuclear weapons from its territory. In June 2022, Belarus agreed with Russia that it would be involved in a nuclear sharing scheme with deployment of Russian dual-capable Iskander missiles to Belarus, conversion of Belarusian warplanes to nuclear-capable status, and training of Belarusian pilots. Deployment of nuclear warheads to Belarus has not taken place but analysts believe it could be an option. At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Belarus insisted that ‘any insinuations regarding a change in Belarus’ non-nuclear status, as well as its non-compliance with NPT obligations, are unfounded.’

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Belarus said that ‘Supporters of the international codification of norms aimed at a complete ban on nuclear weapons, who initiated the development of the [TPNW], no doubt were guided by a noble goal.’ but that it ‘is naïve to believe’ that significant shifts in nuclear disarmament will happen in the foreseeable future.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Belarus should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Belarus should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Belarus should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Belarus should bring into force its Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

2 https://bit.ly/3SPbmHh
3 https://bit.ly/3JdMLsr

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compatible
- Test: Compatible
- Possess or stockpile: Compatible
- Transfer: Compatible
- Receive transfer or control: Compatible
- Use: Compatible
- Threaten to use: Compatible
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Not compatible
- Seek or receive assistance: Not compatible
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Abstained (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Abstained

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1993)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2000)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1996)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: No (Signed 2005)
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: 100–1000 kg
- Plutonium stocks: No
Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Georgia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Lasha Darsalia, said that ‘a multilateral and treaty-based approach provides the best way to maintain and reinforce international peace and security’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Georgia said that it ‘has always been a staunch supporter and adherent to the international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Georgia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Georgia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW STATUS

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire  Compatible
(b) Test  Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile  Compatible
(d) Transfer  Compatible
(e) Use  Compatible
(f) Threaten to use  Compatible
(g) Assist, encourage, or induce  Compatible
(h) Seek or receive assistance  Compatible
(i) Allow stationing, installation, deployment  Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)  Abstained (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022)  No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women)  N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)  N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)  No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)  Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ  No
- Party to the NPT  Yes (Acceded 1994)
- Ratified the CTBT  Yes (Ratified 2002)
- Party to the BWC  Yes (Acceded 1996)
- Party to the CWC  Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement  Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline  N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol  No
- Additional Protocol  Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants  No
- HEU stocks  Cleared
- Plutonium stocks  No

1 https://bit.ly/3JhFEPE
2 https://bit.ly/3Zq4W3F
Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. The government has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Kyrgyzstan maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct. In February 2022, Kyrgyzstan attended a meeting in Kazakhstan hosted by the foreign ministry to promote adherence to the TPNW. Kazakhstan emphasised the compatibility of the TPNW with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, to which all states in the region are parties.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Kyrgyzstan said that ‘in the light of the rapidly changing world paradigm, the issue of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become more relevant than ever’.2 It also submitted to the Review Conference a working paper on the environmental consequences of uranium mining.3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022 Kyrgyzstan proposed the establishment of an international day for disarmament and non-proliferation awareness.4

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Kyrgyzstan should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Kyrgyzstan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Kyrgyzstan should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

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<td>HEU stocks</td>
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<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
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1 http://bitly.ws/BdfR
2 http://bitly.ws/Bdh2
3 http://bitly.ws/Bdh9
4 http://bitly.ws/Bdhf
The Marshall Islands attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. In announcing its decision to participate, the Marshall Islands said that it wanted ‘to see what concrete victim assistance provisions actually come forward by states parties and if they are at scale’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Marshall Islands said: ‘There are several nations and peoples in the world who have experienced nuclear weapons directly – and the Marshall Islands stands among them in close solidarity … Our own experience, history and current challenges to nuclear exposure are key drivers for urging progress in reducing – and ultimately eliminating – nuclear risk.’2

In October 2022, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution to address the Marshall Islands’ nuclear legacy.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Marshall Islands should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

• The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
(b) Test Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile Compatible
(d) Transfer Compatible
(e) Use Compatible
(f) Threaten to use Compatible
(g) Assist, encourage, or induce Not compatible
(h) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(i) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Abstained (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) Observer
1MSP delegation size (% women) 1 (0%)
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) Voted yes
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) Yes
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1995)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2009)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 2004)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 2004)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks No
Plutonium stocks No

2 http://bit.ly/BdCX
Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Thus, if Saudi Arabia were today a party to the TPNW, there would be issues of possible compliance related to the Treaty's prohibition on development of nuclear weapons, which would need to be addressed by a meeting of states parties.

Saudi Arabia possesses a sizable stockpile of mineable uranium ore; has announced an intention to build several nuclear reactors across the country; and possesses several types of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. While these factors do not necessarily indicate the country's interest in developing nuclear weapons at this time, Saudi Arabia's Small Quantities Protocol exempts the country from IAEA monitoring and inspections obligations, which increases ambiguity around the country's nuclear intentions and capabilities.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Saudi Arabia said that it 'gives special attention to acceding to all the treaties and agreements that would help to eliminate all forms of nuclear weapons, achieve peace and stability, and reduce the risks of wars where internationally forbidden weapons are used'.

Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017. After having voted in favour of the previous annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, Saudi Arabia abstained on the vote in 2021 and 2022.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Saudi Arabia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Saudi Arabia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Saudi Arabia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, and rescind its Small Quantities Protocol.
- Saudi Arabia should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

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<th>Of concern</th>
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<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
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TPNW voting and participation

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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
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<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
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Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1988) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1972) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1996) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Original) |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

1 http://bitly.ws/BfCd
Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Serbia maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Serbia encouraged all nuclear-weapon states ‘to find ways to jointly fulfil the obligations arising from Article VI of the [NPT]’. It added that it considers ‘possible threats to use nuclear weapons to resolve disputes between states to be unacceptable’.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Serbia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Serbia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Abstained (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1992)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2004)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 1992)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2000)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: Cleared
- Plutonium stocks: No

¹ http://bit.ly/BFCs
Singapore is the only South-East Asian state that has not yet signed the TPNW. It attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

Singapore maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Singapore said: ‘The humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons serve as a reminder for all states parties to uphold the NPT, in particular Article VI, to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons to mankind.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Singapore said that it has ‘a clear and consistent position’ on the TPNW, arguing that its ‘concerns were not fully addressed when the TPNW was adopted’ and that the Treaty ‘should not affect in any way the rights and obligations of states parties under other treaties and agreements’. Furthermore, Singapore encouraged ‘the international community to work towards finding a realistic and complementary role for the TPNW within the existing global nuclear disarmament architecture, of which the NPT remains the cornerstone’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Singapore should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Singapore should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1. [http://bitly.ws/BfCW](http://bitly.ws/BfCW)
2. [http://bitly.ws/BfD4](http://bitly.ws/BfD4)
Switzerland's highest executive authority, the Federal Council, intended to decide at the beginning of 2023 whether or not Switzerland will become a state party to the TPNW based on a report to be published by the federal administration.1 Switzerland attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 but has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022. It announced in June 2022 that the ‘new evaluation’ of the Swiss position on joining the TPNW would begin later in 2022, based on the outcomes of the 1MSP and the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August. ‘Regardless of the result of this new evaluation, Switzerland intends to continue to engage constructively with the TPNW,’ it said.2

At the NPT Review Conference, Switzerland noted the TPNW’s entry into force and posed the question ‘whether this new Treaty can find its place in the normative architecture built around the NPT, and whether efforts in this field can be complementary’. It further called on nuclear-armed states ‘to abandon the nuclear build-up and the parade of nuclear arsenals – to return to the path of arms control and disarmament.’3

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Switzerland highlighted the convening of the 1MSP and said that it would continue reassessing the Treaty ‘with due consideration of developments within the framework of the NPT and the TPNW’, as well as the ‘broader security context’.4

In November 2022, 34 prominent Swiss citizens, including former government officials, federal councillors, and presidents and vice-presidents of the International Committee of the Red Cross, criticised the government’s decision not to sign the TPNW to date as an ‘unjustifiable anomaly’ and called on it to become a signatory immediately.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Switzerland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1 http://bitly.ws/Bgu5
2 http://bitly.ws/Bgu7
3 http://bitly.ws/Bgu8
4 http://bitly.ws/Bgu6
5 http://bitly.ws/Bgu7
Syrian Arab Republic

Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. It has also never cast a vote on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW.

Syria maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, the Arab Group in the UN, of which Syria is a member, delivered a statement that described the TPNW as ‘a very important treaty’ and noted the active participation of Arab states in the work leading to the Treaty’s adoption in 2017.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Syria should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• Syria should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
• Syria should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
• Syria should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

- Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compatible
- Test: Compatible
- Possess or stockpile: Compatible
- Transfer: Compatible
- Receive transfer or control: Compatible
- Use: Compatible
- Threaten to use: Compatible
- Assist, encourage, or induce: Compatible
- Seek or receive assistance: Compatible
- Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Never voted
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): Did not vote
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): Yes
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT: No
- Party to the BWC: No (Signed 1972)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Acceded 2013)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Terminated)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: At least 1 kg
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/BdcX
Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Tajikistan maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

In February 2022, Tajikistan attended a meeting in Kazakhstan hosted by the foreign ministry to promote adherence to the TPNW. Kazakhstan emphasised the compatibility of the TPNW with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, to which all states in the region are parties.¹

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Tajikistan said that the elimination of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction ‘remains one of the most important issues of the modern world’ and called for the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tajikistan should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Tajikistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Abstained (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Did not vote |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: Yes (Ratified 2008, Semipalatinsk)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1995)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1998)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Acceded 2005)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Rescinded 2015)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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In September 2021, the government of Tonga said that the question of Tonga’s accession to the TPNW was being discussed ‘at the highest level’.1


Tonga maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Tonga is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Tonga should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Tonga should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Tonga should also adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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1 Communications from the government of Tonga to ICAN, 7 September 2021
2 http://bitly.ws/BdE3
Ukraine did not participate in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 and has consistently abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Ukraine maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without the need for a change in conduct.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Ukraine warned that, following Russia's invasion of its territory, 'the risk of nuclear war is now higher than it ever was since the Cold War’. ‘Today, the Russian Federation openly threatens with its ability to use nuclear weapons,’ it said. ‘The international community cannot simply turn the blind eye to this reckless rhetoric.’ Ukraine also noted its consistent support ‘for a total elimination of nuclear weapons' and ‘for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as a tool to achieve this goal’.

RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ukraine should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
(b) Test Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile Compatible
(d) Transfer Compatible
(e) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(f) Use Compatible
(g) Threaten to use Compatible
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce Compatible
(i) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Abstained (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1994)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 2001, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Ratified 1975)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1998)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks Cleared
Plutonium stocks No

Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

Albania may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Albania said: 'We remain committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, believing that in the current security context, a step-by-step approach to global nuclear disarmament is the right path to build trust and confidence.'... We all know that a nuclear war cannot be won, so it should never be fought. This is why we are deeply worried by the nuclear sabre-rattling on the possible use of nuclear weapons. They should be condemned, in the strongest terms. We must not allow those who want to push the world backwards.\footnote{https://bit.ly/3Y9zGoe}

An opinion poll commissioned by Pathways To Peace and published in March 2022 found that 98% of Albanians want their country to join the TPNW, with 90% believing that Albania should be among the first NATO members to do so.\footnote{https://bit.ly/3ldxbUh}

The former Albanian president Rexhep Meidani and former prime ministers Ylli Bufi and Fatos Nano were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to 'show courage and boldness' and join the TPNW.\footnote{https://bit.ly/3HzqQHZ}

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Albania should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Albania should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Albania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

### TPNW STATUS

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

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<tr>
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<th>Compatibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
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<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
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<td>(b) Transfer</td>
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<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(d) Use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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**TPNW voting and participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted no (2022)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1990) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2003) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1992) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1994) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

Belgium attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, but did not make a statement.

Belgium may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Belgium said: ‘We cannot be satisfied by the current pace of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon states need to undertake further action. No member of the NPT is exempt from the obligations under Article VI.’

Four former prime ministers and foreign ministers of Belgium (Willy Claes, Erik Derycke, Yves Leterme and Guy Verhofstadt) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Belgium should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Belgium should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Belgium should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Not compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**: Voted no (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022)**: Observer
- **1MSP delegation size (% women)**: 2 (50%)
- **Adoption of TPNW (7. July 2017)**: N/A
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)**: No
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)**: Voted no

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- **Party to an NWFZ**: No
- **Party to the NPT**: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- **Ratified the CTBT**: Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state)
- **Party to the BWC**: Yes (Ratified 1979)
- **Party to the CWC**: Yes (Ratified 1997)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | 100–1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | <50 kg |

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**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, but did not make a statement.

Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need to make changes in its conduct.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

### TPNW STATUS

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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

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<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
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<td>(b) Test</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Transfer</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Use of fissile material for nuclear weapons</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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<tr>
<td>(h) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW voting and participation

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**: Voted no (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022)**: Observer
- **1MSP delegation size (% women)**: 2 (50%)
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)**: N/A
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)**: No
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)**: Voted no

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- **Party to an NWFZ**: No
- **Party to the NPT**: Yes (Acceded 1994)
- **Ratified the CTBT**: Yes (Ratified 2006)
- **Party to the BWC**: Yes (Acceded 1994)
- **Party to the CWC**: Yes (Ratified 1997)

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- **Safeguards agreement**: Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline**: N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol**: No
- **Additional Protocol**: Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants**: No
- **HEU stocks**: No
- **Plutonium stocks**: No
Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Bulgaria may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Bulgaria said that it ‘is fully committed to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons’ and is ‘convinced that it can be attained only within the NPT framework, namely its Article VI, and through a progressive and comprehensive approach that takes into account security considerations’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Bulgaria said that the ‘nuclear threat is at its highest level since the Cold War’, adding: ‘The need for urgent progress on nuclear disarmament is more than evident.’2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Bulgaria should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Bulgaria should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Bulgaria should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1 https://bit.ly/3IHQc9m
2 https://bit.ly/3J2TGVa
Responding to a parliamentary petition urging the Canadian government ‘to break with NATO’s nuclear policy and immediately sign and commit to ratifying the TPNW’, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mélanie Joly, wrote in August 2022 that ‘Canada recognises that the entry into force of the [TPNW] reflects well-founded concerns about the unacceptable pace of nuclear disarmament – concerns that Canada very much shares.’

Canada may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Responding to criticism for Canada’s decision to not attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022 (unlike NATO member states Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway), Robert Oliphant, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said in October 2022: ‘We understand and appreciate the sentiment behind the TPNW, but I will reiterate tonight that Canada is not a state party to this Treaty, as several of its provisions are incompatible with our NATO commitments. NATO is a defensive alliance and, whether we like it or not, nuclear deterrence is currently a reality.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Canada should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Canada should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Canada should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1972)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | 1-10 tons |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

1 http://bit.ly/3KUzs14
China has the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, China said that it ‘endorses the purpose of the TPNW and understands the aspirations and demands of non-nuclear-weapon states to advance nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the nuclear disarmament process advocated in this resolution [on the TPNW] is divorced from the international security reality and runs counter to the principles of maintaining global strategic stability, undiminished security for all, and gradual nuclear disarmament … China cannot accept this.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- China should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- China should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- China should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

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Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Croatia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Croatia said: ‘We must do our utmost to uphold the UN Charter and the rules-based international order, while strengthening the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.’

The former Croatian foreign ministers Zdravko Mršić and Vesna Pusić were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Croatia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Croatia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Croatia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participant in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted no

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1992)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2001)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1993)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Czechia may sign and ratify or accede the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Czechia said that, despite grave international tensions, it ‘firmly believes in the power of multilateralism and international cooperation’. It described Russia’s ‘nuclear rhetoric’ since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as ‘irresponsible and deplorable’.1

Jan Kavan, a former Czech foreign minister and former president of the UN General Assembly, was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.1

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Czechia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
• Czechia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• Czechia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW STATUS

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TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire Compatible
Test Compatible
Possess or stockpile Compatible
(b) Transfer Compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control Compatible
(d) Use Compatible
Threaten to use Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance Compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
Party to an NWFZ No
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1993)
Rated the CTBT Yes (Ratified 1997)
Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 1993)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1996)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
Safeguards agreement Yes
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Yes
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
HEU stocks Cleared
Plutonium stocks No

2 https://bit.ly/2TwCsoP
North Korea has the world’s smallest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.


Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, said in September 2022: ‘By promulgating a law on a policy of the nuclear forces, our country’s status as a nuclear-weapons state has become irreversible.’ He described North Korea’s nuclear arsenal as ‘a deterrent and ultimate weapon’ that has been developed ‘to eliminate nuclear war and secure the country’s pride and safety’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, North Korea stated: ‘In order to realize the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, the United States, the first user of nuclear weapons and the biggest nuclear weapon state in the world, should take the lead in nuclear disarmament and refrain from provision of nuclear umbrella, sharing of nuclear weapons and transfer of nuclear technology’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- North Korea should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- North Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- North Korea should also return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

1 http://bit.ly/41HIFzS

TPNW STATUS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total inventory of warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retired warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stockpiled warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated yield (MT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-bomb equivalents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Not compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Not compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Did not vote |

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | No (1985-2003) |
| Ratified the CTBT | No (Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1987) |
| Party to the CWC | No |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Not implemented |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | No |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | Yes (Mil, Uncertain) |
| HEU stocks | 700 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | 40 kg (Mil) |
Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Denmark may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Denmark delivered a statement on behalf of the Nordic states. ‘In challenging times, it is more important than ever to safeguard the nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control architecture,’ they said.¹

On 25 June 2021, the Foreign Minister of Denmark, Jeppe Kofod, confirmed that there is no legal barrier to Denmark’s accession to the TPNW. However, it would breach NATO ‘solidarity’, he informed a parliamentary committee.²

Three former Danish foreign ministers (Mogens Lykketoft, Holger K. Nielsen and Kjeld Olesen) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.³

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Denmark should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Denmark should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Denmark should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

### TPNW STATUS

**DENMARK**

**SIGNATURE**

**DEPOSIT WITH UNSG**

**ENTRY INTO FORCE**

**DECLARATION**

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<tr>
<th><strong>TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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**TPNW voting and participation**

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**: Voted no (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022)**: No
- **1MSP delegation size (% women)**: N/A
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)**: N/A
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)**: No
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)**: Voted no

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- **Party to an NWFZ**: No
- **Party to the NPT**: Yes (Ratified 1969)
- **Ratified the CTBT**: Yes (Ratified 1998)
- **Party to the BWC**: Yes (Ratified 1973)
- **Party to the CWC**: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- **Safeguards agreement**: Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline**: N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol**: No
- **Additional Protocol**: Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants**: No
- **HEU stocks**: Cleared
- **Plutonium stocks**: No

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Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Estonia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Estonia said that it ‘is determined to contribute to global efforts to strengthen the international law and rules-based order and to the implementation of existing disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation instruments’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Estonia said that it ‘shares the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons and continues to advocate for the progressive approach, pursued in a realistic and responsible way’.2

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Estonia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Estonia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Estonia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

**TPNW STATUS**

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**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

- (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire: Compatible
- (b) Transfer: Compatible
- (c) Receive transfer or control: Compatible
- (d) Use: Compatible
- (e) Assist, encourage, or induce: Not compatible
- (f) Seek or receive assistance: Compatible
- (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment: Compatible

**TPNW voting and participation**

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted yes

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1992)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1999)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1993)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1999)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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1 https://bit.ly/3IHr8z7
Finland abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty until 2021, but changed to a no vote in 2022 after having applied for NATO membership and embraced the alliance’s nuclear doctrine.

In connection with Finland’s application to NATO in May 2022, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Finland issued a statement indicating that, as a NATO member, Finland would retain ‘its high profile in matters of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, without questioning the role of NATO’s nuclear deterrence’.  

Finland submitted a letter of intent to NATO in July 2022, declaring that it accepts ‘NATO’s approach to security and defence, including the essential role of nuclear weapons’ and that it is ‘willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions’.

Finland attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, but did not make a statement.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, it said: ‘Nuclear weapons pose a risk for every nation. A nuclear weapon detonation would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. It is in our common interest to reduce risks for any nuclear weapon use – intended or unintended.’

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Finland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Finland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Finland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): Observer
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): 3 (33%)
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Abstained

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1974)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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France has the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

The French President, Emmanuel Macron, issued a joint statement with his US counterpart, Joe Biden, in December 2022 in which they reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The Treaty does not, in their view, ‘reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.’1 Like the other nuclear-armed states, France did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Ahead of the 1MSP, 56 French parliamentarians argued that, by isolating itself from the dialogue at 1MSP, France would only weaken its denunciation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear posturing.2

At the French National Assembly in October 2022, a cross-party group of parliamentarians launched an inter-parliamentary network, or circle, ‘to initiate reflection on military nuclear issues and in particular on the TPNW’.3 It is the first initiative of its kind in a nuclear-armed state.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, France, in a joint statement with the UK and the US stated that ‘Progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda is only possible if we were to have an incremental, inclusive, consensus-based, multilateral process that takes into account the prevailing international security environment.’4

RECOMMENDATIONS

• France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
• France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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| 1 http://bit.ly/3ZwZAmJ | 3 http://bit.ly/3Ygkxl7 | [57x33]272 | [74x33]France has the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, issued a joint statement with his US counterpart, Joe Biden, in December 2022 in which they reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The Treaty does not, in their view, ‘reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture’.1 Like the other nuclear-armed states, France did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Ahead of the 1MSP, 56 French parliamentarians argued that, by isolating itself from the dialogue at 1MSP, France would only weaken its denunciation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear posturing.2

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RECOMMENDATIONS

• France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
• France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire
(b) Transfer
(c) Receive transfer or control
(d) Use
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce
(f) Seek or receive assistance
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) Voted no (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) No
1MSP delegation size (% women) N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) N/A
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

Party to an NWFZ No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
Party to the NPT Yes (Acceded 1992)
Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state)
Party to the BWC Yes (Acceded 1984)
Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

Safeguards agreement Voluntary offer
TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
Small Quantities Protocol No
Additional Protocol Partial
Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants Yes (Civ)
HEU stocks 2 tons (Mil)/5.4 tons (Civ)
Plutonium stocks 4.9 tons (Mil)/79.4 tons (Civ)

France has the world’s fourth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, issued a joint statement with his US counterpart, Joe Biden, in December 2022 in which they reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The Treaty does not, in their view, ‘reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture’.1 Like the other nuclear-armed states, France did not attend the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Ahead of the 1MSP, 56 French parliamentarians argued that, by isolating itself from the dialogue at 1MSP, France would only weaken its denunciation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear posturing.2

At the French National Assembly in October 2022, a cross-party group of parliamentarians launched an inter-parliamentary network, or circle, ‘to initiate reflection on military nuclear issues and in particular on the TPNW’.3 It is the first initiative of its kind in a nuclear-armed state.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, France, in a joint statement with the UK and the US stated that ‘Progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda is only possible if we were to have an incremental, inclusive, consensus-based, multilateral process that takes into account the prevailing international security environment.’4

RECOMMENDATIONS

• France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
• France should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• France should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
Germany attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022.

Germany may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant. At the 1MSP, the German delegation said that ‘Germany is committed to engaging in constructive dialogue and exploring opportunities for practical cooperation,’ noting that ‘supporters and sceptics of the TPNW can work shoulder to shoulder’ to make progress in reducing global nuclear stockpiles and preventing proliferation. It also said that as a NATO member, and ‘confronted with an openly aggressive Russia’, Germany could not accede to the TPNW, as this ‘would collide with our membership in NATO including nuclear deterrence’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annalena Baerbock, said that Germany participated in the 1MSP because it wanted ‘to improve dialogue and cooperate in addressing the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons – in the field of victim assistance or the remediation of areas contaminated by nuclear testing’. She also described Germany's participation in the 1MSP as part of ‘an effort to overcome polarisation – and give equal weight to the views of countries of the North and the South in the NPT community’.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Germany said that observing the 1MSP ‘did not and will not’ modify its legal position on the TPNW, which it does not deem ‘to be an appropriate framework to make tangible progress on nuclear disarmament.’3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Germany should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Germany should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Germany should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Greece may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In October 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Nikolas Dendias, elaborated on Greece's opposition to the TPNW, noting that its membership of NATO ‘gives rise to allied obligations, which our country takes into account in formulating its positions in this regard’.1 Dendias’ comments were in response to parliamentary questions submitted by the MeRA25 political party;2 whose secretary-general, Yanis Varoufakis, has expressed support for Greece's accession to the TPNW and has pledged to promote this goal.3

As part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, Greece declined to accept a recommendation in March 2022 to become a state party to the TPNW.4

The former Greek foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.5

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Greece should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Greece should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Greece should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1 https://bit.ly/3y7CQhI
3 https://bit.ly/3ZEnGMN
5 https://bit.ly/2TwCs0p
Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Hungary may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Hungary expressed regret that ‘due to the military conflict in Ukraine the risk of nuclear weapons being used is higher than ever at any time since the height of the Cold War, and the already challenging security environment has ‘deteriorated further’. It argued that ‘the current conditions are not conducive’ to nuclear disarmament, but this goal remains ‘as relevant as ever’. It called for redoubled efforts ‘to bring forward this noble cause by making tangible progress’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Hungary said that ‘there is no “fast track” in nuclear disarmament – only an incremental approach, consisting of gradual and concrete building blocks, can produce tangible results’.2

The former Hungarian defence minister Szekeres Imre was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Hungary should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Hungary should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Hungary should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1 https://bit.ly/3EF9Pq0
2 https://bit.ly/3y5tARb

**TPNW STATUS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TPNW voting and participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</th>
<th>Voted no (2022)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ No
- Party to the NPT Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the CWC Yes (Ratified 1972)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol No
- Additional Protocol Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants No
- HEU stocks Cleared
- Plutonium stocks No
Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Iceland may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant. In September 2022, a proposed resolution instructing the government to sign and ratify the TPNW was submitted to the Icelandic Parliament for the seventh time. It was debated and referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee.1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the Parliament that Iceland did not participate in the TPNW's negotiation in 2017 because, without the involvement of the nuclear-armed states, ‘it was foreseen that no success would be achieved’.2

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Iceland said that the urgent need to fulfil Article VI of the NPT ‘is seriously amplified by the threats of the Russian Federation to resort to nuclear weapons in its senseless war against Ukraine’. It called for a rekindling of the spirit seen in Reykjavik, the Icelandic capital, in 1986 when the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union met to discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Iceland said that the ‘precarious’ international security landscape has led ‘most states to the realisation that the global community needs to reinvigorate and recommit to the global disarmament and non-proliferation agenda’.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Iceland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Iceland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Iceland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

1  http://bit.ly/3Ze4SnK
India has the world's seventh largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

India has a longstanding and frequently referenced policy in favour of global nuclear disarmament, formulated in similar terms to those of the NPT nuclear-weapon states. In 2022, however, India continued to fail to comply with this policy and demonstrated that it does not have the will to purposefully pursue nuclear disarmament.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, India reiterated that the TPNW does not create any obligations for it and that the Treaty 'in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary international law,' but added that 'India stands ready to work with all countries to achieve our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.'

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- India should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- India should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- India should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

### Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total inventory of warheads</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired warheads</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated yield (MT)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-bomb equivalents</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Compatibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Transfer</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ThREATen to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted no (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>No (Annex 2 state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards agreement</td>
<td>Item-specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Partial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>Yes (Mil, Dual-Use)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>4.5 tons (Mil)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>8.8 tons (Mil)/400 kg (Civ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Israel has the world’s second smallest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Israel noted that it did not participate in the negotiation of the TPNW and has voted no on all UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, because it has ‘deep reservations’ regarding the Treaty ‘based on substantive as well as procedural considerations’. It also argued that the TPNW fails to give due regard to security and stability considerations. Furthermore, Israel outlined issues that stand in the way of Israel’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which included ‘significant gaps’ in the verification regime and the status of adherence and compliance in the Middle East region.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- Israel should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Israel should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Israel should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

¹ http://bit.ly/3F2s5kK
In May 2022, the Foreign Affairs Committee of Italy’s Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution committing the government to ‘continue to assess … possible measures to approach the contents of the TPNW’ and to consider participating in the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP), to be held the following month.\(^1\) However, Italy opted not to participate in the meeting.

Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Italy may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Italy said: ‘Even in the most trying time for the Treaty, we firmly believe that the solution lies not outside but within the Treaty, in the full implementation of its provisions.’\(^2\)

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Italy said: ‘The NPT provides the only realistic legal framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, in a manner that promotes international stability consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all. This goal can only be achieved through a gradual approach, by taking effective measures that involve all the stakeholders in a consensus-based perspective.’\(^3\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Italy should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Italy should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Italy should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Not compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | N/A |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | No |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- Party to an NWFZ | No |
- Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
- Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state) |
- Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1975) |
- Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1995) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | 100–1000 kg |
| Plutonium stocks | Stored abroad |

1 http://bitly.ws/Bde3
2 http://bitly.ws/Bde7
3 http://bitly.ws/Bde8
Japan opted not to attend as an observer at the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, generating expressions of anger and disappointment among atomic bomb survivors. The Japanese Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, defended the decision not to participate, arguing that Japan should promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a way that allows it to maintain ‘trust with the United States, Japan’s only defence ally’.1

Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolution on the Treaty, including in 2022. Japan may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida said: ‘As a Prime Minister from Hiroshima, I believe that we must take every realistic measure towards a world without nuclear weapons step by step, however difficult the path may be.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Japan submitted a draft annual resolution entitled ‘Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons’, which for the first time acknowledged the adoption, opening for signature and entry into force of the TPNW, as well as the convening of its 1MSP.3 However, Japan emphasised that it has ‘not changed its national position on the TPNW’, which it also described as ‘an important treaty that could be regarded as a final passage to a world without nuclear weapons’.4

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Japan should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Japan should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Japan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Latvia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Latvia called for ‘a progressive and practical approach to nuclear disarmament, accounting for security realities and strategic stability’, adding: ‘We firmly support a multilateral and treaty-based approach.’

Three former Latvian defence ministers (Tālavs Jundzis, Linda Mūrniece, and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis) were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Latvia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Latvia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Latvia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW STATUS

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Compatibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted no (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Acceded 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1996)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>Cleared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

Responding to a recommendation in September 2022 to ratify the TPNW as part of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review, Lithuania said that its ‘position of non-acceptance of the [TPNW] has not changed and will remain unchanged for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance’.1

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Lithuania said that it ‘supports [an] inclusive approach to nuclear disarmament where nuclear and non-nuclear states engage in meaningful steps towards creating the environment conducive for further nuclear disarmament negotiations’.2

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Lithuania reiterated its ‘strong commitment to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and called on all states to respect their obligations and commitments in this field’.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Lithuania should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Lithuania should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Lithuania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| (b) Test | Compatible |
| (c) Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (d) Transfer | Compatible |
| (e) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (f) Use | Compatible |
| (g) Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (h) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (i) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1991)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2000)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1998)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No (Rescinded 2022)
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

1 http://bitly.ws/BdiD
2 http://bitly.ws/BdiI
3 http://bitly.ws/BdiK
Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Luxembourg may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Luxembourg said that we must ‘continue our efforts to halt the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of nuclear arsenals and their delivery systems’ and ‘reverse the trend of undermining key instruments for arms control’. It added that it ‘is crucial to address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons’, and it is in the interest of us all to ‘stay the course towards a world without nuclear weapons’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Luxembourg should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Luxembourg should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Luxembourg should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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<tr>
<td>(g) Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TPNW voting and participation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted no (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1997)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Compliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. [http://bitly.ws/BdiS](http://bitly.ws/BdiS)
Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Micronesia has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Pacific Small Island Developing States, of which Micronesia is a member, delivered a joint statement which said: “We are gravely concerned about the serious shortfalls in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT although the nuclear weapon states have spent billions of dollars on modernizing and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. This amount could have been better spent on helping victims of past use and testing of nuclear weapons, fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 and on the sustainable development goals.” The statement also said that ‘Despite the unfortunate recent behavior, following the invasion of Ukraine, and hinting at their possible use, there is hope’, and noted the entry into force of the TPNW and the convening of the Treaty’s First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Micronesia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Micronesia should conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.
- Micronesia should also adhere to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

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TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

TPNW voting and participation

- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote): Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022): No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women): N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017): N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017): No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258): Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Acceded 1995)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 1997)
- Party to the BWC: No
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1999)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: Yes (Modified)
- Additional Protocol: No
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: No
- Plutonium stocks: No

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Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Monaco has a nuclear-weapons-free defence posture and maintains policies and practices that are compatible with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. It can therefore sign and ratify or accede to the Treaty without the need for a change in conduct.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Monaco should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Montenegro may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Montenegro said that it is ‘firmly convinced that a multilateral approach [to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation] provides the best way to maintain and reinforce international peace and security’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, it said: ‘The manifest erosion of international trust and cooperation, along with growing proliferation challenges, puts the disarmament architecture to a great test.’2

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Montenegro should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Montenegro should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Montenegro should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

### TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Receive transfer or control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW voting and participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ | No |
- Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 2006) |
- Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2006) |
- Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 2006) |
- Party to the CWC | Yes (Acceded 2006) |

### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement | Yes |
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
- Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
- Additional Protocol | Yes |
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
- HEU stocks | No |
- Plutonium stocks | No |

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1. [http://bitly.ws/BdFu](http://bitly.ws/BdFu)
2. [http://bitly.ws/BdFA](http://bitly.ws/BdFA)
The Netherlands attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022, after its parliament instructed the government to send a delegation. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

The Netherlands may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant. In a statement to the 1MSP, the Netherlands promised to ‘contribute to constructive dialogue’, but noted that it remains firmly committed to NATO’s ‘policy of nuclear deterrence and our nuclear task’ – that is, the hosting of US nuclear weapons on Dutch territory – and ‘does not have the intention to sign or accede to the TPNW’, which it views as ‘incompatible with our NATO obligations’.

In a report to the Dutch parliament in August 2022 on the outcomes of the 1MSP, the foreign ministry opined that ‘for the time being’ further participation by the Netherlands in TPNW meetings as an observer ‘is not useful’.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Thijs van der Plas, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, said that the world is currently neither at peace nor safe. ‘We need to create a safer world, free from the risk of nuclear warfare. Now more than ever.’ he said.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Netherlands should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.

- The Netherlands should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

- The Netherlands should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

- The Netherlands should upgrade to a Modified Small Quantities Protocol with the IAEA.

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prohibition</th>
<th>Compatibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Test</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Transfer</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Receive transfer or control</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Threaten to use</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted no (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>Voted no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Abstained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1995)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPNW Art 3(2) deadline</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
<td>Yes (Civ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>100–1000 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>Stored abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 http://bitly.ws/BfuS
2 http://bitly.ws/BfuV
3 http://bitly.ws/Bfv4
4 http://bitly.ws/Bfva
North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations in 2017, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. It has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the TPNW, including in 2022.

North Macedonia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, North Macedonia said that it shares ‘the concern at the risk of the use of nuclear weapons and the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences that will result from this, especially in the context of the Russian Federation’s aggression to Ukraine’.¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

• North Macedonia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
• North Macedonia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• North Macedonia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW voting and participation

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | No |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | N/A |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Did not vote |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Acceded 1995) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 2000) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Acceded 1996) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Acceded 1997) |

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | Yes (Modified) |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | No |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

¹ http://bitly.ws/BfwK
Attending as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) to the TPNW in Vienna in June 2022, Norway said: 'We seek a constructive dialogue between all states to advance nuclear disarmament and counter polarisation in this area.' However, it emphasised that its participation in the meeting was 'not a step towards signing nor ratifying the TPNW, which would be incompatible with our NATO obligations', adding that 'Norway stands fully behind NATO's nuclear posture'.

Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In June 2022, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, the most influential umbrella organisation of labour unions in Norway, resolved to work for Norway’s signature and ratification of the TPNW and for the integration of the TPNW into NATO’s disarmament strategy.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Norway noted that ‘great power rivalry is putting pressure on the multilateral disarmament architecture’ and that recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons ‘must continue to motivate us in seeking a path towards real disarmament’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Norway should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Norway should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Norway should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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1 [http://bitly.ws/BfwS](http://bitly.ws/BfwS)
2 [http://bitly.ws/BfwX](http://bitly.ws/BfwX)
3 [http://bitly.ws/BfwY](http://bitly.ws/BfwY)
Pakistan has the world’s sixth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Pakistan warned that the risk of nuclear war is higher today than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis. ‘The largest nuclear powers have failed to fulfil their disarmament obligations,’ it said.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Pakistan opined that the TPNW ‘fails to take on board our legitimate security concerns’, adding that it ‘does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations arising from this Treaty’ and asserting that the Treaty ‘neither forms a part of nor contributes to the development of customary international law in any manner’.2

Pakistan also said that it ‘remains firmly committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, achieved in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner’, and called for the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention.3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- Pakistan should pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Pakistan should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
- Pakistan should also adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

**TPNW STATUS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total inventory of warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiled warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated yield (MT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-bomb equivalents</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022</th>
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<td>(b) Transfer</td>
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<td>(f) Seek or receive assistance</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TPNW voting and participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<tbody>
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<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
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<td>Party to the NPT</td>
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<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
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<td>Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 [http://bitly.ws/Bfx8](http://bitly.ws/Bfx8)
2 [http://bitly.ws/Bfxf](http://bitly.ws/Bfxf)
3 [http://bitly.ws/Bfxv](http://bitly.ws/Bfxv)
Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Poland may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Poland said: ‘We cannot ignore today’s security realities. Despite recent, vocal claims by some, they do not produce true incentives for nuclear disarmament efforts.’

The former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, former prime minister Hanna Suchocka, and former foreign ministers Andrzej Olechowski and Dariusz Rosati were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS
- Poland should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Poland should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Poland should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

TPNW STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
<th>DEPOSIT WITH UNSG</th>
<th>ENTRY INTO FORCE</th>
<th>DECLARATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022
(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire  Compatible
(b) Test  Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile  Compatible
(d) Transfer  Compatible
(e) Receive transfer or control  Compatible
(f) Use  Compatible
(g) Threaten to use  Compatible
(h) Assist, encourage, or induce  Not compatible
(i) Seek or receive assistance  Compatible
(j) Allow stationing, installation, deployment  Compatible

TPNW voting and participation
- UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)  Voted no (2022)
- Participated in 1MSP (2022)  No
- 1MSP delegation size (% women)  N/A
- Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)  N/A
- Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)  No
- Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)  Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties
- Party to an NWFZ  No
- Party to the NPT  Yes (Ratified 1969)
- Ratified the CTBT  Yes (Ratified 1999, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC  Yes (Ratified 1973)
- Party to the CWC  Yes (Ratified 1995)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material
- Safeguards agreement  Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline  N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol  No
- Additional Protocol  Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants  No
- HEU stocks  Cleared
- Plutonium stocks  No

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Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Portugal may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Portugal said: ‘Peace and security is a goal shared by the international community at large. But nuclear-weapon states have a particular responsibility. Convergence among those states is crucial to tackle our challenges.’

The former Portuguese defence minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Portugal should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Portugal should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Portugal should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- Safeguards agreement: Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: No
- HEU stocks: Cleared
- Plutonium stocks: No

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South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

South Korea may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

North Korea’s continuing advancement of its ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear-weapons programme led to a resurgence of support in South Korea in 2022 for redeployment of US nuclear weapons in South Korea or even for the country to develop its own nuclear weapons. South Korea said that the ‘credibility and relevance of the NPT are being questioned’. It noted ‘dangerous and irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and threats to use nuclear weapons’, decreased transparency regarding nuclear stockpiles, and widening gaps in assessing progress in nuclear disarmament. At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, South Korea said that ‘The tall order to realise a world without nuclear weapons requires effective multilateralism,’ and ‘pragmatic and realistic approaches.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, South Korea said that it is ‘unbearably frustrating that the threat and possibility of use of nuclear weapons are looming larger than ever.’ It also said that ‘The tall order to realise a world without nuclear weapons requires effective multilateralism,’ and ‘pragmatic and realistic approaches.’

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- South Korea should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- South Korea should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- South Korea should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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2. [http://bitly.ws/BfAc](http://bitly.ws/BfAc)
3. [http://bitly.ws/BfAd](http://bitly.ws/BfAd)
4. [http://bitly.ws/BfAg](http://bitly.ws/BfAg)
Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Romania said that it "remains fully committed to a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the [NPT] and advocates a gradual and pragmatic process of nuclear disarmament, based on a step-by-step approach, ensuring undiminished security for all parties". It added: "Advancing towards this ultimate goal must take into account the global security environment, which has been further aggravated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine."  

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Romania should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Romania should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Romania should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, Russia used the threat of escalation to use of nuclear weapons to prevent NATO involvement in the war in Ukraine. It again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament, and remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

In August 2022, Russia blocked consensus for adoption of an outcome document at the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).¹

Russia, like the other nuclear-armed states, opted not to attend as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. Nevertheless, it issued a statement at the conclusion of the meeting criticising the outcomes. ‘In connection with the desire to put on a permanent basis the efforts to universalise the TPNW, as recorded in the final documents of the conference, we emphasise: Russia does not intend to join this agreement and believes that the Treaty does not establish any universal standards,’ said the statement.²

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- Russia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Russia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty's states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

### Nuclear Warhead Inventory at the Beginning of 2023

- Total inventory of warheads: 5,889
- Retired warheads: 1,400
- Stockpiled warheads: 4,489
- Estimated yield (MT): 978.6
- Hiroshima-bomb equivalents: 65,240

### TPNW Art. 1(1) Prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Compatibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possess or stockpile</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
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<td>Transfer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Threaten to use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist, encourage, or induce</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek or receive assistance</td>
<td>Not compatible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
<td>Compatible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Treaties

- Party to an NWFZ: No (4 of 5 NSA protocols)
- Party to the NPT: Yes (Ratified 1970)
- Ratified the CTBT: Yes (Ratified 2000, Annex 2 state)
- Party to the BWC: Yes (Ratified 1975)
- Party to the CWC: Yes (Ratified 1997)

### IAEA Safeguards and Fissile Material

- Safeguards agreement: Voluntary offer
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline: N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol: No
- Additional Protocol: Partial
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants: Yes (Civ)
- HEU stocks: 672 tons (Mil)/6 tons (Civ)
- Plutonium stocks: 128.8 tons (Mil)/63.3 tons (Civ)

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¹ [http://bitly.ws/BfAt](http://bitly.ws/BfAt)
² [http://bitly.ws/BfAu](http://bitly.ws/BfAu)
Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Slovakia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Slovakia said that it supports a ‘progressive step-by-step approach of mutually reinforcing legal measures and practical instruments to promote nuclear disarmament, which takes into account the prevailing security environment’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Slovakia said: ‘We need to make every effort to revitalise the disarmament and non-proliferation.’2

The former Slovakian foreign minister Juraj Schenk was among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.3

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Slovakia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Slovakia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Slovakia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

**TPNW voting and participation**

- **UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)**: Voted no (2022)
- **Participated in 1MSP (2022)**: No
- **1MSP delegation size (% women)**: N/A
- **Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)**: N/A
- **Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)**: No
- **Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)**: Voted no

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

- **Party to an NWFZ**: No
- **Party to the NPT**: Yes (Acceded 1993)
- **Ratified the CTBT**: Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state)
- **Party to the BWC**: Yes (Acceded 1993)
- **Party to the CWC**: Yes (Ratified 1995)

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

- **Safeguards agreement**: Yes
- **TPNW Art 3(2) deadline**: N/A
- **Small Quantities Protocol**: No
- **Additional Protocol**: Yes
- **Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants**: No
- **HEU stocks**: No
- **Plutonium stocks**: No

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2 http://bit.ly/2bfDd
Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Slovenia may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Slovenia said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its ‘unacceptable nuclear rhetoric’ had caused further damage to ‘an already eroded global nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control regime’. It argued that the present security challenges ‘call for a stronger, not weaker, application of international law, norms and institutions’.1

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Slovenia said: ‘The goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, as envisioned in Article VI of the [NPT], should continue to be a final objective.’2

The former Slovenian president Danilo Türk and former defence ministers Ljubica Jelušič and Alojz Krapež were among the signatories to an open letter in September 2020 calling on current leaders in umbrella states to ‘show courage and boldness’ and join the TPNW.3

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Slovenia should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Slovenia should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Slovenia should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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<tr>
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<td>SIGNATURE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire - Compatible
(b) Test - Compatible
(c) Possess or stockpile - Compatible
(d) Transfer - Compatible
(e) Use - Compatible
(f) Threaten to use - Compatible
(g) Assist, encourage, or induce - Not compatible
(h) Seek or receive assistance - Compatible
(i) Allow stationing, installation, deployment - Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) - Voted no (2022)
Participated in 1MSP (2022) - No
1MSP delegation size (% women) - N/A
Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) - No
Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) - No
Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) - Voted no

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

- Party to an NWFZ - No
- Party to the NPT - Yes (Acceded 1992)
- Ratified the CTBT - Yes (Ratified 1999)
- Party to the BWC - Yes (Ratified 1992)
- Party to the CWC - Yes (Ratified 1997)

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

- Safeguards agreement - Yes
- TPNW Art 3(2) deadline - N/A
- Small Quantities Protocol - No
- Additional Protocol - Yes
- Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants - No
- HEU stocks - Cleared
- Plutonium stocks - No

1 http://bit.ly/2FBDq
2 http://bit.ly/2FBDl
3 https://bit.ly/2TwCsO
Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Spain may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, the Deputy Minister of Foreign and Global Affairs of Spain, Angeles Moreno Bau, said: ‘The NPT is facing large-scale challenges and threats of the use of nuclear weapons for the first time in decades. This is posing grave risks to our security.’

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, Spain said that the ‘nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is facing one of its greatest crises in recent decades’, adding that ‘it is essential to move steadily towards nuclear disarmament, without shortcuts’.

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House of the Spanish Parliament adopted a resolution on 21 December 2020 which welcomed the TPNW ‘as an effort to move towards peace, security and disarmament’.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Spain should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Spain should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Spain should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference in 2017 and abstained on the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty until 2021, but changed to a no vote in 2022 after having applied for NATO membership and embraced the alliance’s nuclear doctrine.

Sweden submitted a letter of intent to NATO in July 2022, declaring that it accepts ‘NATO’s approach to security and defence, including the essential role of nuclear weapons’ and that it is ‘willing to commit forces and capabilities for the full range of Alliance missions.’

Sweden attended as an observer the First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW (1MSP) in Vienna in June 2022. In its statement to the 1MSP, Sweden outlined its concerns about the TPNW.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Sweden said: ‘Multilateralism remains our best chance to realise the objectives of the NPT, including our common goal of a world free from nuclear weapons.’

Sweden has launched the Stockholm Initiative, which is aimed at unlocking disarmament diplomacy through constructive engagement and a ‘stepping stones’ approach.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Sweden should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
- Sweden should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- Sweden should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

Sweden

PROSPECTIVE UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIGNATURE</th>
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</table>

**TPNW STATUS**

Sweden

PROSPECTIVE UMBRELLA STATE (NATO)

**TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022**

| (a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Compatible |
| Test | Compatible |
| Possess or stockpile | Compatible |
| (b) Transfer | Compatible |
| (c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible |
| (d) Use | Compatible |
| Threaten to use | Compatible |
| (e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible |
| (f) Seek or receive assistance | Compatible |
| (g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible |

**TPNW voting and participation**

| UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote) | Voted no (2022) |
| Participated in 1MSP (2022) | Observer |
| 1MSP delegation size (% women) | 3 (33%) |
| Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017) | Voted yes |
| Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017) | Yes |
| Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258) | Voted yes |

**Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties**

| Party to an NWFZ | No |
| Party to the NPT | Yes (Ratified 1970) |
| Ratified the CTBT | Yes (Ratified 1998, Annex 2 state) |
| Party to the BWC | Yes (Ratified 1976) |
| Party to the CWC | Yes (Ratified 1993) |

**IAEA safeguards and fissile material**

| Safeguards agreement | Yes |
| TPNW Art 3(2) deadline | N/A |
| Small Quantities Protocol | No |
| Additional Protocol | Yes |
| Enrichment facilities/reprocessing plants | No |
| HEU stocks | Cleared |
| Plutonium stocks | No |

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Türkiye boycotted the TPNW negotiations in 2017 and has consistently voted against the annual UN General Assembly resolutions on the Treaty, including in 2022.

Türkiye may sign and ratify or accede to the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.

At the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in August 2022, Türkiye said it was concerned by ‘the lack of progress in the implementation of the commitments undertaken during previous review conferences’. It also reiterated ‘that the threat of use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable’.1

Marking the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2022, Türkiye said that it was ‘extremely worried’ about the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the context of the war in Ukraine. ‘Every effort should be exerted in order to prevent such a scenario, which would cause a catastrophe on a massive scale.’ Türkiye also expressed support for ‘practical measures towards a world without nuclear weapons, step by step, however difficult the path may be’. It added: ‘This effort is closely related to the continuation of safeguarding humanity’s security and future.’2

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Türkiye should renounce the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, end the hosting of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, and ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its defence posture.
• Türkiye should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the NPT and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• Türkiye should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

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### TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

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<td>Allow stationing, installation, deployment</td>
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### TPNW voting and participation

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<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
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<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
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<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
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### Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
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<td>Party to the NPT</td>
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<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
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<td>Party to the BWC</td>
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<td>Party to the CWC</td>
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### IAEA safeguards and fissile material

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<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
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<td>Additional Protocol</td>
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<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>Cleared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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1. [http://bitly.ws/BgwQ](http://bitly.ws/BgwQ)
2. [http://bitly.ws/BgwW](http://bitly.ws/BgwW)
The United Kingdom has the world’s fifth largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October 2022, the United Kingdom, in a joint statement with France and the United States, stated that ‘Progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda is only possible if we were to have an incremental, inclusive, consensus-based, multilateral process that takes into account the prevailing international security environment.’

In January 2022, an early-day motion marking the first anniversary of the TPNW’s entry into force was tabled in the UK Parliament. It expressed regret ‘that the United Kingdom is neither a signatory of or a party to the Treaty’ and called on the UK government to ‘take urgent steps to comply with the provisions of the Treaty’.

In June 2022, the then First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon, reiterated her commitment to ensure that an independent Scotland would adhere to the TPNW, arguing that its possible membership of NATO should not serve as an impediment.

In March 2022, the Welsh Senedd passed a motion calling on all states to sign and ratify the TPNW.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
- The United Kingdom should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
- The United Kingdom should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.

1 http://bitly.ws/Bgyj
2 http://bitly.ws/Bgyn
3 http://bitly.ws/BgyU
4 http://bitly.ws/BgyZ
The United States has the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal. In 2022, it again demonstrated that it lacks the will purposefully to pursue nuclear disarmament. It remained unwilling to adhere to or engage constructively with the TPNW.

In its Nuclear Posture Review released in October 2022, the United States averred that it ‘actively pursues the goal of a world without nuclear weapons’ but ‘does not consider the [TPNW] to be an effective means to reach that goal’.¹ In the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in the same month, the United States, in a joint statement with France and the United Kingdom, stated that ‘Progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda is only possible if we were to have an incremental, inclusive, consensus-based, multilateral process that takes into account the prevailing international security environment.’²

The US President, Joe Biden, also issued a joint statement with his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, in December 2022 in which they reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The Treaty does not, in their view, ‘reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture’.³

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war.
• The United States should comply with its existing obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.
• The United States should urgently adhere to the TPNW. Until it is in a position to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable component in the global disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, work with the Treaty’s states parties on practical steps towards disarmament, and attend the meetings of states parties as an observer.
• The United States should also ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The United States of America

NUCLEAR-ARMED STATE (NATO)

TPNW STATUS

SIGNATURE

DEPOSIT WITH UNSG

ENTRY INTO FORCE

DECLARATION

Nuclear warhead inventory at the beginning of 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total inventory of warheads</td>
<td>5,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired warheads</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpiled warheads</td>
<td>3,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated yield (MT)</td>
<td>857.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima-bomb equivalents</td>
<td>57,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TPNW Art. 1(1) prohibitions: Compatibility in 2022

(a) Develop, produce, manufacture, acquire | Not compatible
(b) Transfer | Not compatible
(c) Receive transfer or control | Compatible
(d) Use | Compatible
(e) Assist, encourage, or induce | Not compatible
(f) Seek or receive assistance | Not compatible
(g) Allow stationing, installation, deployment | Compatible

TPNW voting and participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNGA resolution on TPNW (latest vote)</td>
<td>Voted no (2022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in 1MSP (2022)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1MSP delegation size (% women)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of TPNW (7 July 2017)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in TPNW negotiations (2017)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation mandate (A/RES/71/258)</td>
<td>Voted no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party to an NWFZ</td>
<td>No (1 of 5 NSA protocols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the NPT</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratified the CTBT</td>
<td>No (Signed 1996, Annex 2 state)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the BWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party to the CWC</td>
<td>Yes (Ratified 1997)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IAEA safeguards and fissile material

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Material</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEU stocks</td>
<td>483.4 tons (Mil)/16 tons (Civ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium stocks</td>
<td>79.8 tons (Mil)/8 tons (Civ)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ http://bitly.ws/Bgzf
² http://bitly.ws/Bgyj
³ http://bitly.ws/Bgzm
THE TEXT OF THE TPNW

TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances,

Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons,

Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation,

Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests,

Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples,

Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law,

Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment,

Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law,

Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources,

Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons,

Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security,

Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime,

Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament,

Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty,

Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha,

Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
PROHIBITIONS
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
   (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
   (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
   (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
   (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
   (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
   (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
   (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 2
DECLARATIONS
1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall:
   (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party;
   (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
   (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State.

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 3
SAFEGUARDS
1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a safeguards agreement in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled.

6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons-related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State
Parties to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

**ARTICLE 5**
**NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION**

1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty.

2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons on its territory under its jurisdiction or control.

**ARTICLE 6**
**VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION**

1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.

2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated.

3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

**ARTICLE 7**
**INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE**

1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty.

2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis.

6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

**ARTICLE 8**
**MEETING OF STATES PARTIES**

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including:

   (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;

   (b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty.

(c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply.

3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties.

4. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties.

5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

**ARTICLE 9**
**COSTS**

1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

**ARTICLE 10**
**AMENDMENTS**

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first.

2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties.
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

ARTICLE 11
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 12
UNIVERSALITY

Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

ARTICLE 13
SIGNATURE

This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

ARTICLE 14
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

ARTICLE 15
ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.

2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 16
RESERVATIONS

The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 17
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

ARTICLE 18
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER AGREEMENTS

The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 19
DEPOSITARY

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20
AUTHENTIC TEXTS

The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic.

DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen.
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1MSP</td>
<td>First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2MSP</td>
<td>Second Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBM</td>
<td>Air-launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALCM</td>
<td>Air-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APMBC</td>
<td>Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCM</td>
<td>Anti-ship cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASMPA</td>
<td>Air-Sol Moyenne Portée Améliorée (Improved medium-range air to surface missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-submarine weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEOBS</td>
<td>Conflict and Environment Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTO</td>
<td>Collective Security Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTBTO</td>
<td>Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLCM</td>
<td>Ground-launched cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>Highly enriched uranium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAN</td>
<td>International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILPI</td>
<td>International Law and Policy Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFCIRC</td>
<td>Information Circular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPFM</td>
<td>International Panel on Fissile Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCPOA</td>
<td>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kt</td>
<td>Kilotons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LACM</td>
<td>Land-attack cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lao People's Democratic Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRSO</td>
<td>Long-Range Standoff Weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>Medium-range ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>Megatons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPG</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTI</td>
<td>Nuclear Threat Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFZ</td>
<td>Nuclear-weapon-free zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPIR</td>
<td>Overhead Persistent Infra-Red</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Power 5 (the five permanent, and nuclear-armed, members of the United Nations Security Council: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pu</td>
<td>Plutonium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-air missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ShLBM</td>
<td>Ship-launched ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine-launched ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM</td>
<td>Submarine-launched cruise missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLCM-N</td>
<td>Sea-launched cruise missile – nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQP</td>
<td>Small Quantities Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>Short-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSB</td>
<td>Submersible ship, ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear-powered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSGN</td>
<td>Submersible ship, guided missile, nuclear-powered</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TNT</td>
<td>Trinitrotoluene</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPNW</td>
<td>Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wh</td>
<td>Warheads</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of mass destruction</td>
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